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The increasing importance of religious and moral issues in American politics 
makes salient once again the question of the relationship between religion and 
democracy.  The United States is in the midst of a debate pitting secularists and those 
who adapt their faith to progressive outlooks against conservatives who see a need to 
ground liberal-democracy in something Biblical.  Taking up this debate, I argue that the 
viewpoints of both secular progressives and religious conservatives suffer from key 
oversights.  While the former fail to notice that their commitment to toleration rests on 
certain absolute claims, the latter overlook the extent to which religion has been 
transformed and liberalized.  Seeking a more nuanced version of this debate, I compare 
 v 
the Enlightenment’s case for toleration to Tocqueville’s claim that democracy requires 
religion for moral support.  Examining Locke and Spinoza, I argue that the 
Enlightenment sought to achieve freedom, prosperity, and a rich cultural and intellectual 
life through the weakening or liberalization of religious belief.  I then turn to 
Tocqueville’s friendly critique of the Enlightenment and try to elucidate his solution for 
preserving, in times of liberalism and equality, the great human devotions which he saw 
as inextricably linked to religion.  I conclude that that by describing a civil religion 
capacious enough to permit tolerance but substantive enough to encourage real devotion, 
Tocqueville gives us a kind of moderate politics seldom found in today’s debates. 
 vi 
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Chapter 1:  Religion, Democracy, and the Collapse of Enlightenment 
Rationalism 
 
“The philosophers of the eighteenth century explained the gradual weakening of beliefs 
in an altogether simple fashion.  Religious zeal, they said, will be extinguished as 
freedom and enlightenment increase.  It is unfortunate that the facts do not accord with 
this theory.” 
-Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 282.1 
 
 Tocqueville’s words from 1835 may now strike us as though they could have 
been uttered by an observer of the contemporary political scene.  In our own day as in 
Tocqueville’s, some of the most influential schools of thought have often considered 
religion, at least as a politically influential force, as something which the assorted powers 
of modernity are all but certain to sweep away.2  As recent events would seem to testify, 
however, religion itself has been showing signs of refusing to cooperate with these plans.  
More than a century and a half after Tocqueville wrote, the political importance of God 
has returned to the attention of Americans.  The attacks of September 11th, the rise of 
various kinds of fundamentalism around the world, the increasing strength put on display 
by religious voters in recent US elections, and the renewed attention given to issues of 
morality, values, and church-state relations in state legislatures and before the Supreme 
Court, all seem to indicate at the very least that religion has refused to be gently placed 
into a quiet grave.  Liberalism and modernity, it appears, have not been entirely 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America throughout this 
dissertation are from Tocqueville 2000.   
2 For a lucid and helpful examination of some of these trends as applied to political science, see Wald and 
Wilcox (2006). 
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successful in marginalizing religious concerns, and it looks as though the relationship 
between democracy and faith will remain a crucial issue for some time to come. 
Even as liberalism today enjoys unprecedented political strength, it has begun to 
confront a new set of challenges rooted in a revival of religious feeling.  The rise of 
various fundamentalist movements outside the West has appeared to many observers as a 
sign of increasing discontent with liberalism’s secular and rationalist roots,3 but more 
alarming is the way in which more restrained and nuanced versions of those same 
objections have found a friendly hearing within the very heart of the democratic world 
itself.  In the United States, where rates of church attendance and belief in God remain 
high, a dissatisfaction on the Right with the perceived dominance of a purely secular 
version of liberalism has given religion a political role which is perhaps new in American 
history.4  Recent attempts in American politics to place greater emphasis on moral 
issues—to ban same sex marriage, to restrict abortion, to promote school prayer, and to 
teach ‘intelligent design’—all seem intended to fill a perceived spiritual void in a society 
which, in the opinion of many, has left God behind.  At the same time, however, an equal 
and opposite reaction on the Left has engendered vociferous opposition to precisely these 
sentiments, and the resulting battles which have occurred over the last several decades 
have left indelible marks on the current political climate. 
                                                
3 Kepel (1994), for example, has argued that what drives these reactionary movements—which are by no 
means limited to the Islamic world—is not primarily an allegiance to tradition but an opposition to the 
commercial way of life of the liberal West as something licentious and corrupting. 
4 For the argument that America is experiencing a Fourth Great Awakening, see Fogel 2000.  Himmelfarb 
(1999) argues that the politicized religious feeling which is present in the United States today is rooted in a 
sense, unprecedented in American history, that religion is under siege from a secular culture which is 
gradually threatening to eclipse it. 
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What is perhaps most significant and troubling about this kind of political conflict 
is that, by giving renewed importance to some very old questions, it has raised issues 
which strike at the heart of liberalism’s original theoretical foundations.  Contemporary 
liberal-democracy, a regime characterized by religious toleration, freedom of speech and 
thought, and a commitment to human rights and economic growth, is the ultimate result 
of an Enlightenment project which attempted to subvert and replace a previous political 
order characterized by widespread religious belief.  The construction of the modern 
nation-state which could provide security for its citizens, the creation of a free-market 
economy which could make people more comfortable and raise the overall standard of 
living, the progress of modern science and the development of technology, and the 
establishment of a political order characterized by limited government, toleration, and 
individual freedom, were all supposed to free human beings from the kind of religious 
passions that tore Europe apart in the seventeenth century.  At the present time, however, 
Enlightenment rationalism is roundly rejected across the political spectrum.  On the 
Right, friendly critics of liberalism have begun to question whether the great material 
achievements of modern civilization have not been accompanied by a profound 
intellectual, spiritual, and moral void, and they have forcefully argued that, as a remedy, 
it is now necessary to place some version of Biblical faith at the center of modern 
politics.  On the Left, on the other hand, leading authors who remain similarly loyal to 
our regime have embraced the radically skeptical outlook known as anti-foundationalism.  
Rejecting all claims to truth as at best groundless and at worst as masks for power, 
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postmodern thinkers have attacked the Enlightenment’s assertions about reason and 
human nature as both untenable and politically suspect.5  
The debate between these two camps appears to suggest that democracy’s current 
position of unprecedented political strength may hide a disturbing theoretical weakness, 
for while there is a broad consensus in the West that liberalism is desirable, there is 
almost no agreement as to why.6  The current political climate seems to be made up of 
two competing versions of liberalism, both of which seek to remain loyal to what the 
Enlightenment created all the while rejecting the original theoretical arguments which it 
used to justify that creation.  The contest between them therefore compels us to confront 
the key question of how—if at all—modern democracy can be reconceived if its original 
basis is jettisoned or altered.  How can religious revivalists on the Right remain loyal to 
liberalism while attacking its underlying thought as productive of a spiritual and 
intellectual decline, and how can they expect to re-constitute it around the Bible—a book 
whose friendliness to liberal-democracy is at least open to question?  And how can anti-
foundationalists on the Left remain so moralistic about the likes of equality and human 
rights while simultaneously asserting that liberalism cannot ground itself in anything 
other than prevailing cultural sentiments?  
To appreciate the depth of the problem that faces us, it will be helpful to begin 
with an examination of the troubling problems that have arisen in the wake of the 
apparent collapse of modern rationalism.  In this chapter and the next, I attempt to 
                                                
5 See the accounts in Ceaser 2006 and Owen 2001, both of which are discussed below. 
6 This issue is not trivial, for the long-term health of any regime requires not just common agreement but 
also the kind of internal self-confidence which can move citizens to a zealous defense of their country. 
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analyze the two most prominent visions of post-Enlightenment liberalism, beginning with 
their popular manifestations.  I briefly survey some of the key electoral and demographic 
divisions over religious questions which have arisen in America over the past several 
decades, and I argue that the stark electoral cleavage between secular progressives and 
religious conservatives should actually be regarded as a deeper disagreement about the 
meaning and the foundations of liberal-democracy.  Having embraced postmodern 
historicism, the progressive Left seeks to preserve liberal tolerance without linking it to 
the Enlightenment’s claims about reason or human nature.  The religious Right, on the 
other hand, faults the Enlightenment’s hedonistic materialism for creating a society in 
which moral virtue, civic dedication, and intellectual greatness are increasingly becoming 
absent, and it looks for a popular religious revival to provide the moral restraints which it 
believes are needed in order to safeguard liberal-democratic freedom and protect an 
imperiled high culture.  Even as they come to sight at the level of common arguments and 
popular polemics, however, these competing versions of liberalism each seem to be 
plagued by key problems and tensions.  For while the postmodern Left fails to notice the 
extent of its own deep-seated moral attachment to democratic principles and is thus not as 
free from absolutism as it supposes, the religious Right appears similarly unaware of the 
degree to which religion today has been shaped by the same liberal outlook which it 
regards as inherently unstable.   
To gain a greater appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments 
of both sides in this debate, and to judge whether the tensions which I begin to outline in 
chapter one are insuperable, I turn in chapter two to an examination of some 
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contemporary thinkers who have tried to present these competing versions of liberalism 
in theoretically consistent forms.  Looking first at the work of Peter Augustine Lawler, 
Richard John Neuhaus, and Robert P. Kraynak, I explain the religious Right’s criticism of 
the Enlightenment, which centers around the claim that liberalism’s originators accepted 
an atheistic, materialistic, and relativistic view of human nature, and that they 
furthermore sought to spread that view to the general public.  These conservative thinkers 
therefore fault the Enlightenment for engineering a society in which moral restraints are 
largely absent, in which human beings no longer experience the pull of devotion to 
country, family, or community, and, moreover, in which great intellectual and spiritual 
achievements have become increasingly rare.  And yet, there is also a tendency among 
some of these thinkers to look to Christianity in an effort to discover supports for exactly 
those liberal principles which they also profess to find so troubling, and so, as I will 
argue, their writings may owe more than they suspect to the moral and theological 
reforms which the Enlightenment carried out.  After this, in the second half of chapter 
two, I will turn to a brief examination of what may well be the most far-reaching attempt 
to re-conceive of liberal-democracy on postmodern premises: John Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism.  Rawls attempts to design the blueprints for a polity which rests on no 
philosophical foundations, which therefore includes numerous incommensurable 
worldviews, but in which key liberal freedoms nevertheless remain secure.  From his 
account, however, it is not quite clear whether the disagreement that characterizes liberal 
politics is really as deep as he supposes, and I close this chapter by arguing that his work 
contains deep tensions because it fails sufficiently to acknowledge that today’s 
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democracies are characterized by a deep-seated moral uniformity—a uniformity which he 
himself is often forced to acknowledge and which he at one point explicitly associates 
with the thought of John Locke.  
These spokesmen for both the Left and the Right, I therefore argue, display a 
common tendency to remain deeply attached to the Enlightenment even while criticizing 
it.  Taken together, their failures reveal the need we face to articulate a substantive 
defense of liberal principles, and I therefore turn in chapters 3 and 4 to an examination of 
those theological and cultural foundations for liberalism which the Enlightenment sought 
to lay.  In chapter 3, I examine the way in which Locke anchored his teaching about 
toleration in a new, “reasonable” version of Christianity—a version of Christianity which 
de-emphasized the New Testament’s teaching on justification by faith as well as Jesus’ 
calls for acts of extreme self-abnegation.  By effectively removing from the Bible those 
all-demanding and self-sacrificial virtues which he saw as linked to persecution and 
intolerance, Locke sought to bring Christianity more into line with the rational pursuit of 
temporal happiness.  His revised New Testament therefore serves as a source for social 
harmony by promulgating a universal ethic about charity and good works, and, in his 
analysis, it can provide an effective civil religion for a liberal polity precisely because its 
teaching about rewards and punishments in another life is meant to appeal not primarily 
to an instinct for devotion or self-overcoming, but instead to the inescapable desire for 
the pursuit of happiness which all human beings feel. 
But the fact that Locke believes it necessary for philosophy or political science to 
endorse a civil religion, and thus also to lend its support to claims of revelation, opens his 
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thought up, ironically, to the same criticism which is currently leveled against the 
Enlightenment by today’s religious revivalists.  For by doing this, Locke’s philosophy 
acts as the servant of society, and this same tendency also leads it to transform itself into 
the modern, technologically driven scientific enterprise which, far from making any 
claim to possess an exalted status or to represent the summum bonum, aims instead to 
foster the widespread increase of material well-being.  But, as I argue in chapter four, the 
recognition of this problem does not necessarily require a return to orthodoxy.  In fact, 
Spinoza’s version of liberalism is noteworthy because it refuses to compromise 
philosophy’s claim of dignity, and it promises to lay the basis for a spiritually and 
culturally rich democratic society which will not only allow the most outstanding 
intellects to flourish, but which will also be marked by a rich communal life and a robust 
and spirited dedication to the common good on the part of the citizenry.  And yet, 
Spinoza goes much farther than Locke not only in seeking to undermine orthodox 
Christianity, but also in cultivating a self-absorbed, self-interested, and this-worldly ethic 
that looks down upon the Bible’s devotional moral teaching as the relic of a backward 
and primitive age.    
As I turn in chapter five to an analysis of Tocqueville, this question of devotion, 
and of the hopes for another world with which it is so frequently linked, becomes the 
theme of the dissertation.  For Tocqueville, as I argue, found in America something that 
closely resembles the kind of self-interested and this-worldly version of Christianity 
which Locke sought to propagate, and he saw beneath the surface of that liberal piety a 
latent radicalism which was likely eventually to move in a secular, Spinozistic direction.  
 9 
Observing the political life of a society whose religious and cultural outlook had been 
decisively shaped by the triumph of Enlightenment rationalism, Tocqueville came away 
deeply troubled by the tendency of that rationalism, as he put it, to do “a sort of moral 
violence” to human nature.  Indeed, many of the pathologies and the dangers to 
democracy which he famously diagnosed are the products, as I will argue, of modernity’s 
failure to carve out a place for the devotional longings which human beings feel, and 
which incline them not just to hope for another life, but to hope to deserve immortality by 
engaging in acts of self-overcoming or self-sacrifice.  Because of this, according to 
Tocqueville, religion is much more deeply rooted in human nature than Locke or Spinoza 
acknowledge, and his political science seeks to make use of it in order to channel these 
longings in a healthy direction and to prevent them from taking on new forms which may 
yet threaten to bring about the eradication of both political freedom and what he calls 
“human greatness.”  By attempting to re-instill democracy with a spiritual aim and 
purpose, but one which also recognizes and seeks to preserve the very substantive goods 
which it can offer, Tocqueville, I conclude, articulates a new moral basis for liberalism—
a civil religion which is capacious enough to permit tolerance but substantive enough to 
encourage real devotion.  In so doing, he rises above the partisan fray of his time and our 





Although social scientists have traditionally tended to focus on material factors 
when explaining the roots of key political disagreements, 7 students of contemporary 
politics have recently begun to take note of the increasing salience of a new set of 
religious and cultural cleavages.  The disparity between Americans and Europeans as 
regards rates of church attendance and religious belief is by now a well-told story,8 and 
over the past decade both journalists and political scientists have spoken with increasing 
frequency about an American polity which is becoming more and more polarized along 
“partisan, geographic, and cultural lines” (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005, 1).  Election 
analyst Michael Barone, for example, has written that the “demographic factor most 
highly correlated with voting behavior in 2000 and 2004 was religion, or depth of 
religious belief,”9 and political scientists Alan Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders 
similarly conclude that the divide on the electoral map between “red states” and “blue 
states” really does reflect a deepening cleavage between the secular, progressive, and 
                                                
7 Wald and Wilcox rather bluntly—if hyperbolically—note that apart “from economics and geography, it is 
hard to find a social science that has given less attention to religion than political science.”  They attribute 
this trend largely to the field’s tendency, perhaps reflecting the realities of much of twentieth century 
politics, either to perceive “class as the ‘real’ underlying force in electoral behavior” or to regard “religious 
forces” as “epiphenomenal, fossilized remnants of an ancien regime” (Wald and Wilcox 2006, 525).  Of 
course, there are a large number of exceptions to this, many of which will be discussed below. 
8 According to the World Values Survey, 60% of French and 55% of Britons say that they “never” or 
“practically never” attend church.  By contrast, 45% of Americans say that they go at least once a week and 
60% once a month.  94% claim to believe in God, 75% believe in life after death, and 71% believe in Hell.  
38% of Americans either agree or agree strongly that atheists are unfit for public office, compared to only 
7% of Belgians, 9% of French, and 2% of Dutch (Source: World Values Survey, 1999-2002, 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org.). 
9 Barone 2008.  Barone’s prediction that this would change in 2008 was of course to some extent borne out, 
although it should also be noted that Obama’s easy victory was accompanied by the successful passage of a 
same-sex marriage ban in California, one of the bluest of blue states and one which he carried with 61 
percent of the vote.  For an analysis of possible shifts in the cultural landscape during the 2008 election, see 
White 2009. 
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urban coasts, and the more religious and traditionalist ‘Middle America.’  Even though, 
according to these authors, most Americans  “are moderates, or perhaps more accurately, 
[are] inconsistent in their political views” (4),10 about a quarter of the overall electorate 
nonetheless consists of active partisans who have drifted farther apart politically (6) and 
become more loyal to one party (9) and more geographically concentrated over time (11).  
While more states are thus becoming ‘safe’ for one party or the other, in 2004 “the largest 
differences between red state voters and blue state voters” were about religion: 
“Compared with blue state voters, red state voters were much more likely to be 
Protestant, to consider themselves born-again or evangelical Christians, and to attend 
religious services at least once per week.” (12).   
 The most salient division in American politics today, Abramowitz and Saunders 
conclude, is “between religious and secular voters.”  “There is a large group of voters 
who report that they attend religious services at least once per week; there is an equally 
large group who report that they seldom or never attend religious services” (12).  In 2004, 
religion was the greatest predictor of the positions which voters took even on issues (such 
those involving foreign policy) which would seem little connected to matters of faith.  
White voters who reported attending religious services at least once a week were 
(predictably) more likely than those who did not to oppose abortion and gay marriage, 
but they were also substantially more likely to support the Iraq War, to approve of 
President Bush’s job performance, to identify themselves as conservative, as Republican, 
                                                
10 All references over the next two paragraphs come from Abramowitz and Saunders 2005. 
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and to vote for Bush (14-15).11  Among whites, religious identification and church 
attendance had more of an influence on voting behavior “than any other social 
characteristic including income, education, gender, marital status, and union 
membership” (15).  Thus, Abramowitz and Sanders conclude, “The religious divide is 
now much deeper than the class divide in American politics” (16). 
But even if it is the case that the American public is partitioning itself into ever 
more deeply entrenched cultural camps, it would still appear somewhat oversimplified to 
say that this division merely pits the religious against the secular.  As Galston and Nivola 
point out, millions “of Protestants, ‘modernist’ evangelicals, Vatican II Catholics, and 
non-Orthodox Jews regularly vote Democratic,” and in 2004 Bush and Kerry “split the 
mainline Protestant vote precisely down the middle” (Nivola and Brady 2006, 23).  Self-
identified secularists are now a core base of the Democratic party (ibid.) but they still 
only constitute around fifteen percent of the public.  According to John C. Green, it is 
more useful to understand the electorate’s political divisions by noting their correlation 
with a set of prior theological cleavages.  Green’s analysis of the 2004 National Survey of 
Religion and Politics takes the unusual step of classifying religious groups according to 
their degree of orthodoxy and their attitude towards modernity.  He divides America’s 
three main religious denominations into subgroups (which he terms Traditionalist, 
Centrist, and Modernist)12 according to the their levels of religious engagement, the 
orthodoxy of their beliefs and practices, and their “desire to preserve such traditional 
                                                
11 There was at least a 19 percent difference in each of these categories. 
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beliefs and practices in a changing world” (Green 2004, 4).13  According to Green, what 
is now most likely to influence one’s political views is not whether one is loyal to this or 
that religious tradition but instead whether one is loyal to tradition as such.  In his survey, 
more orthodox members of all faiths tended to identify themselves as conservative and as 
Republican, while modernists, along with self-described atheists and agnostics, 
overwhelmingly described themselves as liberal and as Democratic (ibid., 3, 52-3).  On 
the whole, traditionalists were more likely not only to oppose abortion and same-sex 
marriage (ibid., 39-40, 45), but also to take conservative positions on non-social issues 
such as those relating to economic and foreign policy (ibid., 20-1, 30-1).  On the other 
hand, modernists from all denominations were likely to take liberal positions on all kinds 
of political questions, with self-described secularists, atheists, and agnostics sitting 
furthest to the Left (ibid., 3, 20, 31, 40, 45). 
Green’s analysis begins to describe the political importance and perhaps the 
culmination of a sociological trend that has been growing over the past two decades.  As 
E.J. Dionne Jr. notes, religious fault-lines which formerly ran between denominations 
now run across them.14  Liberal Catholics, Protestants, and Jews now ally themselves 
together against conservative members of their own faiths, while conservatives from all 
traditions overlook specific differences of theology and regard each other as common 
allies in a fight against the secularizing forces of modernity (Nivola and Brady 2006, 
                                                                                                                                            
12 These denominations are Evangelical Protestants (26%), Mainline Protestants (16%), Catholics (18%), 
as well as the Unaffiliated (16%).  The remainder of the survey was made up of several smaller groups, 
such as Black and Latino churches, Jews, and other Christian and non-Christian groups (Green 2004, 3). 
13 Traditionalists were more likely to read Scripture regularly, to have a high view of the Bible’s authority, 
and to believe in a personal God and an afterlife.  For the full coding criteria see Green 2004, 55-6.   
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200).  And this religious reshuffling, by bringing new, cultural issues to the fore, has 
gone together with a realignment of the two major American parties.  Green notes that 
Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants are now  “in the process of trading places in the 
Republican coalition” (Green 2004, 10).  His analysis confirms what the electoral maps 
told us in 2000 and 2004: well-to-do social liberals from the urban centers of the 
Northeast and the West Coast are leaving the Republican Party, and traditionalist 
Christians from the Midwest and the South are taking their place.  As Galston and Nivola 
point out, up until the 1970s the two parties often overlapped ideologically and were 
made up of broad coalitions representing diverse segments of the country.  Southern 
conservatives and members of the Northern working class voted Democratic; affluent but 
socially moderate urban Northeasterners as well as conservative Western agrarians voted 
Republican (Nivola and Brady 2006, 10).  But, as Dionne notes, the “cultural battles of 
the 1960s redefined not only the right, but also the left” (ibid., 177).  In their aftermath, 
American liberals have changed their points of emphasis to cultural matters: whereas 
trade-unionism, market regulation, and various welfare measures were the former litmus 
tests for membership within the Democratic party, these have now been replaced by 
abortion, “stem-cell research, gay marriage, and Hollywood culture” (ibid., 177).  
Similarly, on the Right, “Religious conservatives, ignited by court decisions on school 
prayer and abortion and reacting against what they saw as the depredations of trashy 
magazines, movies, and television programs, decried the growing ‘secularization’ of 
America” and launched an attempt “to restore the consensus on values that existed—or at 
                                                                                                                                            
14 This observation was first made by Wuthnow (1988).  See also Layman 1997. 
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least seemed to exist—before the 1960s” (ibid., 194).  While Republicans therefore 
turned away from their traditional constituency—the affluent—and created a new base 
for themselves by “appealing to the cultural concerns of whites with moderate incomes 
and socially conservative views,” Democrats saw an opportunity to gain support among 
“social liberals in the upper middle class” who had long voted Republican but who had 
no use for things like restrictions on abortion (ibid. 178).15 
 
LIBERALISM AND THE CULTURE WARS 
 Because this shift in the American political landscape appears rooted in a more 
fundamental sociological cleavage, it will be helpful briefly to examine the character of 
this divide.  Over the past several decades James Davison Hunter has forcefully argued 
that apparent political disagreements between liberals and conservatives can often be 
traced to a deeper quarrel about the meaning of liberal-democracy and of America’s 
national identity (Hunter 1991, Hunter 1994, Hunter and Wolfe 2006).  Hunter insists that 
the collapse following the Second World War of a moral consensus rooted in the Bible 
(Hunter 1991, 67-77)16 has brought about “a fundamental realignment in American 
culture” (47).  The United States, he claims, is now split between “competing moral 
visions” (43): an “orthodox” one which remains loyal to that “longstanding Judeo-
Christian consensus” (76) and considers moral rules to be fixed and absolute, and a 
“progressive” one which sees them as flexible and dependent on historical circumstances 
                                                
15 For further analysis of this current realignment of the American parties, see also Miller and Schofield 
2008. 
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(43, 48, 118).  Both “factions strongly affirm the ideals of the American democratic 
tradition,” but because “they understand this tradition differently,” they often view 
themselves as the true guardians of liberalism and their opponents as grave threats to it 
(Hunter and Wolfe 2006, 25).17 
 The orthodox moral vision, as Hunter presents it, takes its bearings from a 
“universally valid” moral authority which applies in “every circumstance and context” 
(121).  Its adherents often speak of natural rights, but their authority is not Enlightenment 
rationalism but instead a specific brand of theology (121-2).  They claim that liberalism 
must be anchored in a set of principles which can be found in a very broad and capacious 
reading of the Bible—a reading which can discover the moral code all Christians as well 
as Jews share in common (109-10).  Widespread religious belief, they maintain, is crucial 
for democracy’s health because it endows it with a lofty aim and purpose all the while 
inculcating a set of moral restraints which are necessary for the preservation of freedom 
(109-10).  Democracy is “the embodiment of Providential wisdom” and divine 
righteousness (109), but, as Gertrude Himmelfarb has argued, its maintenance requires 
the “self-discipline, self-restraint, self-control,” and “self-reliance” which only religion 
can provide (Himmelfarb 1999, 85).  Freedom, according to this account, should thus be 
understood in a positive and therefore restricted sense: it is not the license of the 
individual to do what he pleases but instead “the freedom of a society to govern itself—
what philosopher Charles Taylor has called ‘civic freedom’” (110, emphasis original).  
                                                                                                                                            
16 Unless otherwise noted, all references over the next several paragraphs come from Hunter 1991. 
17 Consider the rhetoric employed by those partisans quoted by Hunter in his prologue entitled “Stories 
from the Front,” e.g. at 25, 27-8. 
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Liberty is an opportunity for the individual to serve his community by acting virtuously 
in accordance with certain fixed moral guidelines—guidelines which serve in turn to 
restrict liberty within modest bounds. 
The orthodox account claims that America’s providential blessings also give it 
special duties, and that is why “America has a unique mission to extend the boundaries of 
liberty and righteousness” (quoted on 112).  A foreign policy which aims to maintain and 
if possible spread democracy abroad affirms the historical superiority of liberalism while 
simultaneously preserving a sense that liberty exists primarily for service to others.  
Indeed, it is precisely because they perceive that this idea of self-sacrifice is being lost 
sight of that members of the orthodox camp tend to support a socially conservative 
agenda which pays particular attention to sexual mores and to the protection of the 
traditional family (122).  Americans, they seem to believe, are too much out for 
themselves.  Himmelfarb, for example, argues that capitalism’s tendency to produce “an 
unseemly materialism and hedonism” (Himmelfarb 1999, 12 fn), while not economically 
damaging, risks bringing about a kind of spiritual diminution which is gravely 
threatening to the future of humanity (Himmefarb 1999, 13).  The traditional family, on 
the other hand, is seen as the bedrock of morality because it restrains these impulses, and 
orthodox opposition to abortion, feminism, and same-sex marriage can thus be regarded 
as arising from a desire to apply some brakes to a liberal political order which has been 
left too much to its own devices. 
The orthodox call for moral restraint, however, should not blind us to this camp’s 
allegiance to liberalism itself.  Alan Wolfe, a critic of Hunter who places himself on the 
 18 
Left and who has written extensively on religion, cautions that America’s religious 
conservatives are “most definitely not trying to impose their Christian beliefs on an 
increasingly secular society” (Wolfe 1998, 67, emphasis original).  Rather, they tend to 
speak in terms of toleration and of rights—for example, of the need for a secular society 
to tolerate the free exercise of religion (Wolfe 1998, 67) or of the rights of parents to raise 
their children as they see fit (Wolfe 1998, 122).  But perhaps no fact better illustrates the 
orthodox camp’s allegiance to basic liberal principles than its near-universal embrace of 
capitalism.  As Hunter makes clear, leading voices on this side of the cultural divide find 
a sacrosanct right to unlimited material acquisition in the very same sources in which 
they hope to discover moral restraints.  Hunter quotes Jerry Falwell’s declaration that 
“the free enterprise system is clearly outlined in the Book of Proverbs” and was endorsed 
by Jesus Christ: “Ownership of property is biblical.  Competition in business is biblical” 
(quoted on 111).  Moreover, Hunter notes that among many contemporary pop 
theologians the idea of Christian charity—“Give and you’ll be given unto”— has taken a 
decidedly self-interested and profit-oriented turn (112).  Religious conservatives as 
Hunter presents them seem not to know about the Biblical teaching on the sin of greed or 
that the proper relation of man to material possessions according to Scripture is not 
ownership but stewardship.18 
On the other side of the cultural divide, progressives too show a tendency 
simultaneously to reject and embrace the core tenets of Enlightenment liberalism.  As 
                                                
18 See, for example, 1 Timothy 6:10-17.  For a glimpse of the potential origins of today’s pro-capitalist 
theologies, see Locke’s reinterpretation of that passage in Chapter Five of the Second Treatise of 
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Hunter describes them, progressives eschew the absolutism of modern rationalism and 
instead look upon truth as a “process” or “as a reality that is ever unfolding” (44).  A 
rapidly growing number of them profess no religion at all,19 and those who do frequently 
tend to “resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assumptions of 
contemporary life” (44-5, emphasis original).  Claiming that “traditional sources of moral 
authority” such as Scripture “no longer have . . . binding power over their lives” (45), 
they tend to join denominations (such as Reform Judaism or Mainline Protestantism) 
which have made their peace with secular intellectual trends and which thus downplay 
“the supernatural and miraculous aspects” of the Bible in favor of “an almost exclusive 
emphasis upon its ethical” message (79). 
 That ethical message, however, far from being permanently valid, must be 
uniquely adapted to “human relationships today” (124).  Traditional faith, or the morality 
that is actually contained in the Bible, according to Hunter’s progressives, “is no longer 
relevant for modern times” because “moral and spiritual truth” itself is not “static and 
unchanging” but “a growing and incremental reality.”  Morality is “conditional and 
relative” (123), and so today’s ethical guidelines are similarly of no validity outside of 
our current (liberal-democratic) historical circumstances.  Indeed, as Hunter summarizes 
it, the “dominant basis of moral reasoning” among progressives is a subjectivism which 
grounds ethical authority solely in “personal experience.”  Associated ultimately with 
“Kant, Existentialism, and the various streams of Heideggerian hermeneutical philosophy 
                                                                                                                                            
Government (section 31).   Locke’s attempt to downplay the New Testament’s calls for self-sacrifice will 
be discussed at greater length in chapter three. 
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such as found in Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty,” this position holds that “experience is 
ordered and moral judgments are made according to a logic rooted in subjective intuition 
and understanding,” the underlying premise being that “by virtue of our symbolic 
activity, we human beings are responsible for the way the world is.”  In practical terms, 
this translates into a praise for “expressive individualism” as well as “a moral pragmatism 
centered around the individual’s personal conception of his or her own emotional needs 
or psychological disposition” (125).  Ethical rules are relative to “the private whim or 
personal perspective of individuals” (126), and the values that are present in any given 
community of such individuals must be “loose-bounded” and “oriented toward 
legitimating the prevailing zeitgeist” (126-7).  
In Hunter’s description, however, this belief in the mutability of all values seems 
always to accompany a certain moralism with which it appears to be in tension.  He notes 
that members of progressivist religious groups still look to their respective traditions in 
an effort to find “universal ethical principles” which can lead to “the fulfillment of human 
needs and aspirations,” and their simultaneous rejection of the “absolute authority” (124) 
of those traditions may have much to do with a perceived threat which that authority 
poses to these same aspirations.  Similarly, thoroughly secular progressives retain “latent 
value orientations.”  These tend to coalesce into an outlook which judges everything 
according to the standard of “human well-being” and which gives particular emphasis to 
“the ethical themes of autonomy and freedom,” especially as regards “individual or 
minority self-determination” (75-6).  Hunter does not comment on this possibility, but 
                                                                                                                                            
19 In the 1999 World Values Survey 20% of Americans listed their religion as “none.”  When Hunter wrote 
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when reading his account one is led to wonder whether the progressivist rejection of all 
absolute standards is not itself inextricably linked to a belief in the moral superiority of 
the particular outlook that is held to result as a consequence of that rejection.  The “aim 
of the progressivists’ vision,” he writes, “is the further emancipation of the human spirit 
and the creation of an inclusive and tolerant world” (Hunter and Wolfe 2006, 15).  They 
do seem to look forward to a future which will be characterized by an historically 
superior human good—a good which involves the flourishing of authentic human 
relationships unsullied by power and domination, as well as the realization of the long-
suppressed aspirations for self-determination of individuals and minority groups.   
Indeed, when it comes to more practical questions, the relativism of Hunter’s 
progressives actually seems to serve as a gateway to a deeply felt moralism.  Restrictions 
on abortion, for example, are said to be unjust not only because there is no fixed moment 
at which life begins (126) but also because they limit individual freedom of choice—and 
being “oppressed is the absence of choice” (114).  Traditional gender roles can be 
abolished because they are simply “human constructions imposed through socialization,” 
but they also ought to be, since that socialization was conducted by “powerful and 
sometimes oppressive institutions” (126).  Finally, homosexuality and other non-
traditional family arrangements are permissible because the various forms which the 
family can take are “historically and culturally variable,” but these arrangements are 
legitimate only “as long as those forms reflect a positive and caring relationship” (126)—
an abusive relationship presumably would not be justified.  Combining a rejection of 
                                                                                                                                            
in 1991 the number he cited was 11% (Hunter 1991, 76).   
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moral absolutism with an idealistic vision of a more just society, Hunter’s progressives 
appear to regard the sources of authority revered by their adversaries as residues of 
institutions which were formerly used to control minds and tell people how to live.  
Conversely, they regard liberal-democracy as a regime which is dedicated to the 
liberation of human beings from such shackles—a regime which will permit men and 
women to live as free, choice-making beings and tolerate and accept one another for who 
they are authentically.  The chief aim of the American Founders, they insist, was “to 
establish and preserve ‘pluralism and diversity’” (114).  Thus, far from requiring 
widespread religious belief, the Constitution established “a secular, humanistic state” in 
which individuals could live by their own lights and become, in the words of Arthur 
Schlesinger, “skeptical, irreverent, pluralistic and relativistic” (quoted on 113).   
Freedom in the progressivist account should therefore be understood negatively 
and “in terms of the social and political rights of individuals.  This is what Charles Taylor 
has called ‘liberal’ freedom (as opposed to ‘civic’ freedom, mentioned earlier),” and it 
especially emphasizes the need of the individual to be “granted immunity from 
interference by others in his life, either by state or church or by other individuals’” (114).  
Relativism here connects to the virtue of tolerance, for it frees us from absolutist 
doctrines which prevent us from living however we wish.  For the same reasons, the 
progressives insist that “the founders gave us a ‘living Constitution,’” for they did not 
want us to “be straightjacketed” to the outdated ideas of the past (113-4).  In progressive 
thought as Hunter summarizes it, the idea of negative liberty is inextricably linked to a 
deeply felt sense of justice, which is defined in terms of a celebration of diversity and 
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“the end of oppression” (114).  This is why progressives tend to highlight the plights of 
groups who are thought to have had their voices silenced (115).  And because 
empowering marginalized groups requires economic redistribution, the progressives’ 
relativism eventually gives way to deeply moralistic calls for “social justice”—calls 
which underlie not only the Left’s support for the welfare state but also its distrust of 
American power (which is held to create vast inequalities in the world) (115). 
 
THE MUDDLED MIDDLE 
Hunter’s analysis seems to capture the key elements of the worldviews that lie 
beneath the statements of the most vociferous warriors in America’s culture wars—of 
politicians, editorialists, and the leaders of advocacy groups.  But he insists, and a vast 
body of empirical literature confirms, that most Americans reside somewhere between 
the two extremes which he describes.20  But those extremes remain sizable.  Hunter 
estimates that around 5 to 7 percent of Americans (or 10 to 12 million people) are 
“committed partisans of the Christian right and of the progressive left,” but one quarter of 
the overall population (some 60 million people) is less active though sympathetic to one 
side or the other (Hunter and Wolfe 2006, 25).21  More crucially, however, the zealous 
minority contains society’s elite opinion-shapers who control the political landscape, set 
                                                
20 Other than Wolfe, the most influential critic of the idea that Americans are deeply divided is perhaps 
Fiorina (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2005).  See also Davis and Robinson 1996, DiMaggio, Evans, and 
Bryson 1996, and Evans 2003. 
21 Galston and Nivola similarly point out that even though a plurality of Americans stake out moderate or 
compromise positions on social issues like abortion and same-sex marriage, a large majority (over 60 
percent) still inhabits the extremes (Nivola and Brady 2006, 182-3). 
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the tone and agenda of public debate, and determine the options which members of the 
“soft middle” have to choose from (Hunter and Wolfe 2006, 33).   
Most Americans are united in their common allegiance to basic liberal principles, 
but the “struggle to define America” which Hunter describes is about how those 
principles should be properly understood.  Indeed, the orthodox and progressive camps 
appear to present competing visions of liberalism which divide Americans not only 
against each other but even within themselves.  Alan Wolfe, Hunter’s foremost critic, has 
argued that the culture war is being fought only by intellectuals and that most Americans 
inhabit a so-called muddled middle (Wolfe 1998, 276).  Yet, he also admits that since 
those intellectuals determine the available options, the culture war also takes “place 
inside Americans.”  Wolfe claims that Americans are pulled both ways.  They believe in 
“both traditional religious values and personal freedom” (Hunter and Wolfe 2006, 46); 
they support the right of women to work, for example, but they also lament the effect 
which that has had on the family (Wolfe 1998, 107, 113-4).  The culture war, according 
to Wolfe, should therefore really be seen as a divide “between sets of values important to 
everyone” (Wolfe 1998, 279).  Americans continue to muddle through, but should their 
ability to craft a tension-ridden modus vivendi be a cause for optimism?  On the contrary, 
this may only signal that there is no consensus about the meaning and the basis of the 
liberal principles we cherish.  Our apparent agreement may hide a deeper division that 
cuts to the heart of the character of our polity.22 
                                                
22 Whereas Wolfe argues that a moral disagreement which exists among elites effects the lives of ordinary 
people by tugging them in different directions, Morris Fiorina goes a step further.  Relying exclusively on 
anecdotal evidence, Fiorina and his co-authors state that the very “idea of a culture war is something 
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Indeed, this may appear all the more troubling once we consider that both sides in 
the culture wars are looking to defend liberalism by turning to schools of thought which 
are fundamentally alien to it.  Their problematic attempts to reconcile modern democracy 
with the Bible, on the one hand, or with German historicism, on the other, leave both 
sides exposed to damaging criticisms from their opponents.  The progressive Left’s 
problematic mix of relativism and moralism, for example, appears to be the result of an 
attempt “to turn something into a support for liberalism” that was originally intended to 
be its “death blow” (Owen 2001, 92).  What James Ceaser appropriately calls “idealistic 
anti-foundationalism” (Ceaser 2006, 76) tries to link deeply felt democratic sentiments to 
a “radical version of historicism” (ibid., 72) which can ultimately be traced back to 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, two thinkers who had anything but respect for human equality.  
Nietzsche, of course, called for democracy’s destruction because he predicted that it 
would create a spiritually sub-human being called the last man.  But according to Ceaser, 
the most theoretically influential thought on the American Left today embraces 
Nietzsche’s historicism while trying to overlook his rejection of democracy.  
Contemporary “neo-pragmatism or anti-foundationalism” calls for even more democracy, 
all the while claiming that such democracy cannot be grounded in anything deeper than 
“narratives of hope” (ibid., 74-5). 
Turning to a brief analysis of Richard Rorty, Ceaser writes that narratives “sound 
a bit like foundations,” but since they are not seen as “tied to deeper structures of reality” 
                                                                                                                                            
completely unfamiliar to most Americans” (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2005, 21 n. 14; see also the 
epigraph to his book).  This more radical conclusion, which Wolfe would likely disagree with, seems to sit 
uneasily with the evidence which both Wolfe and Hunter present. 
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they are not quite as serious.  Nobody would “sacrifice for a narrative” (ibid., 75); no one 
would die for it, kill for it, or try to impose it upon his neighbor.  The replacement of 
foundations with narratives is seen by Rorty and other neo-pragmatist thinkers as healthy 
because it leads to an indifference to serious questions.  It instills a live-and-let-live 
attitude which encourages toleration and precludes “rigid or absolutist politics” (ibid., 
75).  In response to this, however, critics such as Ceaser and Owen have argued that 
rather than encouraging openness to alternative points of view, such widespread 
skepticism might create a citizenry which is “listless, apathetic, and lacking in resolve” 
(ibid., 87).  Owen notes that Rorty goes so far as to acknowledge that the acceptance of 
liberalism and tolerance “means conceding to Nietzsche that democratic societies have no 
higher aim than what he called ‘the last men’” (quoted in Owen 2001, 187 n.7).  Rorty 
simply concedes that “the prevalence of such people may be a reasonable price to pay for 
freedom” (quoted in Owen 2001, 90).  But even on its own terms this response appears to 
be profoundly inadequate.  As Owen notes, recalling Tocqueville’s warning that spiritual 
decline is linked to despotism, “A free society must concern itself with the sort of people 
it produces, lest it produce those who do not vigilantly guard their liberty” (Owen 2001, 
91).  Indeed, Ceaser recalls that “the skepticism that came to prevail in many of the new 
democracies of Europe in the 1920s and 1930s” left a “vacuum at the center of political 
life” which was eventually filled by dangerous, anti-democratic ideologies (Ceaser 2006, 
86-7). 
If the progressive Left tries to use originally illiberal thought to defend toleration, 
the religious Right may be said to make the opposite error.  By reading liberalism and 
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democracy into the Bible, today’s Christian conservatives may ultimately risk bringing 
about this same listlessness and apathy.  Such, at any rate, is the conclusion which Wolfe 
points to when he describes how politically conservative religion in the United States 
today is often permeated by the same individualistic cultural trends against which it is 
usually thought to be a reaction.  Americans, he writes, “take their religion seriously,” but 
very few take it so seriously that they see it as a guide for “how other people should live” 
(Wolfe 1998, 55, emphasis original).  Not only do they consider faith to be a strictly 
private matter, they also redefine religion to mold it to their pre-existing liberal tastes 
(ibid., 62)—tastes which include non-judgmentalism, a live-and-let-live attitude, and a 
respect for the private beliefs of others.  Wolfe reports that even the most conservative 
Americans whom he interviewed seldom used terms like “sin” or “moral rot” (ibid., 48-
9), and the overwhelming majority of his sample agreed with the statement that “There 
are many different religious truths and we ought to be tolerant of all of them.”  
Americans, he succinctly concludes, “have added an Eleventh Commandment,”: “Thou 
shalt not judge” (ibid., 54). 
 Calls for a return to a pre-modern style of faith, Wolfe insists, originate from a 
deep misapprehension of our contemporary situation (ibid., 303).  Indeed, the Christian 
conservatism of the heartland which seems to be carrying out such a return has in fact 
been infiltrated by the most modern and liberal cultural tendencies (Hunter and Wolfe 
2006, 59-61).  In his detailed survey of religion in the United States, Wolfe points out 
that Americans tend to approach their faith as they do almost everything else in their 
lives: individualistically.  Evangelicalism in particular is growing because, by 
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emphasizing the possibility of a personal relationship with God—and a kinder, gentler 
God at that (Wolfe 2003, 165)23—it fits in seamlessly with larger cultural trends.  
Evangelical services are “personal, enthusiastic, unstructured, and informal;” pastors 
dress down, play rock music, and address God colloquially (26).  In a country where 
people frequently go shopping for places of worship (44-5), to attract members churches 
have had to highlight the “personal sides of faith” (35) and downplay the likes of liturgy, 
creed, and doctrine (which parishioners find to be divisive and thus unappealing).  As a 
result, according to Wolfe, the spiritual life which one finds on display in culturally 
conservative churches is rather unimpressive.  Sermons are theologically thin and rarely 
assert that the requirements for salvation are complex or difficult (31).  The music is bad 
and reflects the bathos of popular culture (29, 126).  Most alarmingly, the emphasis of 
worship is placed on the individual’s needs and desires rather than on community, duties, 
or obligations to tradition (65).  In its more extreme incarnations, this latter tendency has 
resulted in such narcissistic teachings as “prosperity theology” (32) and Bruce 
Wilkinson’s The Prayer of Jabez, a book which sold nine million copies and instructs 
believers to pray for the increase of their investment portfolios (33-4).24 
 But, if Wolfe is unimpressed with this lack of moral seriousness, he is all the 
more discouraged by the lack of intellectual life which he finds in America’s 
conservative churches.  The de-emphasis of doctrine, he writes, has dumbed religion 
down and prevented it from encouraging serious thought about man, his duties to others, 
                                                
23 Unless otherwise noted, all references over the next several paragraphs come from this work. 
24 One Baptist minister told Wolfe that “If we use the words redemption or conversion” to congregations 
“they think we’re talking about bonds” (Wolfe 2003, 81).   
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and his place in the cosmos.  Churchgoing Americans tend to know little about the Bible 
(69-74), and even fundamentalists—among whom one would expect to find the most 
Biblical literacy—tend to pay attention only to its specific injunctions so that they may 
apply them to their daily lives (69).25  They rarely consider Scripture as a collection of 
ideas, and in this, according to Wolfe, they merely reflect the anti-intellectualism and the 
distaste for ideas that permeates society today (68-9).  Among all religious groups, talk of 
one’s personal relationship with God which also tries to avoid controversy not only 
discourages “any kind of doctrinal reflection” (74), it also puts an emphasis on feeling 
rather than thinking.  This is why Pentecostalism, a charismatic religion which looks for 
communion with God through experience and emotion, has recently grown so rapidly.  
“Pentecostal forms of religious expression have become popular because—like 
increasing numbers of school teachers, leaders of therapeutic communities, mental-health 
professionals, and even occasional academics who live in secular worlds—they seek 
authenticity through experience rather than through ideas” (81).   
 Wolfe’s final assessment of conservative religion in America is mixed.  As a 
liberal and a professed nonbeliever (184), he finds its individualistic and even 
materialistic (95) brand of Christianity to be encouragingly supportive of tolerance.  He 
reassures his fellow progressives that there is no real attempt on the Right to “restore 
traditional morality to the country” (125).  Even as America has moved to the Right 
politically, it has actually moved to the Left culturally (126), and those who say that they 
take the Bible literally actually tend not to live that way (252).  Evangelicals who “prefer 
                                                
25 This, however, should not be construed to suggest that fundamentalists are uneducated.  Wolfe is quick 
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a God of love to a God of truth are not going to kill for their beliefs” (261), and the 
decline of the idea that certain beliefs are required for salvation—along with the religious 
shopping that the de-emphasis of doctrine encourages—“acts as a kind of insurance 
policy against bigotry” (262).  At the same time, however, Wolfe cannot consistently 
maintain the position that the frivolities of American religious life often “turn out to be 
blessings in disguise” (262).  For even if the decline of a serious belief in sin is conducive 
to tolerance, it also “makes it difficult for the faithful to emphasize classic religious 
themes such as duty and responsibility” (183).  “As a nonbeliever,” Wolfe candidly 
writes, “I ought to be encouraged by this development,” but  “somehow I am not pleased 
with this retreat from sin, for the ease with which American religious believers adopt 
nonjudgmental language and a psychological understanding of wrongdoing is detrimental 
to anyone, religious or not, who believes that individuals should judge their actions 
against the highest possible ideals of human conduct” (184).   
In a bizarre way, Wolfe’s analysis actually confirms the criticism of liberalism 
voiced by religious conservatives.  So successful has liberalism been at undermining a 
sense of duty that in America religion itself, which was supposed to restrain selfishness, 
actually caters to individual desires and never issues commands “that seriously conflict 
with modern beliefs” (Wolfe 1998, 298).  Because he finds that Americans “go 
overboard” in their commitment to toleration, Wolfe claims to discover “considerable 
evidence” for the view that the spread of “cultural relativism or secular humanism” has 
rendered Americans unable “to appreciate what is truly valuable in a world of 
                                                                                                                                            
to dismiss this idea as a myth (Wolfe 2003, 69). 
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transcendental truths” (Wolfe 1998, 298).  As William Galston notes, Wolfe’s analysis 
points to a growing danger: “A choice-based conception of social life leads to 
instrumental bonds, a cult of conflict avoidance, an absence of real engagement, and a 
loss of seriousness” (Galston 1998, 119).  Echoing criticism from the Right, Galston—
who is no conservative—warns that liberalism may be unable to endure without the 
restraints provided by the old-fashioned outlook which, according to Wolfe, is decidedly 
not present in conservative religion as it is actually practiced.  
This new morality—do what you choose, when you choose, without fear 
of legal coercion or social disapproval—is an experiment without 
precedent in human history. Perhaps it will succeed; I doubt it. At some 
point, we will be called upon for sacrifices that we can't pay others to 
make on our behalf. And then we will see whether the self-protective 
nonjudgmentalism Wolfe so ably describes constitutes an adequate basis 
for a free society (Galston 1998, 120). 
  
What Wolfe appears to desire is a middle path which can encourage tolerance 
while preserving the moral and intellectual seriousness which today’s tolerant cultural 
attitudes actually seem to threaten.  He seems to be searching for a popular religious 
outlook which is capacious enough to discourage persecution but also narrow enough to 
focus attention on serious questions about man’s duties to God and his neighbor.  This is 
perhaps the key question in contemporary debates between progressives who link religion 
to intolerance and conservatives who emphasize its role in inculcating moral seriousness.  
Both sides of course claim to achieve this mean and thus to preserve liberal principles 
while rejecting their Enlightenment origins.  But can liberalism draw its strength from 
elsewhere without sacrificing either tolerance or human greatness?  The survey of 
popular arguments and sociological trends contained in this chapter has suggested that the 
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orthodox and progressive attempts to do this may suffer from grave problems.  But it 
might of course be the case that the tensions which seem to be contained in the outlooks 
of politicians, journalists, and ordinary voters could be resolved through more 
thoroughgoing efforts to elucidate coherent versions of these competing liberalisms.  
Contemporary thinkers who have presented theoretical articulations of the outlooks of 
one or the other camp, after all, may well be able to provide consistent and satisfying 
legitimations of modern democracy that do not require the support of Enlightenment 
rationalism.  To judge whether these enterprises have been successful, and thus whether 
the versions of liberalism they contain can stand firm, it will be useful next to turn to an 
examination of some of the most articulate spokesmen for the religious Right and the 
progressive Left.  
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Chapter 2:  The Weaknesses of Today’s Partisan Liberalisms 
“This book is not precisely in anyone’s camp; in writing it I did not mean either to 
serve or to contest any party; I undertook to see, not differently, but further than the 
parties.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 15 
 
The previous chapter has attempted to show the way in which our current political 
climate is divided between two competing moral visions of what modern democracy is 
and what it stands for.  At the level of popular or journalistic polemics, these outlooks 
frequently show themselves to be “less than coherent” (Hunter 1991, 43), and so to gain a 
fuller appreciation of the thought animating political life today, it will be necessary to 
turn to some of the authors who have attempted to present them in theoretically consistent 
forms.  If these presentations, in turn, should come to sight as tension-ridden or otherwise 
unsatisfactory, it will then be possible, in true Tocquevillian fashion, to move beyond 
today’s partisan debates to a deeper appreciation of our contemporary situation.  
As we have seen, both sides in these debates display an attachment to liberalism 
which is in some way linked to their common tendency to reject, on deeply moralistic 
grounds, the outlook of Enlightenment rationalism.  Thus, as this chapter will show, the 
authors whose work constitutes the theoretical backbone of the Christian Right display an 
unreserved hostility to the alleged atheistic materialism of the social contract tradition, 
but they fault that tradition in large part because they find it incapable of sustaining a 
democratic and egalitarian view of human dignity and human freedom.  And yet, in 
looking instead to the Bible and to the Christian theological tradition for a defense of 
modern notions of human rights, they seem to overlook the potentially illiberal and 
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undemocratic teachings of those sources.  Indeed, the theological support for liberalism 
which they discover there owes much to the Enlightenment tradition which they reject—a 
tradition which broke from the authorities to which they seek to return—and the 
conception of public piety that they look to as a replacement for modern rationalism 
therefore may very well be infused with the same troubling individualistic tendencies 
which they elsewhere inveigh against.   
In a similar fashion, today’s secular progressives also reject the original moral 
foundations of democracy on the grounds that these are undemocratic.  Thus, John Rawls, 
motivated by an apparent injustice inherent in all moral or philosophical absolutism, has 
sought to show how liberal-democracy, conceived as a society characterized by the 
flourishing of numerous, incommensurable worldviews, can fulfill its moral promise of 
radical pluralism.  But as this formulation of his thought should hopefully make clear, 
Rawls’ project of political (as opposed to metaphysical) liberalism seems to be plagued 
by a deep confusion: for the very commitment to moral relativism which leads Rawls to 
reject Enlightenment rationalism is also itself deeply moralistic.  His liberalism is 
therefore marked by an unrecognized moral absolutism, and that absolutism manifests 
itself politically in a common moral agreement whose existence he seems to presuppose 
among democratic citizens—which in turn suggests that his society is not and cannot be 
as radically pluralist as he thinks.  Like his adversaries on the Right, Rawls inherits, and 
incorporates into his political philosophy, a moral and theological outlook which owes its 
origins to the Enlightenment’s reform of Christianity.  Ultimately, then, the shortcomings 
of both versions of liberalism which we will examine in this chapter will point us to the 
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need for a fresh examination of the Enlightenment—an examination which will 
potentially make clear the moral justifications for liberalism which both the Left and the 
Right require but cannot provide, and which will furthermore indicate whether their 
respective rejections of it are justified.   
 
CHRISTIAN LIBERALISM: A NEW POSTMODERNISM 
To form an understanding of the conservative position in contemporary American 
debates about religion’s relationship to democracy, it will be helpful to begin with an 
analysis of the Right’s rejection, on religious but also liberal-democratic grounds, of 
modern rationalism.  One of the most serious and far-reaching attempts to articulate the 
details of a postmodern Christian politics has been carried out by Peter Augustine Lawler, 
who celebrates the apparent collapse not only of the Enlightenment, but also of all 
modern political rationalism, on the grounds that it failed to recognize, let alone satisfy, 
humanity’s deepest needs.  According to Lawler, modern thought from Machiavelli to 
Marx has been united in a common attractive yet ultimately flawed endeavor: the modern 
philosophers all believed that if science could “master or overcome nature” by subjecting 
it to limitless rational control, then it could also eradicate suffering (Lawler 1999, 1).26  
Believing that they could “make for themselves in this world what God promises in the 
imaginary world to come,” the moderns rebelled against the Biblical God—who denies 
                                                
26 All citations over the next several paragraphs come from this work. 
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the “possibility of definitive success of merely human efforts”—and tried to show that 
men could be satisfied without any thought of what lies beyond this life (16).   
According to Lawler, this vision of a society of satisfied secularists reaches its 
culmination in the idea of the “end of history,” a concept which Francis Fukuyama 
misunderstood because he mistakenly supposed that a society without suffering could 
still be populated by “free and dignified human beings” (16).   The modern project as 
Lawler describes it was premised on the scientific view that humans, like other beings, 
are “just ‘stuff’ or matter” (19).  Rousseau, for example, claimed that human beings in 
nature were so unselfconscious that they lacked an awareness of their own mortality, and 
the triumph of the modern project would entail the recreation of such a state in which the 
“core of human individuality”—our restless awareness that each of us will die and die 
alone—has been eradicated (23).  But since death, of course, cannot be overcome by 
natural means, it follows that only a kind of lobotomy can eliminate this suffering, and 
the modern project’s ultimate task is therefore to make humans at home in this world by 
making them forget about their mortality.  In contrast to Christian theology, which holds 
with Pascal that man will always remain “dissatisfied,” “not totally at home in this 
world,” and therefore perpetually in need of communion with the divine (32), the whole 
modern scientific establishment is now devoted to demonstrating that this condition is, so 
to speak, curable (36-7).  Thus, according to Lawler, there already exists a troubling 
tendency among Americans “to live immersed thoughtlessly in the present” (28), and to 
turn, for example, to psychotherapy in order to prove Pascal wrong by putting their own 
experiences of death to death (28, 36-7).  
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Now, Lawler attributes the most far-reaching attempt to do this to postmodernism 
“as it is usually understood,” or to the anti-foundationalist thought of secular progressives 
like Richard Rorty, whose subjectivist philosophy permits him to claim that the 
experience of death can be removed by a kind of linguistic engineering (45-6).  This is 
why this kind of postmodernism “is really hypermodernism” (2), for by doing this it 
finally brings to fruition the Enlightenment’s “merely material and secular goal” of 
“mortal life as it might be lived in the sunlit uplands of global democracy and 
abundance’” (quoted on 48).  But as Lawler notes, Rorty is also forced to admit that the 
lack of concern with death which he hopes will characterize “bourgeois culture” is an 
“anti-Socratic view” (54).  He concedes that “we, the people who value self-
consciousness” (quoted on 55), will not find a home within it, and he even goes so far as 
to admit that his hoped-for future state “is the one Kojève finds at history’s end, the 
‘nihilistic wasteland’ of Martin Heidegger populated by Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘last men’” 
(54).  His liberalism, he admits, “will not be a home to “serious philosophy, artistic 
excellence, and noble deeds.”  Indeed, he “cheerfully acknowledges that ‘the typical 
character types of liberal democracies are bland, calculating, petty, and unheroic,’” but he 
blithely affirms that this is simply “the price we pay” for liberating men from their 
experience of mortality (54) or, to say the same thing, for “alleviating misery” (55). 
If the full triumph of the Enlightenment were possible, according to Lawler, it 
would necessarily signal the final destruction of human greatness and human dignity.  
Fortunately, from his point of view, the colossal failure of the modern project proved to 
be inevitable for the simple reason that human nature necessarily rebelled against it.  
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What is needed to take its place is what he calls “Postmodernism rightly understood” (1), 
a return to “Pascal’s Augustinian psychological realism” (5), which he also says is 
compatible with “Socratic or Thomistic rationalism” (2).  This “Christian realism” (5) 
finds a source for the dignity of the individual in his solitary experience “of the mystery 
and alienation of being human” (12)—an experience which leads each person to come to 
an awareness “of his own limits and so of his need for God” (5).  Thus, reflection on the 
reasons for modernity’s failure—on the threat it poses to human dignity and the hubris of 
its attempt to eliminate suffering—suggests the wisdom of a renewed openness to 
revelation. 
While Lawler thus claims that the triumph of modern democracy poses a grave 
threat to human dignity, his call for a return to Christianity is intended not as a 
replacement for liberalism but, indeed, as a new foundation for it.  In the work of Walker 
Percy, for example, he discovers a defense of individual rights against the “mishmash 
anthropology” which Thomas Jefferson articulated in the Declaration of Independence—
for while Jefferson, according to Percy, defined man “as a creature,” or as a created being 
with inherent worth, he also incoherently claimed that that creature “was endowed with 
the purpose of pursuing this-worldly, self-won happiness” (94).  Because the modern 
scientific view of man cannot regard him as more than material, the Declaration’s moral 
teaching is necessarily parasitic on the leftovers of a Christian understanding which 
discovers “the foundation of the dignity of the human individual” and the “source of 
personal sovereignty and so of individual rights” in the “courageous experience” of self-
conscious mortality (94, 96).  In the absence of this, modern scientific materialism 
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permits the treatment of human beings as though they were no more than matter.  Its 
notion of human autonomy, which liberates the self “for the pursuit of ‘its own destiny 
without God’” (quoted on 95) frees human beings from all moral limitations, and it is 
therefore “responsible for most of the murder and gratuitous violence of our century” (95; 
cf. 141-2).  This same warning, according to Lawler, can also be found in the right-wing 
populism of Christopher Lasch, who juxtaposes the quest for happiness of America’s 
urban and scientific elite to the “democratic moral responsibility” of its religious 
heartland (171).  While the latter’s outlook, according to Lasch, is characterized by a 
sober awareness of human limitations, that of the former is characterized by a “pro-
choice” position which holds that human existence is neither mysterious nor sacred, and 
that there are thus no legitimate barriers to the pursuit of felicity in the here and now 
(181).  Like Percy, Lasch holds that this position “leads to the elimination of whole 
classes of human beings” (182), and he supports a socially conservative agenda from the 
conviction that the “rule of law and limited democracy depend on respect for the personal 
mysteries of sex, love, and death” (171). 
 Lawler, then, calls attention to the work of Percy and Lasch because, in his 
estimation, they mount an authentically Biblical defense of liberal-democracy.  Lawler 
calls Percy a Thomist (106), but his particular brand of Thomism seems not to place the 
essence of religious faith in a sense of duties to others but instead in the individual’s 
solitary experience of Pascalian restlessness.  Similarly, Lasch’s call for a return to 
religion takes its bearings from the despair and melancholy which modern individuals 
feel (173).  He regards that solitary experience of alienation as the surest foundation of 
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liberal freedoms, and he argues that “Submission to God makes people less submissive in 
everyday life” (quoted on 173).  Lawler writes that Lasch’s work points “toward 
Thomism as the authentic postmodernism” (174), and he elsewhere characterizes Percy 
as a “contemporary Thomist or Tocquevillian” (106).  This last formulation, however, is 
extremely puzzling, for it seems to gloss over the fact that whereas Tocqueville 
emphatically affirmed the justice of democracy and praised the separation of church and 
state, Saint Thomas argued for limited monarchy, the establishment of religion, and the 
legislation of morality.27  Consequently, at this point it may be fair to stop and ask 
whether the Christian political ideas to which Lawler seeks to return might be more 
liberalized than authentic Thomism.  Or to put the question another way, how can any 
kind of Thomism give a principled defense of modern democracy?  
  
LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND THE BIBLE 
 In an earlier work which tries to elucidate the essentials of a Christian democratic 
politics, Lawler argues that human liberty “has a worthy foundation not in the modern 
impetus toward freedom from suffering and other forms of necessity, but in freedom for 
the duties of the creature to his or her Creator” (Lawler 1994, 4).28  Modern democracy, 
he therefore insists, can be reconceived as something fundamentally Christian, and it can 
retain its core liberal principles (such as limited government and the separation of church 
and state) even while redefining freedom Thomistically in terms of duties rather than 
                                                
27 Cf. Democracy in America  I.2.9 and II.4.8 with Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 90, A. 3; I-II, Q. 95, A. 1; 
and II-II, Q. 10, A. 8. 
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rights.  This is because the origins of modern democracy, in his opinion, are not 
ultimately rooted in Enlightenment rationalism.  Those who regard the Declaration of 
Independence simply as a Lockean document, he insists, espouse an “extreme view” 
which fails to consider the possibility that the American founders revolted “against the 
Christian tradition while retaining certain presuppositions derived from Christian 
experience” (7).  For even if they did accept Locke’s rationalistic teaching of natural 
rights, by affirming the egalitarian and trans-political dignity of the individual, he insists, 
they could not help but continue and even radicalize a tradition of political thought which 
is ultimately rooted in the Bible.  “Christians discovered the experience of the dignity of 
the individual,” Lawler writes, and they were also the first to claim that this dignity is 
enjoyed by all equally regardless of citizenship.  Consequently, the Declaration’s 
egalitarian view of human liberty is “decisively biblical and Christian” (7).   
 According to Lawler, the founders—or at least the majority of them—were not 
true Lockeans, and this is because they did “not understand political liberty 
fundamentally to be a means for the effective pursuit of power and wealth” (8).  Indeed, 
even Jefferson believed that humans “have a natural inclination toward morality,” and so 
he therefore actually unknowingly agreed with Thomas Aquinas (45).  Thus, to the extent 
that the founders followed Locke at all, they followed only the “exoteric” Locke, the 
“superficially” Christian Locke (31), and not the true “Machiavellian” Locke (8) who 
teaches that human beings have no choice but to provide for themselves in a world 
without God (17).  The Locke whom the founders knew claimed only to modify but not 
                                                                                                                                            
28 Unless otherwise noted, all references over the next several pages come from this work. 
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to reject the Christian Natural Law tradition (31).  Indeed, Lawler even goes so far as to 
speculate that because of this, and because they remained deeply moralistic in the cause 
of liberty, even the most free-thinking of the founders may have remained somehow 
unselfconsciously or inchoately religious (31).  But if that is the case, it would seem to 
follow that their self-understanding, and with it, that of the regime which they created, 
must inevitably be of a less than clear-sighted character.  For if the founders followed 
only the outward, rhetorical, half-Christian presentation of a philosopher who claimed to 
continue but actually broke with the medieval Natural Law tradition, how can Lawler 
also claim that the principles of the Declaration constitute that tradition’s logical 
culmination or fulfillment? 
 Lawler’s evidence for this, as we have already seen, is that the modern, egalitarian 
view of human dignity—the view which is inherent in but not sustained by the Lockean 
idea of natural rights—“points to and ultimately depends on the Christian experience of 
personal transcendence” (7).  Because the idea of human individuality is a Biblical and 
Christian discovery, it follows, in the words of Vatican II’s Dignitatis Humanae, that “the 
right to religious freedom” is based on this idea of dignity and that it is known through 
both reason and revelation (quoted on 18).   Now of course, the words “religious 
freedom” never occur in the Bible, and so it would seem necessary to ask at this point 
whether Lawler’s understanding of the Christian tradition might not reflect a confusion 
similar to the one which he attributes to the founders.  For even as he presents the 
founders as less than clear-sighted about what they were doing, he also presents the polity 
which they created as continuing a Christian tradition that pre-dates Vatican II by 
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centuries.  For example, he claims that Madison included religious opinions “concerning 
one’s duties to God” under the heading of property in Federalist 10 (8-9), and that in so 
doing he appealed “to the ‘Thomistic’ principle that each human being has the personal 
responsibility freely to seek the good” (9).  Thus, as he writes, because liberalism “frees 
the Church, the academy, and the family from political control,” it provides for the 
political realization of this Thomistic promise.  According to his account, modern 
democracy’s characteristic refusal to legislate morality or correct belief effectively 
liberates human beings for the pursuit of the “transcendent personal striving” which 
constitutes the meaning and purpose of their existence (9), and it thereby also permits 
them to seek out and achieve their spiritual fulfillment to a much greater extent than was 
possible under the established churches of the Middle Ages. 
Now, in response to this argument, it would seem reasonable to assert that 
Jefferson and Madison in fact viewed freedom of conscience as a measure against 
orthodox Christianity.  In the last letter that Jefferson ever wrote, he conveyed his hope 
that the Declaration’s promise of “the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and 
freedom of opinion” would once and for all arouse men “to burst the chains” of “monkish 
ignorance and superstition.”29  Since Thomas Aquinas spoke nowhere of a right to 
religious freedom, but instead supported the institution of religiously-based and even 
theocratic law, is not his thought perhaps the prime example of the kind of illiberal, 
irrational, and “monkish” political order which Jefferson had in mind?  To see how 
Lawler seeks to avoid this seeming tension, it will be helpful to turn to a brief analysis of 
                                                
29 Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman, June 24, 1826 (Jefferson 1984, 1517). 
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his more practical view of the Constitution.  He finds the beginnings of this view in the 
anti-Federalist Aristocrotis, who claimed that the original Constitution’s failure to 
acknowledge God’s sovereignty and its prohibition on religious tests for office would 
remove religion as a potential check on governmental power (25-6).  Because 
“Aristocrotis was right” to recognize that in the absence of religion there can be no 
supports for human dignity and no limits to what is possible or permissible, Lawler 
insists that liberty in today’s democracy needs to be re-conceived  “as the freedom to 
decide how to discover and to do one’s duty to one’s Creator” (32).  Freedom of religion, 
in other words, should be seen as freedom for religion, and the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment should therefore be seen as corrections to the secular deficiencies of the 
original Constitution which were intended to introduce “some partisanship on behalf of 
religion” (32-3).   
That partisanship, according to Lawler, is what serves to endow liberty with a 
positive and ennobling but also restricted purpose (33-4).  But here again one is 
compelled to ask whether this idea of positive liberty is really coherent, especially when 
it is applied to freedom of conscience.  How can liberty of thought co-exist with—or 
rather, be the same as—a duty to carry out religious obligations—i.e. with a duty to 
believe?  Now, Lawler finds an articulation of this view of liberty in the work of Richard 
John Neuhaus, and it will be useful to turn briefly to Neuhaus to judge how coherently its 
parts fit together.  Like Lawler, Neuhaus discovers the origins of democracy in 
Christianity (Neuhaus 1984, 94-5), and he celebrates the Catholic Church’s acceptance of 
the principle of religious freedom after Vatican II as a development which freed it from 
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its previous authoritarianism and thus finally allowed it to come into its own (Lawler 
1994, 144-5).  But at the same time, he also vociferously attacks the modern, negative 
understanding of liberty—which regards Christian teaching as “optional”—as 
“inappropriate for persons with dignity” (ibid., 146-7).  Human dignity and the 
preservation of liberty—including presumably religious liberty—thus requires an answer 
to “the question of what freedom is for”(Neuhaus 1984, 92, emphasis original), and 
Neuhaus finds that answer in the duties which he claims are prescribed by an informal 
American religious establishment—a second constitution composed not of governmental 
powers but of shared beliefs and mores which are nonetheless publicly authoritative.   
Neuhaus discovers this unwritten constitution in a long tradition spanning from 
the Founding to Lincoln’s speeches to the Supreme Court’s former interpretation of the 
First Amendment (ibid., 100-3), and he also claims that it is currently being resuscitated 
by a religious revival in the heartland (ibid., 93).  This tradition holds that we Americans 
are a religious people who regard faith not as a private matter but as an ideal of justice—
“a righteousness not of human devising” which orients politics towards “a transcendent 
good”(ibid., 105).  Moreover, as Neuhaus insists, this understanding of religious freedom 
could not be more opposed to the Enlightenment’s teaching that society springs from a 
contract “in which disinterested and traditionless individuals strike a deal and call it 
justice” (ibid., 105).  Because that tradition understands religious freedom negatively, as 
a liberation from transcendent moral obligations, it inculcates an “indifference to 
normative truth” which begins a slide toward popular relativism.  It culminates in the idea 
that a pluralistic society must “count all opinions about morality as equal . . . because we 
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are agreed there is no truth by which judgment can be rendered.  The result is the 
debasement of our public life by the exclusion of the idea—and consequently of the 
practice—of virtue” (ibid., 111-2). 
But even though Neuhaus attacks the Enlightenment, it is not so clear whether his 
claim that the Christian God is “the God of democratic equality and freedom” (Lawler 
1994, 153, emphasis original) can avoid showing some signs of having been influenced 
by that same “traditionless” understanding of human nature which he criticizes.  For even 
Lawler admits that Neuhaus’ thoughts in this regard are based more on democratic moral 
conviction than on Scriptural interpretation: his belief in a liberal and egalitarian view of 
human dignity springs from an “orthodoxy or ‘conviction’ that exists prior to reason” 
(ibid., 160).  Thus, for example, he attacks those who demand evidence for the 
Declaration’s “self-evident” claim about equality for their refusal to grasp what he 
regards as an undeniable but indemonstrable first principle (Neuhaus 1984, 87), and he is 
similarly suspicious of the Catholic Natural Law tradition because he believes “that every 
attempt to root human morality or purpose in nature is inherently elitist,” and he views its 
history “as intertwined with the Church’s pre-Vatican II anti-democratic and anti-liberal 
ecclesiological pretensions” (Lawler 1994, 160).  But because he thus rejects Natural 
Law, he also dismisses the Thomistic view that a good polity must make use of the law to 
inculcate virtue.  Indeed, he argues that the Constitution had a “Christian inspiration” 
precisely because it did no such thing.  On the contrary, the founders’ “reluctance to 
prescribe the methods of ‘political education’ to inculcate virtue” can be attributed to 
“their awareness that such education tends to hide the truth of the person from himself” 
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(Lawler 1994, 151).  He thus appears to ascribe to the founders a highly liberalized or 
personalized Christian outlook—an outlook which stresses not so much a sense of 
religious duty and a concern for doctrinal orthodoxy but instead the individual’s deeply 
felt need to “be recognized in his concrete particularity by a personal God.”  Only 
“biblical-Christian theology,” he argues, “understands fully the significance of the 
person’s consciousness of his particular existence and his concern for his particular fate” 
(ibid.). 
Because an individual’s ultimate fate concerns only himself, Neuhaus seems to 
suggest, the state by right should leave him free to discover his own religious duties.  
Now, this happens to be one of the most important arguments that can be found in 
Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration.  But as previously noted, Neuhaus most 
emphatically denies that he is endorsing Locke’s brand of liberalism.  On the contrary, he 
wishes for religious duties to be duties in the traditional sense, that is, obligations which 
are not created by the individual for himself but which come from outside and even 
demand great sacrifices.  He and Lawler both seem to be attracted to two opposing 
visions of political society: a liberal one which regards human beings as autonomous 
possessors of rights—including the right to live and to think as they wish—and a pre-
modern one in which government is not created by the people but ordained by God and in 
which the self is not autonomous but endowed with certain obligations, including the 
obligation to accept doctrinal orthodoxy.  Alarmed by the spiritually stultifying effects of 
modern individualism, Lawler and Neuhaus look to religious tradition to re-invigorate 
liberalism with an understanding of virtue that calls upon citizens to make sacrifices in 
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the name of something greater than themselves, but they also remain attached at a deep 
moral level to the same liberal-democratic regime which leaves men on their own to 
pursue their good as they see fit—so much so that they even present that regime as the 
fullest manifestation of the Christian God’s justice.   
Lawler tries to reconcile these opposing visions by arguing that liberalism is good 
because its permissiveness leaves individuals and churches free to discover and perform 
their duties to God: it guarantees religion “the full freedom to achieve its own proper task 
of the spiritual liberation of man” (Lawler 1994, 139).  He and Neuhaus both seem to 
trust that if left free to do as they choose human beings will for the most part choose 
right.  But the arguments against negative liberty which they both espouse and the very 
powerful critiques of modern individualism which they present would seem to be 
powerful evidence that they themselves cannot entirely accept this.  Indeed, a great part 
of the Christian tradition to which they appeal held that if left free human beings, because 
they are fallen beings, would inevitably pursue profit and pleasure rather than virtue.  For 
this reason, Thomas Aquinas and other pre-modern thinkers taught that the ideal Biblical 
regime was not democracy but an illiberal aristocracy which uses the full force of the law 
to inculcate moral virtue and religious orthodoxy.  So, to put this problem another way, it 
would seem that Lawler and Neuhaus display a deep moral attachment to a liberal regime 
that leaves men on their own, but they also accept the Thomistic view according to which 
a regime’s justice depends on its capability to instill virtue in the citizenry.  But if 
liberalism is not the most effective regime at doing this, then these thinkers would have to 
jettison one of these two views and either accept democracy—and therewith the spiritual 
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diminution they abhor—or consider that an illiberal regime, by virtue of its capacity to 
lead humans to perform their duties to their Creator, would be by virtue of that very fact 
superior to it. 
 
A CONTEMPORARY RETURN TO ORTHODOXY 
To gain greater clarity about what is at issue here, it may be helpful to turn to an 
author who has articulated that “extreme view” about the character of the American 
regime which Lawler criticizes.  Robert P. Kraynak has elaborated a provocative critique 
of the Enlightenment which is intended to show that liberalism threatens to bring about a 
spiritual and intellectual decline precisely because its fundamental precepts are wholly 
opposed to Christian understandings of politics.  Contemporary religious thinkers, he 
writes, are correct to say that democracy needs Christianity to ground its “deepest moral 
claims . . . about the innate worth and dignity of every individual” (Kraynak 2001, xii),30 
but their insistence that the Christian teaching on human dignity sanctions a liberal 
conception of justice is the result of a confusion which causes them to read “notions like 
democracy and human rights” (xiii) into the Bible.  Because they are deeply attached to 
both Christianity and modern liberalism, they have not adequately reflected on the extent 
to which those two bodies of ideas oppose one another, and they have attempted, by hook 
or by crook, to fuse them “together in their hearts and minds” (7).  Today’s leading 
Christians, Kraynak challenges, expect the Christian teaching about human dignity to 
                                                
30 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this section come from this work. 
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serve as a check on liberal individualism, but as they interpret it, that teaching is itself 
liberal and individualistic, and it has thus been permeated by the very same ideas it is 
meant to restrain.  
Kraynak’s central thesis, which, as he alleges, his fellow Christians have failed to 
appreciate, is that “modern liberal-democracy needs God, but God is not as liberal or as 
democratic as we would like Him to be” (xiii, emphasis original).  This becomes readily 
apparent once one appreciates the extent to which modern thought broke completely with 
the Biblical tradition and tried to establish a political order which was at its core secular 
and even atheistic.  Kraynak’s critique of the Enlightenment’s ill effects on the human 
soul is also his attempt to refute the notion held by thinkers like Lawler and Neuhaus that 
the origins of modern democracy presuppose, even in some inchoate way, a continuation 
of the Christian tradition.  It is true, he writes, that modern liberal thinkers propagated the 
egalitarian idea that every person has “inherent worth” (21), but they drew this insight not 
from Biblical sources but instead by denying “that objective knowledge of the highest 
good is possible to obtain” (xii).  The most fundamental argument for the existence of 
liberal rights, Kraynak therefore insists, suffers from a deep-seated self-contradiction.  
Liberal philosophers “from Locke and Kant to Rorty and Rawls” have all inspired an 
idealistic “passion for justice” (18), but they have attempted to ground this on 
popularized skepticism and on the widespread belief that there are no natural or 
theological supports for human dignity (21).  They tried, paradoxically, to show that 
precisely because  “the universe is ordered by scientific laws that are indifferent to man” 
humans are free to “assert their own dignity by showing that they are autonomous beings 
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and masters of their fate” (21).  To see what Kraynak has in mind here, one need only 
recall that John Locke’s political arguments for natural rights in the Second Treatise and 
A Letter Concerning Toleration were accompanied, in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, by an endorsement of the relativistic position that there is no summum 
bonum in human life.31   
As Kraynak summarizes the Enlightenment’s thought, nature’s indifference to our 
fate permits our “willful creations” to “take precedence as sources of human dignity or 
worth” (21-2).  Such core moral absolutes as “individual rights and democratic consent” 
(21) therefore rest on the anti-Biblical understanding that humans have no duties to God, 
that they are free to do as they wish, and that there are no limits to what they can 
accomplish for themselves.  Thus liberated, humans can now give attention to the goods 
properly of concern to them—to life, liberty, and property, goods which henceforward 
become the centerpiece of a new notion of rights.  But these rights, now endowed with a 
sense of moral worth such that they are considered worth dying for, are ultimately rooted 
in a conception of liberty which is entirely negative because it is founded on the idea that 
there is no summum bonum to which humans must aspire (22).  It is here, according to 
Kraynak, that liberal thought reveals itself to be ultimately self-undermining, for a purely 
negative conception of liberty can never provide the basis for such sacrifice or devotion.  
As early as Locke, who inspired our modern ideas of democratic freedom but who also 
claimed “that there is no essential trait . . . that clearly distinguishes human beings from 
                                                
31 See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.21.55. 
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the other animals” (32),32 the modern school of natural right is “at cross-purposes with 
itself, exalting and debasing man from one moment to the next” (32).  As the centuries 
proceeded, according to Kraynak, subsequent modern thinkers radicalized Locke’s 
paradox and made ever greater demands for dignity combined with even more extreme 
declarations of doubt.  Finally, this problematic line of thinking reached its apex in the 
anti-foundationalism of thinkers like “Rorty, Dworkin, Ackerman, and Rawls” (35)—all 
of whom deny the possibility of any kind of “foundation for justice” all the while 
incoherently insisting upon “an absolute moral imperative to treat all people with equal 
concern and respect” (36 ).   
According to Kraynak, this last incarnation of modernity’s “strange mixture of 
nihilism and moralism” (36) has finally brought about the spiritually inferior society 
which was latent in the democratic project from its beginning.  This, he argues, is most 
visibly apparent in a set of “weaknesses and anxieties” which currently pervade the West 
(10) and which can be attributed to the moral relativism which thinkers like Rawls and 
Rorty have spread “to the general public under the banner of enlightened thinking” (xii).  
Since the most common argument now given to defend democracy “derives from moral 
relativism” and praises its permissiveness, it is no wonder that “most political leaders and 
citizens” are unsure of liberalism’s purpose and “uncertain about how to defend its 
fundamental principles” (10).  And this lethargy, in turn, has had profoundly deleterious 
effects on our society.  Liberalism has certainly eradicated the economic “misery and 
degradation” (28) of the pre-modern age, but it has also replaced a high culture that 
                                                
32 Kraynak’s reference is to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.27.10. 
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aspired “to spiritual, philosophical, artistic, and heroic greatness” with a popular one 
“dedicated to the mundane pursuits of ordinary people” (27).  As a result, what we 
witness today is a society which lacks any kind of deep meaning or purpose, “a society 
dominated by the prosaic activities of material production and consumption, usually in 
the sterile atmosphere of an urban office building and impersonal suburb, where the chief 
concerns of people are economic security and status, bourgeois creature comforts, and 
physical health” (Kraynak 28).  Therefore, although modern democracy ostensibly leaves 
citizens free to pursue whatever way of life they wish, the vast majority can be counted 
on to make an identical choice.  What the unrestricted liberty that democracy grants to 
each “leads to most of the time,” in the words of Ernest Fortin, is neither “a noble 
dedication to some pre-given ideal, nor a deeper religious life, nor a rich and diversified 
society, but easygoing indifference and mindless conformism” (quoted on 29). 
Far from endorsing the right-wing populism of a Lasch or a Neuhaus, then, 
Kraynak makes no attempt to conceal the anti-democratic character of his argument.  
Although he certainly has great respect for some of democracy’s accomplishments, he 
frankly admits that his first loyalties lie with a Christian tradition which holds that 
political hierarchy and illiberal penal laws are absolutely indispensable requirements for 
the cultivation of religious virtue.  A large part of his book consists of a tour through the 
Bible and the Christian theological tradition which endeavors to show that Scripture’s 
understanding of political life could not be more opposed to that of liberal-democracy.  
He shows, for example, that the Covenant Theology of the Hebrew Bible “is 
undemocratic” (46), for while the Book of Exodus does contain a narrative of national 
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liberation, that liberation is carried out “for the purpose of putting on the yoke of the law 
in the polity of Moses” (48).  The intrusive penal law of the Old Testament regulates “all 
aspects of religious, personal, and social life” (49) because it is rooted in the recognition 
that man’s fallen nature will lead most with the freedom to choose not to choose virtue.  
It seeks “to make the Israelites a holy people like their holy God . . . and holiness 
demands severe punishments” (49).  In a similar fashion, although the New Testament 
contains an egalitarian spiritual message favoring “the poor and the humble over the rich 
and the powerful” (52), according to Kraynak this should not be misconstrued as support 
for democracy.  On the contrary, precisely because the Gospel gives priority to salvation 
in the next world, its message of “inner freedom” is perfectly compatible “with obedience 
to external political authority, even with political oppression” (53).   
Now, in Kraynak’s estimation, because the overwhelming majority of 
contemporary Christians have lost sight of this, because they have secularized the Bible’s 
idea of human dignity by equating it with a support for democracy and human rights in 
this world, they have infused their faith with the very tendencies which they would also 
like it to counterbalance.  In so doing, they have not only undercut “the political utility of 
religion” (168), but they have also given religious authority to a “skeptical and 
subversive” line of thinking which is antithetical to the very idea of religious duty (169).  
As an antidote to this, Kraynak advocates what he admits will be a “difficult and 
unpopular” position (169), namely that the whole idea of rights—and with it, the entire 
liberal understanding of justice—should simply be jettisoned.  Since rights are founded 
on skepticism and “conceptions of autonomous freedom” (169), they liberate self-love 
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and the appetites of “our fallen nature” (171).  They cause the body to triumph over the 
soul, and they “eventually swallow up higher ends and subvert all higher authorities, 
including the churches and theologians who defend them while trying to avoid their 
negative side effects” (171).  Indeed, as he writes, even attempted half-way houses such 
as so-called positive or restricted rights will not “lead people to a sense of gratitude and 
duty to God” because their “deep premise” remains “the autonomous self—the belief that 
man is born free and can determine his own destiny without being dependent upon others 
or beholden to higher powers” (172).   
As a replacement for rights, Kraynak proposes something he calls “limited 
government under God” (185) or “constitutionalism without liberalism” (267)—a vision 
of political life which accepts the realities of modern democracy on prudential grounds 
but which in its key principles is fundamentally hostile to it.  This vision holds that 
government “is instituted by God” and not, as the Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution assert, by consent of the people (184).  It maintains that “the obligation to 
obey political rulers is a religious duty” (184), and it therefore completely overturns the 
separation of church and state.  After all, the modern notion of an unconditional “right to 
religious freedom” relegates “the One True Religion” to the status of a mere private 
association and in so doing gives error “the same rights as the ultimate, cosmic truth” 
(179).  Error of course can be tolerated “as a matter of prudence” (179), but in principle 
Kraynak’s state espouses a Thomistic vision of political life which rejects freedom of 
conscience and takes an active hand in leading human beings “upward toward virtue and 
piety” (184)—i.e. towards correct belief.  
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The foremost task of Kraynak’s state will therefore be to shape “the characters 
and souls of citizens” by instilling in their minds a concern for “religious duties” and for 
“Christian orthodoxy” (189).  This illiberal aim of course requires hierarchy rather than 
democracy, and so Kraynak proposes strengthening potential aristocratic elements in 
American society such as “undemocratic religious traditions, the social leadership of 
upper classes, elite institutions of higher learning, and patriarchal authority figures,” all 
of which once “served as checks on the irresponsible freedom and equality of a mass 
democracy” (238).  More specifically, a return to a more authentically Christian political 
order requires placing restraints on capitalism (242), returning prayer to public schools, 
and protecting “the Christian family”—a task which can be accomplished by outlawing 
homosexual marriage, promoting “prolife legislation,” and making “divorce extremely 
difficult or nearly impossible” (221).  The last of these will of course require placing 
“some curbs on contemporary feminism” in order to preserve “the divinely ordained and 
natural distinctions between men and women,” but Kraynak is confident that it will be 
possible to dispel “the unspiritual idea . . . that motherhood and homemaking are 
unworthy tasks of modern educated women” (221).   
As this brief summary of Kraynak’s politics should hopefully make clear, many 
of his practical proposals would likely be unpalatable even to most religious 
conservatives who agree with his assessment of modernity’s spiritually damaging 
character.  Lawler, Neuhaus, and the leaders of the orthodox camp whose views Hunter 
catalogues may wish to outlaw abortion and same-sex marriage, but they also remain 
deeply attached to such fundamental liberal principles as human rights and religious 
 57 
pluralism—as becomes evident when they speak of finding new foundations for 
democracy in a broad-based and doctrinally capacious “Judeo-Christian” consensus 
rather than in one specific brand of orthodoxy.  Moreover, as Wolfe shows, large 
numbers of ordinary Americans who are either socially moderate or somewhat 
sympathetic to the Right do have serious concerns about the direction of popular culture, 
but they would almost certainly balk at Kraynak’s assertion that doing something about it 
requires outlawing divorce and returning women to the home.  But Kraynak’s larger 
point, which our understandable reaction to his anti-democratic politics should not blind 
us to, is that conservatives who accept his analysis of modernity’s problems cannot 
coherently also shy away from his aristocratic solution.  If they reject the Enlightenment, 
he suggests, then they also cannot delude themselves into thinking that they can preserve 
the political order it created—and especially not by reading support for it into the Bible.   
Kraynak’s most important contribution, then, is to show that the vision of 
liberalism espoused by today’s religious conservatives is fundamentally ridden with 
tensions.  The praise of religious freedom (and perhaps also the de-emphasis of original 
sin) which is found in the work of Lawler and Neuhaus seems to owe much to the same 
Enlightenment outlooks which they also critique.  Indeed, as we will see more clearly in 
the next two chapters, one important aspect of the Enlightenment’s theological reforms 
consisted in an attempt to lay the basis for freedom of conscience by effectively reading 
out of the Bible any commandment to believe.  By calling attention to the way in which 
the thought of leading Christian intellectuals has been unknowingly influenced by such 
Enlightenment teachings, Kraynak poses a challenge not only to them, but also to all 
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friends of liberalism.  In the first place, although his critique of the whole modern 
tradition is bracing, one might object that it is also brief, polemical, and painted with a 
broad brush.  Therefore, to discover the origins of the contemporary religious outlooks 
which he faults, and also to see whether his criticism of the moral and political thought of 
the Enlightenment is justified, it will be necessary to conduct an examination of those 
seventeenth century authors who helped to change the way the Bible is read.  By turning 
first to Locke, whose arguments Lawler and Neuhaus both accept and criticize, we will 
be able to consider whether it is truly the case that liberalism’s origins endowed it with an 
inescapable spiritual void.  But even if we find that Locke’s denial of a summum bonum 
leaves him vulnerable to Kraynak’s criticism, it would seem that there remains an 
alternative foundation for liberalism in Spinoza, a thinker whom Kraynak never 
mentions, and who not only refuses to endorse a position of skepticism or relativism, but 
who also promises a truly high-aiming liberalism—a liberalism characterized by the 
flourishing of philosophy and high culture, by the presence of deep patriotism and civic 
virtue, and all within an atmosphere in which orthodox Biblical piety has been decisively 
undermined.   
Secondly, Kraynak’s attempted aristocratic revival would also seem to invite a 
consideration of Tocqueville, who wrote in large part to convince partisans of religion 
and aristocracy of the need to accept democracy.  Tocqueville famously warned of the 
potentially dire effects which democracy could have on the human soul, but he also 
believed that religion could counteract that danger without at the same time 
fundamentally undermining basic liberal principles.  Indeed, Tocqueville wrote at a time 
 59 
which he famously proclaimed to be irreversibly democratic—a time in which arguments 
in favor of overturning democracy were bound to have little influence.  For a very similar 
reason, Kraynak’s illiberal arguments are considerably beyond the pale of what is 
politically acceptable in America today; aside from perhaps leading to disillusionment 
among a certain segment of the population, it is hard to see what practical influence they 
could have.  But that disillusionment, that loss of confidence in the meaning and purpose 
of our liberal democracy, would be by no means trivial.  Indeed, the loss of confidence 
which Kraynak himself so ably describes as characteristic of today’s society would 
appear to be a symptom of the near-universal rejection of Enlightenment principles which 
is now characteristic not only of the Right, but of the Left and the Center as well.  For 
this political situation, which is not so different from the one that was present in the 
nineteenth century, attention to Tocqueville’s friendly critique of the Enlightenment 
would seem to be most useful.  For even while rejecting as unhealthy many of the key 
insights of modern political rationalism, and even while noting the great spiritual 
despair—and even the inclination for suicide—which gripped individuals in modern 
democracy, Tocqueville warned of the dangers of aristocratic revival, and he drew from 
his observations of America the hope to develop a new political science that could re-
instill democracy with a spiritual aim and purpose. 
 
 60 
RAWLS’ PROGRESSIVIST LIBERALISM: DEMOCRACY AS RADICAL PLURALISM 
 The thought of the progressive Left, as we have seen it expressed in ordinary 
political discourse, rejects both traditional religion and the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment because it is deeply suspicious that all absolutist claims are incompatible 
with democratic pluralism.  This conception of political life understands liberalism 
chiefly a regime of diversity which gives individuals and groups the freedom to pursue 
whatever moral visions give meaning and purpose to their lives.  Because liberalism, so 
the thought goes, aims to foster the authentic development of a multitudinous variety of 
conflicting and incommensurable moral notions, it cannot without self-contradiction 
attempt to ground itself on any foundational claims—for all such claims, it is alleged, 
necessarily stifle expressive liberty, seek coercively to mold a naturally occurring 
diversity into an artificial uniformity, and thus are inextricably linked to political 
authoritarianism.  Among contemporary thinkers, perhaps no one gives a more elaborate 
and detailed articulation of this position than the later John Rawls.  Having abandoned as 
unworkable and even as undemocratic the idea implicit in A Theory of Justice that 
liberalism should claim the loyalty of citizens on the basis of a shared “comprehensive” 
moral outlook, Rawls attempts in Political Liberalism to draw the blueprints for a 
“freestanding” democratic society which protects all the usual liberal freedoms without 
rooting itself in any philosophical foundations.   
 Rawls’ opening premise is that “modern democratic society is characterized . . . 
by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (xvi).33  
                                                
33 Unless otherwise noted, all references in the remainder of this chapter section come from Rawls 2005. 
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Liberalism, he suggests, is in its essence a regime of moral diversity; its very purpose is 
the fostering and accommodation of difference, and so democratic citizenries are by 
definition “profoundly divided” among “religious, philosophical, and moral” worldviews 
which, despite their common “reasonableness,” differ on the most fundamental points 
(xviii).  Democratic political life is not just characterized by the usual sorts of 
disagreement but instead by “the most intractable struggles”—struggles which transcend 
the level of ordinary politics and are waged “for the sake of the highest things: for 
religion, for philosophical views of the world, and for different moral conceptions of the 
good” (4).  Far from regrettable, however, this deep moral disagreement, Rawls insists, is 
but “the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free 
institutions” (xxiv).  Because democracy, in essence, is pluralism, the moral conflict 
which it produces is inherent in the idea of liberalism itself—so much so that any 
conception of justice which tried to do away with it by asserting its own absolute moral 
claims “would not be liberal” (143).  
 Rawls thus insists that philosophical absolutism is inseparable from political 
absolutism: the idea that citizens should espouse a common “comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine” is inherently undemocratic because any such consensus 
“can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power” (37).  Rawls terms this 
insight “the fact of oppression,” and he maintains that even liberal and democratic 
comprehensive doctrines such as those of Kant and Mill, if allowed to govern society, 
will inevitably violate their own principles and mimic the Spanish Inquisition, whose 
occurrence “was not an accident” but a necessary consequence of the public insistence on 
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moral uniformity (37).  The society which Rawls described in A Theory of Justice, he 
now maintains, suffered from precisely this defect: because it required that citizens “hold 
the same comprehensive doctrine,” its argument relied on “a premise the realization of 
which its principles of justice rule out” (xl).  A truly liberal society, Rawls now insists, 
must therefore be wholly inclusive, and to this end he now promises that because the 
conception of justice described in Political Liberalism will not assert the truth of its own 
principles, it can even peacefully incorporate the adherents of various “religious and 
nonliberal doctrines” (xlv) who reject them.  Political liberalism, he writes, “is sharply 
different from and rejects Enlightenment liberalism.”  Because the latter “attacked 
orthodox Christianity” (1997, 804)—and did so, one might add, on account of 
Christianity’s hostility to liberalism—it failed to realize its own principles.  Genuine 
liberalism therefore, according to Rawls, should not be traced back to “an Enlightenment 
project” of secular rationalism (xviii) but instead to the aftermath of the European wars of 
religion (xxiv), when the adherents of violently conflicting and irreconcilable moral 
outlooks compromised with one another and recognized the “new social possibility” of a 
“pluralist society” which could incorporate all these views because it espoused none of 
them (xxv). 
 But if liberal-democracy arose by integrating all these conflicting doctrines 
without altering them in the least, it would seem reasonable to ask how it ever became so 
“harmonious and stable” (xxv).  Rawls himself is somewhat taken aback by this: as he 
acknowledges at the beginning of his work, given the extent of moral conflict in today’s 
pluralist democracies, it is “remarkable that . . . just cooperation between free and equal 
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citizens is possible at all” (4).  But Rawls’ project is not simply to explain how it is that 
citizens of today’s democracies can get along, for he repeatedly insists that his vision of 
political life is not to be “a mere modus vivendi” (145).  His society will not just be stable 
but instead stable “for the right reasons” (xxxvii).  It will be a product not of compromise 
but of consensus, and the loyalty which citizens feel for it will be not utilitarian but 
“wholehearted” (xxxviii).  If we had earlier taken Rawls’ praise of democracy’s radical 
moral divisions and his disavowal of any comprehensive claims on the part of the liberal 
state to imply that citizens should not remain attached to liberalism at a deep moral level, 
it now seems that this was a profound mistake.  On the contrary, Rawls insists that his 
“political conception of justice”—which affirms the value of pluralism and a respect for 
citizens’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines—is “itself a moral conception” which all 
citizens can affirm “on moral grounds”(147).   
 Even while denying that it is possible to have any kind of moral agreement within 
pluralist democracies, then, Rawls also insists that just such an agreement is possible—
provided it is limited to the domain of the political.  To see how Rawls attempts to avoid 
this seeming contradiction, it will be necessary to recall that the pluralism which he 
attributes to democratic societies is not “simple pluralism” (164) or “pluralism as such” 
(144) but “reasonable pluralism” (xviii)—a pluralism which, as previously noted, consists 
only of “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (xvi).  Now reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, as Rawls appears to define them, are those which do “not reject the essentials 
of a democratic regime” (xvi).  Unlike “unreasonable,” “irrational,” or “mad,” 
comprehensive doctrines, which can only be contained “so that they do not undermine the 
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unity and justice of society” (xvi-xvii), reasonable comprehensive doctrines appear to 
have something innate in them which makes them amenable to democratic norms and 
principles.  They, and not their unreasonable and illiberal counterparts, can compose the 
basis of an overlapping consensus which can claim the allegiance of citizens at a deep 
moral level.  This is possible because in a society marked by reasonable pluralism 
citizens simultaneously espouse “both a comprehensive doctrine and the focal political 
conception,” which are “somehow related” (xix).  Each citizen in a Rawlsian polity, so 
the thought seems to be, will have a comprehensive doctrine which is primarily 
concerned with the “nonpublic” realm (220), but this in turn will support a conception of 
justice—an endorsement of basic liberal principles—which is limited to a distinct, 
political sphere.  Because every reasonable comprehensive doctrine can be expected to 
support the overlapping consensus from its own point of view, citizens—whose primary 
loyalties lie with these doctrines—can endorse liberal-democracy with real moral 
conviction (11-12).   
 But if the moral conflict which characterizes modern democracy is carried out 
exclusively between reasonable views, and if reasonable views are primarily defined by 
their acceptance of basic liberal norms, is this conflict is really as dire as Rawls 
supposes?   Indeed, what seems to set reasonable comprehensive doctrines apart from 
unreasonable ones in his thought is that the former accept their own nonpolitical status, 
and Rawls acknowledges that he can count on this because he finds it already present in 
liberal society.  As he puts it, the “dualism in political liberalism” between the single 
“political conception” and the various (nonpolitical) “comprehensive doctrines” arises 
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not “from philosophy” but instead from “the special nature of democratic political culture 
as marked by reasonable pluralism” (xxi).  Because democratic societies affirm a 
separation between the political and the nonpolitical, the reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines which are loyal to it also endorse that same separation.  Contemporary 
Catholics, for example, are reasonable because, although they oppose abortion and 
decline to practice it among themselves, they nonetheless respect a right to it “as 
belonging to legitimate law.”  To do otherwise or to resist that law “with force . . . would 
be unreasonable,” because “it would mean their attempting to impose their own 
comprehensive doctrine” on others who do not accept it (lv).  Confining their moral 
reasoning merely to themselves, they deny a right to abortion solely to those who, it must 
be said, have voluntarily joined their fold (and could voluntarily leave it).  They thus 
tacitly endorse the position of the liberal state that abortion (like religious belief or 
church-membership) is a personal choice, and their doctrine is reasonable because it 
holds that in cases where the law of that state conflicts with their deeply held religious 
tenets, it is the latter which must give way. 
Reasonable pluralism as Rawls describes it may therefore divide citizens “deeply” 
(10), but only at the level of “the personal, the familial, and the associational” (10).  
When it comes to politics, the deep sources of meaning which so separate these 
competing worldviews can be set aside, and an overlapping consensus which endorses a 
common conception of justice can easily be discovered.  This is because comprehensive 
doctrines belong to what Rawls calls “the ‘background culture’ of civil society.  This is 
the culture of the social, not of the political.  It is the culture of daily life, of its many 
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associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and 
teams, to mention a few” (14).  Rawls thus seems to suggest that what is truly “of value 
in human life” and what gives citizens their deepest purposes and reasons for living, can 
be found in such nonpolitical attachments as friendship, family, and “associational 
relationships” (13).  These “nonpolitical aims and commitments” (30) are so fundamental 
that without them “we would be disoriented and unable to carry on,” and when they 
change—as they frequently do—“we are likely to say that we are no longer the same 
person” because we have acquired a new moral identity (31).  But because they are 
merely associational, individuals remain free to adopt or reject them at their leisure 
without any corresponding change in their political status or civil rights.  “On the road to 
Damascus Saul of Tarsus becomes Paul the Apostle.  Yet such a conversion implies no 
change in our public or institutional identity” (31).   
Now, this remarkable statement seems to invite the response that a conversion to 
Christianity under the Roman Empire was not as politically inconsequential as would be 
a conversion to or from any of the various religious sects which are peaceably 
incorporated into liberal society today.  In assuming that religion is merely a nonpublic 
association,34 and furthermore that the various churches, being ‘reasonable,’ view 
themselves that way, does not Rawls here presuppose something which is true of liberal-
democracies but which was not so readily apparent in the societies which preceded them?  
                                                
34 Rawls uses the term ‘nonpublic’ rather than ‘private’ because he believes that “there is no such thing as 
private reason” (220 n.7).  The underlying thought here seems to be that the reasoning employed by 
associations is still of a communal character.  In this section I follow Rawls’ usage, even though his terms 
‘nonpublic’ and ‘nonpolitical’ seem to be more or less equivalent to what the Enlightenment sought to 
make ‘private.’ 
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To begin to grapple with this problem, it should first be observed that the comprehensive 
doctrines which will be included in Rawls’ overlapping consensus all “respect the limits 
of, and serve a role within, the [liberal] political conception of justice” (176).  As 
previously noted, what makes them reasonable is that they support liberal norms on their 
own terms.  To this end, Rawls acknowledges that ‘public reason’—the body of moral 
language which he will permit citizens to use when discussing their fundamental 
principles—is composed of “a family of political conceptions of justice” (1997, 773), but 
this family is only made up of “many liberalisms” (1997, 774).  Followers of Locke, of 
Mill, of Kant, and of various tolerant and liberalized religious outlooks will all be able to 
contribute to it, but their disagreements will pale in comparison to their consensus on 
what Rawls frequently calls “matters of basic justice.”  They may argue with one another 
about how to interpret or “order, or balance” their “political principles and values,” but 
they can do so only because at a deeper level they all “specify the same ones” (1997, 
774).    
 
REASONABLENESS AS AN ENLIGHTENMENT INHERITANCE 
Rawls’ original promise, of course, was that he would show how various 
conflicting liberal and illiberal comprehensive doctrines could give their support to 
liberal-democracy.  In now admitting that, on the contrary, the deep divisions which 
characterize today’s pluralist societies are in fact intramural ones between convinced 
liberal-democrats, he seems to reveal that he presupposes the moral agreement which he 
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was supposed to construct.  As he acknowledges at the opening of his work, ideas about 
justice in modern democracies are actually quite uniform: “religious toleration is now 
accepted, and arguments for persecution are no longer openly professed; similarly, 
slavery, which caused our Civil War, is rejected as inherently unjust, and however much 
the aftermath of slavery may persist in social policies and unavowed attitudes, no one is 
willing to defend it” (8).  Because basic liberal principles are universally assented to, 
Rawls writes that his only task will be to “collect such settled convictions” and on that 
basis to “try to organize the basic ideals and principles implicit in” them into “a coherent 
political conception of justice” (8).  Rather than build a liberal consensus among various 
illiberal parties, he will look to the “shared fund of implicitly recognized ideas and 
principles” which are already present in our culture and then present these in a way that 
accurately reflects “our most firmly held convictions” (8).  These convictions, to be sure, 
inevitably give rise to an “enduring controversy,” but only over “the most appropriate 
understanding of liberty and equality” (9).  On the desirability of those values themselves 
we are all already agreed. 
Rawls, it therefore appears, is not actually manufacturing much of a moral 
consensus for liberal-democracy, since by appealing to one that already exists he 
implicitly invites to the bargaining table only those parties who already respect a regime 
of toleration.35  Modern democracies, it therefore appears, are not actually so diverse after 
all, for when it comes to basic questions of justice, “in a well-ordered society supported 
                                                
35Owen writes that “the capacity of people to come to an agreement despite their supposedly profound 
differences is not so amazing, since Rawls has from the outset included as parties to the discussion only 
 69 
by an overlapping consensus,” citizens’ “political values and commitments . . . are 
roughly the same” (31-2).  Indeed, it is precisely this deep agreement on political 
fundamentals that makes it unnecessary for Rawls to attempt to justify liberalism before 
an independent standard.  Because the liberals who exclusively make up his audience are 
all agreed on certain fundamentals, he can say that he is only trying to put into order “our 
considered convictions” (26), or to articulate the “conception of justice” which is “most 
reasonable for us” (28, emphasis added).  That conception will obviously be a liberal one 
because, as he tautologically states, “the most reasonable political conception of justice 
for a democratic regime will be, broadly speaking, liberal” (156).  Because we are all 
convinced liberals and likely to remain so, we can be counted on to remain loyal to a 
liberal view which “removes from the political agenda the most divisive issues, serious 
contention about which must undermine the bases of social cooperation” (157).  Our 
tradition presupposes that religion, for example, has been relegated to what Rawls calls 
the ‘background culture’ and thus that the principle of “liberty of conscience, which takes 
the truths of religion off the political agenda,” is established (151).  In a democratic 
regime, theological challenges to liberalism have joined arguments in favor of slavery 
and serfdom as matters which are simply considered beyond the pale of acceptable public 
discourse: “these matters are reasonably taken as fixed, as correctly settled once and for 
all.  They are part of the public charter of a constitutional regime and not a suitable topic 
for ongoing debate and discussion” (151 n.16). 
                                                                                                                                            
those liberals who do not differ on the crucial political question at issue.”  As such, “Rawls’s ‘overlapping 
consensus’ presupposes itself” (Owen 2001, 113-4). 
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Now Rawls, of course, does not simply regard this gag-rule as a historical 
inheritance.  As he acknowledges, “that certain matters are reasonably taken off the 
political agenda does not mean that a political conception of justice should not provide 
the grounds and reasons why this should be done” (152).  But in Rawls’ overlapping 
consensus this task is left to the various comprehensive doctrines themselves, and so it 
would appear that if he is to count on their support he must in fact presuppose a certain 
historical inheritance in which only certain types of comprehensive doctrines exist.  In 
particular, his thought would seem to require that the religious groups present in his 
polity view themselves as nonpublic associations and accordingly refrain from taking 
their claims of theological orthodoxy so seriously that they would deny freedom of 
conscience either to their own members or to outsiders.  Rawls acknowledges that to be 
considered reasonable religions must endorse what he calls “an account of free faith,” a 
doctrine which upholds the spiritual autonomy of the individual and accordingly permits 
him to seek his own salvation by choosing his church for himself (170).  Rawls has few 
doubts, however, that “except for certain kinds of fundamentalism, all the main historical 
religions admit of such an account and thus may be seen as reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines” (170).36  After introducing the idea of this account of free faith, however, 
Rawls in a corresponding footnote explicitly associates it with Locke’s Letter Concerning 
Toleration, and he points out seven of Locke’s key conclusions which, taken together, 
                                                
36 It is true that Rawls cautions that he may be assuming this “too optimistically” (170).  In a 1998 letter 
proposing revisions to Political Liberalism, however, he drops this note of qualification and confidently 
asserts that “Catholicism (since Vatican II),” along with “much of Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam,” can 
all find a home in his polity: “I hold that, except for fundamentalism, they can support a constitutional 
democratic regime” (438). 
 71 
establish the primacy of the individual conscience in theological matters and subordinate 
the church to secular authority and to the claims of reason.37  Each of these claims were 
of course highly controversial in Locke’s day, and Locke thus had to argue that they were 
not just reasonable in Rawls’ sense but also true.  Rawls, however, seems able to remain 
confident that what he calls fundamentalism will not pose much of a challenge to his 
project, and this is because the kind of religious believers whom Locke was arguing 
against have now largely disappeared.  As Rawls himself acknowledges, the religious 
views which are dominant in today’s liberal societies are no longer akin to those 
espoused by “Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth century” (148).  Because both of 
these faiths “held that it was the duty of the ruler to uphold the true religion and to repress 
the spread of heresy,” toleration among them would have been “a mere modus vivendi” 
and subject to abandonment once the political situation changed (148).  In order for real 
moral agreement on liberal principles to exist, Rawls acknowledges, views such as these 
had to be marginalized, and liberal society now remains harmonious and stable because 
the adherents of such salvationist religions “are very much in the minority, and are likely 
to remain so” (148).   
Now of course, Rawls had opened the book by claiming that liberalism first arose 
when these two religions came to a common moral understanding which, however, also 
allowed them to preserve their most fundamental moral differences.  What he now admits 
                                                
37 These conclusions are: (1) “God has given no man authority over another;” (2) “no man can abandon the 
care of his salvation to the care of another;” (3) “the understanding cannot be compelled by force to belief;” 
(4) “the care of men’s souls is not given to the magistrate as that would determine faith by where we were 
born;” (5) “a church is a voluntary society, and no man is bound to any particular church and he may leave 
it as freely as he entered;” (6) “excommunication does not affect civil relationships;” (7) “only faith and 
inward sincerity gain our salvation and acceptance with God” (145 n.12). 
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is that such a thing would have been impossible, and indeed, its very idea would seem to 
be incoherent.  Instead, he implies that liberalism as we know it today is the beneficiary 
of a certain theological transformation which occurred sometime around the seventeenth 
century and which made Catholicism and Protestantism other than they once were.  Both 
of these religions have now adopted Lockean theological outlooks according to which 
churches are but “associations” and are therefore akin in their political status, it must be 
said, to the likes of “universities, scientific societies and professional groups” (220).  “In 
a democratic society,” Rawls writes, “the authority of churches over their members” is 
“freely accepted” (221).  Understanding this, modern religious denominations recognize 
the liberty of individuals to make up their own minds on theological questions, to seek 
their salvation wherever they judge best, and thus to enter or leave congregations freely: 
“Whatever comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral views we hold are . . . freely 
accepted, politically speaking; for given liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, we 
impose any such doctrine on ourselves” (222).  The worst sentence that a church can pass 
is that of excommunication, but as Rawls notes (while drawing on Locke), this effects no 
change in the civil rights of the one who is excommunicated (145 n.12).  In short, modern 
churches most characteristically recognize that they have no right to command citizens in 
the same way that the state does, for “as free and equal citizens,” to decide whether we 
accept church teachings “is regarded as within our political competence specified by 
basic constitutional rights and liberties.”  “By contrast, the government’s authority cannot 
be evaded except by leaving the territory over which it governs, and not always then” 
(222).   
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To make the nature of this theological inheritance a bit clearer, it will be helpful 
to consider the strain that Rawls’ professed neutrality begins to face as he confronts the 
following very powerful objection: “Certain truths, it may be said, concern things so 
important that differences about them have to be fought out, even should this mean civil 
war” (151).  Such an objection has much in common with the kinds of religious claims 
which the Enlightenment argued against.  Since a regime of toleration, so the thought 
goes, legitimizes heresy and idolatry in principle, is it not worth destroying, even at the 
risk of great amounts of bloodshed?  After all, how can we be sure that the temporal good 
of civil peace should be preferred to the heavenly bliss of salvation, especially when it is 
our duty to love our neighbors and therefore not to allow them to put their souls in 
jeopardy by falling into error?  Thomas Hobbes, in a chapter entitled “Of What is 
Necessary for a Man’s Reception into the Kingdom of Heaven,” noted that the “most 
frequent pretext of sedition and civil war” has to do with the unresolved difficulty of 
when one should obey God and when one should obey one’s civil sovereign.  Because 
nothing on earth can possibly compare with the joys or the pains of another life, it would 
obviously be “madness,” says Hobbes, to obey man over God when doing so carries the 
risk of “being damned to eternal death” (Leviathan xliii.1-2).  To secure allegiance to the 
secular state, the philosophers of the Enlightenment had to show not only that salvation 
does not demand that we change our neighbors’ religious opinions, but indeed, as Locke 
argued in A Letter Concerning Toleration, that to attempt do so by force places one’s soul 
in danger of perdition.  To quell the civil wars of their own time, in other words, these 
thinkers had to provide an answer to the question posed in Hobbes’ chapter title and 
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weigh in on matters theological.  Rawls, on the other hand, can only tell us that religions 
which claim that the “values of salvation and eternal life” outweigh the “worldly values” 
of liberal politics are all by definition unreasonable (1997, 801-2). 
But of course, that a particular viewpoint is unreasonable does not necessarily 
make it false, and still less does it make it politically inconsequential.  Rawls thus needs 
to acknowledge the potential existence of what he calls “the apparent paradox of public 
reason”—a dilemma which holds that it is neither reasonable nor rational for citizens not 
to look to “the whole truth as they see it” when that truth conflicts with the liberal state’s 
conception of justice (216).  If a member of an illiberal religious sect believes that his 
duty to God demands that he forcibly convert those who do not share his views, how can 
he be expected to drop this demand simply because the liberal regime regards such 
behavior as unjust?  For Rawls, this problem is solved only because there are no such 
believers in his polity.  As he writes, “when the political conception is supported by an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the paradox of public 
reason disappears” (218, emphasis added).  Because the only religions which endorse his 
overlapping consensus sanction freedom of conscience on theological grounds and have 
thus “adapted to the conception of justice” he describes (219), religious intolerance is 
simply not the problem for Rawls that it was for the Enlightenment thinkers.  The account 
of free faith which Locke provided has indeed transformed all the major Christian 
religions and permitted them to endorse liberal principles, and Rawls can therefore safely 
count on an ecumenical theological uniformity which was created for him by his 
predecessors.  But considering that Rawls’ state will refuse on principle to make any 
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substantive theological claims, it would seem in a poor position not only to justify those 
claims before outsiders, but also to encourage a truly zealous devotion to the cause of 
toleration on the part of its own citizens.  
 
CIVIC EDUCATION AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF STATE NEUTRALITY 
At this point, then, it would appear that Rawls’ polity faces the following 
difficulty.  Despite his insistence to the contrary, his regime of radical diversity actually 
seems to be characterized by an underlying uniformity—a uniformity which has been 
bequeathed to contemporary society by the same Enlightenment rationalism which he has 
claimed to reject on account of its intolerance towards orthodox religion.  But since 
Rawls too will not admit truly orthodox believers into his polity, that polity can neither 
justify that exclusion nor provide a foundation for the deep moral commitment to liberal-
democracy which its citizens, as he assumes, will feel.  Now of course, it might be 
assumed, as Rawls had first led us to believe, that this is not such a problem, for each 
comprehensive doctrine, as we recall, is supposed to inspire a moral confidence in the 
justice of liberal principles on the strength of its own authority.  But as Rawls continues, 
he begins to indicate that these nonpublic viewpoints are actually quite weak.  Qualifying 
his earlier description of the overlapping consensus, Rawls now writes that in actual 
political life, “the allegiance to a principle of political justice” rarely depends upon “the 
knowledge of or the belief in its derivation from a comprehensive view” (159-60).  What 
is more important, he insists, is that that conception of justice be seen by citizens as 
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“reasonable in itself” or “as part of a pluralist view” (160), reasonableness and respect for 
pluralism having much the same meaning to Rawls.  Most people in liberal society, he 
therefore seems to suggest, are actually not that firmly attached to their comprehensive 
doctrines, nor have they really reflected all that much upon them, but they are firm in 
their moral attachment to a regime of toleration.  “In everyday life,” Rawls writes, “we 
have not usually decided, or even thought much about,” how our comprehensive 
doctrines relate to the political conception.  “Most people’s religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines are not seen by them as fully general and comprehensive,” and there “is 
lots of slippage, so to speak” (160).  Comprehensive doctrines are highly malleable, and 
people generally choose them without thinking much about what they have to say about 
politics: “Should an incompatibility later be recognized between the principles of justice 
and their wider doctrines, then they might very well adjust or revise these doctrines rather 
than reject those [liberal] principles” (160).  
But if the political realm is authoritative in this way, and if citizens are more 
deeply attached to the liberal regime than they are to their various nonpublic associations, 
then that regime would appear to face the need to assert itself and to make exactly the 
kinds of absolute moral claims which Rawls would have it eschew.  Since liberal-
democracy, as he acknowledges, tends to make “citizens’ comprehensive views 
reasonable if they were not so before” (163-4), it would seem bound to engage in exactly 
that kind of moral and cultural formation which Rawls would like to avoid.  But it may 
very well do this not through the oppressive use of state power, as Rawls had earlier 
implied, but through more gentle and less noticeable ways.  Thus, even if they are not 
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officially outlawed, intolerant religious views will likely “cease to exist” in Rawls’ 
society for the obvious reason that they will fail to gain adherents among a citizenry that 
is attached to contrary principles (196-7).  But as he also acknowledges, such an 
occurrence would not be simply coincidental, for the liberal regime will necessary also 
lay down authoritative “constraints to which all churches and associations are subject” 
(1997, 789).  Although Rawls is certainly willing to tolerate a certain amount of anti-
democratic behavior within churches if their members consent to it—as found, say, in 
Catholicism’s refusal to ordain female priests—that is as far as his acceptance of illiberal 
religion can extend.  In their external behavior, Rawlsian churches will have no choice 
but to respect the tenets of liberalism.  If they do otherwise they will be acting 
unreasonably, and if they teach otherwise their loyalty to liberalism will not be for the 
right reasons.  As Rawls admits, the regime of rights which is the hallmark of liberal 
society is all-encompassing; if it is to have any force, it must penetrate every area of life 
and govern the behavior even of individuals: “If the so-called private sphere is alleged to 
be a space exempt from justice, then there is no such thing” (1997, 791).   
Now, this deeply moralistic assertion seems quite at odds, to say the least, with 
Rawls’ original anti-foundationalist premises.  He is now forced to admit quite explicitly 
not only that the liberal state requires moral uniformity, but also that it must create that 
uniformity by favoring certain comprehensive outlooks at the expense of others.  But 
since Rawls’ opening premise was that any such behavior is by definition illiberal and 
undemocratic, he has to ask himself whether the effective exclusion of these illiberal 
comprehensive doctrines is unfair to them.  “Is the political conception,” he asks, 
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“arbitrarily biased against these views” (197)?  His answer, however, is powerful and 
direct: it is not unfair to them because “social influences favoring some doctrines over 
others cannot be avoided by any view of political justice.  No society can include within 
itself all forms of life” (197).  Rawls wrings his hands and laments “the limited space, as 
it were, of social worlds,” but he ultimately concedes that no polity can avoid the need to 
“exclude some ways of life that realize in special ways certain fundamental values” 
(197).  Rawls therefore finds that he must do what he said he would not do and place a 
limit upon pluralism, and as he continues he also seems to go further and to suggest that 
this restriction will not simply be arbitrary, or based solely upon what “we” prefer, but 
will in fact require that the liberal state make certain theological claims.   
What if, for example, there are illiberal elements in the background culture which 
pose a challenge to fundamental liberal principles?  In a very revealing passage, Rawls 
admits that in such a case the democratic state may have to assert that the views of its 
adversaries are not just unreasonable in his sense but also false.  In “affirming a political 
conception of justice,” he writes, “we may eventually have to assert at least certain 
aspects of own comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine” (152).   
This will happen whenever someone insists, for example, that certain 
questions are so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled 
justifies civil strife.  The religious salvation of those holding a particular 
religion, or indeed the salvation of a whole people, may be said to depend 
on it.  At this point we may have no alternative but to deny this, or to imply 
its denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had hoped to avoid 
(152, emphasis added). 
 
In times of crisis, or when forced to mount a principled defense of its own freedoms, 
Rawls’ state must abandon its professed neutrality.  When religious believers assert that a 
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concern for salvation justifies curtailing citizens’ liberty of conscience, the Rawlsian state 
will oppose them.  In so doing, it will try, as far as it can, to refrain from making 
references to any comprehensive doctrine, but as Rawls plainly admits, “Of course, we do 
not believe the doctrine believers here assert, and this is shown by what we do” (153).  
As Owen points out, “This final admission is explosive.  For since the liberal state must 
act, and since it cannot take any religious prescription as authoritative for its actions, the 
liberal state in principle denies that there are any true, politically relevant religious 
prescriptions.  Liberalism rests on a theological premise” (Owen 2001, 119, emphasis 
original).  That premise, indeed, involves an answer to the most important question as 
concerns man’s relationship to God, namely that of what is or is not required in order to 
gain entrance to the kingdom of heaven.  As Rawls admits, “our actions” which we take 
to defend the liberty of conscience “imply that we believe the concern for salvation does 
not require anything incompatible with that liberty” (153, emphasis added). 
 Rawls, then, seems to be reluctantly confronting the fact that politics is 
authoritative in a way that sits uneasily with his earlier assertions about how the deepest 
sources of human identity and meaning can be found in nonpublic, associational 
attachments.  The liberal state, it now appears, provides authoritative answers to certain 
crucial questions.  By shaping not just the moral but also the theological outlooks of 
citizens, it takes the leading role in the formation of human character.  Rawls, as 
previously noted, acknowledges that liberal-democracies tend to make comprehensive 
doctrines reasonable and tolerant (36, 144), but he also goes so far as to suggest that a 
liberal regime may also need to “affirm the superiority of certain forms of moral 
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character and encourage certain moral virtues” (194).  “Even though political liberalism . 
. . is neutral in its aim” (194), its need to promote the cultivation of certain kinds of 
comprehensive doctrines and discourage others justifies taking “reasonable measures” to 
“strengthen the virtues of toleration” (195), civility, reasonableness, and fairness (194).  
The Rawlsian state, it now appears, will not stop at imposing “restrictions on permissible 
comprehensive views;” it will go further and “inevitably encourage some ways of life and 
discourage others, or even exclude them altogether” (195).  In particular, it will promote 
an ethic of civility, tolerance, and cooperation, and to this end, even if it denies doing any 
such thing, it will encourage the development of a liberal or bourgeois way of life marked 
by compromise, a sense of fair play, and a desire to get along with others.  Such a way of 
life, of course, will not give serious importance to religious questions, but will likely tend 
to regard the often violent theological disputes of the past as tragic impediments to the 
more reasonable (and thoroughly this-worldly) goals of peace, security, good-
neighborliness, and economic well-being. 
 Now Rawls is understandably troubled by his need to admit that his radically 
pluralist liberal state will need to encourage certain ways of life and discourage others.  
Unlike the thinkers of the Enlightenment, who saw this clearly but believed that this 
endeavor was called for by reason or natural right, Rawls has to ask “whether how it does 
this is just” (196)—that is, just in his pluralistic sense of the term.  How can liberalism 
encourage and discourage certain comprehensive doctrines and ways of life while 
nonetheless refraining from taking any actions “intended to favor any particular 
comprehensive view” (196)?  Has Rawls not here been forced into a simple 
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contradiction—a contradiction which not only undermines his promise to incorporate 
illiberal religious believers into his polity but which also reveals that that polity’s 
diversity masks an underlying and altogether necessary moral uniformity?  Indeed, what 
Rawls may not adequately consider is the way in which the commitment to pluralism 
itself creates a specific kind of homogeneity which centers around a common agreement 
on the benefits of diversity and which excludes those who deny this claim.   
Perhaps nothing better illustrates this than Rawls’ discussion of compulsory civic 
education.  Rawls tries to concede as much as he can to parents who belong to religious 
sects which “oppose the culture of the modern world and wish to lead their common life 
apart from its influences” (199).  He tries to draw a contrast between his own 
requirements for education and those of Kant and Mill, but on the fundamental point he 
nonetheless holds fast.  Political liberalism, he writes, “will ask that children’s education 
include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for 
example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is 
not a legal crime” (199).  Although Rawls tries to carve out as much room as possible for 
religious sects which oppose modernity, that cannot extend to a complete toleration of 
illiberal political teachings.  These sects do not enjoy a total monopoly on the education 
of their children for the very simple reason that the liberal regime under which they live 
considers those children not as wholly subordinate to their parents but as autonomous 
beings with rights.  Since among the most prominent of those rights is the liberty of 
conscience, the liberal regime must ensure that those children know when they come of 
age that they are free to decide for themselves which religious association they would like 
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to belong to, and this means that it must close down as unreasonable any religious school 
which would bring them up to believe otherwise.   
 Since the education he calls for is far from radically pluralist, then, Rawls must 
answer the sensible objection “that requiring children to understand the political 
conception in these ways is in effect, though not in intention, to educate them to a 
comprehensive liberal conception” (199).  His response to this is to capitulate, though 
apologetically: “It must be granted,” he writes, “that this may indeed happen in the case 
of some.  And certainly there is some resemblance between the values of political 
liberalism and the values of the comprehensive liberalism of Kant and Mill” (200).  To 
give children the choice between liberal and illiberal conceptions of political life is not a 
step that Rawls is willing to take; when his support for liberal-democracy comes into 
conflict with his support for pluralism, he recognizes that it is the latter which must give 
way.  His professed openness to all ways of life is really an openness only to those ways 
of life which accept liberal principles, and considering that he has also admitted the 
relatively superficial character of liberalism’s diversity, it may well be an openness only 
to a single way of life.  Thus, although he would hesitate to express himself in these 
terms, his future citizens must be taught that liberal principles are true ones.  “The 
unavoidable consequences of reasonable requirements for children’s education,” he 
writes, “may have to be accepted, often with regret” (200).  To be sure, Rawls repeats, 
“Justice as fairness honors, as far as it can, the claims of those who wish to withdraw 
from the modern world in accordance with the injunctions of their religion, provided only 
that they acknowledge the principles of the political conception of justice and appreciate 
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its political ideals of person and society” (200).  But of course, any reclusive sect which 
endorsed toleration, individual autonomy, and freedom of conscience would only 
apparently withdraw from the modern world; in the crucial, political sense, it would 
remain very much a part of it because it would accept the fundamental tenets of modern 
liberalism.   
  
THE WEAKNESS OF RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM 
 Since the superficial diversity of Rawls’ pluralism actually masks a deeper 
uniformity, the problem which his work is meant to solve is therefore not the “torturing 
question” (1997, 803) which he first pronounced it to be.  Because the citizens of today’s 
democratic regimes share a common allegiance to basic liberal principles, their 
differences are not so fundamental and their cooperation is not so surprising.  At the same 
time that Rawls admits the need for this uniformity, however, his continuing endorsement 
of anti-foundationalism renders him unable to provide the robust moral defense of liberal-
democracy which he can not help but acknowledge as necessary.  Indeed, he goes out of 
his way to apologize for offering such a defense, and it is therefore tempting to wonder 
just how much confidence in liberal principles the recipients of a Rawlsian civic 
education would actually come away with.  Since they would also be taught that appeals 
to moral absolutes are undemocratic, the students in a Rawlsian civics class would likely 
receive at best a half-hearted explanation of the virtues of their own political tradition—
an explanation that would present that tradition as characterized chiefly by 
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nonjudgmentalism, that would regard its need to assert itself as at best a necessary evil, 
and that would therefore seem unlikely have the necessary tools at its disposal in those 
emergency situations when there really is a need to make comprehensive claims.   
 Rawlsian citizens would therefore be raised to look upon “the fundamental ideas 
of a democratic society” (40) as meaningful because of their communal character, that is, 
as a part of the heritage which “we” who are committed to them happen to share.  But the 
kind of communal attachment to which Rawls appeals is hardly robust, since, after all, it 
springs from the same distrust of moral absolutism which leads him to defend only 
grudgingly—and therefore unsatisfactorily—those liberal principles to which he is so 
obviously attached.  Thus, as previously indicated, in his reluctance to make any truth-
claims he insists that his conception of justice “starts from within a certain political 
tradition” (1985, 225) and therefore can only describe and clarify, rather than justify, 
“what we now think” (26).  Now, to be sure, Rawls says that political philosophy arises 
in response to “deep political conflicts” (45), and he imagines as an example of such a 
conflict a quarrel between Alexander Stephens and Abraham Lincoln over the South’s 
principled defense of slavery.  Remarkably, however, his account of this hypothetical 
conversation suggests that liberalism is incapable of defending its own principles of 
justice before an independent standard and thus that it cannot show the moral error even 
of a defender of a slave-society.  “No political conception of justice,” he writes, “could 
have weight with us unless it helped to put in order our considered convictions of justice 
at all levels of generality” (45).  Now to be sure, Rawls would label doctrines such as 
Stephens’ as ‘unreasonable’ or ‘mad’ and exclude them from his overlapping consensus, 
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but he could do so only on the basis of a pre-existing cultural agreement on the 
definitions of sanity.   “Political philosophy,” he comments in an extraordinary and 
surprising statement, cannot exist apart from traditions of “political thought and 
practice,” and it therefore “cannot coerce our considered convictions any more than the 
principles of logic can” (45).   
But one could of course respond to this with the obvious objection that the 
principles of logic can do precisely this.  If, for example, a view which we hold dear is 
actually confused or self-contradictory, is it not the task of political philosophy, 
Socratically understood, to point out these tensions and to help us to find a more clear-
sighted path?  Rawls’ brand of political philosophy, on the contrary, cannot oppose the 
moral convictions which it takes to be of primary importance in human life.38  Simply 
put, Rawls seems to suppose that we are our prejudices—and unfortunately, his defense 
of liberalism turns out to be similarly dogmatic.  Because it roots itself entirely within our 
current political tradition, political liberalism declines to engage the arguments of those 
who are not a part of that tradition.  In what is perhaps his most lucid statement of this, 
Rawls again takes up the objection which a thinker like Kraynak might pose.  Some 
“fundamentalist religious doctrines,” he writes, “will reject the ideas of public reason and 
deliberative democracy” (1997, 805-6).  Their adherents will “say that democracy leads 
to a culture contrary to their religion” and will “assert that the religiously true . . . 
                                                
38 See also Rawls’ introductory remarks to his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy: “Political 
philosophy has no special access to fundamental truths, or reasonable ideas, about justice and the common 
good, or to other basic notions.  Its merit, to the extent it has any, is that by study and reflection it may 
elaborate deeper and more instructive conceptions of basic political ideas that help us to clarify our 
judgments about the institutions and policies of a democratic regime” (Rawls 2007, 1, emphasis added). 
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overrides the politically reasonable” (1997, 806).  Rawls’ response to these claims this 
time is not to engage them, much less to claim that they are misguided, but simply to 
assert that they can have no place in liberal society: “We simply say that such a doctrine 
is politically unreasonable.  Within political liberalism nothing more need be said” (1997, 
806). 
Rawls, then, seems both to acknowledge and to deny that liberalism needs to 
justify itself on what he would call comprehensive grounds.  He finds all such appeals to 
moral truth to be politically suspect and hostile the flourishing of pluralism, but his 
objections to such absolutist claims are rooted in a deep-seated loyalty to a certain picture 
of democracy which he simultaneously seems to accept as a moral absolute.  His thought 
therefore appears to provide a particularly lucid and thoughtful representation of that 
combination of relativism and moralism which Hunter finds to be so prevalent among 
contemporary progressives.  He sees (rightly) that modern democracy contains a diversity 
of competing and irreconcilable worldviews, but he also appears not to acknowledge 
sufficiently the extent to which that pluralism is limited to secondary or nonpolitical 
matters.  Thus mistaking superficial pluralism for deep pluralism, Rawls takes for granted 
the existence of a certain moral outlook which endorses toleration and freedom of 
conscience and which originated as a product of the Enlightenment’s reform of religion.  
His loyalty to democracy compels him to acknowledge the need for its most fundamental 
principles to be defended, but his simultaneous endorsement of anti-foundationalism and 
his suspicion that any such defense would be somehow illiberal leaves him incapable of 
providing it.  The apologies which he presents for occasionally asserting the justice of his 
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own way of life would therefore seem to be indicative of a lack of self-confidence, and 
indeed, of a spiritual lethargy that may very well be present throughout the society which 
he often claims to be merely describing.  
The thinkers of the Enlightenment, however, had no such qualms, and their 
arguments on behalf of democracy, toleration, liberty of conscience, and other basic 
freedoms were presented in the full awareness that these principles would have to be 
justified before an audience whose religious disposition rendered it fundamentally hostile 
to them.  Locke and Spinoza in particular tried to argue for freedom of speech and 
thought while fully aware that the Bible, at least as interpreted in their time, did not 
sanction the account of free faith which Rawls is confident can be attributed to it.  They 
therefore provided arguments for these principles which appealed not only to universal 
reason but also to a new interpretation of Scripture—an interpretation which was 
intended to change how we think about what a church is, who should be tolerated, and 
what God requires of us in order to attain salvation.  If we are therefore to make headway 
in discovering the principled defense of liberal freedoms which Rawls requires but cannot 
provide, it is to these Enlightenment thinkers that we must first turn. 
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Chapter 3: Locke’s Reasonable Christianity 
“There is an innumerable multitude of sects in the United States.  All differ in the 
worship one must render to the Creator, but all agree on the duties of men toward one 
another.  Each sect therefore adores God in its manner, but all sects preach the same 
morality in the name of God.  If it serves man very much as an individual that his religion 
be true, this is not so for society.  Society has nothing to fear nor to hope from the other 
life; and what is most important to it is not so much that all citizen profess the true 
religion but that they profess a religion.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 278 
 
“It is also from this point of view that the inhabitants of the United States themselves 
consider religious beliefs.  I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion—for 
who can read to the bottom of hearts?—but I am sure that they believe it necessary to the 
maintenance of republican institutions.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 280. 
 
“America is, however, still the place in the world where the Christian religion has most 
preserved genuine powers over souls.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 278 
 
The analysis contained in the previous chapter has raised some troubling 
questions about the most common attempts to preserve the political fruits of the 
Enlightenment while jettisoning its rationalist foundations.  As we have seen, the most 
serious thinkers on both ends the political spectrum often show themselves to be 
unconsciously dependent on that same tradition of modern political rationalism which 
they criticize—and in particular, they display a common tendency to presuppose a 
particular understanding of religion which our society has inherited from the thinkers 
who laid its theoretical foundations.  The next two chapters will therefore attempt to 
make the nature of this inheritance clear by detailing how the Enlightenment sought to  
render Christianity less zealous and demanding—and therefore more pacific and 
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tolerant—than it was in pre-liberal societies.  They will try to show the ways in which the 
originators of early modern liberalism sought gradually and subtly to change the religious 
outlooks of the societies in which they lived, and how they therefore articulated that 
“account of free faith” which Rawls correctly diagnoses as ubiquitous in democracy 
today.  
Now, this intended project of cultural transformation is perhaps most clearly 
apparent in Benedict de Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise, which contains not only 
the first philosophic argument for a democratic republic devoted to the protection of 
freedom of thought and speech, but which also not coincidentally laid the foundations for 
modern ways of reading the Bible.  Spinoza’s suggestion that Scripture is best understood 
as historical and cultural literature—that its accounts of miracles and revelations should 
be seen as the poetic and imaginative expressions of a traditional, pre-scientific people, 
and that it was written not by a single author but was instead the product of a two-
thousand year process of literary accumulation—shocked his contemporaries, and they 
would no doubt still be considered shocking in some circles today.  Indeed, the sheer 
radicalism of Spinoza’s thought would appear to provide a reason to begin our 
investigation not with his work but instead with that of John Locke, whose writing has 
not only carried greater weight historically in the Anglo-American world,39 but whose 
religious teaching is also much more moderate than that of his contemporary, and who 
should therefore hold greater appeal across the current political spectrum.  Locke’s Letter 
                                                
39 The classic text here is Hartz 1955.  See also Curti 1937 and Miller 1943.  For an overview of the 
debates surrounding Locke’s place in early American political thought, see the discussions in Dworetz 
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Concerning Toleration, after all, articulates the classic liberal solution to the problem of 
the separation of church and state—a solution which rests on the creation of a distinction 
between a public sphere and a private sphere, and which accordingly consigns religion to 
the realm of the latter.40  But the Letter also joins that apparently secular teaching to a set 
of unmistakably theological claims.  Thus, in the work’s very first sentence Locke 
declares that he esteems “Toleration to be the chief Characteristical Mark of the True 
Church,” (23)41 and he then goes on to cite the authority of the Gospel in order to inveigh 
against the cruelties, and indeed the impieties, of religious persecution (23-4).   
Thus, despite his arguments for a version of what would become our secular 
doctrine of the separation of church and state, Locke’s foremost motivations are generally 
taken to be religious ones.  For this reason, his arguments for toleration are now 
commonly considered unacceptable by scholars working in the tradition of contemporary 
liberal thought.42  Indeed, not only does Locke ground his theory of toleration on Biblical 
arguments, but these religious underpinnings appear to be connected to a severe 
restriction on religious pluralism: in one of the most famous part of the Letter, Locke 
                                                                                                                                            
1990, 3-38 and Pangle 1988, 7-39.  For Locke’s influence in Great Britain and on the Continent, see Israel 
2001, 515-27. 
40 Myers calls the Letter “the founding document of modern political liberalism” (Myers 1998, 180).  Cf. 
also Wootton 1993, 105 
41 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Letter in this chapter are to William Popple’s English 
translation, which is contained in Locke 1983. 
42 See the discussion in Schwartzman 2005.  As Dunn writes in the introduction to his study of Locke’s 
political thought, “I simply cannot conceive of constructing an analysis of any issue in contemporary 
political theory around the affirmation or negation of anything which Locke says about political matters.  
The only argument in his entire political philosophy which does seem to me still to be interesting as a 
starting point for reflection about any issue of contemporary political theory is the theme of the Letters on 
Toleration, and in Locke’s thought this rests firmly upon a religious premise.  Indeed one of the central 
expository points made throughout this book is the innate dependence of an extremely high proportion of 
Locke’s arguments for their very intelligibility, let alone plausibility, on a series of theological 
commitments (Dunn 1969, x-xi; cf. also 1984, 59). 
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denies toleration not only to Roman Catholics and the intolerant, but also to atheists (49-
51).  In the minds of many contemporary liberals, these restrictions are sufficient to make 
Locke at best a proto-liberal thinker (cf. Israel 2006, 139-44; Wootton 1993, 104-6), and 
even attempts to claim that his arguments are acceptable potential constituents of a 
Rawlsian overlapping consensus must necessarily overlook the one condition which he 
apparently considered indispensable for the maintenance of a healthy liberal society (cf. 
Schwartzman 2005).  For it is not sufficient, according to Locke, simply to ensure that 
liberalized religious arguments exist alongside potentially atheistic ones, for the “taking 
away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all” (Letter 51, emphasis added). 
At the same time, however, these restrictions may also be a sign that Locke’s 
thought is both more clear-sighted and more moderate than that of most contemporary 
theorists.  For against thinkers on the Right like Kraynak, Locke promises to show that 
Christianity, properly interpreted, contains a robust and permanently enduring teaching 
about limited government, religious freedom, and human rights.  But on the other hand, 
against thinkers like Rawls, Locke’s thought appears to contain a sober (if religiously 
driven) assessment of the dangers of an increasingly secular kind of liberalism.  Indeed, 
there is good reason to suspect that he wrote The Reasonable of Christianity as a response 
to Spinoza and those more radical thinkers who were to follow in his wake.  In defending 
that work against the attacks of his antagonist John Edwards (Edwards 1984), Locke 
wrote that he had intended it “chiefly for those who were not yet thoroughly, or firmly, 
Christians,” and that he therefore had sought primarily—if not exclusively—to reach 
“those, who either wholly disbelieved, or doubted of the truth of the Christian religion” 
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(Locke [1823] 1963, 7:164).43  Intending to reach those who had “mistaken and 
slandered” Christianity, Locke had written, as he claimed, in the “hope of doing some 
service to decaying piety” (ibid., 165).  Now, considering that the audience which Locke 
sought primarily to reach was apparently made up of freethinkers, to say nothing of 
outright atheists, it would seem likely that his arguments in favor of piety would need to 
be crafted to appeal, at least at some level, to secular concerns.44  There would thus seem 
to be at least grounds to suspect that Locke may have sought to roll back a “decaying 
piety” by inculcating a mindset that is quite similar to the one described by Tocqueville 
in the quotations provided at the opening of this chapter: by showing the utility of 
religion in addition to arguing for its truth, Locke may have hoped to show not only that 
Spinoza had gone too far, but also that a concern for Christianity’s social benefits can 
allow it to preserve its “genuine powers over souls.”45 
There is therefore good reason to think that the liberalized yet nonetheless strong 
piety which Tocqueville claimed to have seen in America is very much of a piece with 
                                                
43 Helpful background on Edwards’ attack can be found in Higgins-Biddle 1999. 
44 The two major exceptions to the scholarly consensus regarding Locke primarily as a religious thinker are 
Macpherson 1962, 194-262 and Strauss 1953, 202-51.  Wootton discovers in Strauss and those who have 
accepted his interpretation a “simplification” of Locke’s thought which attributes to him a desire “to 
inculcate irreligion” (Wootton 2003, 69).  This allegation, of course, assumes that a thinker’s political 
teaching must necessarily reflect his personal religious beliefs.  It ignores the possibility that Locke may 
have been a rationalist who was convinced of the need to support popular religion in one form or another, 
and that he therefore may have written in a way that reflected his concern for this perceived need.  
45 Of course, the suggestion that Locke may be responding in part to Spinoza (as well as Hobbes) is 
obviously contradicted by his claim that he was “not so well read” in these authors “as to be able to say 
what their Opinions” were (Reply to the Bishop of Worcester, quoted in Higgins-Biddle 1999, xxix).  
Records of Locke’s library catalogue, however, show that he owned a copy of the Theologico-Political 
Treatise and the Opera Posthuma (as well as the Leviathan and other works by these two thinkers)  (see 
Harrison and Laslett 1965, 155, 238). 
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the “reasonable” Christianity which Locke articulated in his work of that title.46  He 
seems to promise the possibility of a religious outlook which liberal citizens can become 
attached to for the social benefits which it provides, but which does not also by that very 
fact risk undermining itself.  He claims to show that religion is or can be made tolerant 
without becoming empty of real spiritual content, and indeed, that the religious morality 
which all liberal faiths have in common can provide the basis for a spirited attachment on 
the part of citizens to the common good—an attachment which will prevent the liberal 
idea of individual freedom from giving way to a narrow or hedonistic selfishness.  To see 
this, it will be helpful to consider briefly the overall impression which Locke’ case for 
toleration conveys.  The Letter contains a number of interweaving arguments, but the one 
with which the work opens anticipates the claim of The Reasonableness of Christianity 
that the spirit of the Gospel “is that of Charity” (Locke [1823] 1963, 7:3).  As Locke 
defines it in the Letter, that spirit of charity, or the true teaching of the Church of Christ, 
commands the humane treatment even of “those that are not Christians” (Letter 23), and 
it therefore seems to suggest that the primary message of the Gospel is one about good 
works.  To be sure, he acknowledges throughout the Letter that only true belief and 
correct forms of worship can be acceptable to God, but he also presents persecution for 
                                                
46 The tremendously strong place which Lockean religious ideals held in America during the Revolutionary 
Period has been demonstrated by Dworetz (1990).  See especially his discussion of the New England 
clergy’s knowledge and admiration of Locke’s “scripture commentary” as early as the 1730s, and of their 
subsequent use of it in the 1770s to justify rebellion (ibid., ch. 5).  Dworetz’s account provides powerful 
historical evidence of the way in which Locke’s religious teaching successfully combined a concern for 
self-interest and individual rights with a spirited concern for religious duty.  He also records the way in 
which Locke’s interpretations of the Bible were able to transform some of the classic Christian proof-texts 
commanding obedience to the established authorities into mandates about the duty to resist such authorities 
when they become tyrannical (see esp. his brief discussion of Romans 13 on pp. 169-72).  For a broader 
discussion of the place of Locke’s theology—and that of Enlightenment religious ideas more generally—in 
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the sake of such things as a manifest sin which places souls “in danger of eternal 
Perdition” (24).  Thus, as Locke describes them in the Letter, “the introducing of 
Ceremonies” and “the establishment of Opinions”—“which for the most part are about 
nice and intricate Matters, that exceed the Capacity of ordinary Understandings” (24)—
would appear to be of much lesser importance than those rules of common decency 
which not only hold society together, but which also enable citizens to enjoy the “Life, 
Liberty, Health, and Indolency of Body” which are protected by the liberal regime (26). 
But it is possible to go further.  Because Locke is seeking to lay the basis not just 
for peace, but also for the idea that toleration is a duty as well as a right (Tarcov 1999, 
180)—and so too for a richer sense of social bonds—it is unlikely that he would have 
expected such bonds to form among citizens who believed one another to be damned on 
account of dogmas, ceremonies, and anything else that has little to do with moral 
behavior (cf. Myers 1998, 184-5).  Thus, the Letter declares most ceremonies, including 
baptism, to be but “frivolous things” which “might be observed or omitted” without 
prejudice to the salvation of souls.  Its overall impression is therefore, if not to denigrate 
the outward forms of worship, then at least to consider the emphasis placed upon them to 
be unfortunate, since this tends to “breed implacable Enmities amongst Christian 
Brethren, who are all agreed in the Substantial and truly Fundamental part of Religion” 
(36).  That substantial and fundamental part of religion, on the other hand, would appear 
capable of fostering some truly rich social bonds.  The same church that “judges not those 
that are without” will also embrace “all Men that are honest, peaceable and industrious” 
                                                                                                                                            
America throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Ahlstrom 1972, 343-63, 466, 518-9, as 
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(54; I Cor. 5:12-13).  As Tocqueville observed in America, the idea that a church is a 
private association which men can enter or leave in accordance with their consciences, 
and thus also that freedom of conscience and the rest of Christian morality are of greater 
importance than forms of worship, has the potential to create a “natural Fellowship” 
among men that can take a robust and spirited direction (31; cf. Tocqueville 2000, 281).  
Indeed, men who have been brought up to believe that “the Laws of Equity, both Humane 
and Divine,” are laid down to protect their private freedoms, will also be animated by that 
same sense of justice on those occasions when those rights are infringed.  If they should 
find it necessary, they will “think it lawful . . . to resist Force with Force, and to defend 
their natural Rights . . . with Arms as well as they can” (55). 
The potential success of Lockean liberalism therefore would seem to hinge on the 
subtle creation of a new kind of theology which will quietly, and unofficially, replace the 
intolerant brands of Christianity that he identifies at the opening of the Letter as nearly 
universally accepted in his own time.  Most famously, he denies the privilege of 
toleration to those churches that “will not own and teach the Duty of tolerating All men in 
matters of religion,” or perhaps even “in matters of meer Religion” (50).47  This proviso 
would have likely denied toleration to “almost all the churches of Locke’s day except the 
                                                                                                                                            
well as Curti 1937, 114-17. 
47 The word “meer” does not appear in the Latin text of the Letter, but it is present in Popple’s English 
translation (cf. Locke 1963, 90).  In the introduction to this edition of the Letter, Montuori argues that 
William Popple’s 1689 translation was based on a Latin text likely given to Popple by Locke himself and 
that “Locke followed Popple’s work very closely and certainly checked Popple’s translation” (Locke 1963, 
xl).  After noting several instances in which Locke either refused to repudiate, or even claimed credit for, 
Popple’s English version, Montuori concludes “without a shadow of a doubt, that Popple’s translation, 
supervised and approved by Locke, is rather a new edition” of the Letter “than an unauthorized translation 
of it” (Locke 1963, xlvi).  See the evidence he presents in Locke 1963, xxx-xlvi.  But cf. Wootton 1993, 
133 n.21.  
 96 
Quakers” (Tarcov 1999, 179-80), and so it seems that his intention must have been to lay 
the basis for a society that could not have come into existence within his own lifetime.  
He looks forward to an imagined future when “pulpits every where” will resound with his 
“Doctrine of Peace and Toleration” (34); when the faithful of all denominations will be 
taught from their first day in Sunday School that the Gospel commands a respect for the 
natural rights of others; and therefore when the overwhelming majority of citizens will 
agree to the proposition that any minister of God who teaches otherwise “understands 
not” or “neglects the Business of his Calling,” and that he shall consequently “one day 
give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace” (34).  The Lockean liberal state, in short, 
will have the legitimacy and the popular backing to deny intolerant faiths the right to free 
exercise because it will have come into being in part as the result of an educational 
project that will have subtly changed citizens’ views about what true religion requires.  
But to the extent that this new understanding of religion has been successfully 
implemented, this is a power that it will seldom if ever have to use. 
 
The Letter and the Reasonableness 
 Now of course, the Letter is a polemical work, and aside from a few scattered 
quotations from Scripture, its claim that toleration is “the chief Characteristical Mark of 
the True Church” is by and large a dogmatic one.  The ethic which it puts forth as the 
authentic teaching of the Gospel therefore presupposes a more direct and dialectical 
engagement with the New Testament, and Locke provides this in The Reasonableness of 
Christianity.  While a full appreciation of Locke’s religious teaching would require an 
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analysis not only of the Reasonableness and the Letter, but also of his other major 
works—a task which is obviously too large for present purposes—a brief examination of 
Locke’s treatment of the Gospel should shed some light on the specific character of the 
moral and religious ethic which he expected to characterize the future citizens of liberal-
democratic society.  This will not only help to elucidate the character of the religious 
outlook which Tocqueville found on display in America, but it will also serve as a 
springboard to a discussion of the more radical philosophic teaching of Spinoza. 
 But before delving into the Reasonableness, it will be helpful to say a few words 
about the puzzling relation of that work to the remainder of Locke’s corpus.  The 
overwhelming view among Locke scholars is that the Reasonableness was written at least 
partly in an attempt to remedy the defective arguments that were present in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding.  In the latter work, Locke had repeatedly asserted 
that morality is capable of demonstration, but he had also inexplicably failed to provide 
any such demonstration.  More specifically, he had claimed that morality requires a 
providential God “who sees Men in the dark” and has the power to reward or punish them 
according to their deeds (Essay I.3.6).  Thus, it follows that if morality can be 
demonstrated, such a God can be shown to exist as well, but although Locke promises to 
provide a proof to this effect (see, e.g., Essay IV.10.12), his attempt to do so is a 
notorious failure.48  It is therefore frequently claimed that Locke’s entire theoretical 
                                                
48 Dunn writes that “the Essay as a whole shows one glaring defect.  The demonstrative argument for 
God’s existence which it offers goes no distance at all towards establishing the reality of a God concerned 
to punish or save human beings.  The unmistakably Christian conception of a God on which Locke’s moral 
convictions rested could be vindicated only by an appeal to revelation” (1984, 84; cf. also 66 and 1969, 94-
5).  According to Dunn, this failure serves “to illuminate some of the key restraints on his imagination” 
(ibid., 86).  Similarly, Ashcraft throws up his hands at Locke’s “repetitious, dogmatic assertions.”  As he 
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project—which spanned at least four decades—ultimately showed itself to be marked by 
a deep incoherence; that he dedicated his life to showing that ethics, and hence also 
divine providence, could be demonstrated mathematically, but when he realized his 
inability to do this he took refuge at the end of his life in the study of Scripture, and the 
fruit of this was The Reasonableness of Christianity as well as A Paraphrase and Notes 
on the Epistles of St. Paul.49  This view of Locke therefore holds that his rationalist 
convictions were rooted at bottom in a deep and abiding Christian faith, and that although 
that faith may have been heterodox by the standards of the society in which he lived,50 it 
nevertheless led him to the view that reason at its utmost can do no more than come to 
recognize its “own self-limitations” (Ewing 1965, xviii).  Thus, although Locke may have 
failed in his endeavor to ground “the ethics of a gentleman” (Marshall 1994, 157) in 
unassisted reason, and although his life’s work as a whole may be ultimately disjointed, 
that failure was ultimately the product of deep and admirable sentiment which led him to 
concentrate all his efforts on trying to vindicate the particular code of selfless behavior 
which he termed the Law of Nature.51 
                                                                                                                                            
complains, “The circular reasoning of an argument which infers the existence of God from a perceived 
rational ordering of objects, and which defends the ‘rationality’ of that order in terms of God’s intentions, is 
never breached in the Essay.  Indeed, it is as though Locke is engaged in exploring the various radii of 
knowledge as they touch upon the perimeters of his beliefs, but never does he permit himself to step outside 
the circle of his faith” (Ashcraft 1969, 204-5).  See also Marshall 1994, 384.  But for a contrary 
perspective, see Owen 2007, 159ff. and Pangle 1988, 198-204, 214-5. 
49 Versions of this thought can be found in Ashcraft 1969, 218ff.; Dunn 1969, 187, 193-4; 1984, 66-7, 85; 
Higgins-Biddle 1999, xcix-ci; Marshall 1994, xii-xviii, 388, 449; and Wootton 1993, 111-12.  
50 Wootton, for example, tries to rescue Locke from the charge of rationalism by associating him with 
Socinianism (1993, 66ff.). 
51 Noble though it may have been, however, Locke’s outlook according to this presentation is not thereby 
appealing.  Thus, Dunn writes that Locke’s teaching on how one should live was even “from his own point 
of view a disastrous failure.  Unlike his theory of knowledge, it offers scarcely even the core of a view 
which we might ourselves hold” (1984, vi). 
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 Now, this line of interpretation seems to accord very much with the devout tone in 
which much of the Reasonableness is written, and it also seems to be urged on us by 
Locke himself, who scatters that work with the same kind of unfulfilled promises that 
pervade the Essay.  Its very title, after all, seems to promise exactly that proof of a 
providential God—and indeed, of the Christian God—which is missing from the Essay, 
and lest we overlook this clue, Locke also repeatedly informs the reader throughout the 
work that “the light of reason” has “revealed to all mankind” not only that God exists, but 
also that he is “good and merciful” (231[133]).52  It therefore appears incorrect to 
presuppose that Locke merely gave a “misleading title” to a work that was actually 
intended to proclaim “the failure of reason” (Spellman 1988, 129), or that by calling 
Christianity “reasonable” he really meant only that it was simple and straightforward—
i.e. “not extravagant, not forced, not extraordinary” (Yolton 1985, 88).  Rather, 
considering his claim to have written this work for a rationalist audience, it appears once 
again that he intended—and apparently failed—to show that the teachings of Jesus 
Christ, and especially his promise of heavenly rewards for virtue, can be demonstrated on 
rational grounds.  As we will shortly see, his argument to this effect will culminate in an 
almost laughably thin argument asserting that reason can attest to the veracity of Jesus’ 
miracles, which has predictably shown itself to be another easy source of criticism from 
contemporary scholars (see, e.g., Mooney and Imbrosciano 2005).  But to understand 
why Locke is apparently content to present himself like this, and why he is especially 
                                                
52 Unless otherwise noted, all references in the remainder of this chapter come from The Reasonableness, 
which I cite by paragraph number (helpfully provided in the Ewing edition) followed in square brackets by 
the corresponding page number in volume seven of The Works of John Locke (Locke [1823] 1963).   
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inclined to do so to a rationalist audience, it will be helpful, as the dominant 
interpretation encourages us to do, to pay attention to the connections which may exist 
between Locke’s moral teaching and his apparent attempts to show the rationality of the 
Christian revelation. 
 Locke claimed that he was prompted to write the Reasonableness when he was 
“accidentally” confronted with one of those religious quarrels that frequently “made so 
much noise and heat” among the dissenting churches of his day.53  Such violent disputes 
over theology were perhaps the distinguishing feature of political life in post-
Reformation England (to say nothing of Europe more generally), and Locke wrote the 
Letter, of course, in an attempt to bring them under control.  But whereas the Letter tries 
to establish that control by positing a set of unproven answers to theological questions, 
The Reasonableness “tends to peace and union among Christians” (Locke [1823] 1963, 
7:189) because, in Locke’s words, it provides “a stricter and more thorough inquiry into 
the question about justification” (ibid. 186).  As we had earlier been tempted to suspect, 
then,  it appears that the Reasonableness will provide those theological proofs that the 
Letter’s dogmatic assertions about the way to salvation cry out for.  It contains Locke’s 
confrontation with the “direct and plain” message which he says he encountered in 
Scripture (and which in turn seems inextricably linked to Christianity’s tendency to beget 
religious violence) “that it was faith that justified” (ibid. 186-7).54  In order to discover 
                                                
53 A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, in Locke [1823] 1963, 7:186. 
54 For a helpful analysis of the religious and political climate which spurred Locke to write the 
Reasonableness, and of the link between the New Testament’s emphasis on faith and Christianity’s 
historical tendency to produce “schisms, separations, contentions, animosities, quarrels, blood and 
butchery” (ibid. 358), see Zuckert 2002, 149-53.  
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the character of that faith, Locke claims that he undertook a fresh “reading of the New 
Testament”—a reading which examined only the words of the Bible itself, and which 
thus advantageously ignored nearly seventeen hundred years of interpretation.  Even 
more surprisingly, Locke acknowledges that the teaching which he gathered from this 
direct and literal reading of the Bible was so novel and so unconventional that it had 
absolutely nothing in common with any existing “systems of divinity.”  On the contrary, 
as he writes, “the general silence I had in my little reading met with, concerning any such 
thing, awed me with the apprehension of singularity” (ibid. 187).   
Paradoxically, the teaching which Locke discovered to be the plain and common 
sense understanding of Christianity was not shared in his time by a single actual 
Christian.55  He thus admits that his teaching is likely to come to sight as heterodox, at 
least by seventeenth century standards, and he also begins to hint at what he found to be 
defective about more ordinary interpretations of the Bible.  In the Second Vindication, at 
any rate, Locke mentions two distinct differences between his own interpretation of 
Scripture and that which is contained in the “books of divinity” which he has read.  
Firstly, Locke claims that he was the first to notice the way in which Jesus displayed an 
extreme caution in his public speeches and therefore communicated his most important 
messages indirectly, through “parables and figurative ways of speaking.”  Secondly, and 
of greater immediate importance, Locke says that he discovered evidence in the Bible for 
“the necessity” that a lawgiver such as Jesus “should be sent from God, for the reforming 
                                                
55 It was, however, shared by Thomas Hobbes, who, as Locke’s critic John Edwards pointed out, claimed 
in chapter xliii of the Leviathan that the only belief needed to make one a Christian is that Jesus is the 
Messiah.  See Edwards 1984, 129 along with Zuckert 2002, 154-5.   
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the morality of the world” (ibid. 187).  The Reasonableness, as previously mentioned, 
was therefore written not only to rebut the claims of orthodox theologians, but also (if not 
primarily) to answer the objections which were commonly “made by Deists against 
Christianity” (ibid. 188).  Those objections maintain that Christianity is unreasonable 
because it calls for the acceptance of dogmas that cannot be understood, and also that it is 
unnecessary—for society, so it is alleged, does not require support from supernatural 
revelation (ibid. 188).  Now, in thus arguing against Deism, Locke claims the rhetorical 
advantage that comes from opposing what appears to be a kind of barely concealed 
atheism, but he also makes a serious point about the dangers of popularized rationalism.  
For Deists and others like them may naively overlook the civic need for a popular belief 
in such things as reason cannot verify.  Indeed, as Locke insists, Christianity’s moral 
teaching (when properly reformed, to be sure) “might be of some use in the world” even 
now precisely because its teaching about divinely revealed law surpasses “all that 
philosophy and human reason” has “attained to, or could possibly make effectual to all 
degrees of mankind” (ibid. 188).   
 
SIN, REDEMPTION, AND MERIT 
The Reasonableness, then, appears to be an attempt to carve out a middle path 
between the views of orthodox theologians who oppose toleration, on the one hand, and 
those of Deists who are hostile to Christianity, on the other.  At the opening of the work, 
Locke finds these two positions represented in two “extreme” opinions about Adam’s 
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Fall and thus also about Christ’s redemption.  While “some men would have all Adam’s 
posterity doomed to eternal infinite punishment for the transgression of Adam, whom 
millions had never heard of, and no one had authorised to transact for him or be his 
representative; this seemed to others so little consistent with the justice or goodness of the 
great and infinite God, that they thought there was no redemption necessary” (1[4-5]).  
Now, the first position is precisely that of the traditional idea of original sin.  It holds that 
Adam’s sin brought about a corruption of human nature and “a state of guilt” that 
condemned all his posterity to “endless torment, in hellfire” (3[6]).  According to this 
view, it was only God’s grace in sending His son to mankind that permitted a select few 
to escape such a fate and to enter paradise, and then not through works but only through 
faith in Christ.  According to Locke, however, this idea is so far from that of authentic 
Christianity that it actually shakes “the foundations of all religion” (1[4]).  Those who 
object to it on the grounds that it undermines God’s justice are correct.  For God to 
condemn men to a final and irreversible death is one thing (for men, being naturally 
mortal, have “no right” to an everlasting existence), but for Him to put them “in a state of 
misery, worse than not being, without any fault or demerit of their own,” is quite another.  
This indeed “would be hard to reconcile with the notion we have of justice” and would in 
fact, as Locke quite baldly states, “confound good and evil, God and Satan” (5[8]).  Not 
only is the idea of original sin unjust, but, as Locke points out with relief, it is nowhere 
mentioned in the New Testament: “But, as I remember, everyone’s sin is charged upon 
himself only” (4[7]). 
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While Locke thus grants the objections which Deists pose to traditional 
Christianity, he also suggests that those objections do not apply to the authentic or 
original version of it which can be uncovered through an uncorrupted reading of the 
Bible.  But his message to the Deists also seems to be that they have not thought 
adequately about those moral concerns which have led them to reject original sin.  Their 
dissatisfaction with the idea of undeserved divine punishment, Locke suggests, leads 
them to “make Jesus Christ nothing but the restorer and preacher of pure natural religion; 
thereby doing violence to the whole tenour of the New Testament.”  Not only is it far-
fetched to read natural religion into the Bible, but it would also seem to hinder the task of 
moral edification which, as Locke will eventually argue, really composes the “whole 
tenour of the New Testament” (1[5]).  Locke’s compromise solution, as he states it 
initially, is that the Bible should be read as “a collection of writings, designed by God, for 
the instruction of the illiterate bulk of mankind, in the way to salvation” (1[4-5]).  For this 
task natural religion is insufficient, and the “illiterate bulk” need to regard the Gospel as a 
divinely revealed and therefore coherent work—a work which, to be sure, needs to be 
understood in a way that takes into account the language and the modes of speaking of 
the ancient Jews (1[5]), but which nonetheless was “designed by God” in its entirety.   
Now, Locke does not here say what the way to salvation is, nor does he indicate 
what opinion he thinks the literate minority ought to hold about it.  But since the 
traditional Christian teaching about justification rests upon the presupposition of original 
sin, it is hard to see how Locke’s view of that subject could avoid heterodoxy.  He claims 
that in paradise Adam enjoyed “a state of immortality, of life without end,” which he then 
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lost when he ate from the Tree of Knowledge (2[5]).  This immortality was not due to 
Adam by right but was given to him only by the grace of God (6[7-8]), and when God in 
turn expelled him from Eden and declared that he and all his posterity should eventually 
die, He committed no injustice.  Since humans have no right to anything beyond “a 
temporary mortal life,” God merely returned Adam’s descendents to the condition which 
nature had assigned them (5-6[7]).   But if Locke’s description of our condition here is 
disconcerting, it is also brief, and he does not give the reader much time to consider why 
a benevolent and all-powerful God would create us only to condemn us to an inevitable, 
final mortality.  Indeed, this view of human life would seem to be even more troubling 
than the one provided by original sin, since the latter at least gives an explanation for why 
the human condition is at it is.  But before the reader can think too much about this, 
Locke pulls back, and he raises the hopeful possibility of eternal life.  For by Jesus, “the 
second Adam,” men are “restored to life again, that so by Adam’s sin they may none of 
them lose anything, which by their own righteousness they might have a title to” (9[9]).  
As Locke thus surprisingly insists, according to Scripture all those who live their lives in 
“exact obedience to the law” do not receive immortality by God’s benevolence but in fact 
“have a claim of right to eternal life” (9[9]).56   
Now, his primary evidence for this is Romans 4:4: “to him that worketh is the 
reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt.”  But notwithstanding this quotation, the 
                                                
56 By claiming first that men have no right to anything other than a mortal condition and then almost 
immediately reversing himself, Locke obviously provides two contradictory answers to the question of 
whether by natural right men may become entitled to eternal life.  This tension remains present beneath the 
surface of the discussion that is to follow, and it provides the first hint that the Bible’s teaching about an 
afterlife, even as reinterpreted by Locke, may not actually enjoy the sanction of reason which he insists that 
it does.  Cf. Rabieh 1991, 948 n.12 and context. 
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Biblically alert reader should immediately be struck not only by this strange doctrine, but 
moreover by Locke’s claim to find it in the mouth of such an authority as St. Paul, who is 
perhaps the most prominent Biblical champion of the idea of justification by faith.  And 
indeed, Locke’s invocation of Romans here appears puzzling to say the least, for the 
words he quotes are immediately preceded by the claim that Abraham’s works could not 
justify him before God (Rom. 4:3, cf. also 4:13).  Indeed, in this passage as a whole Paul 
appears to be attacking the very position which Locke is arguing for, and this problem 
grows all the more acute when Locke glosses Jesus’ words at Luke 10:25 to show what is 
needed to inherit eternal life: “‘Do this,’ i.e. what is required by the law, ‘and thou shalt 
live’” (9[10]).  But what is “required by the law” according to this passage is not simply 
to obey the law, but to “love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, 
and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself” (Luke 
10:27).  What the Bible considers necessary for salvation, in other words, is not simply 
the performance of good works, but instead an internal disposition of loving devotion, to 
God and to others, which, because it is carried out with all one’s soul, is contaminated 
with no admixture whatsoever of concern for one’s own well-being or worldly prosperity.  
By providing such an unorthodox, and indeed, grossly erroneous reading of these Biblical 
passages so early in the work, Locke thus seems to be signaling to the careful reader what 
his strategy will be as he moves forward.  If his teaching here is any indication, it seems 
that he will attempt in what follows not just to interpret Scripture, but to impose onto it a 
new moral teaching which will seek to downplay the New Testament’s emphasis on 
selfless devotion. 
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But to return to Locke’s summary of the Biblical narrative, he claims that the law 
which guarantees human beings a right to immortality in return for obedience is “the law 
of reason” or “of nature” (14[11]); it is the unchangeable “eternal law of right” (20[13]) 
and it is identical to what Locke elsewhere calls the “law of works,” as distinguished 
from the “law of faith” (16[12]).  This law was revealed to the Jews in the moral part of 
the law of Moses (18, 20, 22[12-14]) and also to the Gentiles (as Locke discovers through 
a somewhat contentious reading of St. Paul) via natural reason, “their consciences 
bearing witness” (19, 22[13-14]; Romans 2:15).57  Part of that law, as announced by 
Christ and confirmed by reason, states that all who follow its prescriptions with absolute 
fidelity shall enjoy “eternal life and bliss” (12[11]), but those who fail to do so in “any 
way” or commit even a single transgression shall face the prospect of certain mortality 
(11[10]).  The only alternative to the existence of such a law is the authorization of 
“disorder, confusion, and wickedness,” for as Locke states (and this is as far as he goes at 
this point in showing the grounds for the law of works in natural reason), if disobedience 
is permitted in any small detail “government and order are at an end; and there can be no 
bounds set to the lawless exorbitancy of unconfined man” (14[11]). 
But although the law of works may require “an exact performance of every tittle” 
with no possibility of atonement (16-17[12]), it is also the case that humans all inevitably 
                                                
57 Locke inserts a parentheses into his quotation of Romans 2:14-15 which suggests that the Gentiles 
follow a “law written in their hearts” because they “find it reasonable to do” so (11[13]).  Paul, however, 
never mentions reason, and in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (I.3.8-9) Locke quite explicitly 
says that there is no such thing as the conscience.  
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sin and so are practically incapable of claiming a right to eternal life (12[10-11]).58  Were 
matters to stand thus, we would be without the hope for a better state (and virtue would 
similarly remain bereft of the possibility of reward).  Fortunately, according to Locke, 
“Christian believers have the privilege to be under the law of faith too” (23[15]), and 
under the terms of this law God, following the death and resurrection of Christ, has 
permitted faith “to supply the defect of full obedience” and has thus admitted believers 
“to life and immortality, as if they were righteous” (22[14]).  In Locke’s theology, as now 
becomes clear, reward and punishment are doled out “to every one according to his 
works” (6[8]), but faith can be used as a kind of currency that can be exchanged to make 
up for our inevitable moral failings.  None “are truly punished but for their own deeds” 
(6[8], emphasis added), and so while human beings are theoretically at liberty to think as 
they wish, in practice only believers in Christ can be saved.59   
To uncover this doctrine in the New Testament, Locke continually refers to Paul’s 
epistles, but it is worth paying attention once again to some of the differences between 
                                                
58 Spellman, who interprets all of Locke’s works as devoted to vindicating the traditional idea of original 
sin, understandably has some trouble with these opening passages.  Indeed, what is puzzling about Locke’s 
presentation here is that he is wholly silent as to why our reason—or even the maintenance of human 
societies—demands such a draconian law, nor does he explain why we are incapable of following it.  He 
thus seems to allow his more traditionally-minded readers to assume that he believes sin to be “the product 
of a voluntary but universal unwillingness to obey God’s law” (Spellman 1988, 140).  As we will soon see, 
later in the Reasonableness Locke reverses his position and claims that we are fallible and imperfect by 
nature and that we therefore have a reason to expect forgiveness (182[112])—which implies of course that 
our slips-up are not wholly voluntary. 
59 Believers therefore have everything to gain and nothing to lose by accepting Christ.  Indeed, throughout 
the Reasonableness Locke continually emphasizes the hopeful message of Jesus’ “good tidings” (84[46], 
99[53]) and pays little attention to the promises of hellfire with which he frequently threatens unbelievers.  
Locke does, however, mention these occasionally—e.g. at 45[26], 97[51], and 161[99]—perhaps to 
indicate the new gloss he is putting on the Biblical text (at 161[99] Locke even mentions the threat of 
damnation as a part of Christ’s “happy tidings”).  In these opening paragraphs, Locke states that the 
punishment of those who would not follow Jesus “was to lose their souls, i.e. their lives” (15[12]).  On 
Locke’s equivocation about hell, see Rabieh 954 n.16. 
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Locke and Paul in order to see where Locke quietly diverges from the traditional 
Christian teaching.  On the surface, their positions are similar, for both agree that, as a 
practical matter, only Christian believers have access to immortality.  But Locke’s 
deeper, theoretical disagreement with Paul would seem to be signaled by his repeated 
invocation in the work’s opening section of Paul’s statement that “By one man sin 
entered into the world, and death by sin” (2,6,10[6,7,10]; Rom. 5:12).  This, of course, is 
one of the clearest statements in the New Testament of the idea of original sin which 
Locke has claimed not to find in the Bible, and it is followed by a declaration, which 
Locke does not quote, that after the Fall “death reigned . . . even over them that had not 
sinned” (Rom. 5:14).  According to Paul, as previously intimated, even a complete 
adherence to the moral law is incapable of justifying someone before God.  Because 
humans are inherently corrupt, they have no capacity for holiness on their own, and they 
can only be redeemed to a state of immortality by God’s free gift of grace, something 
accessible solely to those with faith in Christ (Rom 5:15ff).  This, roughly put, is the 
orthodox position which Locke at the opening of the work had declared to be 
incompatible “with the notion we have of justice” (6[8]), and as he proceeds it becomes 
clear that one of his overall goals in this work will be to read it out of the Bible.  He 
claims (without reference to Scripture), that “Where there is no law, there is no sin.”  In 
such a state, he insists, nothing is required of men and “all are righteous equally, with or 
without faith” (21[13-14]).  Thus, when Paul said that “all have sinned and come short of 
the glory of God” (Rom. 3:23), he meant that obedience to the law must be sufficient to 
justify men and achieve that glory, for otherwise the very idea of sin would be 
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incomprehensible (19[13]).  This reasoning, however, is alien to Paul, for whom law is 
not the definer of right and wrong—or a set of commandments whose fulfillment thus 
justifies one according to merit—but a punishment, or a sign of man’s fallen nature.  Sin 
“is not imputed when there is no law” (Rom. 5:13) because a state without law would be 
one where man would be free of the corruptions and depravities that make law 
necessary—it would be (and was) a state of paradise.60  Locke thus quotes Paul’s 
declaration that “Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in 
the book of the law,” but he omits the immediately preceding sentence, which declares 
that all those under the law are already cursed (17[12]; Gal. 3:10), as well as the 
following verse, which states that “no man is justified by the law in the sight of God” 
(Gal. 3:11).   
Because Locke rejects original sin, which is the fundamental premise of the 
epistles from which he quotes, his discovery in Paul of a Biblical doctrine which holds 
that faith leads to salvation because it makes up for our deficient obedience to the law of 
nature is highly tendentious and even playful.  In what may be his most far-fetched 
Biblical reference thus far, Locke claims that when Paul says “we establish the law” 
through faith (20[13]; Rom. 3:31) he is really speaking of the moral part of the law of 
Moses (or the law of nature), which, if it did not exist, would leave nothing to be 
                                                
60 To Paul, these corruptions and depravities consist not in misdeeds per se but in those lusts and inordinate 
longings that lead human beings to commit them.  In suggesting that sin presupposes law and that without 
law nothing is forbidden, Locke also implies that these passions and desires are neither signs of a corrupt 
condition nor sins meriting punishment but rather simply an inescapable part of human nature.  When 
discussing the roots of human action in the Essay, Locke writes that “if there be no Prospect beyond the 
Grave, the inference is certainly right, Let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for tomorrow 
we shall die” (Essay II.21.55; Is. 22:13; I Cor. 15:32).  What the Bible considers sin, Locke seems to regard 
simply an unavoidable part of our psychology. 
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“counted to men for righteousness,” for, to repeat, there can be no transgression—and 
hence also no atonement through faith—without law (21[13-14]).  Even a cursory glance 
at the passage from which Locke is quoting, however, should be sufficient to indicate that 
Paul is referring to a new law, the law of faith, which justifies only “him which believeth 
in Jesus”—i.e. not one who merely performs “the deeds of the law” (Rom. 3:26-8).  
Whereas in Locke’s theology the law of faith is subordinate to the law of works—for 
belief merely makes up for our failure to perform actions which in theory would be 
sufficient to earn us immortality—in Paul’s account the situation is quite the opposite.  
To Paul, not only is true belief required for salvation (and therefore subject to command), 
but actions by that very fact are inferior to and exist in the service of faith.  In other 
words, the chief difference between Locke and Paul amounts to this: to Paul, in contrast 
to Locke, salvation can be achieved only through the internal submission of the mind to a 
set of doctrines which are not rational but revealed, and certainly not through the 
conformity of one’s actions to a set of rules, no matter how rational or how necessary for 
the maintenance of human societies those rules may be.  Locke’s chief criticism of Paul, 
and thus also of most traditional interpretations of the Bible, would therefore seem to 
center around Christianity’s unreasonableness, or its teaching that there is something 
more important than adhering to a law which reason vouches for because without it 
“there can be no bounds set to the lawless exorbitancy of unconfined man.”  Because it 
holds that earthly goods such as peace and security may need to be sacrificed in order to 
attain the heavenly good of salvation, the actual New Testament not only contradicts “the 
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notion we have of justice,” but it is apt to give rise to precisely that kind of fanaticism 
which Locke wrote the Reasonableness to eliminate. 61 
 
THE LIFE AND MISSION OF JESUS 
Locke’s task in the remainder of the work, for which his interpretation of Paul has 
laid the necessary groundwork, will therefore be to describe a “reasonable” version of 
Christianity which is no longer prone to such excessive tendencies.  Accordingly, he 
devotes the next and longest section of the work to showing just what, according to the 
Bible, human beings need to believe in order to be counted as having faith in Christ, and 
the answer he comes up with is, to say the least, undemanding.  Through an 
excruciatingly detailed and endlessly repetitious examination of the history contained in 
the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles, Locke concludes that there is but a single 
article of belief necessary for salvation, namely that “Jesus is the Messiah,” which is 
equivalent to his being the Christ, the King of the Jews, and the Son of God.  Not only, 
then, does the Bible not require the acceptance of more specific and complicated creeds 
and doctrines (such as the Trinity, original sin, and transubstantiation), but it in fact 
enjoins only the most minimal set of beliefs that could possibly be considered Christian.  
Indeed, as we will see more at length below, the proposition which Jesus required 
believers to accept in order to be saved, according to Locke, was so vague and so 
                                                
61 Consider in this regard Locke’s invocation of Mark 8:35-38 at the beginning of his discussion of the law 
of faith (15[12]).  Locke, as previously noted, purports to discover Biblical evidence here for the view that 
there is nothing worse than losing one’s life.  In context, however, Jesus calls for extreme self-denial and 
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generalized that neither Christ’s followers nor even the Apostles themselves truly 
understood what it meant. 
Locke’s analysis in this long section appears to be composed of two elements: a 
surface theological teaching which repeats over and over again the conclusion that only a 
single article of faith is necessary for salvation, and a more subtle and scattered historical 
account of who Jesus was, what kind of followers he attracted, and how the Christian 
religion came to be.  As to the first of these, Locke’s obvious achievement in arguing that 
the “great proposition” which “distinguished believers from unbelievers” at the time of 
Jesus was only whether “he was the Messiah or no” (28[17]) is to recast the entire 
Christian theological tradition as a series of false glosses and human impositions upon a 
single idea which is as simple and easy to understand as it is divine.  By thus purporting 
to recover the original and authentic Christian message through an unbiased examination 
of its source in the Scriptures, Locke suggests that the religious wars which he is writing 
in response to are disputes over similarly human impositions.  Since all European 
Christians already accept the proposition that Jesus is the Messiah, these quarrels are “not 
only barbarous but pointless” (Rabieh 1991, 941).  Moreover, because the proposition 
required for salvation is so minimal, and indeed, so devoid of specific content, it is hard 
to see how anyone who is persuaded by Locke, whether Christian or not, would not 
assent to it—especially considering the immensity of what he would have to gain by 
doing so. 
                                                                                                                                            
declares that “whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and 
the gospel’s, the same shall save it” (Mark 8:35). 
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What makes the belief required for salvation so capacious, however, would also 
seem to render it rather unimportant—for in Locke’s account, the single article that is 
needed to make one a Christian is so general that it asks almost nothing of us in terms of 
how we live our lives.  True faith does not require that action be performed in its 
service,62 and it certainly does not justify any kind of political or religious hierarchy.63  In 
fact, as Locke proceeds he corrects a possible misimpression which we may have 
received at the opening of the work: for the simple belief that Jesus is the Messiah, it now 
appears, is actually not sufficient to gain someone the forgiveness that is necessary to 
attain eternal life.  This is not because some other belief is required but, quite the 
opposite, because it is but the most preliminary requirement for salvation.  In addition, 
certain things are “required to be done for justification” (50[28], emphasis added), and 
Jesus accordingly taught another set of lessons “that concerned practice, and not belief” 
(94[51]).  Indeed, as Locke notes, even though at the time of the New Testament the 
single article was the only thing that allowed people to become members of the Church of 
Christ, this could only do so “as far as mere believing could make them so” (165[102]).  
This statement, which reminds of the mention of “mere religion” in the English version 
of the Letter, appears to suggest that belief is almost irrelevant altogether, and that 
                                                
62 When Locke discusses Jesus driving the traders from the temple, he interprets his words—“Make not my 
Father’s house a house of merchandize” (77[43]; John 2:12-15)—to be simply a declaration that he is the 
Son of God and hence also the Messiah.  Locke makes no mention whatsoever of the anti-commercial 
message of the story.  
63 Locke claims that Jesus’ words at Matthew 16:18—“thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my 
church”—refer not to Peter but to the idea of his being the Messiah.  By suggesting that this universal creed 
is the rock or foundation of the Church, he presents a new interpretation of the Biblical passage 
traditionally used to justify Apostolic Succession (especially of the Pope, the spiritual descendent of St. 
Peter), but he can do this only by ignoring the obvious fact that Jesus is here speaking to Peter, as well as 
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works—perhaps even in the absence of faith—could perhaps be sufficient to gain 
someone entry into the Kingdom of God.  The guiding premise of the Reasonableness 
until this point, of course, has been that only belief in Christ can make up for our moral 
failings, but it now appears that the actual content of that belief is so non-specific and 
vacuous as to be almost self-undermining.  The simple mantra that “Jesus is the 
Messiah,” after all, can be interpreted any number of ways, and Locke’s teaching is that 
all of these ways are equally correct.  Incensed by this, Locke’s antagonist John Edwards 
correctly pointed out that the single article does not necessarily enjoin a belief even in 
Christ’s divinity (Edwards 1984, 113; see also Zuckert 2002, 152-3).  Now, to be sure, 
throughout this long section Locke insists on the continuing need for a belief in Jesus’ 
miracles—and especially the resurrection—precisely because these are the sole evidence 
we have of that divinity (32[20]).  But the general thrust of his argument would seem to 
give adherents of his new theology reasons at least to question how seriously these should 
be taken.  For if the acceptance of miracles is but a pre-condition for “mere believing,” 
then neither the grounds nor the content of that belief would appear to be of any great 
importance, and there would seem to be little need to acknowledge them in a way that 
does more than pay them lip-service.   
The possibility that Locke may be quietly sewing doubt about Jesus’ divinity 
requires more evidence, but it does provide a compelling reason to examine the historical 
account of the origins of Christianity which is also present in this section.  To make sense 
of that account, it is helpful to begin with the fact, which Locke repeatedly mentions, that 
                                                                                                                                            
what seems to be an important Greek pun on the words for Peter (Petros) and rock (petra) 
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the “jews had no other thoughts of their Messiah, but of a mighty temporal prince” 
(140[82]).  According to Locke, at the time when Jesus made his appearance, the Jewish 
nation was in a state of political agitation that was tinged with extraordinary religious 
hopes.  The population was gripped by the expectation that God would imminently send 
them a leader whose “government and kingdom” would bring about their deliverance and 
usher in a new era.  That era, which they alternatively referred to as the “Kingdom of 
God,” the “Kingdom of Heaven,” and the “Kingdom of the Messiah,” was to be a time in 
which the Jews’ political and material fortunes were to be miraculously reversed (38[22]; 
53[29]; Dan. 9).  Filled “with the expectation of a glorious earthly kingdom,” they were 
looking for a new “RULER in Israel” (59[33]) who would not only liberate them from 
the Romans, but who would also “raise their nation into a higher degree of power, 
dominion, and prosperity than ever it had enjoyed” (140[82]).  They anticipated that their 
Messiah would miraculously transform them from a people whose lot was to be 
continually subjugated by one foreign power after another into a new and eternal Rome.  
Their prophecies said of the Messiah that “all people, nations, and languages should serve 
him,” and they expected that when he finally came God would grant them an “everlasting 
dominion,” apparently over the entire world (59[33]; Dan. 7:13-14).  Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, they believed that this would be the beginning of an era of 
(bodily) immortality: they expected that “the just should be raised from the dead to enjoy 
in that ‘new world’ a happy eternity with those of the Jewish nation who should be then 
living” (148[88]). 
                                                                                                                                            
(51[28],105[57]). 
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Now, it was in this atmosphere of boiling political and messianic hopes that Jesus 
first entered onto the scene.  At that time the imminent coming of the Messiah was “the 
general expectation,” (53[29-30]) and many among the Jews “thought that the kingdom 
of God should immediately appear” (54[30]; Luke 19:11)—a phenomenon which Locke 
says can be attributed to the fact that they “were under a foreign dominion, subject to the 
Romans” (58[32]).  As Locke later informs us, the Jews were not only living under 
foreign occupation, but they were subject to the worst kind of tyranny, where the whims 
of a “jealous and cruel prince, who encouraged informations, and filled his reign with 
executions for treason” made life and property perpetually insecure (138[81]).  In such an 
atmosphere, where freedom was absent, where hunger and poverty were widespread, and 
where people lived in a state of continual, gnawing fear, the hopes of finding “an 
extraordinary man” who was full of “divine power” and capable of performing miracles 
grew to exceeding heights (58[32]).  Bowed by oppression and reduced to a state of utter 
helplessness, the Jewish masses began to follow Jesus because they came to believe that 
only a divine miracle could deliver them from their present misery.  Indeed, as Locke 
narrates the history of Jesus’ life, he is careful to catalogue the specific miracles which he 
performed, but it is curious to note that, almost without exception,64 these all consist of 
the sudden alleviation of bodily pain or misfortune.  Jesus heals the sick, he raises the 
dead, he cures the blind, the dumb, and the lame, and most importantly, he feeds the 
hungry (see, e.g., 87,90,91,96,100,101,116-17[47,48,49,51,52,53,64-5]).  Locke twice 
notes that, because Jesus gave people bread, he attracted “multitudes that followed him 
                                                
64 The lone exception, if I am not mistaken, is his curing of the possessed (90[49]). 
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for the loaves” (103,144[54,85]).  When he spoke to them of eternal life, as Locke rather 
comically puts it, he very often spoke “in a mixture of allegorical terms of eating, and of 
bread” (103[54]).  The multitudes that followed Jesus, in other words, were driven not 
primarily by imaginary otherworldly hopes but by a very real temporal hunger, although 
this hunger may very well have led them to long for a state where such needs would no 
longer have to be satisfied.  Upon being miraculously fed, they were ready to “set him up 
at the head of a tumult” and to force him to become a king (144[85]), for they thought 
they had finally found someone who could give them what they sought: “the grandeur of 
a temporal kingdom in this world, and the protection and prosperity they had promised 
themselves under it” (103[55]).  According to Locke, it was only to confuse this mob and 
prevent it from forcing him to start a revolution that Jesus had recourse to rhetoric about 
another world and about eating his flesh instead of actual bread (103[55]). 
Now, since Jesus’ Gospel was preached to the poor, the first thing that his life and 
mission elucidates is the existence of a large class-divide within Jewish society.  Locke 
presents Roman Judea as divided, roughly speaking, between a very poor and very 
hungry multitude, and a Romanizing Jewish elite (which is represented in this story 
chiefly by the Pharisees).  Moreover, Locke indicates that in order to learn about the 
character of Jesus’ followers, it is sufficient to look at the Apostles, who were in fact 
most representative of the poorest, least intelligent, and most destitute elements of this 
society.  Thus, when Christ promised them that they would “eat and drink with me at my 
table, in my kingdom” (151[90]; Luke 22:29), the Apostles grossly misunderstood the 
character of that kingdom and even took his words literally, as evidenced by their 
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question to him after the resurrection: “Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom 
unto Israel?” (149[89]; Acts 1:6).  But, perhaps surprisingly, Locke gives Jesus enormous 
credit for shrewdly choosing “a company of poor, ignorant, illiterate men” to be his 
Disciples.  They, like the rest of the masses, were mostly interested in attaining some 
combination of freedom and food, and Locke writes that they were predisposed to look 
for miracles precisely because they “were not of the ‘wise and prudent’ men of the 
world.”  Rather, as he astonishingly suggests, they were but “a company of poor, 
ignorant, illiterate men” who, with respect to matters of prudence and intelligence, were 
as “mere children.”  It was these child-like men who were “convinced by the miracles” 
which they saw Jesus do daily, and “though they, with others, expected a temporal 
kingdom on earth,” they were not “too inquisitive after the time, manner, or seat of his 
kingdom, as men of letters, more studied in their rabbins, or men of business, more 
versed in the world, would have been forward to have been” (141[82-3]).  Whereas 
smarter men would have questioned how anyone, let alone a poor carpenter, could lead a 
successful rebellion against one of the greatest empires the world has ever seen, this 
group of hungry and unintelligent riffraff was filled with a zealous and desperate 
confidence that Jesus could simply do so miraculously.  Moreover, because he recognized 
their benign and simple natures, Jesus could be sure that they would do no more than 
what was asked of them, and that they could therefore be counted on not to say the wrong 
thing to the wrong people, thereby ruining his best laid plans. 
But what exactly were those plans?  This is something that Locke hints at only 
indirectly, and so to make sense of Jesus’ character and motivations it may be best to 
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begin with an account of what sort of person Locke says that he was.  Now, perhaps the 
first thing that comes to sight in this respect is how manifestly unlike the Apostles and the 
rest of his followers Jesus seems to have been.  Where the Apostles were simple-minded 
and unquestioningly obedient, Jesus was shrewdly calculating and politically savvy.  
Locke paints Jesus as a master of rhetoric, who always knew just what to say and what 
not to say on each occasion, and most importantly, when to let his miracles do his talking 
for him.  Throughout his career, he always picked just the right moment to retreat before 
danger presented itself—after performing miracles and attracting a following, he would 
withdraw to the hills before the authorities became suspicious, and he therefore wisely 
chose not to perform any miracles in the city of Jerusalem until his last days (see, e.g. 61-
66[34-38]). 
Now, according to Locke, Jesus employed his characteristic caution in order to 
escape from two main dangers, and in fact, it would seem perhaps that all of his actions 
can be explained once it is recognized that he had “an eye to” the “straitness” that was 
produced by their opposing pressures.  As Locke cryptically summarizes his dilemma, 
Jesus had to create “new converts” on the one hand, while avoiding the traps posed to 
him by “captious Jews,” on the other (121[70]).  He needed to increase his following 
among the poor masses, but he needed to do so cautiously and judiciously, in such a way 
that would not allow their political passions to come to a head.  For if they did, as 
previously noted, this riff-raff might “set him up at the head of a tumult” and force him to 
start a revolution.(144[85]; cf. also 74[42]).  But while Jesus needed to fan the flame of 
revolution just to the point where it would be on the brink of burning out of control, he 
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also needed to demonstrate his innocence to the Romans—and not just simply so that he 
could protect himself.  Thus, Locke also notes that he never claimed to be the King of the 
Jews within the hearing of the Romans or the Pharisees (137[80]).  Instead, he spoke of a 
kingdom in another world in order to demonstrate that he was genuinely innocent of the 
sedition of which he was accused: he was well aware that “for a kingdom in another 
world, Pilate knew that his master at Rome concerned not himself” (71[39-40]).  It was 
imperative that he “not die as a criminal and a traitor” (138[81]) but instead that he “be 
offered up [as] a lamb blameless and void of offense, his innocence appearing to all the 
world, even to him that delivered him up to be crucified” (74[42]; cf. also 62[35], 
120[70]).  It was for the sake of this goal, it appears, that his whole rhetorical strategy 
was directed, and it succeeded immensely.  Pilate pronounced him innocent five times 
(136[79]), and he finally gave him over to be crucified “against his conscience” (138[81]) 
only when the Pharisees threatened to denounce him to Caesar—something which made 
it sadly necessary for him to look to “secure his own head” (137-38[80-81]). 
 Jesus, in other words, engaged in this strange and seemingly paradoxical behavior 
because he was seeking to become a martyr.  He truly wanted to die, but to die innocent, 
satisfied not only in his own conscience but also in those of his own murderers that he 
was free of fault.  But why?  Locke provides a clear answer to this question in his Second 
Vindication: “It is evident from Scripture, that our savior despised the shame and endured 
the cross for the joy set before him; which joy, it is also plain, was a kingdom” (Locke 
1823 [1963], 7: 235).  As Locke will also make clear very shortly, God had promised 
Jesus “an everlasting kingdom in heaven” (178[109]), and “it is evident” that “he had 
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regard to” to this promise “in his sufferings” (177[109]).  Jesus, in other words, appears 
in Locke’s account to have been a man of great political ambition, but he was astute 
enough to realize that in the political atmosphere in which he found himself there was no 
this-worldly avenue for the satisfaction of his desires.  If he had proclaimed himself king 
of the Jews and started a rebellion, that rebellion would surely have failed and would 
have “drawn on him the reputation and death of a turbulent, seditious malefactor” 
(74[42]).  But if, on the other hand, he had tried to do his best within the confines of 
Judean society, he would have found his way blocked on all sides.  As a poor man from 
Bethlehem, he would have had no access to the society of the Romanizing Pharisees, and 
at any rate, considering the post he attained, his ambitions certainly reached much, much 
higher than that.  Drastically “straitened” on both sides and deprived of a more ordinary 
outlet, Jesus’ ambition took a fanatical and otherworldly turn.  He sought to give up his 
life in order to see his resplendent desires fulfilled in another world, just as his followers, 
who were cruder and less imaginative than he, originally sought to attain eternal life in 
this one. 
 Jesus, then, appears to be an exemplar of exactly that kind of religious 
spiritedness which Locke draws upon to a certain extent in the Letter Concerning 
Toleration, but which he is also attempting by and large to moderate in this work.  Jesus’ 
otherworldly ambitions provide a more intellectualized and high-aiming, and therefore 
also more instructive, example of the desire for salvation that animated his followers—
and it is worthwhile to consider what form such a desire would take in a Lockean middle 
class society in which a poor man from Bethlehem would have a greater opportunity to 
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rise up in the world.  Locke’s description of the social condition of the Jews at the time 
when Jesus appeared, after all, seems to link the development of religious hopes, and the 
belief in miracles, to conditions of material desperation, political oppression, and 
intellectual backwardness.  Among Jesus’ poor and downtrodden followers, the desire for 
another life—or for an eternal extension of this one—seems to have resulted from a 
combination of poverty, tyranny, and ignorance—and this ignorance, of course, may give 
one cause to question whether the miracles which so impressed these people were 
genuine.  If Jesus was so shrewd, after all, might he not have known how to play on the 
fears and superstitions of the multitude in order to convince them that he could produce 
bread from thin air, or even that he had risen from the dead?  But however that may be, 
Locke’s suggestion in this section would seem to be this: in a society that is more 
comfortable, more prosperous, and more free, one should not expect people like Jesus to 
attract a following.  Indeed, if the most astute and ambitious are given a safer outlet for 
their desires, one should not expect such people to appear in the first place. 
 
LOCKE’S CIVIC THEOLOGY 
Having completed his subtle critique of the New Testament and of the version of 
Christianity contained within it, Locke is now ready to draw the blueprints for a liberal 
theology which can replace it.  His loosening of Christianity’s doctrinal requirements—
which he will soon extend even further—has reduced the place of belief to one of 
practical irrelevancy, to “mere” belief, and the debunking character of his analysis of the 
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Gospels seems intended to sew doubts, if only among a certain segment of his readers, 
about Jesus’ divinity.  Accordingly, the theology which Locke now articulates seems to 
understand itself as a well-intentioned form of propaganda, as a lesson for the “illiterate 
bulk of mankind” (1[4-5]) that is not privy to that debunking, and its main substantive 
teaching is that eternal life is a reward for righteous living, or for conforming “our actions 
to the law of God” by “doing works meet for repentance” (171[105]).  This theology, in 
other words, has an unmistakably civic character.  Not only does it instruct believers to 
regard Jesus “as their King” and eternal life as their reward for fulfilling their promises of 
“obedience to him” (168[104]), but it also seems to teach them to look upon religion in 
the same way, and as serving the same purposes, as the liberal state.  If the old 
Christianity, in other words, ultimately came to sight as unreasonable because its 
emphasis on faith failed to respect and even undermined what is politically necessary, the 
new faith will show itself to be reasonable precisely because it is oriented towards the 
maintenance of human societies.  Locke can thus speak of the “reasonableness, or rather 
necessity” (172[105]) of the New Covenant because, according to his rationalism, the 
dominant role played by the pursuit of advantage leads human beings to look upon law as 
something that exists because it is necessary, and a reasonable law is therefore 
synonymous with a necessary one.  But of course, getting people to view divine law in 
this way would seem to require bringing their theological views into line with their 
political ones, and so Locke’s first step in outlining a rationalized Christianity is to paint 
a picture of a theological universe in which God and the other divine beings exhibit the 
same passions and attachments to their own self-interest as mankind. 
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Seeming, in effect, to begin the book anew, Locke now provides another account 
of the Fall, but this time he begins from the premise—which was entirely absent from the 
similar discussion in the work’s opening pages—that Adam was “the Son of God” 
(173[106]).  Adam “was immortal,” Locke now informs us, because he shared in this 
aspect of “the likeness and image of his Father.”  Eternal life, in other words, was 
something he inherited.  But after he transgressed his Father’s command, he “forfeited 
that state of immortality” and so could not pass it down to his descendents, who were all 
therefore born “mortal, like their father” (179[106]).  God, as any angry parent might do, 
disowned Adam and cut him out of His will, and so mankind from that point on had no 
more right to eternal life than the heir of a disinherited son would have to lay claim to the 
property of his grandfather.  Eventually, however, God, “out of his infinite mercy” 
became “willing” (though interestingly Locke does not say ‘desiring’) “to bestow eternal 
life on mortal men,” and to make this possible he sent Jesus into the world (174[106]).  
Now Jesus, according to Locke, was conceived “in the womb of a virgin . . . by the 
immediate power of God” and so “was properly the Son of God” (174[106]).  He 
therefore enjoyed the same immortality as all those “who were the immediate sons of 
God” and who had not “forfeited that sonship by any transgression” (175[106]).65  Jesus 
“was the heir of eternal life, as Adam should have been, had he continued in his filial 
duty” (175[107]).  Had Adam remained faithful, he would have bequeathed eternal life to 
his descendents, and Jesus’ chief accomplishment has been to put this error right by 
bringing human beings quite literally back into God’s family.  For, according to Locke, 
                                                
65 Locke’s rather comic theology in this section therefore appears to be quietly polytheistic and 
 126 
Jesus made it possible for men to become “his brethren” and fellow sons of God “by 
adoption” (175[107]).  As God’s children, Christians are also “joint-heirs with Christ ” 
(175[107]; Romans 8:15-7) and they are therefore entitled “to share in that inheritance, 
which was his natural right” (175[107]).  
Now this line of argument, of course, hardly captures what faithful Christians 
mean when they speak of themselves as children of God or brothers of Christ.  In what 
now appears to be an extremely comic (and blasphemous) section of the work, Locke 
dares to recast God’s gift of immortality to Jesus and eventually to mankind as an issue of 
inheritance in accordance with his own teaching about filial duty and paternal 
responsibility.  According to that teaching, as it is outlined in Chapter Six of the Second 
Treatise of Government, the only way for parents to ensure the loyalty of their children is 
through their power to dispose of their property, and the strongest motive for children to 
remain obedient is their hope of attaining that reward.  Such self-regarding and even 
mercenary motives, Locke now asserts, guided God and Jesus in their relationships with 
one another, and they ought also to guide us in our attitude toward both of them.  Locke 
begins to indicate this when he says that God, after having a son again at long last, 
decided “for his sake” (175[107], emphasis added) to allow men to become immortal too.  
Like any ordinary father, God’s foremost concern was not for us, who were as perfect 
strangers to Him, but for the well-being of His newly born child.  He wanted to bequeath 
to Jesus not just immortality but also “an everlasting kingdom in heaven” (178[109]).  
Well aware of this, as previously noted, Jesus endured death on the cross because he 
                                                                                                                                            
anthropomorphic, for he nowhere says that Adam and Jesus were God’s only “immediate sons.”  
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knew that his sacrifice would be amply rewarded, and just before his final breath he 
called out to his Father and demanded the kingdom which was to be “given him upon this 
account of his obedience, suffering, and death,” saying “the hour is come; glorify thy 
Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee . . . I have glorified thee on earth: I have finished 
the work which thou gavest me to do” (177[109]; John 17:1-4).  God and Jesus, in other 
words, had a deal: Jesus was to spread God’s glory on Earth in return for a kingdom in 
heaven, and now that he has fulfilled his end of the bargain, Jesus does not shy from 
telling his father to pay up.  Neither party to this contract was concerned chiefly with the 
well-being of the other, and certainly not with any third party, although we human beings 
stand to benefit a great deal incidentally.  This is because if God had allowed the old, 
unforgiving law of works to remain intact, Jesus’ kingdom would have had no subjects 
and there would have been no one “to sing praises unto his name” (178[110]).  It was 
therefore “out of his mercy to mankind, and for the erecting of the kingdom of his Son, 
and furnishing it with subjects” (178[110], emphasis added) that God, “for his Son’s 
sake,” decreed that all those who were to “enrol themselves” in Jesus’ kingdom, “profess 
themselves his subjects, and consequently live by the laws of his kingdom” could have 
their sins forgiven them and join Jesus in eternal life (178[110-11]).66 
The picture of the divine cosmos which Locke here provides appears to be a 
tongue in cheek attempt to describe what Christian theology would look like if it were to 
conform entirely to the principles of his rationalism, and it also therefore seems to be an 
                                                
66 As Rabieh summarizes the teaching of this section, God’s mercy to mankind took the form not of a love 
for us but only of a desire to do what was necessary “to set up his son in the family business” (Rabieh 1991, 
954).   
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allegorical way of conveying his serious view of just what, according to that rationalism, 
the driving forces behind human psychology are.  In contrast to the traditional Christian 
teaching, which holds that Jesus sacrificed himself out of love for mankind, Locke insists 
that he endured death as a price worth paying for the great reward which he coveted.  
This, he seems to suggest, is as close as one can get to sacrifice in a world in which men 
“cannot be hindered” from pursuing their happiness (245[149]).  Indeed, this frank 
acceptance of the unavoidability of selfishness is the cornerstone of Locke’s new 
religious teaching, which instructs human beings to look upon eternal life purely as “the 
reward of justice or righteousness” (180[111]).  Locke’s Jesus assumes the role of a 
monarch who doles out benefits in another world in exchange for good behavior in this 
one, and because he is concerned with works rather than faith, that is, with what we do 
and not with what we think, he cares not a whit whether we obey him solely to obtain this 
reward.  On the contrary, such calculations on the part of the individual would appear to 
be not only acceptable but even necessary, for nobody, Locke implies, can be counted on 
to obey any law for its own sake.  Jesus’ great achievement, he states, was to make “the 
eternal law of right” (180[112]) effectual by backing it up with rewards and punishments, 
for without such sanctions that law would be “but empty talk, without force, and without 
influence” (185[114]).  Even though the natural law is ostensibly “of eternal obligation” 
(180[112]), that law’s inability to enforce itself, together with the inescapably self-
interested character of human beings, means that we should by no means expect eternal 
obedience to it.  Rather, wherever that selfishness is not kept in check by the artificially 
imposed prospect of reward and punishment, human beings will acknowledge no moral 
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constraints and there will result an “introducing and authorizing [of] irregularity, 
confusion, and disorder in the world.”  As Locke will soon make clear at greater length, 
Christ’s most important accomplishment was to bring order to this chaos and “to reform 
the corrupt state of degenerate man” (180[112]) by endowing justice with external 
sanctions.  Recognizing that humankind lacked any mechanism for restraining its natural 
and inescapable selfishness, he curtailed that selfishness precisely by appealing to it.   
Locke’s criticism of Biblical Christianity therefore seems to be that it suffers from 
a delusion which is characteristic of traditional morality more generally: nobody, he 
suggests, can be expected to forego the pursuit of his own happiness, although such 
restraints as are necessary for social harmony can be provided by recognizing and 
building upon that desire.  Accordingly, his theology seeks not only to marry justice and 
advantage through the prospect of another life, but also to propagate a new moral 
teaching that can both liberate and moderate self-interest while we live here.  Not 
surprisingly, Locke discovers that moral teaching in the Sermon on the Mount, where 
anyone would expect to find the details of Christian ethics most clearly laid out.  Here, as 
Locke recalls, Jesus claimed not to make new laws but merely to confirm and reinforce 
“all the moral precepts in the Old Testament.”  He explained the Old Law, or the “eternal 
law of right,” in “its full and clear sense” by freeing it from the “corrupt and loosening 
glosses of the Scribes and Pharisees” (188[115]).  Having said this, one might expect that 
Locke would now go on to quote a substantial portion of Christ’s words from the 
Sermon, but he instead provides us with a rather brief and cursory summary of them.  In 
Locke’s synopsis, Jesus tells his audience “that not only murder, but causeless anger, and 
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so much as words of contempt, were forbidden.  He commands them to be reconciled and 
kind towards their adversaries: and that upon pain of condemnation.” 
[He] not only forbids actual uncleanness, but all irregular desires, upon 
pain of hell-fire; causeless divorces; swearing in conversation, as well as 
forswearing in judgment; revenge; retaliation; ostentation of charity, of 
devotion, and of fasting; repetitions in prayer, covetousness, worldly care, 
censoriousness: and on the other side commands loving our enemies, 
doing good to those that hate us, blessing those that curse us, praying for 
those that despitefully use us; patience and meekness under injuries, 
forgiveness, liberality, [and] compassion (188[115]). 
 
Now the language of each of these prescriptions is lifted directly from the King James 
Bible (especially Matthew 5 and Luke 6), and so it would be easy to miss the degree to 
which Locke’s gloss on Jesus’ words makes a series of suggestions which the Biblical 
Jesus never intended.  The Jesus of the New Testament, for example, forbids becoming 
angry “without a cause” (Mat. 5:22), but he clearly implies that suffering injustice does 
not qualify as a legitimate pretext for indignation, for he also commands not resisting evil 
and turning the other cheek (Mat. 5:39; Luke 6:29).  Locke’s Jesus, on the other hand, 
does not call for this kind of self-abnegation.  He counsels patience, compassion, and 
forgiveness to those who have been wronged, but he does not order one who has been 
robbed of his cloak to give up his coat also (Luke 6:29).  Matthew’s Jesus forbids all 
divorces “saving for the cause of fornication” (Mat. 5:32); Locke’s forbids “causeless 
divorces” without specifying what those causes are, and he therefore seems to leave a 
great deal of room for such potential causes to proliferate.  The Jesus of the New 
Testament, in short, calls for extreme self-denial and the total repression of the passions: 
he blesses the meek (Mat. 5:5), insists upon a complete disregard for outward possessions 
(Mat. 5:42), and prohibits even looking at a woman in lust (“and if thy right eye offend 
 131 
thee, pluck it out” [Mat. 5:29]).  Locke’s Jesus enjoins none of these things, but rather 
limits himself to requiring civility, equanimity, and tolerance on the part of those who 
might feel themselves aggrieved. 
 Locke, in other words, under the guise of merely repeating the words of Jesus, is 
creating a list of transformed Christian virtues which will characterize the citizenry of a 
liberal republic.  He removes from the Sermon on the Mount those old Christian virtues 
which call for extreme moral devotion and self-sacrifice, and he replaces them with new 
ones which promote tolerance, civility, and getting along with others.  Instead of 
requiring a puritanical form of self-denial, Locke’s new ethic merely prohibits “irregular” 
sexual desires—while apparently recognizing the need to protect the family as a 
necessary institution, it sees no need to do more than this or even to define what these 
“regular” desires are and thus what counts as a family.  The Lockean Jesus commands 
fidelity to promises (not “forswearing in judgment”), not getting angry easily, forgiving 
one’s competitors and neighbors, and, in general, being polite (not “swearing in 
conversation”).  He does not mention charity as a virtue, but he does consider 
“ostentation of charity” to be a vice.  Most notably, he nowhere praises piety, but he does 
condemn ostentation of devotion and of fasting, as well as “repetitions in prayer.”67  
Those who live by this ethic, it would seem, will be self-absorbed but also easy-going; 
they will value whatever small fortunes they possess, but they will not think to increase 
them by violent or even overly-strenuous means.  Although they will view all matters 
through the prism of their own self-interest, they will also expect others to do so as well, 
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and this frank recognition that the world is competitive will persuade them to 
accommodate themselves to others and thus to respect an ethic of civility and tolerance 
which occasionally calls for curtailing the pursuit of their own advantage.  Since 
everyone has a right to seek his own happiness, so the thought goes, that right ought to 
extend only so far as it is consistent with that of everyone else to do the same.68  Those 
who adopt his outlook will therefore have desires which are liberated but limited.  They 
will satisfy them easily in marriage and family, rather than in grander and more socially 
disruptive outlets, but they will certainly not be tempted by any kind of asceticism.  They 
will respect religion as socially important and even as necessary, but they will prefer to 
take it themselves in small or at most medium-sized doses.  Not only will they no longer 
respect the old, self-abnegating Christian virtues, but they will likely look upon those 
who display them as excessively moralistic, as adhering to them for the sake of their own 
pride and self-esteem, and they may even suspect them of being hypocrites like the 
Pharisees who are lining their pockets in secret while preaching charity in public.  Above 
all, they will likely be suspicious of religious zeal as something socially disruptive, and 
while they will remain easy-going but not necessarily indifferent, they will regard being 
judgmental (or “censorious”) as the new cardinal sin.   
 Such, at any rate, appears to be the mindset that Locke expects to bring about by 
engaging in this rather loose analysis of Jesus’ moral teaching.  By removing the all-
demanding and self-sacrificial character of the Christian virtues, Locke seems to hope 
                                                                                                                                            
67 The New Testament’s Jesus warns against ostentation and “vain repetitions” in prayer, but he does so in 
the name of sincere, inward piety (Mat. 6:5-8).  Locke’s Jesus draws no such contrast. 
68 For the potential origins of this thought in Locke and other thinkers, see Bolotin 2007. 
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also to remove their capacity to encourage zealotry and persecution.  His Jesus delivers 
the comforting message that there is rarely if ever a need to make sacrifices, and he 
therefore could not be farther from the one found in the Gospels, who, as Locke himself 
now acknowledges, “commands self-denial, and the exposing ourselves to suffering and 
danger . . . upon pain of losing our souls” (191[116-7]).  Indeed, as if to indicate the great 
gulf that lies between his own moral thinking and that of the New Testament, Locke 
follows his summary of the Sermon on the Mount with a series of long quotations from 
the Bible which convey the self-abnegating message of the authentic, pre-Lockean Jesus.  
This Jesus commands his followers to “Give alms, of such things as ye have,” to “beware 
of covetousness,” and to “be not fearful, or apprehensive of want” (196[118]; Luke 
12:15, 22, 32-48).  He states that “Whosoever exalteth himself, shall be abased: and he 
that humbleth himself, shall be exalted” (197[118]; Luke 14:11).  Unlike Locke, who 
claims that only thoughts of reward can adequately ground morality, the Bible’s Jesus 
asserts that the only virtuous actions are those which are undertaken with no regard for 
benefit whatsoever.  “When thou makest a dinner, or supper, call not thy friends, or thy 
brethren . . . lest they also bid thee again, and a recompense be made thee,” but call 
instead “the poor and maimed, the lame and the blind,” precisely because “they cannot 
recompense thee.”  Here the difference between Locke and the Biblical Jesus could not 
be clearer, for while Jesus does indeed promise that “thou shalt be recompensed at the 
resurrection of the just,” he does not come near following Locke in teaching that that 
reward should be foremost in one’s mind (198[118-9]; Luke 14:12-4).   
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By recording these passages without comment, and thus also without his own 
endorsement, Locke allows the reader to see the difference between his own, mercenary 
moral teaching, and that of the Jesus of the Gospels, which can perhaps be summarized 
by the declaration that “whosoever . . . is not ready to forego all that he hath, he cannot be 
my disciple” (199[119]; Luke 14:33).  Indeed, this difference is perhaps most clearly 
highlighted in the one instance in which Locke does offer a brief (and almost comically 
inadequate) interpretation of Jesus’ words.  To understand Christ’s instruction to “sell all 
that thou hast, and give it to the poor” (203[119]), Locke writes, we must recognize that 
Jesus, when delivering this message, is attempting to test whether his interlocutor at the 
time really believes him to be the Messiah.  Jesus’ demand that he sell his possessions 
and give the proceeds to charity was therefore not an addition to the moral law or a 
“standing law of his kingdom” but only “a probationary command to this young man; to 
try whether he truly believed him to be the Messiah, and was ready to obey his 
commands” (203[120]).  In other words, Locke claims that Jesus intended this message 
of extreme self-denial only for this one specific historical person.  For us—who 
presumably need no such test of faith—selflessness is not necessary and simple 
obedience to the moral law is sufficient for our justification.   
But if that is the case, one may be tempted to ask why it is even necessary to 
believe in the single article that Jesus is the Messiah.  For if Christ, after all, punishes 
people not “for unbelief, but only for their misdeeds” (222[126]), it would seem quite 
unreasonable for him to deny immortality to virtuous people who lived before his time or 
who otherwise have no access to the Gospel.  This, not surprisingly, is an objection which 
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Locke now grants, and he declares that those who wonder what is to become of such 
people are asking a question whose answer “is so obvious and natural” that it is not even 
worth asking.  Since nobody “was, or can be required to believe, what was never 
proposed to him to believe” (228[128]), Christians are not the only ones who have access 
to eternal life.69  Of course, Locke’s guiding assumption until this point has been that 
because reason or the law of nature demands that all who sin in even the most trifling 
way deserve death, immortality is not a right but a privilege that is reserved only for the 
faithful.  Now, however, Locke reverses himself and completely repudiates this view: 
“the light of reason,” he now insists, has made clear to all who would make use of it not 
that God is harsh and punitive but that He is “good and merciful” (231[133]).70  The 
eternal law of right teaches not that punishment is eternal but “that a man should forgive, 
not only his children, but his enemies, upon their repentance,” and so it also indicates that 
God, “the author of this law,” will “forgive his frail offspring” if they ask Him to.  
Unassisted reason, Locke thus suggests, has made clear that the possibility of immortality 
is open to us, although “the revelation of the Gospel” also endorses this, and should thus 
be acknowledged, because it has said “nothing to the contrary” (232[133]). 
This last, surprising statement, appears to suggest that the New Testament has 
now become largely superfluous in Locke’s thinking: at best it enjoys its authority only 
because it fails to contradict what reason declares to be “obvious and natural.”  Locke is 
                                                
69 The extension of grace which Locke now carries out is jarring, and it sits uneasily with the view that 
Locke believed that only Christians have access to salvation.  Thus, Spellman suggests that Locke could 
not have been entirely serious about this (1988, 142).  Cf. also Dunn 1984, 85, who fails even to notice this 
passage. 
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therefore very far from his opening promise to read the Bible literally and on its own 
terms, and he has in fact come around to embrace a version of the natural theology which 
he once denounced.  Indeed, as if to underscore this, he now acknowledges that some are 
likely to object to his teaching by pointing to a passage in Scripture that declares Jesus to 
be “the only true Messiah” and the sole way to salvation (233[133-4]; Acts 4:12).  But 
although Locke records this objection, he never responds to it, and it is left hanging as a 
reminder of the orthodox position from which he is breaking.  The official teaching 
which he comes to at the close of his long examination of the Bible is that the only faith 
required for immortality is a belief that God is “a rewarder” of those who obey Him 
(228[130]; Hebrews 11:6).  Again appealing to the authority of Paul, he writes that 
Abraham’s faith “was counted to him for righteousness” because he never doubted that 
God would grant him those “temporal blessings” which were specified in the covenant 
which they had made together (228[129-30]; cf. 24-5[16]).  Abraham was saved, in other 
words, because he never doubted that God would deliver those benefits which made his 
obedience worthwhile.  This, indeed, is the final definition of faith which Locke presents, 
and it is so generalized and capacious that it makes the single article which he spent over 
a hundred pages describing seem parochial by comparison.  Since, as Locke insists, the 
possibility of immortality is made apparent by reason as well as revelation, anyone, 
whether with access to the Bible or not, can make a personal agreement with God that 
promises rewards in return for virtue.  Indeed, this is why Paul (at least according to 
                                                                                                                                            
70 This condition thus seems to make salvation available to the third group whom Locke does not explicitly 
discuss here: non-Christians who have access to the Gospel.  Later in the work he will effectively subsume 
Islam (and by implication, Judaism) under the heading of Christianity (239[137]). 
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Locke’s summary) taught that the faith of pre-Christian believers “was nothing but a 
steadfast reliance on the goodness and faithfulness of God, for those good things, which 
either the light of nature, or particular promises, had given them grounds to hope for” 
(229[131], emphasis added).   
 
THE NECESSITY OF CHRISTIANITY 
At this point in the work, then, Locke appears to have guided his reader towards a 
substantial but by no means total liberation from Biblical Christianity.  And although the 
civic intentions behind his new definition of faith might seem to be somewhat 
transparent, Locke nonetheless appears to expect his intended audience to begin to accept 
a version of natural theology that contains a teaching about otherworldly rewards and 
punishments.  He seems to look forward to the day when a new kind of believer who 
takes pride in being guided by reason will look down on revealed theology for its 
parochialism and for its tendency to beget persecution and will instead admire natural 
theology for its universal message of decent ethical living (cf. Essay III.9.23).  But of 
course, since that moral message is founded upon the hope for immortality, this whole 
line of argument compels one to ask how Locke can claim with such certainty that reason 
indicates the existence of a providential God.  As previously mentioned, we appear to 
stand in need of that very proof that Locke never provides in the Essay.  Moreover, it 
would seem to be precisely here, in a book entitled The Reasonableness of Christianity, 
as Delivered in the Scriptures, that we should expect to find a clear and cogent 
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demonstration showing not only that reason can confirm the existence of a God, but 
moreover that it can discover the providential and miracle-performing God of the Bible—
or at least a more universalized, Lockean version of Him.  Such a task would appear to be 
the obvious next step in Locke’s argument, but instead of undertaking it he turns to a 
different but related problem.  Why is it, he asks, that we need a savior?  “What 
advantage have we by Jesus Christ” (234[134])?  Now this question, of course, would 
have come across as shocking to say the least if it had been asked at the opening of the 
book.  But having since reduced faith in Christ first to a mere precondition for eternal life 
and then to something utterly redundant, Locke has taken his reader step by step to the 
point where he can find the guiding assumption of the book thus far to be perplexing and 
even absurd.  If the law of faith, once it has been filtered through Locke’s new natural 
theology, no longer requires a belief in Christ, why should we care about him in the first 
place?  Might we even be able to get along without any kind of revealed religion at all? 
 This question of what advantage we have by Jesus Christ, and thus also by 
Christian revelation, will guide Locke through the remainder of the work, and it would 
seem inextricably linked to the more fundamental question of how reason can 
demonstrate God’s otherworldly providence.  Indeed, one possible answer to this latter 
question might be that we need revelation precisely because we have no natural 
knowledge of the existence of the Biblical God.  Although this would seem to be the kind 
of thing that one would expect to hear from a certain kind of pre-Lockean believer, Locke 
nonetheless seems to endorse it when he gives his first explanation, if one can call it that, 
of the reason for Jesus’ coming.  Remarkably, he says that it should be “reply enough” 
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simply to say that our “short views” and weak understandings cannot account for it (235-
6[134]).  Now of course, since reason by definition cannot accept such a proposition 
dogmatically, this explanation is far from satisfying.  In fact, it appears to pull the rug out 
from under Locke’s promise to demonstrate the rational character of Christ’s revelation, 
and it may be a quiet indication that he actually cannot satisfy the demand of those who 
are seeking a demonstration of God’s providence.  The religion of reason, in other words, 
may not be so reasonable after all, and the majority of those who accept it may not 
recognize the degree to which their outlooks rest on unproven dogmas.  But what of those 
few individuals who are aware of this and who refuse to ground their opinions on such 
“borrowed or begg’d foundations” (Essay I.4.25)?  What of those progenitors of 
Enlightenment rationalism for whom Locke claims to have written this work?  Might 
there be a genuinely compelling reason for them to follow him in claiming that reason 
wholly endorses Christianity?  For those who cannot be satisfied simply with his 
assurances, Locke offers a second explanation which he says has the “wherewithal to 
satisfy the curious and inquisitive,” and this explanation concerns the “great and many 
advantages we receive” by Jesus’ coming as well as the “need” for it (236[134-5]).  
Recalling his previous promise to show the “reasonableness, or rather necessity” of 
Christianity (172[105]), we may be prompted to ask whether there is a reasonable need to 
propagate a belief in such things as our understandings cannot account for.  Might 
Christianity, in other words, be ‘reasonable’ in the sense that it can deliver something 
which reason requires but which it cannot itself provide? 71 
                                                
71 This possibility would seem to account for Locke’s earlier reversal of his position on the question of 
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Locke, at any rate, appears to lend credence to such suspicions when his tone 
becomes suddenly dogmatic.  There is undeniable “evidence of our Saviour’s mission 
from heaven,” he proclaims, “in the multitude of miracles he did before all sorts of 
people,” so much so that Jesus’ words “cannot but be received as the oracles of God, and 
unquestionable verity” (237[135]).  Although Locke has been steadily guiding his reader 
towards a liberation from Biblical Christianity and an openness to a seemingly 
uncompromised reliance on natural reason, he now reverses himself completely and 
insists on the need for a belief in miracles.  And yet, the character of the liberation which 
he has been working towards makes it extremely difficult to take him seriously when he 
claims that Christ’s miracles were so self-evidently divine that “they never were, or could 
be denied by any of the enemies or opposers of Christianity” (237[135]).  Indeed, since 
“where the miracle is admitted, the doctrine cannot be rejected,”72 it is hard to see how it 
is even logically possible for Christianity’s opponents to have accepted Jesus’ miracles.  
Locke goes so far as to say that the veracity of these miracles was not even questioned by 
“Julian himself: who neither wanted skill nor power to inquire into the truth,” and who 
would not “have failed to have proclaimed and exposed it, if he could have detected any 
falsehood in the history of the Gospel” (240[138]).  But of course, if Julian the Apostate 
had actually believed in the divinity of Christ, it is deeply perplexing that he continued to 
persecute Christians instead of, like Paul, becoming one himself.  On the contrary, he did 
                                                                                                                                            
whether the law of nature mandates forgiveness (231[133]).  If reason or the maintenance of human 
societies requires that humans come to believe that virtue is rewarded in the hereafter, then it would also 
require them to believe in a forgiving God.  If this is true, then it would imply that both the punitive God of 
the Old Testament and the Jesus of the New Testament (who threatens the sinful with eternal damnation) 
left people no hope and were thus apt to unleash rather than restrain the “lawless exorbitancy of unconfined 
man.”  
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exactly what Locke says he did not do: he wrote and published an anti-Christian 
critique.73  As several commentators have noted, Locke’s description of his attitude 
therefore appears to be plainly ironic (Rabieh 1991, 950; Zuckert 2002, 161), and his 
example would seem to provide a quiet indication that those who lack neither “skill nor 
power to inquire into the truth” should actually be led by their unassisted reason away 
from a belief in miracles and in the Christian God.   
But if Locke’s more subtle teaching may be meant to encourage a great deal of 
religious doubt, it also seems to indicate the need to keep that doubt confined to a small 
segment of the population.  His comments about Julian at first appear to be almost 
irresponsibly transparent, but they are quickly overshadowed by repeated assertions that 
the contents of Biblical revelation are wholly rational (241[140]) and that “the works of 
nature . . . sufficiently evidence a Deity” (238[135]).  Indeed, here, as in the Essay, 
Locke’s rhetorical strategy is to swamp the reader with dogmatic statements about the 
harmony that exists between reason and revelation (Pangle 1988, 215).  Moreover, this 
strategy seems to be recommended here to future rationalists in the person of his revised 
version of Julian, who was a vigorous seeker after truth but who nonetheless made sure to 
endorse Christ’s miracles when speaking in public.  For, as Locke states in a very 
pregnant passage in the Essay, even if the truth of revelation is doubtful, the inseparable 
connection that exists between morality and divine reward and punishment should still 
lead anyone who recognizes this to “cry up that for Sacred; which if once trampled on, 
and prophaned, he himself cannot be safe nor secure.”  The safety and happiness of every 
                                                                                                                                            
72 A Discourse of Miracles (Locke 1823 [1963], 9:259).   
 142 
man therefore requires that he “recommend, and magnifie” those rules of moral virtue “to 
others” from which “he is sure to reap Advantage to himself” (Essay I.3.6).  In this 
respect, Locke suggests, the behavior of philosophers should be no different, and indeed, 
he hints that they may even have a special role to play in providing men with “a clear 
knowledge of their duty” (241[138]). 
Now of course, Locke’s main teaching in this final section holds that it was 
Christianity, rather than philosophy, which was able to bring this knowledge of duty to 
mankind.  Prior to Jesus, as he writes, “human reason unassisted failed men in its great 
and proper business of morality” (241[140]).  For a variety of reasons, philosophy could 
not inculcate an effectual and lasting code of ethics, and so it was only after the coming 
of Christ and the advent of his new religion that morality was finally placed upon its “true 
foundations” (243[144] with Locke 1999, 154 and Rabieh 1991, 943 n. 9).  Yet, 
considering Christianity’s historical tendency to produce “schisms, separations, 
contentions, animosities, quarrels, blood and butchery,”74 it seems much more likely that 
Locke’s praise of Jesus in this section is actually a praise of himself.  It is Locke, after all, 
who is attempting to make Christianity more humane and tolerant and who, by 
reinterpreting the Bible in a way that links salvation to works rather than faith, is 
propagating a new religion that promises to make virtue “the best bargain” (245[150]).  
In doing this, Locke seems to be going well beyond “Plato, and the soberest of the 
[ancient] philosophers,” who “were fain, in their outward professions and worship, to go 
with the herd, and keep to the religion established by law.”  For although Locke in one 
                                                                                                                                            
73 Against the Galileans (Julian 2004). 
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sense follows their example by claiming to believe in miracles when speaking in public, 
in another sense he rejects it, for the Reasonableness as a whole utilizes such rhetoric not 
merely for self-protection but instead to challenge and to attempt to reform the religion 
that is established by law in his own time.  Now Locke does not explicitly say why Plato 
and soberest of the philosophers chose to “go with the herd,” but his invocation of the 
fate of Socrates (238[136]) suggests, quite plausibly, that they did so to protect 
themselves.  They employed this rhetorical strategy, it would appear, because they 
recognized how precarious the place of philosophy was in the ancient world.  And yet, 
Locke’s suggestion seems to be that by simply hiding themselves and hoping not to be 
exposed, these philosophers did little more than eke out an existence on the margins of 
society.  Rather than take the initiative to make themselves less vulnerable, they left their 
fates in the hands of fortune or of the good graces of the cities in which they lived. 
Somewhat paradoxically, then, Locke seems to be suggesting that ancient 
philosophy would have looked after its own security much more adequately if it had only 
displayed more courage and attempted to replace “the religion established by law” with 
one that was more friendly to itself.  After all, what could do more to protect philosophy 
than for it to teach men about their moral duties (which of course would include the duty 
to tolerate those with unorthodox religious opinions)?  Classical philosophy “failed men 
in its great and proper business of morality,” it would therefore appear, because it never 
had “authority enough to prevail on the multitude” (238[135]).  Whether for lack of 
ability or lack of interest, it never acquired the public role that would have been needed to 
                                                                                                                                            
74 Second Vindication (Locke 1823 [1963] , 7:358). 
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teach men “what was good and evil in their actions” (241[139]).  In pagan antiquity, this 
would have meant replacing a corrupt religious outlook which emphasized ceremony to 
the exclusion of all else with a monotheistic one that was concerned only with virtue 
(241[138-9]; 238[136]).  Now this, of course, is exactly what Locke is attempting to do, 75 
and his criticism of ancient philosophy seems to be that, rather than attempt to engage in 
a project of cultural transformation through the use of propaganda or myth-making, it was 
content to retreat from society and to keep its deepest insights to itself while taking care 
to guard its speech in public.76   
But assuming once again that Locke’s intended careful reader is a student of the 
more radical, Spinozistic branch of the Enlightenment, his analysis would appear to invite 
the following response.  Even if one grants to Locke that the vast majority of human 
beings need to believe in a providential God who can provide incentives for virtue, does 
not philosophy pay too high a price by presenting itself in a manner that actively 
encourages that belief?  Although his theological writings were controversial during his 
lifetime, Locke was received well in the century after he wrote, and as mentioned at the 
opening of this chapter, his version of toleration has become the classic liberal teaching 
                                                
75 If it is true, as previously suggested, that Locke’s praise of Jesus’ moral message is actually a praise of 
the one contained in his own religious teaching, then his description of the role of priests in the ancient 
world, where “religion was every where distinguished from, and preferred to virtue” (241[139]), would 
seem to be an allegorical description of medieval or pre-Lockean Christianity. 
76 Perhaps because of this, in Locke’s estimation it may be unclear just what the deepest insights of 
classical thought were.  Locke says, for example, that Socrates was killed by the Athenians because “he 
laughed at their polytheism, and wrong opinions of the Deity,” but he does not say what Socrates 
considered the right opinions on that subject to be.  While he notes that “Plato, and the soberest of the 
philosophers” tended to speak exoterically in public, he also indicates that they never made it quite clear 
what they actually thought about “the nature and being of the one God” (238[136]).  To Locke, the caution 
employed by ancient philosophers may have kept their truest opinions in impenetrable obscurity, with the 
result that they were ultimately hidden from posterity. 
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on the separation of church and state.  But whether his solution has tended to foster the 
flourishing of the kind of life that he himself led is another matter entirely.  After visiting 
America, Tocqueville could write that there is no country in the world less occupied with 
philosophy than the United States (Tocqueville 2000, 403).  By presuming that morality 
is reason’s “great and proper business,” in other words, did Locke not run the risk of 
making philosophy the servant of liberal-democracy instead of (as Spinoza would have it) 
the other way around?  Indeed, unlike Spinoza, Locke abandoned philosophy’s claim to 
be the summum bonum, and, endorsing the same kind of relativism as Hobbes (Essay 
II.21.55), claimed that the most that science could do is offer “Advantages of Ease and 
Health” to “increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life” (Essay IV.12.10).  The 
same concern for the public good which leads Lockean political philosophy to bow to 
revelation also leads it to transform itself into the modern, technologically driven project 
to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate.  Spinoza’s political philosophy would 
therefore seem to be an appealing alternative because it refuses to make such 
compromises, and indeed, it promises to show how a democratic regime—and one which 




Chapter 4: Spinoza’s High-Aiming Liberalism 
 
“Such are the opinions of the Americans; but their error is clear: for, it is proven to me 
daily in a very learned manner that all is well in America except precisely the religious 
spirit that I admire; and I learn that on the other side of the ocean the freedom and 
happiness of the human species lack nothing except to believe with Spinoza in the 
eternity of the world.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 281 
  
 Tocqueville claimed to have written a book about the United States because that 
country in his time was already making manifest the social and political consequences of 
the distinctly modern kind of democracy which he saw “advancing rapidly towards power 
in Europe.”  But he also famously noted that, as far as intellectual life was concerned, the 
“great democratic revolution” (Tocqueville 2000, 3) whose inevitability he predicted had 
thus far failed to reach its logical endpoint in America—for in that country at least, the 
influence of democracy on the realm of thoughts and ideas had been strangely arrested by 
the presence of Christianity.  Indeed, even after noting the various modifications which 
the Americans had made to religion in order to accommodate it to their liberal regime, 
Tocqueville continued to describe it as an aristocratic inheritance which he thought would 
be extremely useful in the future for holding democracy back from its innate intellectual 
consequences (Tocqueville 2000, 519).  As will be discussed more fully in the next 
chapter, the liberal-democratic piety which Tocqueville discovered in the United States 
closely resembled Locke’s proposed civil religion, and he saluted it for its apparently 
successful ability to provide a transcendent backing for freedom which could also 
simultaneously keep in check the secularizing tendencies of democracy’s natural 
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instincts.  As the above quotation makes clear, those instincts were most clearly 
embodied in the radical, scientific, and anti-theological outlook that characterized the 
European intellectual elites of Tocqueville’s time.  And as Tocqueville himself here 
acknowledges, perhaps no name is more important among the founders of such thought 
than that of Benedict de Spinoza. 
 That Spinoza’s philosophy is of crucial importance for an accurate understanding 
of contemporary liberal-democracy has been recognized through a recent re-awakening 
of interest in his social and political writings.  Most forcefully, Jonathan Israel (2000, 
2001 and 2006) has credited Spinoza with self-consciously seeking to start a covert, long-
term project which he has termed the “Radical Enlightenment”—an attempt to topple the 
authority of monarchy and organized religion through the popular diffusion of ideas 
undermining the veracity, not just of this or that version of Christianity, but of all 
revelation and all belief in the supernatural.  By corroding the popular belief in prophecy, 
in miracles, and in the unity and coherence of the Bible, Israel contends, the spread of 
Spinoza’s thought dealt a fatal blow to the claim of divine right that constituted the 
central justification for the inequality and hierarchy characteristic of the Ancien Régime.  
Israel therefore credits Spinoza not only with initiating the revolution that would 
eventually overturn the political order and the way of life that Tocqueville refers to as 
“aristocracy,” but also with bringing into being the wholly secular kind of politics, and 
the nearly limitless toleration, which characterizes liberalism today.77   
                                                
77 According to Israel, because Spinoza’s thought extended toleration to freedom of thought and 
expression, rather than simply to freedom of worship, and because he did not make that freedom 
conditional on church membership or on a desire to save one’s soul, it is he, rather than Locke, who should 
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 Because Locke’s argument for toleration proclaims the necessity of a civil 
religion, Israel regards it as an untenable halfway house between the residues of medieval 
Christianity and what he takes to be the full-blown secularism—and indeed, the outright 
atheism—of Spinoza’s thought (Israel 2006, 11-12, 37-8, 44-60).  While this critique of 
the “moderate Enlightenment” may be unfair to Locke in some respects,78 it does seem to 
have a certain historical validity, for in no Western liberal-democratic nation today does 
there exist the kind of civil religion for which Locke called.  Public life in contemporary 
democracies has become secular in a way that would perhaps worry Locke.  In America 
and Europe professed atheists are not denied the privilege of toleration, and the number 
of those who claim not to believe in God or to attend church at all is rapidly growing.  At 
the same time, however, Israel’s insistence that Spinoza ought to be understood as a 
                                                                                                                                            
be more properly credited with the origin of the dominant ideas—such as “democracy, freedom of thought 
and expression, individual freedom, comprehensive toleration, rule of law, equality, and sexual 
emancipation—which since the late nineteenth century have increasingly constituted the declared 
quintessential values of western ‘modernity’” (Israel 2006, 42, 135-63; 2000; and 2001, 265-70; but on the 
limits of Lockean toleration cf. Tarcov 1999, 180-81).  Because Israel finds in Spinoza the root of all 
modern secular thought, he also claims that the entirety of contemporary social science is “basically 
Spinosiste” (2006, 14).  As evidence for Spinoza’s plan to start a clandestine and revolutionary cultural and 
political movement, Israel cites, among other things, his attempts to diffuse his ideas to other members of 
his “atheistic circle” in Amsterdam—and to have them in turn spread these to others, though cautiously—as 
well as his probable involvement in seeking to have the Theologico-Political Treatise translated into 
French (Israel 2001, 163, 174, 302).  For the tremendously successful impact which this diffusion had both 
on the liberal clergy and on ordinary people across Europe, see ibid. pp. 275-327.  Other intellectual 
historians who have stressed the central importance of Spinoza’s thought include Hazard 1953, Jacob 1981, 
and Popkin 1979.  For a discussion of the circumstantial connections between Spinoza’s ideas and those 
contained in the widely but illicitly circulated Traité de Trois Imposteurs, which argued that Moses, Jesus, 
and Mohammed were all pious-frauds, and which was alternatively titled l’Esprit de Spinosa, see Popkin 
1992 ch. 8, who even goes so far as to speculate that Spinoza might have been involved in writing it (ibid. 
p. 147ff). 
78 Because Israel often presents Locke as a theologically-motivated and illiberal reactionary, he does not 
quite take seriously the critique of Spinozism’s allegedly dangerous political tendencies which Locke 
presents.  Although Israel often refers to Locke’s view that human sociability requires the belief in an 
afterlife, he fails to notice Locke’s attempt to preserve religion while changing it so as to make it more 
compatible with liberalism.  Thus, because Israel does not consider the potential secular motivations for 
Locke’s insistence on the need for a civil religion, he also does not take up the possibility that this 
insistence may be well-founded.  See esp. Israel 2006, 135-63. 
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thinker whose primary purpose was to engineer a revolutionary cultural and political 
project seems to sit uneasily with his manner of life and writing.  Indeed, while some 
recent scholars have stressed Spinoza’s political intentions—and have sometimes 
construed these quite narrowly79—there is a long tradition of regarding him not as a 
political revolutionary but as a philosophic hermit.80  Indeed, the most long-standing view 
of Spinoza among contemporary scholars tends to present his thought not as an attempt to 
change the world but as an endeavor to pursue a contemplative or even a mystical ideal—
and to this end it tends to understand the Theologico-Political Treatise as at best ancillary 
to the mature philosophy contained in his Ethics Demonstrated in Geometric Order, a 
work in which Spinoza declares his intention to “consider human actions and appetites 
just as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies.”81 
 The picture of his life and work which Spinoza left to posterity is therefore, to say 
the least, puzzling.  Are we to regard him as the rebellious excommunicated Jew who 
painted his own self-portrait so as to resemble a Neapolitan revolutionary, or as the 
                                                
79 Verbeek (2003, 133-4), for example, takes the Theologico-Political Treatise as concerned primarily with 
17th century Dutch problems.  Cf. also Smith 1997, 10, 19-20. 
80 Following this tradition, Nietzsche famously characterized Spinoza as a “sick hermit” for his apparent 
attempt to live a life characterized by a cold, pure, and disinterested dedication to mathematical truth 
(Beyond Good and Evil, #5).   
81 Ethics III, Preface (Spinoza 1996, 69; all references to the Ethics hereafter come from this translation).  
This denial of any political project on Spinoza’s part can be found in Wolfson’s classic study (1934).  
Wolfson claims that if Spinoza were made “of sterner stuff” and if he had lived a few centuries later, he 
“would have perhaps demanded the overthrow of the old order with its effete institutions so as to build 
upon its ruins a new society of a new generation raised on his new philosophy.  He would then perhaps 
have become one of the first apostles of rebellion.  But being what he was and living at a time when belief 
in the potency of reformation had not yet been shaken by doubt, he chose to follow in the footsteps of 
rationalizers throughout history” and remain aloof from involvement in theological and political 
controversies (Wolfson 1934, 2:330).  The view that Spinoza had no historical influence and was not an 
Enlightenment figure has been more recently affirmed by Mason (1997), who, however, does not view him 
as a rationalist.  For the view of the Theologico-Political Treatise as at best prefatory to the Ethics, see 
Curley 1990. 
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ascetic ‘philosophic saint’ who would come to be idealized in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries?82  This dilemma has led at least one interpreter to conclude that 
Spinoza was somehow both of these—that his life was marked by frustrated efforts at 
democratic political reform followed by masochistic escapes into contemplative 
withdrawal, and that this schizophrenia, in turn, rendered his thought ultimately 
incoherent (Feuer 1958).  The puzzle that is inherent in these two apparently 
irreconcilable sides of Spinoza would seem to be encapsulated in the following questions: 
assuming that Spinoza is a philosopher whose first loyalties lie with the discovery of 
truth, why, if at all, would he undertake to change society?  And if his work does contain 
a project of religious and political reform, what relation could that have to his private 
theoretical endeavors?   
These questions, in turn, appear to invite a consideration of the Theologico-
Political Treatise, for not only is the avowed purpose of that work to found a democratic 
republic in which “each is permitted both to think what he wants and to say what he 
thinks” (20.T),83 but, as Spinoza’s subtitle makes clear, he intends for such a republic to 
be characterized first and foremost by “the Freedom of Philosophizing.”  If we take the 
word freedom here as it is often used in the Treatise and in the Ethics—as a term for the 
human perfection which is possessed by those few individuals who live a fully self-
conscious and rational life—then it would appear that there exists a necessary link 
                                                
82 For Spinoza’s self-portrait in the guise of Tommaso Aniello Masaniello, see Feuer 1958, 38-9. 
83 In this chapter I follow Yaffe’s translation of the Theologico-Political Treatise (Spinoza 2004), which I 
refer to hereafter simply as the Treatise.  I cite it by chapter, paragraph, and sentence number, which Yaffe 
helpfully provides (‘T’ refers to chapter titles, ‘A’ to the annotations which Spinoza appended to the end of 
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between theologico-political reform and genuine philosophic enlightenment.  The nature 
of this link is as yet far from clear, but from a strictly political perspective it invites the 
following consideration: because its primary intention is to bring about the flourishing of 
intellectual freedom, rather than commercial or even political freedom, Spinoza’s 
liberalism appears to be much more high-aiming than that of Locke.  Against critics who 
contend that liberal-democracy in practice has resulted in few genuine intellectual or 
spiritual achievements, Spinoza promises to show that such a regime, if properly 
constructed, will lead to the advent of liberalism in its truest sense—that is, to the 
authentic spiritual liberation of a select few and therewith to the full flourishing of 
humanity at its peak.   
 If Spinoza’s apparent profession of two contradictory attitudes toward political 
reform has engendered competing interpretations of his thought, the related problem of 
his religious beliefs has proven to be all the more controversial.  Although Spinoza was 
almost universally regarded—or rather reviled—as an atheist in his own time, since the 
end of the eighteenth century he has also come to be seen, in Novalis’ famous phrase, as 
a “God-intoxicated man.”84  Modern Spinoza scholarship is thus divided between 
interpreters who follow his contemporaries in regarding him as a covert unbeliever,85 and 
                                                                                                                                            
the work).  On a few occasions I have altered the translation slightly based on the Gephardt edition of the 
Latin text (Spinoza 1925, vol. 3). 
84 The authoritative interpretation of Spinoza for about a century was provided by Pierre Bayle, whose 
Historical and Critical Dictionary condemned his writings and called him the first ever “Systematical 
Atheist” (Bayle 1710, vol. 4, s.v. “Spinoza” [p. 6781]).  For the early reception of Spinoza’s work, see, e.g., 
Bagley 1999 and 2008, 40ff; Israel 1996 and 2001, 275-94.  For the evolution of his reputation from that of 
an atheist to that of a pantheist mystic, see Beiser 1987, 44-108; Moreau 1996; Smith 1997, 11-13. 
85 See, e.g. Bagley 1999 and 2008; Gildin 1980. Hazard 1935; Israel 2006; Lachterman 1991; Popkin 1979; 
Smith 1997; Strauss 1965; Verbeek 2003; Yaffe 1999.  In addition, based on the epigraph provided above, 
it would also seem justified to include Tocqueville in this list. 
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those who view him as a mystic of one kind or another.86  Here again an analysis of the 
Theologico-Political Treatise promises to provide an insight into Spinoza’s true views in 
a way that, at least initially, should be inviting to both sides in this debate.  For in 
addition to proclaiming the need for a society in which “the Freedom of Philosophizing” 
is protected, the Treatise’s subtitle also proclaims that that same freedom not only “can 
be Granted in keeping with Piety and the Peace of the Republic,” but indeed, “that it 
cannot be removed unless along with that Peace of the Republic and that very Piety.”  
Below the subtitle Spinoza affixes an epigraph from I John which proclaims that 
“Through this”—and the word “hoc” in the present context, if not in the Biblical one, 
appears to refer to the freedom of philosophizing—“we know that we remain in God and 
God remains in us: that he has given us of his spirit” (I John 4:13).  By spotlighting this 
passage, Spinoza appears to find a Biblical endorsement for his own philosophic 
pantheism.  The Treatise, in other words, is both a proposal for political reform and a 
religious apologetic.87  In chapter 14, its theological teaching culminates in a lesson about 
the character of true piety and the way to salvation, and the work as a whole can therefore 
be seen as a defense of the conceptions of God and of human beatitudo which are found 
in the chapters 3 and 4 and in the Ethics. 
 But if Spinoza’s Treatise is therefore meant to be a defense of true piety or true 
belief, it is all the more puzzling that in the work’s preface he seems to present that piety 
                                                
86 Feuer (1958), Huenemann (1999), Mason (1997), and Rice (1999) all regard Spinoza as accepting some 
form of supernatural or supra-rational authority.  Donagan (1988 and 1996) regards Spinoza as a rationalist 
but believes he nonetheless accepted the possibility of “naturalized” miracles and revelation.     
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or belief as identical with a life of internal intellectual independence—with the “sound 
reason” or “doubting” which he juxtaposes to the “prejudices” that characterize the 
dominant religious outlooks of his time (P.2.4).  So while Spinoza’s political project is 
meant to provide a defense of his religious teaching and of its conception of human 
blessedness and the way to salvation, it also regards the latter as inseparable from a kind 
of skepticism or religious doubt.  Indeed, as he presents it, it may be only by fostering 
such doubt that Spinoza can defend true religion, and make our age happy, by freeing it 
“of all superstition” (11.1.61).  At the very least, it must be acknowledged that the 
theological and political sides of Spinoza’s treatise are interwoven in a way that is far 
from obviously clear.  To unravel these threads, it will be necessary to follow Spinoza’s 
instructions and undertake an analysis of his argument as it unfolds over the course of the 
Treatise’s twenty chapters (P.6.1).   
 Spinoza opens chapter 1 of the Treatise by endorsing the certainty of Biblical 
prophecy and therewith the authenticity of the revelation of the Mosaic Law (1.1.1; 
1.7.1).  He begins chapter 20, by contrast, with a critique of Moses’ regime and with an 
argument for a polity in which speech and thought are free and in which commerce, 
rather than religion, cements the social bond (20.1.5; 20.6.4; Yaffe 1997, 160-62).  
Between these two endpoints, it therefore appears, Spinoza will outline the stages in a 
progressive education that will take his readers from Biblical theocracy to liberal-
democracy.  This project of enlightenment, moreover, appears to be conducted on two 
                                                                                                                                            
87 In Epistle 30, which he wrote to Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza claimed that he was writing the Theologico-
Political Treatise in part to vindicate himself “as far as I can” from the reputation for atheism which he had 
garnered among the common people (Spinoza 1995, 185-6). 
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levels: it attempts to lead a few select individuals to a philosophic liberation while 
simultaneously carrying out a cultural transformation of society as a whole.  At the end of 
the preface Spinoza claims that his Treatise “will be useful through and through” for 
those “who would philosophize more freely” if they did not unfortunately “deem that 
reason has to serve as handmaid to theology” (P.6.2).  Thus, as Leo Strauss writes, “the 
Treatise is Spinoza’s introduction to philosophy” (Strauss 1965, 28).  And yet, Spinoza 
also addresses his work to readers who are already philosophic (P.6.1) and who therefore 
require no such introduction.  But a treatise on the education of potential philosophers 
could indeed be valuable for other philosophers—provided, of course, that they wish to 
learn how to provide such an education themselves.  Indeed, it is precisely here that 
Spinoza’s philosophic and political projects may come together, for it may be that by 
changing society, by moving it away from divine right monarchy and towards liberal-
democracy, Spinoza intends to cultivate the genuine intellectual freedom of a select few.  
More specifically, by crafting a popular religious outlook—or a progressive series of 
outlooks—which will come ever closer to an approximation (though never to an exact 
replica) of his own philosophic perspective, Spinoza expects to permit a large number of 
people to shadow, and a few to achieve, the thoroughgoing philosophic liberation that he 
claims to have undergone himself.88   
 
                                                
88 For Spinoza’s account of his own philosophic conversion, and of his intentions to aid others to achieve 
the same result, see the opening of his early, unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect 
(Spinoza 1985, 7ff.). 
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POLITICS AND THE PROBLEM OF SUPERSTITION 
 If the twenty chapters that compose the body of the Treatise constitute the steps in 
a project of theologico-political reform, then it would seem that the purpose of the work’s 
preface is to detail the causes that have driven Spinoza to carry out that reform by writing 
it (P.3.4).  In the work’s very first sentence, he indicates the problem to which he is 
responding, and he also appears to hint at what could perhaps be done to solve it.  “If 
human beings could regulate all their affairs with certain counsel,” he writes, “or if 
fortune were always favorable to them, they would not be bound by any superstition” 
(P.1.1).  In keeping with his presentation of this work as a Christian apologetic, Spinoza 
indicates that his purpose in writing the Treatise has been to combat the danger posed by 
superstitious beliefs which are “adverse to religion”(P.1.4)—that is, primitive and 
idolatrous practices which were common among the ancient pagans and which he 
suggests are still unfortunately present among the lowest elements of society in his own 
time.  Among the most vulgar and rustic, he indicates, there continues to exist a residue 
of Greco-Roman piety, a crypto-pagan kind of Christianity which holds that “God” 
communicates his decrees “not in the mind,” but instead through the likes of entrails, the 
ravings of madmen, and bird-omens (P.1.5).  According to Spinoza, these kinds of 
theological errors arise because human beings tend to long for “the uncertain goods of 
fortune . . . without measure” (P.1.2).  Their hopes for the goods of this world—which, 
considering his example of Alexander the Great (P.1.7), may not necessarily be limited to 
those of the body or to creature comforts—are not restrained by a sense of the boundaries 
of the possible, and this constitutes the psychological illness of which superstition, so to 
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speak, is but a symptom.  Assuming that it is not possible to render fortune always 
favorable, two other remedies would thus seem to hold some promise.  The most 
effective cure would be a kind of stoicism, or a sober and thoroughgoing acceptance of 
the role of chance in human affairs.  But since most people would seem to be incapable of 
such an attitude, it would appear that superstition could be dampened—but never entirely 
eliminated—if social arrangements ensured that people became, by and large, more 
fortunate.  If adherence to a more “certain counsel” could make men less dependent on 
external circumstances, one could expect superstition to decline along with desperation. 
 But in a world such as the present one where human beings more often than not 
cannot attain what they long for, they find themselves swinging back and forth on a 
psychological pendulum between the extremes of “hope and dread” (P.1.2).  At their 
lowest points, when they are in the grips of fear and when they see no way to fulfill their 
desires, they willingly “seek counsel on bended knees” from anyone, and they will 
believe any advice, no matter how idiotic, absurd, or vain it may be (P.1.3).  The hope 
which they experience in the midst of their dread ignites a psychological engine which 
deludes them into thinking that they can escape their circumstances—and indeed, it 
would seem that this hope actually grows stronger among human beings the more the 
odds are stacked against them.  But since the sole cause of superstition is dread (P.1.7), it 
has absolutely no presence at the other end of this psychological pendulum (P.1.8).  On 
the contrary, when men find themselves in fortunate circumstances they become 
“overconfident, boastful and proud” (P.1.2).  Entirely self-possessed, they not only spurn 
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all counsel but consider offers of it to be insulting (P.1.3), and for this reason they see no 
reason to turn to a belief in the supernatural. 
 Because superstition is rooted in a psychological reaction to bad fortune, it 
follows, according to Spinoza, that its origins are but a reflection of a natural desire 
which all men experience to seek out their own good.  He thus insists that it is a part of 
superstition, but “adverse to religion,” to propitiate God or the gods “with sacrifices and 
prayers” (P.1.4).  Those who have obtained the objects of their longing (cupiditate) will 
never feel a desire to sacrifice some or all of what they have obtained.  Unlike the 
superstitious, who “beg for divine help with prayers and womanish tears” because they 
“are unable to be of help to themselves” (P.1.5), those who are guided by religion will be 
animated by a spirit of manly self-reliance.  Knowing that God’s decrees have been 
inscribed in their minds, they will look to their own natural capacities in order to find a 
way to extricate themselves from their present dangers.  But while the superstitious, on 
the other hand, will make sacrifices, those “sacrifices” and the prayers that accompany 
them will always be of a fundamentally mercenary character—in fact, they would be 
better described as personal bargains which the desperate try to strike with supernatural 
powers in order to get something by giving something up in return.  Moreover, unlike the 
religious, who accept the authority of their natural capacities, those who are in the grip of 
superstition “call human wisdom vain and reason blind” precisely because these things 
cannot show them the way “to the vain things they long for” (P.1.5).  Since the 
superstitious cannot reconcile themselves to the limitations which nature places on 
human power, and since they cannot accept the place which chance holds in our affairs or 
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the misery whose presence is often beyond our control, they necessarily tend to adopt an 
outlook on life which seeks to discredit the authority of reason and the natural light.  
Thus, from the seemingly innocuous problem of ordinary human misfortune there arises a 
more robust challenge to rationalism itself in the form of mystical doctrines which 
“interpret the whole of nature in amazing” and “insane” ways (P.1.4, 6).   
Now, it is to refute such doctrines which despise and condemn the natural light 
“as the source of impiety” (P.5.1) that Spinoza claims to have written the Treatise.  
Indeed, its first fifteen chapters will be devoted to an examination of Scripture that will 
attempt to show that there is no conflict between the word of God and the natural light—
or in other words, that true “religion,” as opposed to “superstition,” really is as Spinoza 
describes it here.  But in a very pregnant comment, Spinoza now indicates that in order to 
demonstrate the falsity of these mystical and anti-rationalist doctrines, all that is required 
is to show that they really do have their origins in the self-interested and fearful 
calculations which he has just described.  Indeed, he claims that his analysis thus far 
permits him to make three important claims: 
[1] that only while dread lasts do human beings struggle with superstition; [2] that 
all the things they have ever worshiped by vain religion have been nothing but 
phantasms and the hallucinations of a sad and fearful psyche; and, finally, [3] 
that prognosticators have ruled among the plebs to the greatest degree, and have 
been formidable to their Kings to the greatest degree, in the greatest straits of the 
imperium (P.1.8, emphasis added).   
  
If it is true, in other words, that human beings only remain superstitious while they are in 
the grips of dread, it follows that the objects of what Spinoza now speaks of as “vain 
religion” must be little more than “hallucinations of the imagination” (P.1.5).  His 
psychological account of the origins of superstition, in other words, is also meant to serve 
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as a hypothesis which, if proved, would show definitively that the gods worshipped by 
the superstitious are not real and that the anti-rationalist position which they are said to 
sanction is also demonstrably false.  In chapter 1, he will attempt to show that the 
revelations of the Biblical prophets were also imaginary, and that once the Bible is 
purged of its superstitious elements, it too can be said to endorse the authority of the 
natural light.  But in the present context at least, it remains the case that Spinoza’s 
hypothesis about the psychological roots of superstition remains just that—aside from an 
anecdote involving Alexander the Great (P.1.7), he has not actually offered any proof of 
it.  It may therefore be of some importance that Spinoza in the above quotation mentions 
a third consideration concerning monarchy suggesting that there is an intimate connection 
between fear, superstition, and autocracy.  If political arrangements were altered so as to 
replace Europe’s monarchies with liberal republics that could improve the fortunes of 
human beings, and if superstition were to decline as a result, could that perhaps prove 
Spinoza’s psychological hypothesis correct?  
 This suggestion is as yet only preliminary, but it is worth considering whether 
Spinoza is hinting here that in order to demonstrate its own validity rationalism may need 
to undertake a project of political reform.  At the very least, it must be said that until 
Spinoza has somehow shown his psychological account of the origins of superstition to 
be true, his claim that human beings are vulnerable to it “by nature”—rather than by 
something supernatural—must remain purely hypothetical.  Moreover, the same must 
also be true of his professed denial of what those “others say who deem that it arises in 
that all mortals have some confused idea of the deity” (P.2.1, emphasis added).  
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Spinoza’s account of the psychological origins of superstition, of course, makes no 
mention of the problem posed by human mortality.  In fact, its very premise seems to be 
that whereas human beings may worry about death when its prospect is immediately 
before them—as it was for Alexander—when fortune is favorable they are so filled with 
pride and overconfidence that they think little of it.  Thus, because superstition is not the 
product of a restless discontent with mortality as such, but is rooted instead in an 
emotional response to more basic kinds of misfortune, it follows that it is as “variable and 
unsteadfast” as those emotions themselves (P.2.2).  This, at any rate, appears to be the 
fundamental presupposition of the Treatise, but it would also seem to be the hypothesis 
which Spinoza’s political science will need to demonstrate.  For if Spinoza can show 
superstition really to be unsteadfast by bringing about its decline, that would be sufficient 
to refute the view that human beings are naturally troubled by their mortality in a way 
that instills in them a hope to transcend it.  As the body of the Treatise will make clear, 
the need to refute the latter possibility may well be the most important task which 
Spinoza faces: it is prerequisite not only for carrying out his project of political and 
religious reform, but also for vindicating the conception of human excellence which his 
rationalism posits.89 
 Spinoza’s preface, however, is not wholly silent about the possibility of 
immortality.  Indeed, the prospect of “salvation” now comes to the fore as Spinoza ceases 
to mention “superstition” and begins to speak of “religion” instead (P.2.3).  The transition 
                                                
89 For the philosophic attitude towards the problem of mortality, cf. Ethics IV P67, one of Spinoza’s most 
anti-Socratic statements: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation 
on life, not on death.”   
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from superstition to religion—that is, to the monotheism of the Turks as well as of the 
practitioners of “true” religion—appears to occur in the following way.  Superstition, as 
Spinoza has just noted, has historically provided a means for “prognosticators” to rule 
“among the plebs to the greatest degree” (P.1.8).  In fact, this practice has led to the 
common opinion, which Spinoza here puts into the mouth of Quintus Curtius, that there 
is actually nothing that “regulates a multitude more effectively” (P.2.3).  And yet, 
Spinoza’s account of the growth and development of politicized superstition should 
initially lead one to suspect otherwise.  For as long as the multitude remain “miserable” 
(P.2.3), to cultivate superstition for a political purpose is in effect to play with fire.  
Because those who assure the plebs that they can improve their lot through the aid of 
supernatural powers are imposters, unless they are extraordinarily fortunate they will 
soon find themselves in the embarrassing position of being unable to deliver on their 
promises.  The misery of the vulgar consequently ensures that they are as unlikely to 
persist in any given superstition as they are to accept such beliefs in the first place, and 
they can therefore be expected to turn on tomorrow those who are manipulating them 
today.  Thus, “this unsteadfastness has been the cause of many tumults and atrocious 
wars,” for the vulgar “are easily induced by a show of religion now to adore their Kings 
as Gods, and again to execrate and detest them as the common disease of the human 
race” (P.2.3). 
 It is precisely at this point in his account, when monarchy and religious violence 
become prominent themes, that Spinoza ceases to speak of “superstition” or “vain 
religion” and begins to refer simply to “religion.”  He now declares that, to avoid the evil 
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of civil discord, “immense study has been employed to embellish religion, true or vain, 
with worship and pomp so that it might be taken more seriously than any other motive 
and always be cultivated by everyone with the utmost observance” (P.2.4, emphasis 
added).  Faced with this problem of instability, kings have sought to control the harmful 
effects of superstition by radicalizing it, or by seeking to give it the greatest possible 
place in the daily lives of their subjects.  This is why the transformation of superstition 
into religion is also one from polytheism to monotheism: it replaces the natural tolerance 
of pagan antiquity with a single, all-encompassing theology which can successfully 
control human behavior by maintaining total control over thought.  This solution to the 
political problem, according to Spinoza, has been cultivated with the greatest success “by 
the Turks, who consider it an impropriety even to dispute, and occupy each’s judgment 
with so many prejudices that they leave no place in the mind for sound reason or for 
doubting anything” (P.2.4).  But this strategy has also been cultivated by the teachers of 
“true” religion—i.e. Christianity—as well.  Indeed, both Christianity and Islam have 
proved to be successful allies of monarchy because they persuade people “to fight for 
their servitude as though for their salvation” (P.3.1).  Their teaching about the prospect of 
another life is sufficient to render the promises of the older kind of prognosticators 
unpersuasive.  In fact, one can go so far as to say that this teaching of theirs is in fact the 
logical solution to the political problem which the latter first incited.  This is why, 
according to Spinoza, “the spirit of the multitude” in his time is “still vulnerable to the 
superstition of the Gentiles” (P.3.3).  Christianity, in other words, is but the most mature 
version of the kind of piety with which Quintus Curtius was familiar—and it therefore 
 163 
seems that he was not altogether wrong in claiming that nothing regulates a multitude 
more effectively than superstition. 
 But while theocracy thus presents itself as the best solution to the problem of 
regime stability, it is not the only one.  For “in a free republic,” according to Spinoza, 
“nothing can be attempted more unhappily” than to tell citizens how to think.  In this kind 
of regime citizens are so firmly attached to their intellectual independence that they incite 
sedition if—but only if—their opinions are criminalized (P.3.1).  The possibility of this 
alternative solution to the political problem is, according to Spinoza, “the chief thing I 
have set out to demonstrate in this treatise” (P.3.3).  The main purpose of his work is to 
conduct a project of political reform which will culminate in the creation of a liberal-
democratic society where everyone “is granted the full freedom to judge, and to worship 
God on the basis of his own mental cast,” and indeed, “where nothing”—not piety, not 
philosophy, not pleasure, and not even life itself—“is considered dearer or sweeter than 
freedom” (P.3.3, emphasis added).  Now, Spinoza identifies this republic with the one in 
which he lives, but his claim to this effect is dubious to say the least.  In a well known 
letter, he indicated that he wrote the Treatise in part because freedom of speech in the 
Netherlands was “in every way suppressed by the excessive authority and egotism of 
preachers.”90  In saluting the “rare happiness” of the Dutch Republic, then, Spinoza 
presents the Treatise as a work of patriotism, but he also subtly changes the meaning of 
what that Republic and that patriotism stand for.  He replaces the religious kind of 
                                                
90 Epistle 30 (Spinoza 1995, 186).  Spinoza also acknowledges this practice of censorship at the end of the 
preface and at the close of chapter 20 (P.7.1-2; 20.8.1-2).  If Hamburg is taken as Spinoza’s fatherland 
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spiritedness that is present in the historical Netherlands with one that defines itself in 
opposition to the religious prejudices which he now baldly calls “the traces of ancient 
slavery” (P.3.3). 
 But while religion may be less important than freedom in the new, liberalized 
Dutch Republic, insofar as that freedom calls for great sacrifices on the part of citizens, 
the kind of spiritedness which Spinoza envisions on its behalf cannot be entirely secular.  
Because he too will need to persuade citizens “to spend blood and soul” (P.3.1) for their 
country, it appears that Spinoza will need to draw upon at least some aspect of the 
Turkish solution to the political problem which he just inveighed against.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that he now changes his tone somewhat and claims to speak as someone whose 
exclusive concern is to free the “ancient religion” of the corruptions imposed on it by 
modern theologians (P.4.4).  Swearing an oath to “immortal God” (P.4.5), he draws upon 
the kind of anthropocentric way of thinking—the angry sense that the universe must be 
somehow just and therefore responsive to human needs—which he has just associated 
with the origin of superstition and which he criticizes throughout the Treatise.  The 
purportedly original or authentically Biblical Christianity which Spinoza now defends is 
said to sanction exactly the kind of individual intellectual independence which is the 
chief characteristic of his idealized portrait of the Netherlands.  In contrast to all 
seventeenth century beliefs—be they Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or Heathen (P.4.1)—
which are filled with prejudices that incite hatred and “impede each from using his own 
free judgment” (P.4.4), “the ancient religion” commands precisely this.  Indeed, when 
                                                                                                                                            
(since the Treatise’s original title page claimed that it was published there) this problem is all the more 
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Spinoza swears the aforementioned oath, he piously and indignantly inveighs against the 
current predominant view which places religion in “absurd secrets” and which considers 
those who believe the understanding “by nature corrupt . . to have a divine light.”  This 
“is the most inequitable thing” (P.4.5), for true religion, as he implies, commands 
precisely the opposite view: rather than turning human beings from rational beings “into 
beasts” (P.4.4), it protects the human dignity that is found in our capacity for independent 
thinking.  Piety and religion, in other words, are on the side of humanity in the fullest 
sense of that term: they sanction our capacity to live as complete and fulfilled beings 
without the aid of supernatural or superstitious assistance, and they therefore lead upward 
to the summum bonum as Spinoza will go on to articulate it in this Treatise. 
 Spinoza’s central task as he now defines it therefore appears to be quite simple: it 
is to recover the Bible’s authentic support for rationalism which has unfortunately been 
obscured by the tendency of theologians to impose the “insane,” mystical teachings of 
Greek philosophy onto it (P.4.7-8).  Once this task is accomplished, Spinoza’s theology 
will be able to serve as a religious support for a regime which may need to call upon its 
citizens to make sacrifices for the sake of freedom.  But as Spinoza describes it, this new 
piety, though spirited, is also pacific, and so it would seem that its establishment should 
also lessen the need for such sacrifices to be carried out.  Because the citizens of a liberal 
republic will only raise seditions when theologians tell them what to think, in a world 
where the acceptance of “opinion” and the performance of “ministries” are considered to 
be no part of religion at all, and where the clergy consider “picking at dissidents publicly” 
                                                                                                                                            
acute, since censorship was much harsher there than in the Netherlands (Israel 2006, 136). 
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(P.4.1-3) to be the very essence of impiety, that possibility must remain purely 
hypothetical.  This is why the causes of intellectual freedom, civil peace, and true piety 
are in fact one and the same.  A religious outlook that supports the philosophic 
conception of human blessedness will also fulfill Christianity’s longstanding promise to 
bring about “love, gladness, peace, continence, and faith toward all” (P.4.1). 
 According to Spinoza, then, the intellectual independence that characterizes his 
own way of life is in fact part and parcel with that which is called for in the Bible, and the 
project of the Treatise as a whole will be to demonstrate this.  By examining Scripture “in 
a full and free spirit” (P.5.1) he will also show that Scripture sanctions that spirit.  In so 
doing, Spinoza insists, he will establish the Bible’s divinity in a way that the ordinary 
theologians cannot.  For while the latter simply presuppose that it is “everywhere truthful 
and divine,” Spinoza notes that this is the very proposition that has to be established, and 
he asserts that this is more easily done by having recourse to “what does not need human 
fantasies”—i.e. to reason (P.4.8).  But this claim seems to invite the following 
consideration.  If it can be demonstrated that Scripture truly does endorse a life that is 
lived in accordance with reason’s dictates, that itself would render the Bible redundant—
at least for those whose understandings have been cultivated to the greatest degree.  And 
even for the rest, insofar as true piety would be said to consist in a spirit of rational 
thinking and independence of mind, the Bible would seem to serve only as a starting 
point.  To the extent that it remained an authority for someone, that person could not truly 
be said to be pious.  Thus, the idea that a life of piety is one that consists in the cultivation 
of intellectual independence and the use of our natural capacities would appear deeply 
 167 
paradoxical, and these paradoxes are reflected in a series of contradictory statements 
which Spinoza now makes in his summary of the rest of the work.  He claims, for 
example, that the Biblical prophets taught “true virtue” (P.5.3) and endorsed the 
conclusions of the natural light (P.5.7), but he also says that they taught only very 
“simple things” which could incline the multitude towards “devotion” (P.5.7) or 
obedience toward God “with a full spirit” (P.5.7, 10, 13).  Thus, he also claims that 
precisely because it teaches “nothing besides obedience,” revelation is “completely 
distinct from natural knowledge and has nothing in common with it” (P.5.12, emphasis 
added).  If the second of these statements encapsulates Spinoza’s serious view of the 
matter, if reason or philosophy in every case points away from devotion or obedience, 
then it is tempting to suspect that the rationalistic piety which he will propagate in this 
work is meant to be self-undermining.  His analysis of Scripture, in other words, may 
point his most careful reader towards a life of reason that is held to be superior to one that 
is lived in accordance with even the most liberalized Biblical precepts.91 
   
                                                
91 That the Treatise is directed to at least four different groups of readers, and was written with the certain 
prospect of religious and political censorship in mind, seems to be evident from the description of his 
intended audience which Spinoza invokes at the end of the preface (P.6-7).  In accordance with Spinoza’s 
own claim that religious education “can and has to vary in accordance with mental cast” (5.1.13), in what 
follows I will attempt to trace the way in which Spinoza’s project of cultural enlightenment sought to 
achieve a single purpose by communicating different and often contradictory messages to readers whom he 
believed to have different levels of ability and varying degrees of freedom from “prejudice.”  That Spinoza 
wrote esoterically has been most famously argued by Strauss (1952 and 1965, 1-31), although, as Bagley 
points out in some detail, a long tradition dating back to Spinoza’s own time held that he deliberately 
obscured his meaning in order to conceal his religious opinions (See Bagley 1996; 1999; and 2008, 48 
n.54).  Other scholars who have come to regard Spinoza as engaging in esotericism or deception of some 
form or another include Cook (1999), Smith (1997), Verbeek (2003), and Yovel (1989).  This view has 
been criticized most prominently by Donagan (1988, 14-34; 1996), Harris (1978), Garrett (1990), and Rice 
(1999).   
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PROPHECY AND RELIGIOUS ANTHROPOLOGY 
 The task which Spinoza appoints for himself in the Treatise is to embark on a 
fresh reading of the Bible which will take it seriously on its own terms and “admit 
nothing as its teaching” which is not also “taught by it very clearly” (P.5.1).  Thus, as he 
opens chapter 1, he provides a definition of prophecy which would likely be acceptable to 
an orthodox believer.  “Prophecy, or Revelation,” he offers, “is certain knowledge of 
some matter revealed by God to human beings” (1.1.1).  This definition, however, 
immediately leads to a much less orthodox consequence: it sets up a dichotomy between 
the prophets themselves, who have this “certain knowledge,” and their audiences, who 
must embrace what they say solely “by mere faith” (1.1.2).  Now of course, the need to 
accept this distinction would likely not be persuasive to an orthodox believer, who as a 
believer would never claim to know for certain that the object of his belief is real, but 
only to be one of the ‘faithful’ (cf. Struass 1965, 28).  But as Spinoza almost immediately 
makes clear, and in great contrast to what he had suggested in the preface, it now appears 
that he is not writing for such a person.  By defining prophecy as certain knowledge, he 
accomplishes two surprising things: he draws a distinction between the divine messenger 
and the divine message—which results in the unexpected decision to discuss prophecy 
and prophets in separate chapters—and he also concludes “that natural knowledge can be 
called Prophecy” as well (1.2.1). 
 In fact, Spinoza claims, the natural revelations that come through the use of 
reason are far more trustworthy than those of revelation in the ordinary sense, for they 
involve a certainty that “does not yield to prophetic knowledge in any mode” (1.2.3).  
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Spinoza’s evidence for this assertion is found not in the Bible but in an experience which 
he expects his reader to have undergone, for, “as anyone who has tasted the certainty of 
the understanding has without a doubt experienced within himself,” the process of 
rational deduction produces an experience of clear and distinct understanding—“not in 
words but in a far more excellent mode” (1.4.1)—that cannot possibly be controverted.  
Spinoza, in other words, is writing only for a certain type of religious believer: someone 
who continues to accept the Bible’s authority but who has also undergone the experience 
of scientific certainty that comes, say, from completing a Euclidean proof—and who 
furthermore does not suspect that that “inward attestation” (A.2) could have been a grand 
deception.  While continuing to accept the traditional accounts of revelation contained in 
the Bible, such a person would not expect to have a revelatory experience himself, and he 
would therefore agree with Spinoza’s unproven assertion that “we do not have any 
Prophets” today (1.5.3).   
Spinoza’s strategy for convincing such a reader to follow him, which is more 
rhetorically persuasive than logically compelling, is to drive a wedge between his desire 
for certain knowledge and his residual trust in the Bible’s authority.92  Since those who 
read the prophets’ words can only embrace what they say by “mere faith” there exists a 
substantial hearsay problem.  How can we know that these “interpreters” actually 
interpreted God’s words to them correctly?  In fact, how can we be sure that God was 
speaking to them at all?  It therefore seems to be important that the example which 
                                                
92 Spinoza’s strategy in the first six chapters has been well summarized by Gildin: “Spinoza seeks to 
confront his reader with a dilemma by making him choose between an understanding of God which is 
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Spinoza uses to justify his definition of prophecy, and the very first quotation from the 
Bible in the entire book, involves not God speaking to Moses but Moses speaking to 
Pharaoh “in the role of God” (1.1.5).  Since every reported instance of traditional 
revelation involves a human playing this role, so to speak, any reader who prefers to rely 
on his own “inward attestation” should have good reason to begin to question his 
acceptance of the Bible’s veracity.  Indeed, as Spinoza will make clear at the end of the 
Treatise, even many of Moses’ contemporaries believed him to be an imposter 
(17.12.43).93 
  Now, because Spinoza’s argument in this chapter appeals to the experience of 
reason’s “inward attestation,” it does not take seriously the Bible’s claim that the latter is 
not to be trusted.94  He claims that the only way to make sense of its claims that are said 
to exceed the limits of our understanding is “to roll out the sacred scrolls” and carefully 
examine what the prophets have handed down to us “by mouth or in writing” (1.5.2-3).  
But of course, anything that was communicable in such a way would by no means exceed 
the limits of our understanding; the idea that the Bible can only be understood by those 
who are privileged with mystical insights is not something that Spinoza can refute.  In 
fact, his response to such a claim is to ridicule it: he expressly indicates that he will not 
take up the objection of someone who “wanted to understand, or rather to dream, that the 
Prophets had a human body but not a human mind, so that their sensations and 
                                                                                                                                            
Biblical but unacceptable and understandings which, while they are not unacceptable in the same way, are 
unsupported by the authority of the Bible” (Gildin 1980, 163). 
93 See also Yaffe 1997, 139 
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consciousness were of quite another nature than ours” (1.2.4).  Now, in the preface 
Spinoza had promised that his analysis of the Bible would refute precisely this position, 
and so it may be tempting to conclude that that was a mere boast.  But since this boast 
would surely undermine the integrity of the entire Treatise in a way which the author 
would doubtless have recognized, it may also be that by mocking this position Spinoza is 
in fact acknowledging that he cannot refute it in the straightforward manner which we 
might have expected.  Reason, after all, cannot engage much less debunk the claims of 
those who reject the rule of non-contradiction, and so Spinoza’s mockery may be 
intended to show that if he is to fulfill his original promise he will have to travel another 
path.  Perhaps, as Strauss observes, Spinoza’s ridicule of orthodoxy is not meant to 
replace his refutation but rather “is itself the refutation” (Strauss 1965, 28-9).   
 Just how this could be is not immediately clear, but Spinoza may be hinting at the 
character of this alternative refutation when he prefaces his analysis of the Bible in 
chapter 1 by informing his reader that almost the entire Old Testament is written in the 
language of “devotion” (1.5.5).  Thus, as he writes, its Jewish authors ascribe many 
things to God improperly because they think and speak in a way characteristic of the 
vulgar.  They never make mention of “intermediate and particular causes” but instead 
claim that everything that happens to them occurs through God’s will (1.5.5).  Here, 
unlike at the opening of the chapter, Spinoza does not even acknowledge the alternative 
theoretical position which is lurking behind these “vulgar” claims.  He does not consider 
                                                                                                                                            
94 Cf., e.g., I Corinthians 3:19-20: “For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, 
‘He catches the wise in their own craftiness’; and again, ‘The LORD knows the thoughts of the wise, that 
they are futile.’” 
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the possibility that the universe is governed not by impersonal laws discernable to reason 
but instead by an unfathomable divine intelligence.  But he does make clear that this 
latter position, which he will not directly engage, is linked to a particular moral attitude 
which emphasizes “devotion” rather than, say, understanding and self-reliance.  The 
remainder of chapter 1 will therefore be devoted to making the character of that moral 
attitude clear, and it will attempt to show the members of Spinoza’s scientifically-
inclined audience that the Bible was written by those in the grip of a mindset which they 
simply cannot accept. 
 Spinoza’s official teaching in chapter 1 is that all Biblical prophecy, with the 
important exceptions of that given to Moses and Jesus, was purely a product of the 
imagination—although he also acknowledges that the prophets thought that what they 
were imagining was real (1.6.2).  He begins his analysis by claiming that the revelation 
by which the Law was revealed to Moses was real (1.7.1).  To do otherwise, as he 
acknowledges, would “impugn the force of Scripture” (1.9.3)—since both Jews and 
Christians attach crucial importance to this passage, it would undermine not just the Old 
Testament but the New Testament as well.  But Spinoza’s claim that “this voice alone . . . 
was a true one” (1.7.3) is highly dubious: it rests on the Biblical distinction between the 
revelation that was given to Moses and that of all other prophets (1.8.2; 1.13.1-2; Dt. 
34:10-12), which Spinoza interprets to mean that all non-Mosaic prophecy is false!  The 
other prophets, such as Samuel, received their revelations in dreams, times when, as 
Spinoza’s scientifically inclined reader surely knows, the mind “is most capable of 
imagining things that are not” (1.8.5).  But of course, what the Bible actually says in this 
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passage (I Sam 3:3-10) is not that Samuel dreamed that God spoke to him but that God 
spoke to him in a dream.  It does not share Spinoza’s scientific perspective.  Rather—and 
this is the lesson which Spinoza communicates to his most careful readers—it holds that 
dreams, and even waking visions for that matter, can communicate divine wisdom and, 
indeed, commandments which we must follow when deciding how to live our lives. 
 Since the dreams even of the most sober can often drift into the realm of outright 
nonsense, Spinoza’s analysis is disturbing to say the least.  Are we to conclude that the 
Jewish nation for over five-thousand years followed a way of life that was called for in a 
Law that somebody literally dreamt up—and that this person furthermore did not know 
how to distinguish his dreams from reality?  As previously indicated, Spinoza’s official 
answer to this question is no, but this turns out to be an extremely backhanded 
complement.  Since the Mosaic revelation did not occur in a dream or a vision, it follows 
that God must have spoken to the Israelites “Face to face . . . that is, as two human beings 
are used to communicating their concepts to each other, their two bodies mediating” 
(1.9.4).  Since the Jews, in this presentation, were rational and not primitive, it follows 
that they would not simply take on trust that it was God who was speaking to them.  To 
“be made certain of his Existence,” therefore, they wanted actually to see God (1.9.10), 
and this why the Bible frequently describes Him anthropomorphically and in fact “never 
enjoined us to believe that God is incorporeal or even that he has no image or figure” 
(1.9.12; 1.13.1-2).    
 So while the Israelites did not imagine something which they mistook for reality, 
it seems instead that they saw something real which, while in full possession of their 
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faculties, they took to be the Deity.  Like the Greeks and Romans, they worshipped 
something corporeal and, presumably, resembling a human being, although Spinoza also 
acknowledges that at one point they thought that the God who freed them from Egypt 
was a calf (2.9.22).  Now this, of course, is highly unsettling, and so it is perhaps to 
soften the blow that Spinoza now claims that there is a much more rational brand of piety 
available to readers of the New Testament.  Because, as he noted at the opening of the 
chapter, God “communicates his essence to our minds with no bodily means employed,” 
it follows that “if a human being were to perceive some things with the mind alone which 
are not contained in the first foundations of our knowledge and cannot be deduced from 
them, his mind would necessarily have to be more outstanding and far more excellent 
than a human one” (1.14.2).  This kind of “perfection,” Spinoza asserts, was something 
which was possessed only by “Christ,” to whom God revealed the way to salvation not in 
words or visions “but immediately” (1.14.3).  By suddenly invoking Jesus in the middle 
of this highly debunking chapter on the Old Testament—and by referring to him as 
“Christ”—Spinoza suggests not only that he is writing as a Christian, and also that 
authentic Christianity offers a more rational but still genuinely pious alternative to the 
crude corporealism of the Hebrew Bible.  Whereas “Moses spoke with God face to face 
as a man is used to doing with a friend (that is, with their two bodies mediating), Christ . . 
. communicated with God mind to mind” (1.15.4, emphasis added).  And yet, with the 
possibility of this scientific or quasi-scientific idea of prophecy now established, Spinoza 
goes further than he has before and, forgetting his earlier statement that to deny the 
Mosaic revelation is to impugn all of Scripture, claims that “besides Christ, no one”—i.e. 
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not even Moses—“received what was revealed of God except by the work of the 
imagination” (1.16.1). 
 By criticizing the Old Testament in the name of the New Testament, Spinoza not 
only builds himself a rhetorical safety net, but he also begins to elaborate a new religious 
outlook which those scientifically inclined readers of his Treatise who are shaken by his 
analysis of the Mosaic revelation can look to in its stead.95  For these readers, it seems, he 
will present Christianity as rationalistic, but he also appears to cater to a lingering desire 
for the supra-rational, or for assistance from an anthropomorphic God, which they may 
still feel.96  That Jesus Christ is an anthropomorphic God seems to be implied not only by 
the fact that he is quite obviously believed to be both a man and a god at the same time,97 
but also because, as Spinoza shortly informs us, God in fact has neither a mind (1.20.13) 
nor other human moral qualities such as mercy and grace (1.20.20, 23).  If Jesus thought 
he communicated with God “mind to mind,” then it appears that his opinions about the 
divine were little different from those of the Old Testament prophets.   
Spinoza’s analysis of the Bible thus far can therefore be described as employing a 
two-pronged approach: while showing to a large audience how the Bible can be read so 
as to respect reason rather than imagination, he simultaneously demonstrates to his more 
                                                
95 For Spinoza’s strategy of indirectly criticizing Christianity by way of Judaism, see Strauss 1952. 
96 Spinoza’s attribution to Christ of things which are “above human understanding” (1.14.5), or “which are 
not contained in the first foundations of our knowledge” (1.14.2) seems to be ambiguous.  It may simply 
mean that Jesus was “the greatest philosopher who ever lived,” as Strauss suggests (1952, 172), but it also 
could imply that he had access to truths that transcend reason.  In presenting the New Testament’s teaching 
in this way, Spinoza may be appealing to those readers who fancy themselves rationalistic but who also 
continue to think that science will lead them to truths which are somehow mysterious or reflective in some 
way of more traditional religious sentiments.  Cf. Donagan (1988, 28ff.), who places great weight on this 
passage in disagreeing with Strauss. 
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attentive readers that its genuine teaching expresses little more than the vulgar prejudices 
of a very primitive people.  In both cases, however, Spinoza’s case against Scripture is 
“not theoretical but moral” (Strauss 1965, 29).  It seeks to show that the Bible reflects a 
mindset characterized by devotion and wonder, and it seeks to replace that in turn with a 
different mindset which looks up to freedom and understanding.  Thus, he claims, for 
example, that the Bible often uses the word ruach (“spirit”) to refer to human “virtue and 
capability,” and as evidence for this he cites Elihu’s claim to Job that “science is not 
exactly to be sought among the old,” for (in Spinoza’s interpretation of this passage) “it 
depends on the specific virtue and capacity of the human being” (1.17.6; Job 32:8).  Now, 
Spinoza here seems to understand “virtue” as something like Machiavellian virtù, a 
vigorous and manly reliance on one’s own capabilities that is most often found among the 
young.  Indeed, science as he understands it appears to be an intellectual manifestation of 
this: it is the zealous and courageous activity of pursuing the truth for oneself through 
one’s own determined efforts.  And yet, Elihu also says that it is “the inspiration of the 
Almighty” which gives men understanding (Job 32:8).  Elihu contends that wisdom is not 
found among the old not because the young have more courage to seek it out, but because 
it is literally a gift from God—and that gift is not bestowed in return for years of study.  
Thus, the Bible’s true teaching (to which Spinoza only very quietly calls attention), is that 
we have no capacity to attain knowledge through our own capacities, that those capacities 
are therefore worthless, and that we are as a result wholly dependent for it on something 
outside of ourselves.  This is the outlook that Spinoza identified in the preface as 
                                                                                                                                            
97 This would appear to be what “some Churches state of Christ,” and which Spinoza claims not to grasp 
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conducive to “womanish” dependence, and he also of course linked it there to political 
servility (P.1.5). 
The Old Testament’s true teaching on prophecy, it therefore appears, not only 
entails the complete denigration of human reason, but it also presents that denigration as 
inseparable from a support for a political teaching which mandates obedience to a law 
whose precepts cannot be accounted for on rational grounds.  Now, it is true that, on the 
surface of his presentation, Spinoza certainly claims that the Bible endorses natural 
science.  In fact, he asserts that when Solomon used the term “spirit of God” he was 
referring metaphorically to the human mind (1.17.18), or to his “natural science,” which 
Scripture also refers to as “God’s science” (1.18.6).  But in the context of the first of 
these passages, Solomon is actually meditating on the utter insignificance and weakness 
of the mind.  Since the “words of the wise are as goads . . . and much study is a weariness 
of the flesh,” it follows that the purpose of human life is not knowledge but obedience: 
“Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man” (Ecc. 12:11-
13).  Now, in contrast to this view, Spinoza is currently beginning to use the example of 
Solomon in order to construct a Biblically based but rationalistic moral teaching, one 
which purports to vindicate the political and intellectual liberty which Spinoza regards as 
synonymous with a reliance upon one’s natural capacities.  It is therefore tempting to 
suspect that in superimposing this view onto the Bible Spinoza is in fact putting this very 
teaching into practice.  His ‘refutation’ of Scripture, in other words, would seem to be an 
example of the kind of Machiavellian project to which he alludes: a concerted effort to 
                                                                                                                                            
(1.15.1). 
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overturn orthodox Christianity and to replace it with a new “effectual truth.”  He uses the 
mantle of Biblical authority, and especially the figure of Solomon, whom he later calls 
“the Philosopher” (1.6.94), to cultivate an admiration for a human type that will 
henceforth be considered divine precisely on account of its independence of mind and 
refusal to submit to intellectual authority.  And this outlook, in turn, will permit the future 
adherents of a new kind of piety to look down upon more traditional ideas of revelation 
(as Spinoza will soon claim Solomon did [2.9.28]) and to regard even the Bible’s record 
of them as the natural products of a primitive psychology.   
Thus, at the end of chapter 1, Spinoza very clearly applies the account of the 
psychological origins of superstition contained in the preface to the Old Testament.  Just 
as he had there claimed that religion and superstition are very different things, he now 
indicates that it is perfectly in keeping with piety to recognize that the Jews spoke the 
way they did because they were used to referring to God all those things that surpassed 
their grasp and of whose “natural causes they were ignorant” (1.18.9; 2.8.13).  They 
thought storms and lightning (1.18.10) to be sent by God, and they called unusual works 
of nature “miracles” or “works of God” because they thought them “stupendous,” and 
they “admired them in the greatest degree” when they “opened the way toward salvation 
in extreme perils” (1.19.12-13).  Because this fear was mixed with a combination of 
ignorance and the admiration that frequently accompanies ignorance,98 he suggests, the 
Jews looked for guidance in a kind of knowledge whose causes they could not understand 
                                                
98 As will become clear throughout this chapter, Spinoza seldom if ever uses the words “admiration” or 
“wonder” in anything but a pejorative sense.  Cf. his mention of “foolish wonder” in the Appendix to 
Ethics I (Spinoza 1994, 29). 
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and which they considered divine for that very reason (cf. 1.20.5).  Spinoza recalls that 
these things were true not just of the Jews but of the ancient heathens as well (1.18.10; 
1.19.2-3), and he therefore encourages his reader to begin to read the Bible 
anthropologically, as the poetic and literary expression of a typically primitive people, 
which can be understood “in universal terms” (2.10.10) alongside the sacred texts of 
other ancient cultures.   
To begin to articulate the details of this new scientific analysis of prophecy is the 
main task of chapter 2.  As he opens this chapter, he declares that the creation of such a 
study is demanded not only by “Philosophy” and by the subject matter, but also by “the 
time” in which he is writing.  The birth of the Enlightenment, it appears, has made the 
time ripe for a new cultural offensive, and Spinoza indicates that a key part of his version 
of that project will be to show that it is a terrible error to seek out “wisdom” or “the 
knowledge of natural and spiritual matters” from the books of the prophets (2.1.5).  This 
is exactly what the creation of a scientific understanding of prophecy will do: by making 
clear the as yet unknown laws of nature99 that rendered the prophets “more capable of 
these rather than those revelations” (2.5.3, emphasis original), it will sew a salutary 
popular doubt about the wisdom of guiding one’s life by what is contained in the Holy 
Writ.  This is because the presupposition of this science is the teaching of “experience 
                                                
99 Although Spinoza insists that it is certain that prophecy has a natural cause, he modestly claims not to 
know what these particular causes are (1.22.3).  Notwithstanding this, however, he seems to suggest that he 
is aware of at least the necessary groundwork on which any such explanation must be built.  He writes that 
it is not surprising that the prophets “expressed everything spiritual corporeally,” for this agrees “with the 
nature of the imagination” (1.24.1).  What he seems to imply is that human beings cannot help but think of 
supernatural things as anthropomorphic because the imagination is rooted in, and cannot transcend, the 
experience we have of ourselves (cf. 1.9.9). 
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and reason” (2.1.4) that only those who are “rustic and without any learning” tend to have 
prophetic experiences (2.1.3).   
Indeed, Spinoza’s rhetoric is at its most powerful in this chapter when, through a 
series of seemingly arbitrary examples, he shows just how far this claim extends.  Politely 
noting that God always “accommodated” His revelations to the opinions and capacities of 
prophets (2.8.13, 2.9.17, 2.10.1, 2.10.3, 2.10.6), Spinoza catalogues the great ignorance 
of science, and of the most rudimentary tenets of mathematics and astronomy, that was 
present even among those whom the Bible considers to be the most outstanding in 
wisdom and piety.100  He points out that Joshua believed in a geocentric universe, that 
Solomon thought the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle to be 3 to 1, 
and that Adam, Abraham, and Moses all held shockingly primitive and anthropomorphic 
conceptions of God (2.8.5, 9; 2.9.1-12, 18-19).  Now, in cataloguing these things Spinoza 
presents himself as a defender of Scripture (2.8.2), and he goes so far as to suggest that 
by exposing them, and by enabling us to read the Bible literally, he is in fact rescuing it 
from those rationalists who would twist its words to make it seem to say what it clearly 
does not (2.8.4).  But although Spinoza claims that we can and indeed must accept the 
ignorance of the prophets “in keeping with piety” (2.8.13), this piety seems designed to 
                                                
100 This is true especially of Solomon, the epitome of human wisdom according to the Old Testament.  
Spinoza claims not only that Solomon was grossly ignorant of simple geometry, but he also admits that he 
was a prophet, which implies that he too lacked the strength of understanding which is needed to rein in the 
imagination (cf. 2.8.9-11 with 2.1.4; Solomon’s status as a prophet is downplayed, but never explicitly 
denied, at 2.1.2 and 4.4.34).  As Spinoza goes on to present Solomon’s scientific knowledge as the 
centerpiece of his new reading of the Bible, this fact should be kept in mind.  If anything, Solomon was 
only the wisest man “of his age” (2.9.28; 4.4.34), which from Spinoza is not an extremely high 
compliment. 
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foster a contempt for the Bible which will not stop at what he arbitrarily labels as “merely 
theoretical matters” (2.7.12). 
Now of course, the massive surface teaching of this chapter is that despite their 
overwhelmingly primitive and ignorant mindset, the Biblical prophets were nevertheless 
united by their espousal of a common moral teaching.  In Spinoza’s words, they all had 
“a spirit inclined solely to the equitable and the good” (2.4.5), and they could therefore be 
sure that their revelations were true rather than false because they had a ‘moral certainty’ 
(2.4.2).  Now, this claim is taken at face-value by a number of Spinoza scholars,101 but it 
raises certain questions.  If, after all, the prophets were so primitive and rustic, and of 
such disparate temperaments, how likely is it that they all just happened to imagine the 
same, decent moral teaching?102  Now, Spinoza also equates this moral teaching with the 
Mosaic Law (2.4.2; 2.4.7), which he therefore seems to regard as synonymous with a 
code of ordinary moral decency.  One way out of this dilemma might therefore be to 
suggest, as many interpreters have, that Moses was essentially a great legislator103—a 
statesman of very high stature who laid down a good law against which all subsequent 
prophets could check the moral content of their revelations.  But a problem with this 
interpretation is that, as previously mentioned, Spinoza goes out of his way in this chapter 
to discuss how primitive and rustic Moses was.  He shows, for example, that Moses 
believed that God was corporeal and that He had His home in the heavens in the manner 
                                                
101 See, e.g. Donagan 1988, 24-5; Hunemann 1999; Mason 147-71.  This question is to some extent the 
same as that of whether reason teaches virtue in the usual sense, to be discussed more explicitly below.  
102 Huenemann (1999) argues that this is a problem which Spinoza never solved, and that he therefore 
regarded the accounts of revelation contained in the Bible with genuine reverence and love. 
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of the heathen gods (2.9.12, 16).  In fact, Spinoza points out that Moses was not even a 
monotheist.  He believed, actually, that God was only the tribal God of the Jews, and that 
He had consequently left other nations in the care of other gods or sub-gods (2.9.12).  
Most importantly, however, Spinoza shows that the revelations which Moses received 
about the divine law were also “accommodated” to his opinions, for he believed God to 
have anthropomorphic qualities such as compassion, gentleness, and jealousy (2.9.12, 
17). 
 It would be a mistake, then, to view the Moses whom Spinoza presents in chapter 
2 as a wise legislator who simply made good political use out of common superstitions. 
In fact, Spinoza indicates that his mindset was as vulgar as that of those for whom his law 
was given.  It seems that he believed his own lessons, and as a result those lessons were 
terribly defective.  As Spinoza presents it, the moral teaching of Scripture as a whole 
exhorts man to “nothing besides obedience alone” (2.9.7), and as his discussion of the 
Mosaic Law now makes clear, there is nothing farther from reason than obedience.  
Drawing a contrast between Moses and himself, Spinoza writes that Moses taught the 
Jews “not as a Philosopher, that they might ultimately be compelled to live well on the 
basis of the freedom of the spirit, but as a Lawgiver, on the basis of the imperium of the 
Law” (2.9.23).  Philosophy, he thus indicates, has absolutely nothing in common with 
law.  For in the most crucial respect the Law of Moses shared a feature which is in fact 
fundamental to all human law: it sought to procure obedience strictly through the use of 
mercenary rewards and punishments, or “to curb the vulgar as a horse by the rein” 
                                                                                                                                            
103 See, e.g. Frankel 2001 and 2002; McShea 98-9.  In fairness, it should be noted that Spinoza presents 
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(2.9.24; 4.2.2).  The morality which was thus taught to the Jews therefore had absolutely 
nothing in common with “virtue and true blessedness” (2.9.26), of which, he says, they 
were entirely ignorant.  On the contrary, Moses taught them “in the same mode in which 
parents are used to teaching children who lack all reason” (2.9.25, emphasis added). 
 Spinoza’s overt intention in this passage is to emphasize the very primitive 
character of Old Testament morality, but it should not be overlooked that he also implies 
that any morality that teaches obedience is not only childish but also subhuman.  Because 
the rewards and punishments promised by the Mosaic Law blinded human beings to their 
true good—or rather, since the Israelites were already so blind—it kept them in a state of 
spiritual slavery (2.9.23-24).  In contrast to Locke, who goes out of his way to claim that 
the idea of divine reward and punishment is not only necessary but demonstrably rational, 
Spinoza implies that one who is guided by reason will never take his bearings by law.  
That is why Solomon, who had the most reasonable opinions about God in the Old 
Testament, and “who surpassed everyone of his age in the natural light,” saw through the 
law’s intended purpose and simply violated it.  Indeed, he recognized that it existed only 
to control “those who lacked reason” in part because he was aware that the rewards and 
punishments which it promised were simply mythic: “He taught that all goods of fortune 
are vain for mortals . . ., that human beings have nothing more outstanding than the 
understanding, and that they are punished by no greater punishment than foolishness” 
(2.9.28).  A rational Spinozist, it seems, will recognize that because there is no divine 
support for justice in the usual sense, all of one’s efforts should be directed to the pursuit 
                                                                                                                                            
this contrary view at several points later in the book (5.3.5-7; 7.5.13; 17.4.1ff.). 
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of one’s own advantage—but that advantage must only be understood to consist in the 
cultivation of wisdom.  So while there are no categorical imperatives that must be 
followed—and this is the primary reason why obedience as such is irrational—it is also 
the case that no material and bodily rewards can serve to justify making sacrifices.  Thus, 
Solomon’s one error was that  he “did what is not worthy of a Philosopher” and indulged 
in pleasures (2.9.28).  The life of philosophy is not hedonistic.  
 Now, what is most intriguing about this passage from a political standpoint is that 
Spinoza has now begun to present Solomon as a model for a new kind of proto-
philosophic piety.  Not only does he seem to think it not dangerous to advertise the 
irrationality of law, but he even seems to want to create a popular outlook that can admire 
and imitate this kind of spiritual independence.  This would seem to be what Spinoza is 
referring to when he raises the enigmatic possibility of compelling human beings “to live 
well on the basis of the freedom of the spirit”—which is an accurate description of the 
educational task which would be faced by the parent of a child who did not “lack all 
reason.”  For a child who has the natural potential to reach his majority and his liberation, 
the job of a parent is to make appropriate use of rewards and punishments in a way that 
will eventually instruct him to do what is good without such sanctions.  So too, Spinoza 
seems to indicate, the kind of education that a philosopher would hand down to society 
would be one designed to enable at least an elite few—a handful of potential Solomons—
to pursue their truest advantage unhampered by a belief in divine reward and punishment.  
Thus, in the coming chapters, Spinoza will use the examples of Solomon as well as Paul 
in order to claim that Scripture teaches a “worship and love of God” (2.9.24) which is 
 185 
rooted not in the corporeal sanctions allegedly emphasized in the Old Testament, but 
instead in a loftier, more spiritual, and more enlightened kind of self-interest.  But 
although the task of bringing about such a liberation may well also require the weakening 
of beliefs among a greater number, it also remains the case that philosophy is the 
province only of a few.  Because of this, Spinoza will also have to claim that reason, 
which teaches the uncompromising pursuit of self-fulfillment through wisdom, also 
commands ethical living in the ordinary sense.  This is why Spinoza contradicts himself 
so many times in chapter 2, and why in the following chapters he will present several, 
irreconcilable pictures of where our greatest good and our highest blessedness can be 
found.  
 
REASON AND THE RELIGION OF REASON 
 Chapters 3 through 6 are meant to show what Scripture teaches about the 
choosing of the Hebrews, the Divine Law, and miracles (cf. P.5.6).  But by the end of 
chapter 2 Spinoza already seems to have conveyed his view of about the Bible’s 
understanding of these three subjects.  Speaking “in universal terms” (2.10.10), he has 
shown his intended reader that the Scriptures should be understood as the product of a 
typically ancient mindset characterized by devotion, admiration, and above all, 
ignorance—that its authors thought they were “chosen” by God because they believed 
every nation to have its own deity (2.9.12-16), that they lived by a Law that was 
appropriate for their child-like condition (2.9.24-5), and that they considered unusual 
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works of nature miraculous because they wondered at what they could not understand 
(1.18.9-11).  The next few chapters therefore will not be devoted primarily to an 
additional analysis of what the Bible has to say about these subjects.  Instead, they will 
articulate Spinoza’s own philosophic teaching on human psychology, political science, 
and physics.  In each of the next four chapters, Spinoza begins by laying out the insights 
of his rationalism dogmatically, without justification, and he then proceeds to show how 
the Bible should be read by someone whose outlook is more enlightened than the one 
contained in Scripture.  But he also identifies this new rationalistic understanding of 
religion with one that seems at times to dilute that very understanding, and which, in 
cultivating an admiration for the philosophic life, also obscures what distinguishes it from 
the kind of existence that was called for by the old piety.  To make sense of these 
contradictions, it will be necessary to pay attention to two elements: Spinoza’s quarrel 
with the Bible’s psychology, on the one hand, and his attempt to resolve that quarrel 
through the spread of an alternative religious teaching, on the other. 
 Spinoza opens chapter 3 by stating his philosophic thesis, as it were, about his 
understanding of human psychology and of the ends to which, according to reason at 
least, men are naturally led.  “Each’s true happiness and blessedness [beatitudo],” he 
writes, “consists solely in the enjoyment of the good,” and that good furthermore 
“consists solely in wisdom and knowledge of the true” (3.1.1-2, emphasis added).  
Endorsing in his own name the position which he had earlier put in the mouth of 
Solomon, Spinoza suggests that the objects which men ordinarily covet—such as wealth, 
honor, and power—are wholly vain.  Moreover, they are vain in part because the love of 
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them inclines men to competition, or to a preoccupation with the affairs of others.  One’s 
wealth, for example, can only be measured by comparison, and so too with all the other 
goods of fortune.  By contrast, wisdom would seem to be synonymous with “the 
tranquility of true life” (3.1.3) precisely because it does not need to be obtained through 
competition, or after a restless struggle for power.  The possession of wisdom leads to 
what Hobbes derisively termed the “repose of a mind satisfied”104 because it produces a 
kind of enjoyment that is wholly self-absorbed, for if a man happens to be wiser than 
others, that does nothing to “enlarge his wisdom—that is, his true happiness—in any way 
at all” (3.1.2, emphasis added).  The peak of humanity, so to speak, or the end to which 
the pursuit of happiness that governs our psychology points, appears to consist in 
something like the life of contemplative isolation which Spinoza himself famously led.  
Of course, Spinoza does not discount the possibility that a wise man could benefit from 
the presence of others like himself.  But although wisdom can be shared, it can never be 
enjoyed in common, and he therefore seems to indicate that the philosopher would 
consider such benefits solely from the point of view of his own personal utility.  Thus, 
while Spinoza here follows the tradition of ancient and medieval thought in considering 
human beings as oriented towards the pursuit of a summum bonum or a finis ultimus, he 
breaks from that tradition in a significant way by stripping the meaning of those terms of 
any concern for devotion to others.105   
                                                
104 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan xi.1-2. 
105 Spinoza thus eschews the relativism of Hobbes and Locke while retaining their desire to re-orient 
human concerns to the pursuit of rationally construed individual self-interest.  He follows Aristotle and the 
scholastic tradition in positing a single end for human life, but he divorces that end from the religious or 
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 Indeed, according to Spinoza, it would appear that this traditional moral 
understanding is rooted in exactly the kind of envy and resentment—in the kind of short-
sighted and confused thinking—which animates the lives of those whose primary concern 
is with goods other than wisdom.  For the Hebrews, as he indicates, were in the grips of 
precisely this kind of attitude.  Thus, when God told them that he had chosen them “in 
preference to the other nations” and that He was “known to them alone to the neglect of 
others,” He was merely accommodating His message to the mindset of a people whose 
resentment led it to glory in the misfortune of its neighbors (3.1.4-5).  Now, as some 
commentators have pointed out,106 Spinoza’s characterization of the Hebrews’ mindset 
appears to be grossly unfair.  For it fails even to consider the possibility, which the very 
passages to which he refers here plainly indicate (e.g. Dt. 4:5-8), that the Jews were 
“chosen” by God to receive special commandments, or to perform duties that went well 
beyond those called for by ordinary morality, and that these in turn exalted them in the 
sight of other nations as a positive example of justice and righteousness.  Spinoza does 
not take up the possibility that the Jews were to be “a kingdom of priests and a holy 
nation” (Ex. 19:6), although (having been born and educated as a Jew), it is impossible to 
conceive that he was unaware of this view.  And this neglect, in turn, seems to leave 
Spinoza almost unable to explain why Solomon—the Bible’s epitome of wisdom, and a 
man whom he has just presented as liberated from ordinary moral concerns—asked God, 
                                                                                                                                            
moral virtues which call for self-abnegation or self-sacrifice.  Thus, he has been famously characterized as 
“the last of the mediaevals” and “the first of the moderns” (Wolfson 1958, vii). 
106 See, e.g., Smith 1997, 99. 
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out of apparent resentment, not just for wisdom, but also to ensure “that no one in the 
future will be as wise as he” (3.1.5; I Ki. 3:12).   
 Now, the Biblically alert reader will note that when God makes this promise to 
Solomon, He does it not as a concession to envy or as “a mode of speaking” (3.1.5) but as 
a reward for Solomon’s magnanimity and selflessness.  Given the opportunity by God to 
ask for anything that he desires, Solomon requests not riches or long life but knowledge 
of justice so that he can be a good king—and so pleased is God with this unselfish 
request that He rewards him with the wisdom for which he asked along with those other 
goods for which he did not (I Ki. 3:9-14).  Not only are Solomon’s motivations sharply 
different from those which Spinoza claims should animate the most clear-sighted human 
beings, but it would also seem possible to draw a sharp contrast between the wisdom of 
Solomon and the wisdom of Spinoza.  For Solomon’s wisdom, as it becomes apparent 
through his first act of judgment, teaches him and us that the true mother of a baby must 
be she who would rather see it raised by another than cut in two (I Ki. 3:16-28).  Or 
rather, to extrapolate from this story, it teaches that human beings are not solitary and 
selfish by nature but instead conscious of their duties to others.  The Bible teaches that 
our desire for happiness is inextricably bound up with a pull of obligation which we feel 
to entities greater than ourselves—to family, to friends, and to God—and it is very 
possible to conceive that someone who agrees with Spinoza about the primitive and 
unscientific character of the Old Testament may yet continue to feel the tug of this kind 
of devotion.  Spinoza’s true critique of the Bible, in other words, must be moral and 
psychological rather than scientific.  It will have to demonstrate that this devotional 
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understanding of human nature is not natural but historical, and one way to do this would 
be to show that, at least among the most clear-sighted, such longings can be made to 
disappear. 
 This, at any rate, appears to be one way of explaining why Spinoza’s main 
concern in these chapters seems to be to create a philosophic religion which will admire 
the self-absorbed independence of the rational life.  The centerpiece of that religion is a 
new conception of human beatitudo, or of the summum bonum, which, as we have seen, 
consists “solely in wisdom and knowledge of the true” (3.1.2).  As Spinoza had indicated 
at the opening of chapter 1, philosophy can be said to be identical with piety because 
nature’s “universal laws,” which “always involve eternal truth and necessity,” are 
“nothing but God’s eternal decrees” (3.3.2).  Thus, because human beings are “part of 
nature as well,” or, to say the same thing, subject to God’s decrees, they have been 
determined—or chosen by God—to do what they can do to preserve their being (3.3.4-5).  
Indeed, because “no one does anything except on the basis of the predetermined order of 
nature” (3.3.6), it is “absolutely” to be granted that “everything is determined” (4.1.5), 
although this same determinism also makes it “necessary” for human beings, in the 
ordinary course of their lives, to fail to see this and instead “to consider things as open 
possibilities” (4.1.8).  According to Spinoza, in other words, human beings inhabit a 
universe in which God’s presence is all-encompassing, and in which everything that 
appears to them to be a result either of fortune or of human choice is in reality the end-
product of a chain of causation that stretches back to eternity.  We can be said to receive 
“God’s external help” when that causal nexus works out so that something outside 
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ourselves helps to keep us alive, and we can be said to receive “God’s internal help” 
(3.2.5) when we preserve ourselves through our own efforts, but in reality these are but 
two ways of perceiving a single thing.  Just as human nature is actually just “nature itself 
insofar as we conceive it as being determined through human power” (4.1.6)—that is, just 
as our minds are governed by laws of nature, but seem to us to be free—so too the causes 
of things are really but two ways of conceiving of a unified reality: the single all-
encompassing and eternal chain of causes which Spinoza terms “God.” 
 Stripped of its religious coloring, Spinoza’s picture of man’s place in the cosmos 
would seem to amount to this: we are a part of a universe in which we enjoy no special 
status, in which we accordingly do not possess the freedom of the will that is prerequisite 
for virtue in the traditional sense, and in which, far from being able to engage in great 
acts of self-abnegation, we are therefore in fact bound (like all the other natural beings) 
by the laws of nature to preserve ourselves and to seek our own advantage to the extent 
that we are able.  But since “the better part of ourselves is the understanding,” our 
capacity to preserve ourselves as human beings, which is to say, as thinking beings, 
requires that “if we really want to seek what is useful for ourselves, we have to endeavor 
above all to perfect our understanding as much as can be done.  For our highest good 
[summum bonum] has to consist in its perfection” (4.3.1).  This, Spinoza says, is the “aim 
of all human actions” (4.3.5); the same determinism that governs us also orients us 
towards thinking.  Although not all are clear-sighted about this, everything that we do can 
be understood as arising ultimately from the desire to understand “things through their 
first causes” (3.4.1)—which of course entails a recognition that the universe is no more 
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than a nexus of causation, that there is no cosmic support for human dignity, and that 
freedom of the will is but a necessary illusion.  Thus, Spinoza’s paradoxical conclusion 
about human law applies also to the laws of nature: one who recognizes the necessity of 
the laws “acts in a steadfast spirit and on the basis of his own decree,” whereas one who 
does not is held “as a horse by the rein,” for his lack of mental clarity about why he is 
doing what he is doing consigns him to a state of sub-humanity (4.2.2).  Those who act 
because they think they are free and those who do so because they know they are not may 
do the same things, but it is the mental clarity of the latter that makes all the difference.  
The flourishing of human dignity requires becoming resigned to the lack of support for 
such a thing in an indifferent universe, and true freedom of the spirit is founded on an 
intellectual liberation which allows one to recognize that there is no such thing as 
freedom in the ordinary sense. 
 Spinoza’s conception of the summum bonum therefore appears to be deeply 
paradoxical.  Can he really intend for this kind of philosophic resignation to serve as an 
object of aspiration even for relatively elite religious thinking?  These problems, indeed, 
appear all the more puzzling once we consider that Spinoza actually seems to present at 
least two descriptions of human perfection.  When he first begins to describe the 
character of our highest good, he claims that it “has to consist” in the perfection of our 
understanding, but he also suggests that that perfection can come about only if we “seek 
[quaerere]” and “endeavor [conari]” to cultivate our intellects “as much as can be done” 
(4.3.1).  Philosophy as Spinoza first presents it thus appears to be a quest for truth rather 
than a delight in its presence.  It is not an activity but an entire way of life, a life which 
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contains no element of selfless devotion but which is instead wholly dedicated to the 
clear-sighted pursuit of happiness, or to maximizing that which makes us human and not 
bestial.  On the other hand, however, it is also informed by a recognition that the amount 
of that happiness which can be achieved is limited by the bounds of the possible, not least 
because in a universe in which human beings enjoy no special status they cannot attain 
the kind of contemplative perfection hoped for by sub-philosophic believers in teleology.  
Moreover, these doubts about just how much we can know seem to become more 
radicalized as Spinoza begins to speak in a way that appears designed to deny them.  For 
even as he speaks approvingly of the “certainty that really removes all doubt,” he 
indicates that this “depends solely on knowledge of God—both since without God 
nothing can be or be conceived, and since we can doubt all things so long as we have no 
clear and distinct idea of God” (4.3.2).  All the insights of Spinoza’s rationalism, in other 
words, are founded on the assumption, which is at present no more than an assumption, 
that “God” as Spinoza describes Him (and not as the Bible describes Him) exists.  Thus, 
it is also true that “our highest good and perfection depends solely on knowledge of God” 
(4.3.2), for the very idea that our perfection consists in the pursuit of knowledge assumes 
that the pursuit of knowledge is possible—i.e. that the universe is not mysterious but 
ordered in such a way that permits us to understand things “through their first causes” 
(3.4.1).   
 At least according to Spinoza’s initial description, however, it is in no way clear 
that we actually have such knowledge.  Indeed, in chapter 6 he will acknowledge that 
“God’s existence is not self-evident.”  Rather, as he claims, it “necessarily has to be 
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concluded on the basis of notions whose truth is so firm and unshakeable that no power 
can be given or conceived by which they can be changed.”  Spinoza’s entire way of life, 
and all his theoretical conclusions, are therefore dependent upon proving the existence of 
his God—which is to say, the existence of unchangeable natural necessities—“beyond a 
shadow of a doubt.”  For if there were even a remote possibility that the natural order 
could “be changed by some power,” we might be able to doubt God’s existence, and we 
then would “never be able to be certain of anything” (6.1.21, emphasis added).  The 
viability of the summum bonum as Spinoza has defined it thus depends upon a vindication 
of the scientific understanding, but, as previously noted, that vindication cannot be 
provided by an appeal to scientific principles.  Thus, when Spinoza claims that we can 
come to know the property of a cause by inferring it through its effects, and thus that “the 
more we know natural things, the more perfectly we know God’s essence (which is the 
cause of all natural things)” (4.2.3), he seems to be covering over, rather than resolving, 
this fundamental problem.  For the inference of a cause from an effect is adequate only 
insofar as it is assumed that the rules of causation hold;107 it can tell us how the laws of 
nature function, or what their essence would be like if they happen to exist, but it cannot 
assure us that they do.  
Since Spinoza indicates his awareness of this difficulty, and since his entire 
conception of human blessedness is at stake in it, it would appear that the repeated 
professions which he now makes about the certainty of the understanding should be taken 
as at best provisional.  Philosophy to Spinoza, in other words, would seem to consist not 
                                                
107 Cf. Emendation of the Intellect (Spinoza 1985, 13-14). 
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primarily in the understanding of causes, or in the kind of geometric reasoning that is 
present in the Ethics, but in the confrontation with the possibility of revelation, or with 
skepticism as to the possibility of human knowledge, to which the Treatise is devoted.  
That Spinoza presents the conclusions of reason dogmatically in chapters 3 through 6 
may therefore be a signal that he cannot do so in any other way, for any arguments which 
he might have presented in their favor would rest at bottom on premises which would 
have to be simply taken for granted.  But it is also possible that Spinoza’s characteristic 
dogmatism—and he is certainly not the most modest sounding of philosophers—is meant 
to help rectify that deep uncertainty which he only very quietly acknowledges.  If the 
Treatise’s theoretical project is connected to its propagandistic project, then it would be 
beneficial for Spinoza to speak, as he now does, in a tone that is not merely dogmatic but, 
indeed, religious.  Thus, contradicting the indications which he just provided that the 
cause of the whole could be mysterious, he now claims that nothing “can be or be 
conceived without God” and, inserting teleological language, he declares that “it is 
certain that everything in nature involves and expresses the concept of God in proportion 
to its essence and its perfection”  (4.2.3).  Since God is identical to the laws by which 
everything comes to be and is determined, it follows that His ‘concept,’ or an intellectual 
manifestation of Him, pervades everything in the universe.  Thus, not only is it the case 
that human knowledge is possible, for “the more we know natural things, the greater and 
more perfect is the knowledge of God which we acquire” (4.2.3), but Spinoza also 
suggests that the achievement of our highest good somehow infuses us with the divine 
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essence, for it puts us in touch with “God himself insofar as he exists in our mind” 
(4.3.5). 
 This second portrait of man’s “highest blessedness” (4.3.3), then, provides a fuller 
elaboration of the pantheistic doctrine that was hinted at in the Treatise’s epigraph, and it 
also prefigures the picture of the world which Spinoza will go on to present in the 
Ethics—a world which is synonymous with God, and which is therefore pervaded with 
divinity.  By suggesting that everything is somehow “in God,” and that God is also 
simultaneously in each of us, Spinoza appears to draw upon precisely those devotional 
and mystical ways of thinking which he is elsewhere at pains to debunk.  Indeed, he 
asserts that a human being can become “more perfect in proportion to the nature and 
perfection of the thing that he loves,” and although he first speaks of the love of “the 
intellectual knowledge of God”—i.e. the love which a scientist may have for his 
knowledge of the laws of nature—he soon confounds this simply with the “love of God” 
(4.2.4)—i.e. with a love of the laws of nature themselves, which is not something that a 
clear-sighted scientist should necessarily feel.  In other words, he seems to be drawing 
upon residual religious sentiments which may exist among educated believers who, while 
scientifically inclined, are still attached to a view of God that resembles the one contained 
in the Bible.  While such a God may be more impersonal, and certainly less 
anthropomorphic, than the God whom Spinoza disparaged in chapters 1 and 2, He is still 
a deity who can serve as an object of love, and who can also endow the universe with a 
kind of mystical reality (or perhaps with an all encompassing mind) which those chapters 
also showed to be contrary to the teachings of reason.  
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By presenting philosophy as divine, Spinoza thus quite explicitly caters to the 
experience of devotion which he elsewhere disparages, but he also places it in the service 
of something thoroughly non-devotional.  His religious project, in other words, attempts 
to cultivate an admiration for the pursuit of knowledge understood as the individual’s 
greatest happiness, and it therefore also seeks to encourage those who take their religious 
duty to think most seriously, and who have the capacity to cultivate their understandings 
to the greatest extent, to recognize that they are naturally driven solely to pursue their 
own greatest good.  To accomplish this, Spinoza puts forward a new reading of the Bible 
which effectively purges it not only of its devotional elements, but also, at least at first, of 
its teaching about the prospect of another life.  He claims that the polity of the Hebrews 
had no higher purpose than physical security “and the rest of the advantages of this life,” 
for “the aim of society as such” is nothing more than this (3.5.4-5).  For the same reason, 
God’s covenant with Abraham could entail nothing spiritual: all he wanted was a child, 
for, as he supposed, besides children “there was nothing that could be of any importance 
to look forward to . . . in advanced old age” (A.4).  But while Spinoza thus insists that the 
Hebrews’ polity was concerned solely with meeting their most basic human needs, he 
also juxtaposes this allegedly crude carnality and narrow parochialism to the respect for 
“understanding and virtue” (3.5.13)—that is, for what is truly universal—which he 
purports to discover  in the Psalms, the later prophets, and the New Testament (3.5.13-16, 
25, 44-5).  To this end, he claims that the Psalmist’s mention of the human heart should 
be taken to refer to the understanding (3.5.15; Ps. 33:15), and he thus seems to intend to 
replace the experience of loving devotion toward God with one of self-absorbed 
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cognition.  But even as he insists that the later prophets preached “true virtue alone,” he 
also removes the messianic part of their message.  He insists that their predictions that the 
Temple would be rebuilt and the ceremonial law restored should be understood 
historically, as a reference to “the time of Cyrus” (3.5.61).  Since, as he writes, the 
understanding depends “on our power alone, or on the laws of human nature alone” 
(3.4.2), the religious admiration for it which Spinoza is seeking to cultivate neither looks 
down on the human condition as something depraved nor looks forward to transcending it 
in some way.  It aspires neither to self-sacrifice nor to immortality, but to the success of 
the human intellect unfettered by subservience to any power greater than itself. 
Now, that orthodox Christianity does contain a teaching of both immortality and 
self-sacrifice, and that it furthermore considers these to be inextricably linked, becomes 
evident when Spinoza reminds the reader that what he has said so far is contradicted by 
the New Testament: for even if only “security of life” was promised in return for 
obedience to the Mosaic Law, that “observing the commandments of the Old Testament 
is not enough for eternal life is obvious from Mk. 10:21” (A.5).  As Jesus makes clear in 
that passage, what is needed to enter the Kingdom of Heaven is not merely to follow the 
words of the Decalogue but to “sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor.”  So even 
if it is true, as Spinoza suggests, that Old Testament Judaism can be dismissed for its 
parochialism, Christianity would appear to present the prospect of a richer, more 
universalistic, and yet still devotional and otherworldly kind of piety.  To meet this 
challenge, Spinoza’s strategy is not to disparage Christianity but to co-opt it: presenting 
the Apostle Paul as a kind of philosophic hero, he reads into the New Testament a picture 
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of human excellence which is founded on a sober acceptance of scientific determinism.  
Thus, he claims that because Moses was mistaken to imagine God as a “ruler, lawgiver, 
king, compassionate, just, etc.” (4.4.34), it follows that the Decalogue no longer has to be 
taken seriously (4.4.21).  But Paul, on the other hand, recognized “that God’s anger and 
his mercy do not depend on human works,” and that is why “he teaches that no one 
becomes just by the works of the law, but solely by faith (see Rom. 3:28), by which he 
surely understands nothing other than the complete consent of the spirit,” or the 
perception of “God’s laws as eternal truths” (4.4.30, emphasis added).   
 By thus presenting Paul as a Biblical precursor of himself, Spinoza is able to 
present himself as a Christian and to portray authentic Christianity—the “ancient 
religion” mentioned in the preface—as identical to the religion of reason which he began 
to describe at the beginning of chapter 4.108  Spinoza’s scientific determinism, after all, 
has at least a superficial similarity to Paul’s teaching on predestination, and this apparent 
common ground between the two authors may enable Spinoza’s less careful readers to 
overlook the way in which he changes Paul’s original message.  Now, as the above 
quotation makes clear, Spinoza, unlike Locke, does not seek to overlook Paul’s doctrine 
of justification by faith and to replace it with a teaching about works.  But whereas Paul 
in the passages to which Spinoza refers makes clear that when he speaks of faith he is 
referring to the need for the spirit to consent to something supra-rational, Spinoza equates 
                                                
108 Spinoza frequently reminds the reader that Paul often accommodated himself to the grasp and accepted 
opinions of his audience—“he was a Greek with the Greeks and a Jew with the Jews” (3.5.50; I Cor. 9:20).  
Strauss thus suggests that in using Paul’s authority in order to teach a very un-Pauline message, Spinoza is 
employing this same strategy—he is “a Christian with the Christians” (Strauss 1952, 190).  This 
interpretation appears to be borne out both by the substantial differences between the two thinkers to be 
discussed presently, and by the hint about his own use of sacred texts which Spinoza provides at 4.4.8.   
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faith simply with the understanding.  Thus, while Paul claims that human reason is 
untrustworthy because it has been corrupted by original sin, Spinoza denies the latter’s 
existence (cf. 3.5.46 with Rom. 3:9-11, 4:15-6), and he asserts that Paul’s statement that 
God’s virtue and divinity “are conspicuous in his creatures through the understanding, 
so that they are without escape” (4.4.46; Rom. 1:20) should be taken to refer to “the 
natural light”—for human beings could certainly be excused for failing to follow the 
commands “of a light above the natural one” (4.4.47).  In short, what Spinoza finds in 
Paul is a nothing short of a theological sanction for his own philosophic view that human 
blessedness can be found in “complete consent of the spirit”—the paradoxical 
recognition that there is no free will, and that what the Bible calls sin is unavoidable and 
consequently unpunishable (4.4.48-9).109   
Now this, of course, is exactly the view that Locke denounces in the opening lines 
of The Reasonableness of Christianity, and so it would seem reasonable to infer, as we 
did in the last chapter, that Locke had in mind Spinoza, or those who were propagating 
more popularized versions of his thought, when he claimed in the Second Vindication to 
have directed his analysis of the Gospels against the Deists.  But although Locke thus 
seems to have criticized Spinoza for spreading a way of thinking which threatens to 
undermine social bonds, Spinoza could likely respond that Locke’s interpretation of the 
New Testament gave insufficient religious sanction to his own way of life.  By usurping 
                                                
109 Spinoza claims that when Paul denounces human vice at the end of Romans 1 he is agreeing with 
Solomon that the punishment of fools is foolishness (4.4.48; Prov. 16:22).  In context, however, Paul states 
that God, angry at the sins of human beings, “gave them up unto vile affections” and to the “lusts of their 
own hearts,” for which He also will punish them in turn (Rom. 1:24, 26, 32).  Spinoza may therefore be 
quietly intending to show the irrationality of Paul’s understanding of God, along with that of all retributive 
punishment.  
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Paul as a philosophic hero, and by retaining the emphasis on faith which Locke tries to 
read out of the Epistles, Spinoza seeks to endow his liberal theology with the same 
spiritual purpose that he hopes will characterize the democratic regime he is attempting to 
construct.  In other words, if Locke’s reasonable Christianity is designed for “the illiterate 
bulk of mankind,” Spinoza’s, at least at this stage, can be said to be designed for a 
philosophic or proto-philosophic elite.  He revises Paul’s statements about faith so as not 
just to permit philosophy, as Locke does, but also so as to demand it. 
But even so, this response does not put away every misgiving, and it seems to be 
in anticipation of this potential Lockean objection that Spinoza eventually dilutes his 
picture of the self-absorbed character of what he calls the Divine Law.  As early as 
chapter 3, Spinoza had claimed that Scripture commends “true virtue” (3.5.20, 47, 59, 61, 
69), but he had left the content of this virtue ambiguous.  He had asserted that reason’s 
universal authority sanctions the following universal law: “to revere God and to abstain 
from evil works, or to act well” (3.5.17, emphasis added).  By thus blurring the 
cultivation of the understanding with what at the opening of chapter 3 he had 
enigmatically called “acquiring the habit of virtue” (3.4.1), Spinoza seemed to suggest 
that “true virtue” is most fully present in those who follow a universal law of reason 
which mandates a certain code of ethical living.  And while chapter 3 had left the specific 
content of that law ambiguous,110 as Spinoza opens chapter 5 he cites the authority of 
Isaiah to show that it demands not only the “purification of the spirit”—presumably 
                                                
110 That even the self-absorbed conception of the divine law from chapter 4 is not wholly rational is 
apparent from the fact that Spinoza finds it necessary there briefly to re-endow God with anthropomorphic 
qualities such as will and understanding (4.4.14-17; cf. also his comments about Christ at 4.4.24-30). 
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through rational thinking—but also “bringing help to the poor” (5.1.6).  So while Spinoza 
does compromise the self-absorbed character of the ethic that he laid out in the previous 
chapter, he also appears to suggest that a spiritually self-interested outlook, if it is 
interpreted in a certain peculiar way, can encourage human beings to lend one another 
mutual assistance.  Thus, he claims that “Christ promised a spiritual reward” for those 
who followed his instruction not to commit adultery (5.1.14), and he again relies on 
Isaiah in order to claim that the Bible commends “freedom and charity towards oneself 
and one’s neighbor” (5.1.16, emphasis added).  In return for “freedom and charity,” he 
writes, we are promised “a sound mind in a sound body and God’s glory even after 
death” (5.1.18).  Thus, the Psalms also assert that that human beings who follow a divine 
set of “moral lessons” will be rewarded with “blessedness and tranquility of spirit” 
(5.1.19), and Jeremiah similarly taught a “natural law by which all mortals are bound”—a 
law which is founded on the recognition that God “exercises compassion, judgment and 
justice in the world” (5.1.21), and which is furthermore complemented by the New 
Testament’s promise of “a heavenly kingdom” (5.1.22). 
 In providing this new interpretation of Scripture, Spinoza seems to be attempting 
to preserve the spirit of the divine law of chapter 4, but to insist that its teaching about the 
primacy of individual self-interest and fulfillment through rational thinking can be made 
amenable with the duty, which was notably absent from that discussion, to care for one’s 
neighbor.111  The ethical outlook he is trying to craft, in other words, will look upon 
                                                
111 Spinoza’s claim in chapter 4 that the “sum of the divine law” is “to love God as the highest good” 
(4.1.2) obviously invites comparison with Jesus’ version of it, which includes love of one’s neighbor.  Cf. 
Mt. 22:38-40. 
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morality in a self-interested (but by no means crudely mercenary or hedonistic) way.  In 
these passages Spinoza does not mention devotion alongside charity, and he thus appears 
to indicate that those who accept the outlook he is promoting will perform acts of charity 
not out of a sense of duty, but instead because they will regard doing so as the way to 
fulfill themselves as rational beings.  But as the above quotations should hopefully make 
clear, the blurring of charity towards oneself and one’s neighbor that Spinoza is 
promoting would also seem to necessitate re-endowing God with more explicitly 
anthropomorphic qualities, and also rediscovering in the Bible a vague concept of an 
afterlife.  And yet, whether or to what extent such beliefs are necessary for any given 
society would seem to be an open question, for Spinoza also notes that the belief in 
divine reward and punishment “can and has to vary in accordance with the mental cast of 
each nation, as experience sufficiently teaches” (5.1.13).  There may in fact exist the 
possibility of a kind of educational progress in accordance with which societies can 
become more or less liberated from such beliefs, and this task will need to be managed by 
future philosophers, as well as by educators, intellectuals, and members of the liberal 
clergy, who will inherit the Enlightenment project after Spinoza.   
 In the latter part chapter 5, therefore, Spinoza appears to hint at a project of 
potentially radical political and religious reform.  For the first time in the body of the 
Treatise, he undertakes a thematic discussion of the nature and origins of political life, 
and he indicates, as he did at the opening of chapter 3, that the key problem faced by any 
legislator will always be the incredible perseverance in human beings of envy and 
resentment.  If humans “were constituted by nature as to long for [cuperent] nothing 
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except what true reason indicates,” he claims, society would need no laws, but 
unfortunately “human nature is constituted quite otherwise” (5.2.6-7).  “All do seek what 
is useful to them, yet hardly on the basis of the dictate of sound reason” (5.2.7).  
According to Spinoza, in other words, it is a steadfast rule of human psychology that we 
will always pursue our own advantage, but the problem is that the character of that 
advantage is frequently defined in a complicated way, for our conception of what 
constitutes our greatest self-interest is filtered most of the time through a prism of 
irrational emotion.  And this, in turn, can engender spirited longings that, to the untrained 
observer, could be mistaken for acts of willful self-sacrifice.  Thus, Spinoza claims that 
human beings will often long to bring harm to someone who is ruling over them “even 
though it comes with great evil to themselves as well” (5.2.9), and they can “least of all 
abide serving their equals and being regulated by them” (5.2.10).  All in all, humans by 
nature would seem to have a kind of democratic pride which, however, can quite easily 
turn into resentment—the same resentment which Spinoza highlighted in chapter 3 as the 
source of the Hebrews’ apparent devotion.  And just as that envy there came to sight as a 
confusion arising from a failure to discern the true satisfaction that can be found in the 
life of understanding, so too does the desire for spiritual independence which Spinoza 
discusses here seem to be a less self-conscious version of the spiritual and intellectual 
independence sought by the philosopher.   
 Now, to come to an understanding of what Spinoza is trying to suggest here, it 
will be helpful to digress briefly and look at the only comments he makes in the Treatise 
about the authoritative source of Christian ethics: the Sermon on the Mount.  He claims 
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that “when Christ says, Blessèd are the mourners, since they will receive consolation,” 
his meaning can only be understood in reference to his subsequent teaching “that we not 
be worried about anything except God’s kingdom alone and its justice, which is 
commended as the highest good [summum bonum]” (7.5.8; Mt. 5:4, 6:33).  Since Jesus 
equated justice with the kingdom of God, or with the immortality which he promised to 
those who followed him, we can therefore conclude that by “mourners” he was referring 
to “only those who mourn for the kingdom of God and the justice neglected by human 
beings.  For only those can mourn for it who do not love anything except the divine 
kingdom, or equity, and plainly despise the rest of fortune” (7.5.8, emphasis added).  
What Spinoza therefore seems to imply is that Jesus’ teaching about an afterlife has to be 
understood as arising from a deep-seated but still self-regarding sense of justice—a sense 
of justice which, while by no means crudely mercenary, still limits itself to a concern for 
how affairs are organized in this world.  Human beings as he presents them look to the 
law not just for the protection of their lives and worldly possessions, but also to secure 
the personal dignity that is also present wherever freedom and the enjoyment of these 
mundane goods are guaranteed.  Thus, when human beings live in “a good republic” 
where the law is enforced and it is known that crime does not pay, they will take great 
pride in themselves and in their country.  To be “held just” by their fellow citizens—that 
is, to fulfill themselves by acquiring honor and a good reputation (cf. 5.2.5)—they will 
seek to requite injuries “before a judge . . . not on account of vengeance . . . but in the 
spirit of defending justice and the laws of the Fatherland, and for it not to be expedient 
for evil men to be evil” (7.5.13). 
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Unfortunately, according to Spinoza, Jesus lived not in that kind of regime but “in 
a corrupt republic,” and so Christianity’s moral teaching cannot be understood unless it is 
recognized that it was originally directed to “oppressed human beings” (7.5.12).  Because 
there was no hope of justice in this world for those living under the tyranny of the 
Caesars, Christ’s audience was naturally attracted to the prospect of another.  Moreover, 
Spinoza also says that this applies to his injunction to turn the other cheek “and what 
follows further” (7.5.9).  “What follows further” are the following commandments: if 
someone should seek to take away your coat, give your cloak as well, love your enemies 
and “do good to them that hate you,” and, in short “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your 
Father which is in heaven is perfect” (Mt. 5:40, 44, 48).  In other words, Jesus teaches 
that human perfection, like divine perfection, consists in total selflessness, or in complete 
devotional love, and he also insists that it is only by engaging in such acts of self-
abnegation that one can attain immortality.  But Spinoza, on the contrary, claims that this 
kind of moral outlook arose only because, in the particular historical context in which 
Jesus lived, tyranny had nearly deadened the desire for pride and human dignity which all 
men feel.  In the absence not only of freedom, but also of the robust sense of 
independence and spiritual self-expression which it allows, the ancient Jews apparently 
thought that if they gave up on this world, if they gave their rulers all that they asked for 
and more, then they would be rewarded in a life after this one.  It therefore follows that in 
a better regime, such as the one Spinoza is seeking to establish, hopes for immortality 
will be significantly muted, and morality, though still spirited and even animated by a 
sense of duty, will be fundamentally self-regarding. 
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 The central task of Spinoza’s political science, it therefore seems, will be to lay 
the moral foundations for a regime which can successfully manage the problem posed by 
human pride by providing a healthy outlet for it.  In fact, he claims that there actually 
exist just two possible options: “either the whole society has to hold the imperium 
collectively, if it can be done, so that all are bound to themselves and no one is bound to 
serve his equal; or, if a few or one alone holds the imperium, he has to have something 
above the common human nature, or at least endeavor with the utmost strength to 
persuade the vulgar of it” (5.2.12).  What Spinoza suggests, in short, is that every 
political regime that has ever existed, or will ever exist, must be either a theocracy or a 
liberal-democracy.  And if a legislator chooses the first option, his pious fraud will have 
to succeed to such an extent as to eradicate entirely the capacity of those under his 
command to think for themselves (5.2.15).  But if this cannot be completed with the 
utmost success—as it has been by the Turks (P.2.4)—then he will face a dangerous 
prospect, for human beings cannot stand being told what to think or what to do by those 
whom they know to be no greater than they are.  In the absence of legitimate hierarchy, 
they will see only compulsion, and “human nature does not abide being simply 
compelled.”  Rather, “as Seneca the Tragedian says, no one holds a repressive imperium 
together for long” (5.2.8; Troads 258-9). 
 By thus quoting Agamemnon’s angry words from the Troads, a play about human 
sacrifice, Spinoza indicates not just that humans face a choice between theocracy and 
liberal-democracy, but also that the latter possibility should be understood as explicitly 
anti-theological in character.  As long as men retain some shred of their humanity, that is, 
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as long as they retain the ability to think independently, they will struggle against 
religious cruelty and against the desire of priests to take this capacity away from them.  
The most natural form of government for human or thinking beings, then, is a kind of 
republic which institutes what can be seen as a political analogue of the freedom of the 
spirit which philosophers possess.  It is a republic in which humans, closely reflecting the 
mandates of the divine law (cf.4.4.33), are motivated not by the fear of some evil but by 
“the hope of some good that they long for very much” (5.2.13).  Most importantly, 
however, it is a society in which “obedience has no place,” for whatever laws citizens 
make will be sanctioned “on the basis of their own consent” (5.2.14).  In “this mode each 
will long to do his duty” (5.2.13) because each will understand that duty as part and 
parcel with his own rational advantage. 
 On the other hand, according to Spinoza, the Bible’s political teaching would 
appear to represent the fullest possible manifestation of the theocratic alternative.  For if 
liberal-democracy is a regime in which “obedience has no place,” the Mosaic polity was 
one in which it was omnipresent.  In one of the more comic sections of the Treatise, 
Spinoza claims that not just the ceremonial law, but indeed “the whole law of Moses” 
(5.3.9), had no purpose other than ensuring that the Jews could “do nothing at their 
discretion” (5.3.8).  He notes that the Hebrews were not only “not permitted to plow, 
sow, and reap at their discretion,” but they could not “eat, drink, shave,” or even “rejoice” 
except “in accordance with the biddings and commands prescribed in the laws.”  In this 
passage, he presents the Hebrew polity as frankly Orwellian, and he points out that the 
Jews were required “to have certain signs on doorposts and hands and between the eyes, 
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which admonished them to obedience always” (5.3.8).  In short, the goal of the 
ceremonial law was to ensure that the Hebrews could “do nothing at all on the basis of 
their own decree, but everything on the basis of another’s command, and to confess by 
continual actions and meditations that they were nothing in their own right but were 
altogether part of another’s” (5.3.9). 
 Indeed, Spinoza goes even further than this, for he insists that this same analysis 
of the Old Testament ceremonies also applies to those of the Christians, such as 
“Baptism, the Lord’s Supper, festivals,” and even “outward prayers.”  Even though these 
“still are and always have been common to the whole of Christianity,” Spinoza insists 
that they have no spiritual value but were instituted by the civil power in order to procure 
obedience (5.3.10, emphasis added).  He hedges as to whether these were actually 
instituted by Christ, but he remarkably insists that the entirety of seventeenth century 
Christianity is actually fundamentally un-Christian—and he thus implicitly suggests that 
all of medieval European history can be understood more or less as a series of attempts to 
enslave human beings spiritually by subjecting them to religious mind control.  Then, 
using a seemingly random example, he raises an alternative possibility, which seems to 
foreshadow where he is going in the Treatise.  In “the kingdom of the Japanese,” he 
writes, “the Christian religion is forbidden and the Dutch who dwell there are bound to 
abstain from all outward worship on the basis of a command of the East India Company” 
(5.3.11).  In the religious consciousness which Spinoza imagines for the future, 
commerce will domesticate religion, ensuring that its demands are seen as purely spiritual 
and internal, satisfied fully in the activity of thinking for oneself, and not demanding in 
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the least imposing dogmas on one’s neighbor—on missionizing to non-Christian peoples 
like the Japanese—or performing ceremonial rituals.  Indeed, although philosophers are 
not motivated by a concern for the same goods as merchants, insofar as they remain 
fundamentally self-interested, they too could accurately be said to be animated by the 
“spirit” of commerce. 
 If this kind of secular commercialism is an actual political possibility—to say 
nothing of a scenario in which “the Christian religion is forbidden” (4.3.11)—then 
Spinoza seems again to prod the reader to consider to what extent, if at all, such a society 
will need to contain the widespread belief in divine reward and punishment.  At the end 
of chapter 5, Spinoza claims that Scripture’s main teaching can be reduced basically to 
this: that “there exists a God, or a being that has made everything, has directed and 
sustained it with the utmost wisdom, and takes the utmost care of human beings, namely 
those who live piously and honestly.  The rest, however, he punishes with many 
punishments, and separates from the good ones” (5.4.5).  And yet, even as he claims that 
such beliefs “are extremely necessary for the vulgar,” he also quite transparently 
indicates that the need to spread them arises solely from utilitarian motives, for it is 
necessary to impress “obedience and devotion in their spirits” (5.4.7).  He claims, 
seemingly half-heartedly, that “the natural light” can make clear “that there is a God and 
what we have said besides” (5.4.9), but on the very same page he quite explicitly says 
that “experience cannot give any clear knowledge of these things” (5.4.7).  In short, he 
seems inexplicably to contradict himself.  For if it were really necessary for human 
beings to believe in divine reward and punishment, then it would also be necessary (as 
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Locke both suggests and does) for a responsible philosopher to claim that reason can 
indicate their existence beyond a shadow of a doubt.  But while Spinoza seems to suggest 
this at times—and while his Ethics, for example, does culminate in an argument for 
immortality—he also accompanies those suggestions throughout the Treatise with 
explicit statements to the effect that the belief in such things is totally irrational and 
cannot be demonstrated by the natural light.  Spinoza will provide a more complete 
treatment of this problem in chapters 13 and 14, but for now it will be helpful to ask 
whether, in repeatedly undercutting his own civil theology, he is not encouraging 
widespread critical reflection upon it.  Indeed, in accordance with his earlier suggestion 
that there may exist the possibility of a kind of progressive mass-education, Spinoza now 
suggests that there is a need for a new clergy who can pick and choose appropriate 
lessons from Scripture in order to teach the vulgar “with a view to the weakness of their 
intellect” (5.4.15).  If that weakness is a variable thing, then the pastors and ministers of 
the version of Christianity he is promoting, by selecting some passages from Scripture 
which they deem to be “more outstanding than others” (5.4.16), may be able to tailor 
their message in a way that is specifically designed to be appropriate for the particular 
mental cast of their flocks.   
 Spinoza thus indicates that the implementation of his project will require a kind of 
prudential religious statesmanship which will need to be carried out by the new clergy 
and by philosophically-informed intellectuals.  Moreover, because the mindset of the 
latter will take its bearings by a sense of what is universal, it would seem already to 
contain the seeds of a liberation from the Bible itself—if only in the name of a greater 
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piety.  In chapter 3, for example, Spinoza had claimed that whether or not the Bible 
acknowledges that God is the God of all nations “is in no way relevant; for the Hebrews 
cared to write only of their own affairs, not other peoples’” (3.5.21).  The idea that there 
are many paths to God, it seems, necessarily leads to a distrust of traditional religious 
sources, for insofar as each sacred text declares its religion to be the only true one, a full 
respect for it is incompatible with a respect for religious diversity.  Indeed, although 
chapter 6 is devoted to a discussion of natural science and the impossibility of miracles, 
its greater effect is to bring this kind of thinking to its logical culmination and thus to 
prepare the way for the full-blown assault on Scripture’s authority in chapters 7 through 
11.  This is because it propagates, more fully than in chapter 4, a scientific religion which 
looks upon nature as divine and which also, under those auspices, discovers a religious 
duty to analyze Scripture as a scientific, historical document.  At the end of the chapter, 
as previously mentioned, Spinoza forgets about his previous rebuke of Solomon and calls 
him “the Philosopher” (6.1.94).  By cultivating an admiration for his outlook, according 
to which “nothing new happens in nature” and “everything happens by chance” (6.1.41, 
94), Spinoza tries to inculcate a sense among the best educated of the vulgar that they are 
philosophers, which of course will also lead to a severe diluting of the meaning of that 
term.  But Spinoza also notes that when Solomon ruled in Israel “the affairs of the Jews 
were in the utmost vigor” (6.1.41).  Whereas the Hebrews were slavish and backward 
under Moses, who really believed that God rules as a prince (4.4.24), their polity 
flourished under the rule of a Spinozist.  Political success, it appears, can and even must 
occur in a society where the ruling elites have been mostly liberated from a belief in a 
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personal God and in a universe that gives human beings special status.  The task of 
chapter 6 is to lay the basis for a scientific-religious outlook that can bring such an elite 
into existence.  
 Now, as we have by now come to expect, Spinoza’s theoretical arguments against 
the possibility of miracles are unconvincing.  His claims that “nothing happens contrary 
to nature, but it keeps an eternal, fixed, and unchangeable order” (6.1.7) rest on the 
assertion that this has been “demonstrated in chapter 4” (6.1.12), even though he seemed 
to admit there that we cannot be absolutely certain of this (4.4.2).  And as previously 
noted, he also admits in this chapter not only that we cannot prove the existence of “God” 
with absolute certainty, but also that this is nothing short of the level of proof that we 
require, for if there were even the bare possibility of miracles, everything could be 
doubted (6.1.21-22).  The most that Spinoza can show is that for things to “succeed one 
another on the basis of prayer” would be “very alien to sound reason” (6.1.16), but, as he 
here seems to acknowledge, it is precisely the validity of reason that is at issue.  In the 
following chapter he will admit this difficulty more fully by quoting without 
contradiction Maimonides’ declaration that “the eternity of the world is not shown by any 
demonstration” (7.11.21; Guide of the Perplexed II.25).  Since Spinoza is thus clearly 
aware that he cannot prove the theoretical conclusions which he is ostensibly arguing for, 
it would seem that his real intention, here as elsewhere, can be found in their intended 
cultural effect.  This is also evident from the way the chapter begins—with a polemical 
attack on “the foolishness of the vulgar” that consists mainly of name-calling (6.1.1-6)—
as well as from Spinoza’s subsequent acknowledgement of this (6.1.7), and from the fact 
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that the allegedly serious arguments which he then goes on to present are often sophistic 
(e.g. 6.1.34).  At the very minimum, it can be said that they depend on the very 
conclusion which Spinoza is supposed to prove, and so they mainly take the form of 
repeated, dogmatic statements of certainty which, as we have seen, he cannot justify (e.g. 
6.1.16, 18, 23, 26). 
 If the serious core of Spinoza’s refutation of miracles consists, paradoxically, in 
the effect which he intends to have on elite religious opinion, then his opening attack on 
the prejudices of the vulgar would seem to be of greater importance than it might 
otherwise appear.  That attack consists of two main elements: a criticism of the 
commonly accepted division between God and nature (6.1.1-2, 4-5) and a description, 
which recalls the analysis given in the preface, of the reasons why the unscientific ascribe 
what they do not understand to God (6.1.3-4).  As should not be surprising, Spinoza 
contends that both beliefs arise on account of a typically primitive or childish mentality 
characterized by devotion and admiration.  Thus, the vulgar “call unusual works of nature 
miracles . . . partly out of devotion” and partly because they “long not to know the natural 
causes of things” (6.1.3, emphasis added).  Their ignorance, combined with their desire 
for “profit or advantage” (6.1.1) leads them not only to oppose the sciences, but to wish 
to become more ignorant, and they yearn to hear only things which are beyond their 
comprehension and which they therefore “admire on that account” (6.1.3, emphasis 
added).  Similarly, the belief in a dualistic cosmos “seems to have had its origin among 
the first Jews,” who contended that God was a king ruling over nature because they 
wanted to convince their neighbors of His superiority to the natural beings, such as the 
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sun and the moon, which they worshipped.  In so doing, they fancied that “the whole of 
nature was being directed only for their advantage by the imperium of the God whom 
they prayed to,” and so, even “down to this time,” many still accept the possibility of 
miracles because they wish to believe that they are “the final cause on account of which 
God created and continually directs everything” (6.1.5). 
 In Spinoza’s description, the attitudes of human beings appear to be intellectual 
projections of self-interest, and so when that inescapable egoism is accompanied by 
ignorance and wonder it also results in the foolish notion that the cosmos is ordered for 
our benefit.  This is why Spinoza repeatedly mentions the reported miracle of Joshua and 
the sun standing still (2.8.3-8; 6.1.19, 73; Josh. 10:12-13): because it reflects the belief 
that men are literally at the center of the universe, it would seem to be the example of a 
miracle par excellence.112  The religious doctrine which Spinoza espouses in this chapter, 
by contrast, holds that God and the universe are united (pantheism) and that natural 
things are in no way oriented with a view to human benefit.  It seeks not only to cultivate 
an admiration for philosophers but also to convince a new religious elite that they are 
philosophers as well, for philosophers “set true happiness in virtue and tranquility of 
spirit alone, and are not eager for nature to obey them but for themselves to obey 
nature—insofar as they know for certain that God directs nature as his universal laws 
require and not as the particular laws of human beings require” (6.1.43, emphasis added).  
That this statement is meant to describe only a semi-philosophic view is indicated not 
                                                
112 As Donagan points out (1988, 22), this Biblical passage was also invoked by the Holy Office when it 
condemned Galileo, and so Spinoza may also be suggesting that an end to anthropocentrism will benefit the 
cause of intellectual freedom as well. 
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only by Spinoza’s rather dogmatic declaration of certainty, but also by the striking fact 
that, for the only time in the Treatise, he uses the term “obedience” in reference to 
philosophy.  He had claimed in previous chapters that a truly free man will never 
willingly obey anything, and indeed, that even or especially one who recognizes that 
everything is determined will act in accordance with that determinism freely, or with the 
full consent of his spirit.  By speaking here of obedience and associating it with nature, 
Spinoza thus appears to be drawing on a residual devotional instinct among his most elite 
sub-philosophic readers.  Such readers still, if inchoately, think that they are free agents, 
and they yearn in their still vulgar ignorance to submit themselves willingly to something 
greater than themselves—if only, perhaps, with a view to some kind of long-term reward. 
 To cater to this instinct, Spinoza presents an account of the workings of nature 
that at times seems almost to encourage the worship of it.  The philosophic view as he 
summarizes it holds that God cares “equally for all” (6.1.46), but this statement can carry 
two meanings.  It can convey the authentic philosophic view according to which God is 
equivalent to the indifferent laws of nature, which care for no one, or it could imply that, 
precisely because He works exclusively through those laws, “God has a plan not for the 
human race alone but for the whole of nature” (6.1.43).  In other words, it would appear 
to suggest that there is a great divine plan which governs the whole cosmos, and that that 
plan is discernable by human beings who study natural science.  This is why Spinoza 
never denies the existence of divine providence in this chapter; on the contrary, he 
repeatedly says that we can understand God’s providence better on the basis of natural 
laws, and not at all on the basis of miracles (6.1.8, 9, 20, 31).  He thus encourages a way 
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of thinking which will prepare the way for chapter 16’s equating of right with power, for 
he seeks to persuade scientifically inclined believers not to look for individual or 
particular providence, but rather to see everything that happens, no matter how it may 
apparently harm human beings, as a manifestation of God’s perfection.  He encourages 
such believers to admire a kind of resignation to a cosmic order in which they have no 
special status, but which, because it allows them to achieve the blessedness that results 
from recognizing this, really cannot be said to be entirely indifferent to human concerns.  
The contemplation of this order allows mankind to conceive of the “infinite” and 
furthermore to do so “under some aspect of eternity [sub . . . specie aeternitatis]” 
(6.1.30).  Even as chapter 6 denies miracles, then, it also affirms a divine presence in 
nature which can give human beings some vague and undefined access to the immortality 
which their sub-philosophic confusions lead them to hope for.  Indeed, he asserts at one 
point that nature is composed “not only [of] matter and its dispositions, but also [of] 
infinite other things besides matter” (6.1.16fn, emphasis added).  In short, Spinoza’s 
pantheism gives his new religious elite an opportunity to commune with eternity, and to 
do so furthermore by sacrificing themselves, for their admiration for a quasi-divine nature 
which is all-encompassing and which takes no account whatsoever of their particular fate 
allows them to lose themselves in the whole.  
 Once this is recognized, it is easy to see why Spinoza, despite his criticism of the 
Bible, was eventually considered to be not only religious, but a “God-intoxicated man.”  
For he here outlines a new kind of piety which, precisely because it looks up to nature as 
something divine and permanent, also demands looking down on Scripture scientifically 
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as something merely human.  To help potential adherents of this new religion wean 
themselves from the Bible, he uses the last two arguments of chapter 6 to show how the 
Bible can be read in a way that will eventually undermine its own authority.  He begins 
by attempting to show that Scripture itself shares his own understanding of physics—i.e. 
that “when Scripture says that this or that was done by God or God’s will, it understands 
nothing else but that it was done in accordance with the laws and order of nature” 
(6.1.47).  But he also acknowledges that this claim is at best tendentious, and so 
Scripture’s teaching that the universe is governed by nature must be “elicited by 
implication,” or by drawing inferences from circumstantial details “which are by chance” 
narrated in some of the stories.  Thus, he goes on to provide a litany of Biblical miracles 
which can be explained scientifically on the basis of tangential facts which happen to be 
present in the stories about them (6.1.49-62).  In so doing, he provides future theologians 
with a method for re-interpreting the rest of Scripture in a way that will show both that it 
shares the outlook of modern science, and that, as a part of that outlook, it too considers 
reports of miracles to be the results of the practice—which indeed it also at times engages 
in—of catering to the devotion and admiration of the vulgar (6.1.54, 64).  And yet, it 
would appear that not all Biblical miracles can be explained in that way, for he next 
asserts that according to his new religion of nature the belief in miracles is in fact 
impious, and if something can be found in Scripture “which can be demonstrated 
apodictically to conflict with the laws of nature or to have been unable to follow on the 
basis of them, it is plainly to be believed that it was inserted in Sacred Writ by 
sacrilegious human beings” (6.1.67). 
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 Now of course, as Spinoza acknowledges, “we find a great many things in 
Scripture which do not seem able to be explained in any mode through natural causes” 
(6.1.63).  It would therefore appear that much of it is actually impious and therefore 
corrupt.  Spinoza thus suggests that many Biblical stories were written not by God but by 
men, and when men write books they do so in a way that either reflects their own bias or 
their own ignorance (6.1.70).  Thus, far from sharing Spinoza’s contemptuous scientific 
understanding of the sentiments of devotion and admiration, the Bible in fact reflects 
them.  “For many things in Scripture are narrated as realities, and are even believed to be 
realities, which nevertheless were only representations and imaginary matters” (6.1.76, 
emphasis added).  This is why the Jews at the time of Joshua believed that the sun stood 
still in the sky: because they thought the world literally revolved around them, and 
because they wanted to convince the heathens that their God was stronger than the sun 
and the other natural beings (6.1.73).  Such incidents “do not have to be accepted as real 
by Philosophers” (6.1.77).  Indeed, philosophers—which in Spinoza’s present usage 
denotes a relatively large group of elite readers—can better understand the Bible 
scientifically, as a collection of human sources.  “To interpret the miracles of Scripture 
and to understand on the basis of their narratives how they really happened, therefore, it 
is necessary to know the opinions of those who first narrated them and left them to us in 
writing, and to distinguish the opinions from what the senses were able to represent to the 
narrators” (6.1.75).  In short, we need to conduct a scientific examination of Scripture 
which is founded on the presumption that nothing happens contrary to nature, that the 
Bible is the product of multiple authors who composed their work in an ordinary human 
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way, and that it therefore naturally reflects the ignorance and the prejudices that are 
present in all human documents, and especially in very ancient ones.  In the next set of 
chapters, Spinoza will not only found a discipline of Biblical criticism, but also, in so 
doing, he will lay the groundwork for widespread skepticism and distrust of theological 
authority. 
 
TRUTH, OBEDIENCE, AND CIVIL RELIGION 
 Space unfortunately will not permit a discussion of Spinoza’s deconstruction of 
the Bible.  But at the opening of chapter 12 Spinoza provides a helpful summary of it, 
which he puts into the mouth of irate orthodox believers who consider Scripture to be “an 
epistle of God sent to human beings from heaven” (12.1.1).  Against such believers, 
Spinoza in chapters 7 through 10 shows the Bible not to be such an epistle but merely a 
human document, which was written by various authors over a period of “almost two 
thousand years, and perhaps much longer” (14.1.3), and which is therefore pervaded with 
the kind of contradictions, inconsistencies, and seemingly purposeless digressions that 
one would expect to find in a work which was not composed with a single guiding 
intention.  Because he has claimed that Scripture “is faulty, truncated, adulterated, not 
consistent with itself,” and “that we have only fragments of it,” Spinoza predicts—
correctly, as it turned out—that his analysis will lead many to “shout that I have 
committed a sin against the Holy Spirit” (12.1.1).  Moreover, to this anticipated angry 
objection on grounds of piety Spinoza adds another, more measured challenge in his own 
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name.  He confesses “that some profane human beings for whom religion is a burden” 
could derive “a license to sin” from what he has said.  After all, once the masses cease to 
believe that Scripture is everywhere truthful and divine, could they not conclude that it is 
of no authority at all, and thus also that there is nothing which should hold them back 
from yielding to pleasure (12.1.8)?   
 This objection is of course not only religious but also political.  It holds that a 
belief in revelation and in the Bible’s unity is necessary for the maintenance of public 
morality.  It has much in common with the objection against Deism which motivated 
Locke to write The Reasonableness of Christianity, a work which takes for granted the 
single, divine authorship of the Bible and which emphatically affirms the veracity of 
Christ’s miracles.  Spinoza’s response to this objection will take up the next four 
chapters, culminating in the propagation of a civil religion in chapter 14 and in the 
articulation of a new and extremely puzzling way of understanding the relationship 
between reason and revelation: the “separation of philosophy and theology” that is 
achieved in chapter 14 and elaborated upon in chapter 15.  The argument of this set of 
chapters should therefore be seen as an apologetic, or (in accordance with the Treatise’s 
subtitle) as an attempt to show how the radical doubt which Spinoza has sewn about the 
Bible’s authority can be reconciled with the demands of both true piety and civil peace.  
But before Spinoza embarks upon his attempt to “put away every misgiving” about 
whether his argument may encourage licentiousness and impiety (12.1.11-12), he 
acknowledges that “it is impossible to prevent such things” (12.1.9).  Now, that a popular 
belief in Scripture’s unity has not helped morality is abundantly clear from the “very 
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pernicious disadvantages”—the appalling record of persecution and religious warfare—
which plagued Europe in the seventeenth century and which Spinoza discussed at the 
opening of chapter 7 (12.1.5; 7.1.1-7).  But of course, even or especially when this is 
admitted, it would still seem possible to claim, with Locke, that what political stability 
requires is not a deconstruction of the Bible but the re-presenting of it as a unified and 
divinely inspired document whose sole purpose is to teach a single, consistent moral 
message.  Spinoza’s response to this objection will take up the next several chapters, but 
it is important to note here that his primary response to it is largely to concede it: he 
writes that since “virtue is quite rare in any age” there is no surefire way to prevent 
popular licentiousness (12.1.10).  If freedom of thought and the flourishing of philosophy 
require the destruction of the “intolerable superstition” (12.1.5) which has arisen from the 
belief in the Bible’s unity, it may be that Spinoza, for the sake of that goal, is willing to 
endure a greater political risk than Locke is.  Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, 
he presents no indication of any concern that the popular hedonism which he is 
anticipating will have an adverse effect on the attitudes of potential philosophers. 
 Spinoza’s apologetic in chapters 12 through 15 consists in an attempt to show the 
extent to which a population can be brought towards a more rationalistic—but by no 
means fully rational—religious outlook.  In chapter 11 Spinoza claimed that the prophets 
had written not as prophets but only as moral teachers, although they needed to make that 
morality understood by providing reasons accessible to the mental cast of their audience.  
Thus, just as Christ spoke of a kingdom of demons and a kingdom of heaven in order to 
win over the vulgar (cf. 2.10.7 with Mt. 18:10), the Apostles also used “signs” (i.e. tricks) 
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and provided other superstitious embellishments which the Jews—“who despise 
philosophy”—could accept (11.1.22, 48, 59-60).  Chapter 11 ends with a clarion call to 
make “our age” happy by freeing it “of all superstition” (11.1.61), and in chapter 12 
Spinoza quite radically suggests that that imagined liberation could one day extend even 
to a total disregard of the Bible itself.  For, as the Apostles understood, a “thing is called 
sacred and divine which is designed for exercising piety and religion,” and it will remain 
such “only so long as human beings use it religiously” (12.2.1).  The holy, in other 
words, is only that which is necessary to instill morality or “devotion” towards God 
(12.2.4), and this can vary from one age to the next.  Today “we can now do without” 
those superstitious embellishments which the Apostles put into the New Testament 
(12.2.37), and this is no less true of any given book, for to revere what is only 
“parchment and ink” as God’s word is to covert “Religion into superstition” (12.1.6).  In 
one of the most radical statements in the entire Treatise, Spinoza writes that if a book’s  
usage perishes, so that the words do not have any signification or else the book is 
completely neglected, whether from malice or since human beings do not need it, 
then both the words and the book will be of no use and no holiness.  Furthermore, 
if the same words are otherwise disposed, or else the usage prevails for taking 
them in a contrary signification, then both the words and the book, which before 
were sacred, will be impure and profane (12.2.5, emphasis added). 
 
There could come a time, Spinoza thus suggests, when not only the more fantastic and 
irrational parts of the Bible could be disregarded.  If human beings could find a 
grounding for a social ethic in an alternative source of theology, or even in a rationalistic 
ideology, then there is a very real possibility that the Bible could one day come to be 
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regarded as no more than a book of ancient tales not unlike those of Homer or Ovid—to 
say nothing of Orlando the Furious (7.10.9).113   
 But of course, whether the population at large could ever become wholly 
liberated, or entirely rational, is almost certainly doubtful.  We know from chapter 6 that 
the notion of a God who cares for the just over the unjust is alien to the philosophic 
outlook, which holds that God cares “equally for all” (6.1.46).  But the existence of 
morality, as Spinoza now acknowledges, requires that human beings retain a belief that 
God favors those who love their neighbor and practice the virtues of justice and charity 
(12.2.48; 13.1.8).  Throughout the early part of the Treatise Spinoza had suggested that 
obedience, along with devotion and admiration, is not to be associated with a life of 
reason, but he now goes on not only to speak of the need for instilling obedience and 
devotion to God, but also of the need to do so by encouraging the belief that God is a 
judge who favors some over others (e.g. 13.1.10; 14.1.39, 41, 47, 51).  Just why Spinoza 
claims that “all human beings can obey God” (13.1.10; cf. also 14.1.47) even though he 
later says that one who is led by reason can never do so (A.34) is a question whose 
answer will become clear only from an examination of the case for civil religion which 
Spinoza presents and the description of its possible content which he provides.   
                                                
113 When discussing the linguistic difficulties that present themselves to an interpreter of the Bible, 
Spinoza quotes the words of Pythagoras from Ovid, declaring that “gluttonous time” has taken from us 
“almost all the modes of speaking peculiar to the Hebrew nation” (7.5.35).  This phrase comes from a 
speech in which Pythagoras is proclaiming the impermanence of all things, and so Spinoza may thus be 
hinting that because the Bible is a historical document it must also therefore be subject to all the historical 
laws of corruption and decay.  Indeed, he may even be attempting to persuade his reader to consider 
Scripture from this point of view of Pythagorean impermanence—as a document whose eventual decline is 
both possible and inevitable.  For Spinoza’s comically-intended invocation of Orlando the Furious, see 
Strauss 1965, 144. 
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 According to Spinoza, the purpose of both the Old and the New Testaments is 
“nothing besides the training of obedience” (14.1.9), but this obedience can be 
understood in a variety of ways.  For the Old Testament only gave “the first Jews” a law 
written on tablets—in which obedience was guaranteed through the crudest kinds of 
rewards and punishments—because they were “no doubt . . . considered just like 
children” (12.1.4, 6).  But Moses and Jeremiah (in this new presentation) both recognized 
that this would not always be the case.  Because children can grow up and become 
rational, they preached “a future time for the Jews when God would inscribe his law on 
their hearts,” which is to say, their “minds” (12.1.5).  Thus, while Moses and Jeremiah 
promised that things would go well or poorly for the Jews depending on their obedience 
(13.1.27-8), Paul taught that God’s Epistle is inside human beings “on the fleshy tablets 
of the heart,” (12.2.15) and John claimed that “he who has charity, really has and 
recognizes God” (13.1.29).  The Old Testament originally refers to God as El Shaddai, or 
He “who suffices” (13.1.13), and it is therefore appropriate for different people with 
different levels of intellect and education to regard Him and His justice in whatever ways 
are sufficient for them.  At the lowest level of this educational ladder is the Mosaic view, 
which regards God as a judge who doles out rewards and punishment in return for 
ordinary moral behavior, while at a somewhat higher level can be found the view which 
Spinoza associates with John and which can be found in the Treatise’s epigraph (14.1.28; 
1 John 4:13).  As Spinoza summarizes it, John appears to teach a kind of moral 
pantheism.  He holds that since “God is Charity” (14.1.24; 1 John 4:8) one who loves his 
neighbor literally takes God into oneself or participates in His spirit (14.1.30).  John 
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promises a reward that is less crude than Moses’ piety—a reward which is intellectual 
and spiritual rather than material and bodily—but it is one which, because it is a reward, 
and because it is promised to some and not others, remains fundamentally irrational and 
vulgar. 
 Notwithstanding this, however, Spinoza claims that it is necessary for all human 
beings, “none excepted”  to “obey God” and to follow at least some version of divine law 
in the usual sense of the term (14.1.47).  He says that this is especially “salutary and 
necessary . . . in a republic, so that human beings might live peacefully and 
harmoniously” (14.1.51), and he thus seems at least for a moment to defer somewhat to 
the more traditional view according to which the freedom which republicanism grants 
makes necessary a set of moral restraints which only religion can provide.  But since 
anyone could take from this a license to introduce whatever dogmas he wanted on the 
grounds that they are necessary for obedience (14.1.17)—and thus to begin a slippery 
slope towards superstition, thought control, and religious discord—Spinoza undertakes to 
lay out the tenets of a minimalist theology which leaves no place “for controversies in the 
Church” (14.1.38).  Because “obedience is absolutely impossible” if the tenets of this 
theology are ignored, its dogmas are also those “of the universal faith” (14.1.37-8)—i.e. it 
is necessary for everyone to accept them.  According to Spinoza, the sum of this 
universal faith consists in this: “that there exists a highest being who loves Justice and 
Charity and whom all, so that they may be saved, are bound to obey and adore by the 
cultivation of Justice and Charity toward their neighbor” (14.1.38, emphasis added).  
More specifically, it consists of seven dogmas which, it must be said, are replete with the 
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kind of sub-rational and anthropomorphic beliefs about God which Spinoza in chapters 1 
through 6 had claimed to be completely alien to the philosophic view.  Thus, all are to 
believe that God is “highly just and merciful, or the model of true life” so that they may 
“obey him, or know him to be judge” (14.1.39), and they must believe Him unique so that 
their spirits can be moved to devotion and admiration (14.1.40-41).  Moreover, all must 
believe that He “holds the highest right [jus] and dominion over all things,” that He 
bestows mercy and grace on us (14.1.43, 46), and that He is forgiving (14.1.46).  
Additionally, His worship consists only in actions, or in works of justice and charity, and 
all who obey Him “by this plan of living are saved, whereas the rest, who live under the 
imperium of pleasure, are lost” (14.1.45). 
 Spinoza identifies this civil religion as Christian only at the end of his 
presentation of it, when he claims that anyone who believes these seven dogmas has 
“Christ in him” (14.1.46).  The effect of his argument, however, is to expand the meaning 
of Christianity dramatically, for according to these criteria a Jew or a Hindu who believed 
that there was “a highest being” (14.1.39) who sanctioned obedience would be no less 
Christian than a Protestant or a Catholic—indeed, this civil religion is not necessarily 
monotheistic.  On the other hand, a Protestant or a Catholic who (in violation of dogma 5) 
believed that piety consists not in acts of justice and charity but instead in dogma and 
ceremony would not have Christ’s spirit in him.  Moreover, the capacious—not to say 
vague—character of these dogmas permits a great deal of toleration not only among 
different faiths which have been so liberalized, but also among human beings with 
different conceptions of what it means to be “saved.”  For although in speaking of 
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salvation Spinoza seems to refer to an afterlife, he never actually specifies it as such—the 
word salvos can also simply mean ‘safe,’ just as perditos seems to denote ‘lost.’  Thus, 
Spinoza also suggests that it is possible, in conformity with faith and obedience, to hold 
more or less rational versions of the civil religion.  Indeed, Spinoza actually insists that 
each person is in fact “bound to accommodate these dogmas of faith to suit his own 
grasp, and to interpret them to himself in the mode in which it seems easier to him to be 
able to embrace them without any hesitation, but with the spirit’s full consent, so that 
consequently he obeys God with the spirit’s full consent” (14.1.49).   
 Thus, Spinoza suggests, it “has nothing to do with faith” whether God is 
conceived as “fire, Spirit, light,” or even “thought, and so too for what reason he is the 
model of true life: whether it is on account of his having a just and merciful spirit, or 
since all things are and act through him, and consequently we understand ourselves 
through him as well, and through him we see that the true is the equitable and the good” 
(14.1.48).  By raising this last possibility, Spinoza suggests that it would be perfectly in 
keeping with the demands of public morality for citizens—and perhaps even a great 
number of them—to adopt a philosophically-oriented, but by no means fully rationalistic, 
system of ethics.  Such an ethic would define God as thought and would believe Him to 
be providential insofar as, by allowing us to think, He permits us to become one with 
Him and achieve our summum bonum by understanding ourselves.  Even though this 
outlook would deny freedom of the will and hold that God does not “rule as a prince” but 
merely “teaches eternal truths,” and even though it would hold “that the reward of the 
good and the punishment of the evil are natural” rather than supra-natural (14.1.49), it 
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would remain, in the decisive sense, superstitious.  For by claiming that the universe is 
constituted so as to allow human beings to achieve their greatest good, it still would seem 
to contain a kernel of that anthropocentricism which Spinoza places at the origin of the 
belief in miracles and revelation.  In contrast to this, philosophy teaches that man 
achieves his summum bonum only when he recognizes, paradoxically, that he has no 
special status—for the claim that God cares equally for all also implies that there is no 
distinction in status between the wise and the foolish, or even perhaps between men and 
beasts (cf. 16.1.4).    
 Spinoza therefore suggests that it is possible for society to become fully secular, 
although it can never become fully rational.  Every political community requires 
obedience and devotion in some form, and it therefore needs some kind of public myth or 
ideology which can persuade human beings to make sacrifices—which is to say, to act 
irrationally by placing the community’s good above their own.  But it would appear that 
there is absolutely nothing in human nature which requires a widespread belief in 
revelation, or in a God who exercises particular providence in the ordinary sense, or even 
in an afterlife.  And although one might assume that the number of citizens espousing 
such a partially liberated view would be small, Spinoza never says this.  He seems to 
leave it as an open question whether society as a whole could accept natural religion or 
even perhaps take its bearings exclusively from a kind of secular, half-rational ideology.  
Indeed, Spinoza seems to craft just such an ideology in chapter 16 when he discovers a 
teaching about right in nature—a teaching whose irrationality seems to be suggested by 
Spinoza’s comment that when Moses established his rule through a social contract he did 
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not obligate the Israelites by reason (14.1.10).114  Spinoza’s civil religion, unlike Locke’s, 
therefore does not forbid the teaching of atheism, but it would seem to prohibit the 
propagation of any view that encourages citizens to disobey the law or not to keep the 
social contract.  As he writes, faith “grants to each the highest freedom of philosophizing, 
so that he might think whatever he wants concerning any matters without impropriety; 
and it condemns as heretics and schismatics only those who teach opinions urging 
stubbornness, hatreds, quarrels and anger” (14.2.4, emphasis added).  It would therefore 
condemn, or rather compel to silence, any who would follow Spinoza in teaching that the 
social contract is not fully rational or who would believe with Solomon that one should 
only follow the law when it is in one’s interest to do so. 
 But of course, if Spinoza is serious about the need for a civil religion, one could 
again question why he is so open in fostering such doubts.  After all, as previously noted, 
if philosophy recognizes a need to instill obedience in the citizenry, and if that obedience 
requires the propagation of superstition, would it not be philosophy’s responsibility, and 
even its interest, to support this superstition by claiming that it is rational and true?  This, 
however, is a step that Spinoza, in contrast to Locke, unequivocally eschews, and even as 
he argues for the necessity of civil religion he simultaneously makes a series of 
shockingly open claims which would appear to threaten its capacity to take root.  At the 
end of chapter 12 he hints that the true reasons for his civil theology are utilitarian, for he 
claims even an unjust person would have an interest in crying up piety to others 
(12.2.53).  But in chapters 13 and 14 he transforms this hint into a full-fledged claim 
                                                
114 This view also seems to be implicit in Spinoza’s criticism of the Mosaic Law in chapter 2.  
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about the false and irrational character of Scripture’s lessons about justice and charity.  
He claims not only that Scripture is directed to “the slowest” human beings (13.1.4), but 
also that it does not require that we possess “an intellectual or accurate knowledge of 
God” (13.1.11).  On the contrary, because the Bible requires nothing from us besides 
obedience, it “condemns only stubbornness, not ignorance” (13.1.9).  Spinoza therefore 
not only claims that the Bible’s lessons about obedience are noble lies, but he also goes 
so far as to claim that it shares that understanding.  He asserts that God extolled the 
“credulity and the faith” of the Hebrews, in accordance with which, although they lacked 
the “knowledge of God” which he now says Moses possessed, “they nevertheless 
believed in God’s fixed and reckoned promises.”  Moses, by contrast, “had grander 
thoughts concerning God,” and he therefore “doubted the divine promises” (13.1.18).   
 Although Spinoza writes that by practicing justice and charity human beings can 
imitate God “by a certain plan of living” (13.1.26), just five sentences later he contradicts 
himself and says that such a thing is impossible (13.1.31).  He adds, however, that this is 
in no way a problem, for “the intellectual knowledge of God, which considers his nature 
just as it is in itself . . . does not pertain to faith and to revealed religion in any mode,” 
and human beings can consequently “err about it astronomically without impropriety” 
(13.1.31).  Because it is nothing to faith whether “the plebs and the crude vulgar” for 
whom Scripture was written (13.1.36) have erroneous thoughts about God, the Bible 
“everywhere” speaks improperly about Him and attributes to Him anthropomorphic 
qualities such as “a mind” as well as mercy and judgment (13.1.33, emphasis added).  
Spinoza makes this latter claim a mere three sentences after speaking of the agreement 
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between Jeremiah, Moses, and John about God’s justice and mercy (13.1.30).  He states 
that John’s view of God is vulgar and accommodated to his mindset (14.1.29), and he 
thus seems to encourage doubts even about the elite, pantheistic theology which he 
elsewhere encourages.  Even more radically, perhaps, Spinoza goes so far as to proclaim 
that the seven dogmas of his civil religion may “not have even a shadow of truth,” 
although he also says that this is irrelevant “so long as he who embraces them is ignorant 
of their being false.  Otherwise, he would necessarily be rebellious” (14.1.34).  But of 
course, by proclaiming this so openly and transparently, is Spinoza not undermining the 
belief in their truth and thus encouraging this very rebelliousness?   
 This problem is only compounded, rather than resolved, by the rather bizarre 
doctrine which Spinoza now presents as his official teaching: the separation of 
philosophy and theology.  He claims that this separation is “the chief intent of the whole 
work” (14.1.5; 14.2.5).  Now, since in the preface Spinoza had claimed that “the chief 
thing I have set out to demonstrate in this treatise” is the possibility of a republic where 
freedom of thought and speech are protected (P.3.3), it would seem to follow that this 
idea of separation is somehow integral to the establishment of such a republic, or perhaps 
that it will be the primary tenet which characterizes the outlook of its citizens.115  But of 
course, from a theoretical perspective, this doctrine is extremely strange, if not totally 
                                                
115 At the opening of chapter 16 Spinoza prefaces his discussion of political science by suggesting that it 
will be somehow a part of the discussion of the separation of philosophy and theology and of “the freedom 
of philosophizing that the latter grants to each” (16.1.1-3).  This would also imply that the political doctrine 
of chapters 16 through 20 is in some way a continuation of the discussion of civil religion and obedience 
that is found in chapters 12 through 15. 
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incoherent.  After all, since the truth must be either rational or contra-rational,116 it would 
seem frankly nonsensical to assert that neither philosophy nor theology are superior to 
one another.  Indeed, the notion of ‘separation’ itself would require a grounding which 
can only be given either by reason or by revelation (cf. 15.1.13).   
 In Spinoza’s summary, the idea of the separation of philosophy and theology 
amounts to this: “reason is the realm of truth and wisdom, whereas Theology is that of 
piety and obedience” (15.1.36).  Philosophy teaches “nothing but truth” (14.2.1)—i.e. it 
does not teach obedience in any way.  Similarly, faith or theology, by which Spinoza 
understands “precisely revelation” (15.1.37), teaches “nothing but obedience and 
piety”—i.e. it has not even a shadow of truth.  One who recognizes the truth will never 
obey, and one who obeys by that very behavior reveals his ignorance.  Spinoza’s analysis 
therefore points to the inexorable conclusion that philosophers are bad citizens.  There is 
simply an insuperable tension between the demands of philosophy (the summum bonum) 
and the demands of politics.  Although Spinoza suggests several times throughout these 
chapters that his civil theology “agrees with reason” and so “is universal for everyone” 
(15.1.38, cf. also 12.2.28; 15.1.53, 67), philosophers included, he cannot stick to this and 
repeatedly contradicts himself.  Because truth and obedience are necessarily separate, 
“we cannot demonstrate by reason whether the foundation of theology—that human 
beings are saved by obedience alone—is true or false” (15.1.42; cf. also 15.1.44, 66).  But 
since we know from chapters 3 and 4 that our beatitudo or summum bonum consists 
solely in knowledge of the true, and not in obedience, it would seem possible to go even 
                                                
116 As for the idea that there may be things above, but not against, reason, Spinoza insists that since nature 
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further and to state not only that reason cannot show whether theology’s claim about our 
salvation is true, but also that it holds it to be false.117 
 Anticipating Locke’s argument for the reasonableness of Christianity, Spinoza 
suggests that any such attempt, though admirable in some respects, would ultimately have 
a pernicious effect: in the final analysis, it would “call on reason for help in repelling 
reason and endeavor by a certain reason to render it uncertain” (15.1.59).  For, although 
revelation is certainly “necessary in the greatest degree” for the political utility it 
provides and for the “solace” it gives to the weak-minded (15.1.57), to claim on that 
account that philosophy must mythologize or give its sanction to the possibility of 
miracles would entail too great a cost.  Not only would it pervert the dignity of reason by 
making it once again into the handmaid of theology, but it would also effectively 
transform philosophy into the servant of society.  Philosophy would then be compelled to 
orient itself to the concerns of the vulgar and the superstitious; it would have to transform 
itself into a tool for the procurement of the “goods of fortune” which most men covet.  
Indeed, the very dignity of philosophy according to Spinoza rests upon a liberation from 
such concerns, and so it is not surprising, from his point of view, that in order to claim 
that morality is reason’s “great and proper business” Locke also had to surrender 
philosophy’s status as the summum bonum and to present it as a tool for the achievement 
of security and prosperity.  If Spinoza’s imagined liberal republic is less stable and 
                                                                                                                                            
is all-encompassing this distinction is really not tenable (6.1.33). 
117 Smith, then, does not quite go far enough when he claims that Spinoza’s discussion of the seven 
dogmas is “intentionally ambiguous” as to their truth.  For he cultivates this ambiguity by deliberately 
undercutting them and by making more or less explicit statements as to their irrationality and hence also 
their falsity.  Because the contrast which Spinoza draws between reason and obedience here is so stark, it 
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peaceful than Locke’s, if it is filled with the tensions and contradictions that are reflected 
in Spinoza’s own self-contradictions in these chapters about the relationship between 
reason and obedience, those tensions and instabilities might ultimately be essential in his 
view for allowing liberalism to achieve its true purpose: the authentic spiritual liberation 
of a select few. 
  When Spinoza claims at the end of chapter 15 that “everyone absolutely can 
obey” (15.1.67), he thus seems to be covering over the politically suspect nature of the 
philosophic life and to be crafting a popular but inaccurate admiration of reason as 
something that is ultimately on the side of society.  He thus prepares the way for a 
teaching in the next chapter that will purport to discover right (jus) in nature and thus also 
to show that philosophy supports justice.  When Spinoza next writes that there are “a very 
few” human beings “who acquire the habit of virtue from the guidance of reason alone,” 
he therefore seems to be playing upon the ambiguity which he has cultivated between 
philosophic virtue and ordinary civic virtue (15.1.67).  By blurring the great distinction 
between wisdom and obedience—or rather, by teaching that both can exist alongside one 
another—Spinoza encourages a line of thinking which will consider the philosophic 
outlook to be just in the ordinary sense, but which will also to some extent admire its 
liberated character.  In other words, by propagating a dogma according to which 
philosophy and theology are separate, Spinoza is promoting a specific kind of muddled 
thinking in the citizenry.  He assures non-liberated human beings that philosophers 
remain moral and on the side of society, but he also encourages them to think in ways 
                                                                                                                                            
seems mistaken to say that “he is operating with some conception of differing degrees of truth” (Smith 
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that are more and more self-interested and rational, but never completely so.  By claiming 
that reason and revelation each enjoy the dignity that comes from inhabiting their own 
realms, but also that these realms are equivalent to that of truth and that of obedience, the 
otherwise nonsensical idea of separation encourages a respect for religion, on the one 
hand, and a healthy contempt for it, on the other.  Because Spinoza undermines civil 
religion even as he argues for it, he is able to encourage a large number of his readers to 
think through its tensions and to undergo an educational ascent.  As it is elaborated in the 
next five chapters, the final stage of that ascent will produce an outlook that comes as 
close as any popular ethos can to approaching the simultaneously self-interested and 
resigned outlook that characterizes the philosophic view of the world.118 
 
NATURE AND NATURAL RIGHT 
 If Hobbes and Locke both predicted that their teachings on the state of nature and 
natural right would be considered strange,119 Spinoza’s would seem calculated to strike 
the reader as downright bizarre.  For while Hobbes, for instance, had defined the state of 
nature as a realm without government, in which human beings have a right to those things 
which the advent of human law has not yet denied them, Spinoza finds natural right (jus) 
                                                                                                                                            
1997, 115).  Uyl (1999, 153-4) goes further and speaks of “the rationality of justice and charity.” 
118 Thus, Smith’s assertion that “none of the leading exponents of the Enlightenment believed even for a 
moment that political life could dispense with religion altogether” (1997, 3) stands in need of qualification.  
Since the universal religion of chapter 14 henceforth disappears from the Treatise, never to be even alluded 
to again, it would seem that Spinoza is noteworthy among those Enlightenment thinkers in (perhaps) 
seeking to eliminate even an unofficial public role for religion—at least as that term is usually understood.  
Bagley similarly places great weight on the importance of chapter 14 in arguing that Spinoza sought to 
establish a “a modern liberal-democratic theocracy” (2008, 225-6).  For the possibility that Spinoza was 
attempting to replace religion with ideology, see Uyl 1999, 157. 
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in the very order of nature itself—an order which is in no way limited to the affairs of 
human beings, let alone those living in a hypothetical, pre-political state.  The “Right and 
Institution of nature” is the regime, so to speak, “under which everyone is born and for 
the most part lives” (16.4.1).  It is part and parcel with the “eternal order of the whole of 
nature”—the deterministic necessity which compels “all individuals” to exist and operate 
“in a certain mode” and of which each human beings is merely “a particle” (16.4.1).  
When humans form political communities, then, they do not leave the state of nature120 
but rather agree to be bound by the laws of human reason, which aim at their utility, and 
which do not encompass, but rather are encompassed by, the laws of nature properly 
understood (16.4.1-5.1).  And yet, this fact only makes Spinoza’s language about natural 
right seem all the more puzzling, since he himself stated in chapter 4 that the term “right” 
is “more properly” used to refer not to laws of nature but to those which depend on 
human willingness and which men make for themselves in view of some aim (4.1.1).  
Spinoza’s equating of natural right with those actions which not just human beings, but 
all “the remaining individuals of nature,” cannot help but do (16.2.4-5), would therefore 
seem to cut very much against the grain of ordinary moral discourse.  If Hobbes had 
difficulty persuading his readers that a human being has a right to kill someone whom he 
merely thinks may be intending to do him harm, that claim at least remained one about 
human action and human choice.  Spinoza, however, insists not only that justice can be 
                                                                                                                                            
119 Hobbes, Leviathan xiii.10; Locke, Second Treatise sec. 9. 
120 Asked to explain the difference between his political philosophy and that of his contemporary Hobbes, 
Spinoza wrote: “With regard to political theory, the difference between Hobbes and myself . . . consists in 
this, that I always preserve natural right in its entirety, and I hold that the sovereign power in a State has 
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found among what would usually be considered amoral natural necessities, but also that it 
consequently exists not only among irrational and insane human beings, but even among 
animals and inanimate objects (16.2.4).  Since justice and injustice in the ordinary 
understanding are qualities possessed by humans, many might question by what right 
men deserve to be subjected to earthquakes.  But few would claim that an earthquake has 
a right to kill someone or simply to shake the ground.  Yet this is precisely Spinoza’s 
teaching. 
 Spinoza therefore breaks from Hobbes, and goes well beyond the pale of ordinary 
moral discourse, because he equates natural right simply with reality.121  His teaching 
makes what is identical with what ought to be.  Natural right as Spinoza conceives it is 
synonymous with “longing and power” (16.3.1).  It grants to all natural beings whatever 
they wish to attain and can attain, and it “prohibits nothing except what no one longs for 
and what no one can do” (16.4.1)—which is to say that it permits everything possible and 
forbids everything impossible.  A hurricane that destroys a house, a stone that falls to the 
ground and kills a man, and a predator that eats its prey all act according to natural 
necessity and therefore natural right.  Moreover, because nature is a competitive struggle, 
claims of right can be similarly contested.  Big fish eat small fish “by the highest natural 
                                                                                                                                            
right over a subject only in proportion to the excess of its power over that of a subject.  This is always the 
case in a state of nature” (Epistle 50; Spinoza 1995, 258). 
121 It is true that in De Cive (ch. 1, sec. 7) Hobbes famously characterizes the impulse to self-preservation 
as “a real necessity of nature as powerful as that by which a stone falls downward.”  But the derivation of 
moral right from natural necessity is far from obvious, in part because the former requires human 
willingness and the latter entails a denial of it.  At the very least, few would speak of the right of a stone to 
fall, and so it would seem problematic to claim that everyone will or should grant a similar moral right to 
self-preservation.  Perhaps for this reason Hobbes dropped this formulation when he published the 
Leviathan four years later.  Cf. McShea 1968, 137ff, with Strauss 1965, 229.  For the relationship between 
Hobbes and Spinoza, see Curley 1992 and 1996; Gildin 1980; Strauss 1965, 225-50. 
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right” (16.2.2, emphasis added).  Small fish have a natural right to swim away or to fight 
back, but on the whole they will be less successful, and the justice of the event can be 
determined solely by its outcome.  In Spinoza, the idea of ‘might makes right’ is 
therefore not a cynical denial of all morality but instead a real claim about natural, and 
indeed, divine justice.122  Since “the power of nature is the very power of God, who has 
the highest right to everything” (16.2.3), everything that occurs in nature, no matter how 
“ridiculous, absurd, or evil” it may appear from the point of view of our reason (16.4.2), 
should actually be seen as a manifestation of divine right and will.  That we tend to 
regard what are unfortunate outcomes for us as anything but just is only a reflection of 
our own ignorance “of the order and coherence of nature,” as well the fact that “we want 
everything to be directed on the basis of the use of our reason” (16.4.2), which seeks our 
own utility and our own preservation (16.4.1).  Less superstitious and anthropocentric 
than the ordinary understanding of divine justice, Spinozistic natural right provides a 
moral approximation of the outlook of sober resignation, which accepts man’s status as a 
mere “particle” of nature, that is characteristic of the philosophic life. 
 By enabling the most educated non-philosophers to accept a version of this view, 
Spinoza’s teaching in chapter 16 once again tries to cater to anthropocentrism in order to 
undermine it.  A few of those who look to science rather than religion as a moral standard 
will come to recognize that science provides no such thing.  From the propagandistic 
enlightenment of the mass will follow the genuine liberation of a few, but here again it 
seems to be unclear just how far the former project can extend: the central practical 
                                                
122 Thus, Curley has written that Spinoza “is more Machiavellian than Machiavelli himself” (Curley 1996, 
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problem of chapter 16 is the question of how far the “freedom to think, and for each to 
say what he thinks, extends in the best Republic” (16.1.2).  Now, that Spinoza’s foremost 
aim is “the best Republic” should not be overlooked.  Eschewing the relativism of 
Hobbes and Locke, he retains the characteristic question of classical political 
philosophy—but unlike Plato and Aristotle, his discussion of the best regime is meant to 
be more than a thought experiment.  He thus seeks to attain the goal of classical and 
Christian idealism by constructing it on the foundations of modern realism, for he 
suggests that a regime characterized by the flourishing of man’s summum bonum can be 
brought into being in practice, if only human beings can be brought towards a recognition 
that the universe is amoral, indifferent, and non-teleological, and that it therefore in no 
way points to that summum bonum.  The central practical problem of chapter 16 therefore 
reflects a deeper theoretical problem: how can the flourishing of man’s finis ultimus be 
achieved by cultivating a mindset which will hold—if often unselfconsciously—that the 
universe does not support that end?  Or, to express this problem in political terms, how 
can a negative conception of liberty lead to the achievement of a high-aiming purpose? 
 Chapter 16 begins to provide an answer to these questions because, in addition to 
elaborating the foundations of the best republic, it also contains the fullest description in 
the Treatise of the way in which Spinoza understands our highest good.  Indeed, the brief 
description of nature and human nature which occurs in its opening paragraphs comes 
across as a kind of snapshot of philosophy, or of the content of the wisdom under the 
auspices of which Spinoza and people like him view the world.  Spinoza provides a 
                                                                                                                                            
328). 
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succinct summary of this view when he gives his primary definition of the state of nature 
and natural right.  “By the right and institution of nature,” he writes, “I understand 
nothing else but the rules of the nature of each individual, in accordance with which we 
conceive each as naturally determined for existing and operating in a certain mode” 
(16.2.1).  Aside from the determinism which Spinoza has already described in chapter 4,  
this statement has two potentially surprising implications.  Firstly, it suggests that the 
primary element in nature (and thus also in the study of nature) is not the whole but the 
individual.  Nature properly understood consists of rules which are specific to each 
individual and which propel it, so to speak, from the inside.  More specifically, nature’s 
“highest law” is that “each thing endeavor, as much as is in it, to persevere in is state—
and to do so for its own sake and not for another” (16.2.3).  Properly speaking, it seems, 
either there is no whole or what we speak of as the whole is only an aggregate of the each 
of its parts.  It is a construction of the human mind that follows from observing the way 
in which individuals, who are locked in a never-ending struggle of competitive 
selfishness, are compelled to act.  Thus—and this is the second surprising thing—nature’s 
definition follows from the way in which “we conceive” it.  Philosophy constitutes the 
world. 
 Because this picture of nature collapses the distinction “between human beings 
and the remaining individuals of nature” (16.2.4)—be they animals, plants, or even 
inorganic matter—it would seem to entail a kind of atomism.  Indeed, Spinoza not only 
implicitly denies that human beings have any special status in the cosmos, but he 
abstracts entirely from all those larger entities which humans find themselves embedded 
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in throughout their lives.  He assumes that the family, the state, and (as he will soon 
argue) religion are all purely conventional.  He declares that the highest necessity 
governing human nature is a law which impels us to pursue what we perceive to be good 
(16.5.5-8), and this latter claim seems to complicate his picture somewhat.  Indeed, he 
asserts not simply that  natural beings seek to preserve themselves but, more accurately, 
that they wish to persevere in their states: cats want be cats, trees want to be trees, and 
humans want to be humans.  Just as cats do not want to be lions and lions do not want to 
be cats (16.3.2), humans do not wish to become less or more than they are by nature.  
They experience neither a disgust with their condition nor a desire to become something 
greater, but they do have a rich desire to continue existing and operating in a way that 
expresses the qualities which make them who they are and which separate them from the 
other natural beings.  Thus, the ignorant seek to satisfy their appetites because nature 
compels them to continue to live in such a way (16.3.2),123 while the wise, for the same 
reason, desire “to live on the basis of the laws of reason” (16.2.7).  They want to fulfill 
their spirits (16.3.3) by preserving themselves as rational or thinking beings.  In its most 
fully developed form, this can only consist in attaining a clear-sighted recognition of the 
world as it is, and so it is part and parcel with the way of life that follows from the 
resigned, philosophic awareness of man’s lack of special status in the cosmos.   
                                                
123 Thus, although Spinoza speaks of longing or passionate desire (cupiditate) twice in this chapter (16.3.1; 
16.5.16), it seems not to connote any kind of desire for self-transcendence.  Indeed, in this section at least, 
he seems to use this term more or less interchangeably with appetito.  Cf. also Ethics III P9 Schol.: 
“Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as 
they are conscious of their appetite.  So desire can be defined as Appetite together with consciousness of the 
appetite” (emphasis original).  Later in Part III Spinoza derives from this scholium the insight that a man 
“neither strives to do, nor desires, anything unless it can follow from his given nature” (Ethics III P55 Cor. 
Dem.).  
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Now, since the philosophic life as Spinoza conceives of it is characterized first 
and foremost by this robust desire for self-preservation, it follows that it shares a certain 
common ground with the aim of liberal citizenship.  Spinoza had claimed in chapter 5 
that “obedience has no place” in a liberal-democracy (5.2.14), and he notes here that a 
truly free person—that is, one who is “guided by reason” (A.33)—can never obey God.  
Calling his own teaching about natural right into question, he indicates that once “this is 
known” what were previously thought of as rights “cease to be rights, and we embrace 
them as eternal truths, not as rights: that is, obedience goes over into a love that arises 
from true knowledge, as light from the sun” (A.34).  Using the traditional metaphor for 
philosophic enlightenment, Spinoza thus once again indicates that the philosophic life is 
but the most fully self-conscious version of the thoroughly non-devotional psychological 
outlook which he believes to be at the root of all human actions.  The philosopher as he 
describes him is not likely to have a deep or erotic love for the source of his knowledge, 
just as he would not love the sun in this way for allowing him to see.  He will surely 
appreciate the sun for the vision which it permits, and so too he will enjoy the knowledge 
that flows, as it were, from the universe, and which in the end comes to reside within 
himself.  But to claim that a life of wisdom consists in an intellectual dedication to 
something greater than oneself, or to say that it requires the individual to penetrate the 
truth of the whole through his intelligence, is to display a common misunderstanding—
indeed, there is no whole, properly speaking.124  To the extent, then, that Spinoza’s 
teaching of natural right seeks to inculcate a moral approximation of this outlook, it 
                                                
124 Cf. Smith 1997, 143. 
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would seem likely to foster the creation of a political regime whose moral outlook is 
similarly self-interested and non-devotional.  
But if this is the case, how could one understand the fact that Spinoza’s name is 
also frequently placed in the camp of thinkers who are said to have advocated so-called 
“positive liberty?”125  Indeed, it cannot be overlooked that Spinoza is also a member of 
that part of the modern tradition that attempts to carve out a place in the midst of liberal 
freedom for a rich communal life and for a spirited dedication on the part of citizens to 
the common good.  He claims, in contrast to Hobbes and Locke, that human beings need 
to enter into societies “to live securely and best” (16.5.3, emphasis added).  Now, this 
could mean, in accordance with chapter 5, that society is merely necessary “for the 
perfection of human nature and its blessedness” (5.2.4), but Spinoza here goes further and 
suggests that the summum bonum requires surrendering “the right to everything” which 
we have from nature, and bestowing it instead upon the collectivity of all citizens 
(16.5.3).  Reason therefore is said to demand full allegiance to the common good, and 
those who live in accordance with the will of the collectivity will not only “not do to 
another what they do not want done to themselves,” but they will also “defend another’s 
right as their own” (16.5.4).  The calculated self-interest that is reflected in the negative 
version of the golden rule also somehow entails positive duties and spirited obligations.  
Those who are in touch with their natural, rational selfishness should also come to 
believe that that selfishness is somehow at stake when the rights of others are threatened, 
                                                
125 Smith, for example, follows Isaiah Berlin in claiming that Spinoza understands freedom “not as 
negative but as positive liberty” (Smith 1997, 133, but cf. 144; Berlin 1969).  See also his criticism of 
Berlin’s characterization of Spinoza’s politics as illiberal (ibid. 242 n.81).  Cf. also Israel 2001, 259. 
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and so it would seem that they will also defend the rights of others out of a sense that 
there is a true identity between their own good and that of the collective. 
 But that such an outlook is not fully rational seems to be evident from the appeal 
to human pride which Spinoza now makes.  He states that when they enter into the social 
contract human beings will agree to “direct everything solely on the basis of a dictate of 
reason (which no one dares conflict with openly, lest he seem to lack a mind)” (16.5.4).  
His imagined future citizens, it seems, will be governed in part by a deep sense of honor, 
or a pride in being rational, which will also be enforced through the power of public 
opinion.  The social compact, in other words, will need to be grounded at least in part on 
an appeal to sub-rational emotions masquerading as a rational concern for utility.  A 
pseudo-scientific myth is made necessary because no contract can ever be fully rational 
for all people at all times, and Spinoza is quite open about this.  He baldly states that “no 
one will promise without a ruse to yield the right he has to all things, and absolutely no 
one will state promises unless on the basis of a greater evil or in hope of a greater good” 
(16.5.9).  Promises made to a highwayman at gunpoint are of no validity once the danger 
has passed (16.5.11), and thus neither are those made to the state if there is no worthwhile 
reward or sufficiently fearsome threat remaining to sanction them.  Because “no compact 
can have force except by reason of utility,” no one but a fool would expect another to 
abide by a contract “forever” (16.5.15), and this is why all governments have historically 
sought to “compel all by force and restrain them by the dread of an overwhelming 
punishment, of which all are universally afraid” (16.5.17). 
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 But while the ancient origins of states, according to Spinoza, may well have been 
little more than grand exercises in extortion,126 it is not always easy to maintain a 
constant state of fear.  As Spinoza argued in chapter 5, even if repressive regimes do not 
lead to rebellions, they rarely tend to produce vigorous and successful politics (5.2.8).  
But on the other hand, the lies and deceptions that can trick people into obeying of their 
own volition are suitable only for the most backward human beings.  Indeed, as Spinoza 
notes in the next chapter, unless “they are completely barbaric, human beings do not 
suffer being duped so openly and becoming slaves” (17.3.15).  Since Spinoza’s liberal-
democracy will be made up of partially liberated, mostly non-slavish human beings, it 
follows that it will have to dupe them in a way that is not quite so open.  It will have to 
convince them, as Spinoza asserted in chapter 5, that by following the law they are not 
obeying at all but are instead pursuing their own best interests (5.2.13-14). 
 Thus, even though Spinoza has claimed throughout the Treatise that obedience is 
simply the antonym of freedom, and even though he just asserted that fear is absolutely 
crucial for the stability of any political order, he now suddenly claims that it is possible 
for citizens “to obey . . . freely,” as well as out of dread (16.6.1).  He insists that in a 
republic “whose laws are based on sound reason,” one who acts in accordance with those 
laws “is not to be said to be a slave” (16.6.12).  Rational laws aim at the utility of the 
subject, and so by doing “what is useful for the community” the subject also does what is 
useful for himself (16.6.14).  Or, put more clearly, “the more a human being is led by 
reason, that is, the more he is free, the more steadfastly he will keep the city’s rights and 
                                                
126 Cf. Curley 1996, 325. 
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execute the commands of the highest power whose subject he is” (A.33).127  Subjects are 
therefore “not to be said” to be slaves because all political communities need to rest on 
noble lies, but the lie that underlies Spinoza’s republic is noble because it most closely 
approximates the truth.  The myth which it inculcates as a supplement for utilitarianism 
also pretends to be utilitarian, and so even as it covers over the lack of freedom which 
subjects possess, it also brings them closer to an awareness of the psychological engines 
that drive them and therewith to the possibility of authentic liberation. The democratic 
citizen’s outlook therefore would seem to come to sight as a lesser or confused 
instantiation of the mindset of the philosopher.  He will believe that if everyone were 
rational, “everyone would altogether stand by his compacts in the highest faith, on the 
basis of a longing for this highest good [summum bonum]—namely, preserving the 
republic” (16.5.16).  He will share the philosopher’s commitment to reason and to the 
primacy of individual self-interest which reason teaches, but he will also suppose—on 
what he will believe to be strictly rational grounds—that that concern for self-interest 
demands a zealous devotion to the community and even actions which, under any other 
public philosophy, would be considered sacrifices.  Spinoza thus seems to hint at the 
doctrine of “self interest well understood” which Tocqueville would make famous.  He 
suggests that in the future liberal-democratic moralists will need to invent elaborate 
                                                
127 Faced with this statement and others like it, it is easy to conclude, as many scholars have, that Spinoza 
believed that a free man will seek the common good, “[w]hatever the circumstances” (Israel 2001, 261).  
Thus, many interpretations of the Treatise too easily gloss over the radical individualism which Spinoza 
presents as the grounding for this kind of dedication on the part of citizen.  Thus, Balibar, for example, 
finds in the Treatise a proto-Marxist teaching about history whose ultimate goal is the liberation of “the 
masses” (Balibar 1998, 25-49).  
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scientific theories which purport to show that by working for society’s good, the 
individual actually furthers his own. 
But while this belief, being largely ideological, would seem to echo in important 
ways the civil religion from chapter 14, Spinoza in no way suggests that it will require 
any kind of supernatural or otherworldly supplement.  Indeed, it cannot be stressed 
enough that after chapter 14 what Spinoza calls the universal faith is never mentioned 
again.  In contrast to Tocqueville, who considered religion to be a critical supplement to 
the doctrine of self-interest well understood, Spinoza now identifies the democratic 
citizenry’s commitment to reason with a loyalty to scientific secularism, or, at the very 
least, with a hostility to orthodox religiosity.  Again quoting Agamemnon’s words from 
Seneca’s Troads, Spinoza writes that even though the highest powers of a regime have 
the absolute right to command “the most absurd things” (16.6.4), because “no one holds a 
repressive imperium together for long” such things are much less to be feared in a 
democracy (16.6.6-7; Troads, 258).  Because the citizens of a liberal republic will accept 
a diluted version of Spinoza’s rationalism, they will be animated by the following 
thought: the highest powers have the power (and hence the right) to oppress them in 
every way, and hence also to command them to carry out religious absurdities, such as 
the human sacrifice that occurs in the Troads.  But because they will be fully aware of 
this, citizens will not only distrust the government, but will in fact expect anyone with 
power to try to become a tyrant.  Hence, they will consider it their right (because it is 
within their power) to be constantly on their guard against this possibility, which in turn 
will persuade the government “to consult the common good” and to “direct everything on 
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the basis of the dictate of reason,” if only “so as to look out for themselves and retain the 
imperium” (16.6.6).  Thus, as Spinoza writes, agreeing to absurdities “is almost 
impossible” for a democratic assembly, “if it is large” (16.6.8).  In a republic in which 
citizens have been educated to look out for their rational, this-worldly self-interest, the 
freedom of the body politic would seem to vary directly with its size.   
 That a larger republic would be better off than a smaller one, according to 
Spinoza, can be attributed to the fact that it has a particular “foundation and aim, which, 
as we have shown, is none other than to avoid the absurd things of the appetite and to 
confine human beings within the limits of reason, as far as can be done” (16.6.8).  
Ancient republics were small, but they avoided the danger posed by irrational mobs 
through fear and superstition—and this, as Spinoza has shown and will again note in the 
next chapter, inevitably leads to political absolutism and claims of divine right.  The 
republicanism of Greece and Rome ultimately culminated in the pious frauds of 
Alexander and Augustus, and this fraud has been perpetuated with even greater success 
by those who assert that “Majesty is sacred and plays the role of God on earth” (17.3.15 
and context; emphasis added).  A large liberal and commercial republic is the only 
alternative to divine right monarchy, and it can provide this alternative because it is the 
result of a particular kind of widespread education which attempts to dispel the darkness 
of superstition with the light of reason.  After undergoing such an enlightenment, human 
beings will be able to follow Spinoza in looking upon orthodox religion not just as a 
potential source of cruelties and absurdities, but also as a product “of the appetite.”  The 
citizens of a Spinozistic liberal-democracy, in other words, will to a great extent share 
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Spinoza’s own psychological understanding of the roots of religious belief.  They will 
look upon it not as the result of a longing for another world, but as the product of 
irrational emotions and sub-philosophic desires, and they will take pride in being 
liberated from such slavery for the pursuit of rational self-perfection.   
 Now, at the end of chapter 16, Spinoza confronts the objection to this teaching on 
the state of nature which it would seem reasonable to expect from an orthodox believer.  
This objection holds that, because “everyone is bound . . . on the basis of a divine 
commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself,” everything that Spinoza has just said 
quite openly conflicts with revealed divine right (16.8.1).  This objection holds, in short, 
that we are not naturally free but instead come into the world with certain duties to 
exactly those things which Spinoza abstracts from—to family, to friends, to community, 
and to God—and furthermore that we naturally know this to be the case.  Spinoza, 
however, bluntly responds that “we can easily answer this objection, if only we pay 
attention to the natural state.  For it is prior to religion both by nature and by time” 
(16.8.2).  He claims quite openly that human beings are natural atheists and that, as a 
consequence, both religion and religious duty are artificial constructions which have no 
basis in human nature whatsoever.  Although the strength of convention may obscure 
this, any obligations that exist in actual practice are ones which we have freely imposed 
upon ourselves.  Thus, they are not really obligations—for although Spinoza is clearly 
trying to cultivate a sense of obligation to oneself in this chapter, he has also repeatedly 
made clear that since a rational person would never obey, that too is an improper way of 
speaking.  Since we do not long by nature to serve anything that is more than human, or 
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to become more than human, there may be “prayers” in the state of nature (16.3.3), but 
these prayers are nothing more than requests or entreaties (as the word prex could also be 
translated) for things that can fulfill our appetites.  
 Like Locke, Spinoza teaches that churches are human creations which therefore 
have no authoritative political status.  But unlike Locke, he applies this insight not just to 
specific churches but to religion as such, for he does not claim that human beings are 
motivated to religious belief out of a concern for their “eternal estate.”  Indeed, the 
overwhelming message of this final paragraph of chapter 16 is that the belief in another 
world is just as artificial as religion itself.  To be sure, Spinoza sees a residual need to 
appeal to the religious beliefs which still exist even among those readers who have stayed 
with him up until this point, but his attempt to cite the authority of Paul comes across as 
almost comical.  For when Paul claimed “that there is no sin before there is law” (16.2.8; 
16.8.5; Rom. 5:13), he meant not that human beings are free by nature, but that the law 
was given to mankind as a punishment for original sin.  Spinoza, by contrast, teaches here 
that religion itself exists and should be accepted by human beings only on account of its 
potential utility (16.8.11, 15).  Not only does he frankly deny that there is such a thing as 
natural religion, but he goes so far as to characterize revealed divine law as a contract—
and we know that human beings have the highest right to break contracts when it is 
convenient for them.  By cultivating an awareness of this, and by openly stating that a 
human being needs to obey God only to the extent “that it is useful for him and necessary 
for his welfare” (16.8.11), Spinoza seems to invite each reader to consider for himself 
whether it is worth his while to continue taking religion seriously.  In so doing, he 
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cultivates a new understanding of what religion is—an understanding whose effect will 
be to push human beings as far as they can go back towards their natural state of atheism. 
   The outlook which Spinoza seeks to cultivate in a liberal-democratic citizenry, 
then, can therefore be described not just as secular and this-worldly, but furthermore as 
characterized by a refusal to acknowledge any ultimate source of moral or intellectual 
authority that is outside or greater than the individual.  As he summarizes it in the next 
chapter, “it is to be granted to each to reserve for himself, of his own right, many things 
that, on that account, depend on no one’s decree but his own” (17.1.4).  This is almost a 
word-for-word anticipation of what Tocqueville would later identify as the fundamental 
principle of democratic political life: “the dogma of the sovereignty of the people” 
(Tocqueville 2000, 53).128  Spinoza appears to be confident that a citizenry which has had 
its outlook shaped in this way will be a force for freedom.  He seems not to anticipate, or 
at least not to be terribly concerned with, the possibility of majority tyranny which 
Tocqueville diagnoses as a danger to be especially feared in large democratic republics.  
Spinoza claims that democracy “seems the most natural” form of government because it 
also seems “to go along most with the freedom that nature grants to each” (16.6.15).  But 
if democracy most approximates the natural state, might it not reproduce in society the 
insignificance which he says characterizes human beings by nature?  In a modern mass 
democracy, where “everyone remains equal, as before in the natural state” (16.6.17), will 
each human being be but “a particle” of the body politic, and thus also isolated and 
powerless?  Moreover, although Spinoza expects the democratic citizen to be animated 
 253 
by a deep sense of pride, might not an individual contemplating himself in such a 
condition actually come to see himself as largely insignificant and worthless? 
 These questions will need to be considered more fully when we turn to an analysis 
of Tocqueville, but it will be helpful here to reconstruct Spinoza’s potential response.  
And in fairness to Spinoza, it must be recalled that he understands the human desire for 
independence in a robust and spirited way, and he therefore does not expect a regime 
which gives free reign to that desire to produce what Tocqueville called “individualism.”  
At the beginning of chapter 17, he writes that “the highest powers’ right to everything” 
will always remain “merely theoretical” for the simple reason that “no one will ever be 
able to transfer to another his power, and consequently his right, so as to stop being a 
human being” (17.1.2).  Because humans seek not just to preserve themselves, but to 
preserve themselves as humans, when their spirits are not enslaved by superstition they 
will necessarily display a self-assertive and self-affirming concern for their dignity.  No 
absolute government can rule over free and enlightened citizens, because it would “in 
vain . . . command a subject to hate one who has done him a favor, to love one who has 
borne him harm, not to be offended by insults, not to long to be freed from dread, and 
many other things in this mode which follow necessarily from the laws of human nature” 
(17.1.2).  The sentiments of hate and love, of pride and resentment, of fear and hope, are 
all products of the desire for self-interest which, in the vast majority of human beings, is 
inevitably filtered through the prism of the emotions.  As Spinoza noted in chapter 5, 
human beings have a natural pride that can make them ungovernable, but this very thing 
                                                                                                                                            
128 “Providence has given to each individual, whoever he may be, the degree of reason necessary for him to 
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can also be a source of hope.  For even though the vulgar are “not governed by reason but 
by emotion alone,” they nevertheless remain deeply attached to their ideas precisely 
because they are their ideas.  “Each deems that he alone knows everything, and wants 
everything to be modified on the basis of his own mental cast, and figures something is 
equitable or inequitable, a propriety or an impropriety, insofar as he judges it to fall to his 
profit or harm” (17.3.3).  Our moral judgments, Spinoza suggests, are rooted in a concern 
for self-interest, but this self-interest is not limited the pursuit of material utility: it also 
encompasses the natural desire of each human being to live “full of his own sense of 
things” (20.1.4).  We consider just or equitable what satisfies our demand for the honor 
and dignity that comes from intellectual and emotional self-expression, for when others 
accept the truth of our ideas and sentiments, they recognize and pay homage to our sense 
of self-importance, to our prideful individuality, and thus also to our status as real human 
beings. 
 Spinoza can therefore present the state of nature as a positive standard for 
freedom under government (16.6.15-18) because, in his estimation, men are in a way 
positively directed—although this positive-orientation can be best realized, paradoxically, 
when they are left free to pursue their own ends.  Because human beings take pride in 
ruling themselves, both politically and intellectually, a republic can remain free to the 
extent that its citizens see themselves as members of a community of such self-legislating 
individuals—a community which can therefore call for service to the common good 
because it will also proclaim that that good is more or less identical with the individual’s 
                                                                                                                                            
be able to direct himself in things that interest him exclusively” (Tocqueville 2000, 381; cf. also 62). 
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own.  Spinoza’s practical task over the final four chapters will therefore be to elaborate 
how a virtuous republic can be formed on a sober recognition of the inescapability of 
human vice.  For from a realistic awareness of humanity’s political and intellectual vices, 
Spinoza seeks “to constitute an imperium” not only in which “no place is left for fraud,” 
but also in which “everyone, whatever his mental cast,” will “put the public right ahead 
of private advantages—this is the task, this is the labor” (17.3.5; Virgil, Aeneid VI.129).  
Politically, Spinoza will seek to show how a negative conception of freedom can most 
effectively lead the majority of human beings to achieve the positive purpose for which 
they naturally strive.  In a similar way, he will show that a regime which merely 
guarantees the freedom to philosophize will be sufficient to ensure the flourishing of 
man’s summum bonum.  
 
FROM BIBLICAL THEOCRACY TO LIBERAL-DEMOCRACY 
 Chapters 17 through 20 contain Spinoza’s practical political teaching—but they 
present this teaching, at least to begin with, in a very strange way.  Instead of simply 
describing the character of a good constitution, Spinoza suggests that, albeit with a few 
minor modifications, we can look to the “successes” of the Mosaic regime as a model 
(17.2.2).  That this is obviously a red herring is suggested by a number of factors, not the 
least of which is that the title of chapter 17 indicates that the “divine Republic” was 
ultimately a failure—not only could it “scarcely subsist without seditions,” but it 
eventually ceased even to be a republic (17.T).  Additionally, even if one puts to one side 
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all the extremely negative comments which Spinoza made about the politics of the Old 
Testament in chapters 2, 5, and 11 (cf. 11.1.9), and even if one ignores the account of the 
development of the idea of divine right—as rooted in an ever-developing series of pious 
frauds—which immediately proceeds Spinoza’s new description of the Mosaic regime, 
there still remain two huge problems.  Firstly, as we have seen, Spinoza’s liberal-
democracy is to be rooted in a balance of power (or right) between the government and 
the people, and Spinoza dutifully seeks to uncover such a balance in the Mosaic regime 
(17.7.1; 17.9.5-6)—but of course, no such balance is possible when the government is 
held by an omnipotent God, as Spinoza claims that it was (17.4.8).  Secondly, the idea 
that the Hebrews could enter into a social contract with God in the state of nature 
completely contradicts the teaching of the previous chapter, where Spinoza asserted that 
that state is prior to religion both in nature and in time (16.8.2).  His forthcoming 
description of the Biblical polity would therefore appear to be largely tongue in cheek.  
At the very least, it is an attempt to disguise an innovative teaching as a conservative one.  
But it also seems to contain an attempt to show how the Bible’s political teaching can be 
explained on the basis of his own rationalistic political science.  Spinoza’s practical 
political teaching, in other words, will emerge through a dialogue which he will set up 
between his own understanding of politics and that of Scripture.  By following Spinoza 
closely, and by noting where the Hebrews succeeded and where they failed, it will be 
possible to piece together how he expects to arrange human political relationships so as to 
move society from a reliance on the Bible’s politics to an acceptance of his own. 
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 According to Spinoza, before the establishment of the monarchy the Hebrews 
experienced not one but three regimes, and the movement between these seems actually 
to foreshadow this transition from theocracy to liberal republicanism.  After leaving 
Egypt, the Jews re-entered the state of nature, and they compacted together to transfer “to 
God all their natural power to preserve themselves” only after “they had experienced his 
wondrous power, by which alone they had been preserved” and without which they knew 
they would surely perish (17.4.6-7).  God came to rule over the Hebrews in the same way 
that all the earliest governments came to establish themselves: by making it clear to them, 
in the manner of the highwayman from chapter 16, that they had no choice but to obey.  
But although Spinoza cautions that this theocratic constitution was democratic in 
practice—for the right to consult God, and to interpret and enforce the law, was held by 
everyone equally (17.5.1)—that democracy was abandoned at the very first instance 
when the nation attempted to do these things.  When the Jews approached God for the 
first time “to hear what he wanted to command,” they became “so terrified” and “so 
thunderstruck” that they were convinced they were about to die, and they promptly 
abandoned all their political rights and handed absolute power over to Moses, who was 
deemed to have “the role of God” (17.5.2-4).  Their primitive fearfulness led them 
naturally to embrace theocracy and absolutism, but in Spinoza’s initial presentation at 
least, it took only a generation for the Hebrew nation to progress to the point where they 
could accept a kind of religiously-based liberal republicanism.  Moses enjoyed absolute 
sovereignty because he possessed a total monopoly on political, as well as legal and 
moral authority (17.5.6).  But after he died he left no successor (17.5.9), and the regime 
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that arose after him was marked by a division between the secular powers who 
administered everything, and the religious authorities who guarded the law that held the 
people’s hearts and minds. 
 Spinoza’s articulation of the features of this regime revolves around the following 
question: how could the people remain free of government oppression, on the one hand, 
and zealously devoted to their polity, on the other?  The official answer which he 
provides is that it was the separation of religious and political authority which 
accomplished this.  The primary feature of the regime was the temple or “palace of God,” 
and it was here, Spinoza says, that “the supreme Majesty of that imperium” was located 
(17.5.13).  The high priest of the temple, which was chosen by heredity from the line of 
Aaron, was “the highest interpreter of the divine law,” as well as “the one who gave the 
populace the answers of the divine oracle” and who “supplicated God” on their behalf 
(16.5.16).  But while the Levites and the priests thus retained total moral authority, and 
were therefore held “in the greatest honor by the common plebs” (17.5.17), they in theory 
possessed no political authority at all.  They owned no property, but rather were fed and 
housed at public expense (17.5.17), and they had no power to put the divine commands 
into practice.  The latter power was held, in emergencies, by a commander in chief 
(Joshua) who ruled temporarily over all the tribes, who had the right to ask for God’s 
answers, but only through the pontiff, and who furthermore could state these commands 
to the people and “compel the populace to do them” (17.5.20).  In non-emergencies this 
power was held by the princes of individual tribes—or perhaps by some “councils” 
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whose character Spinoza does not fully describe (17.5.23)—who would have to receive 
God’s answers officially before they gained the force of law (17.5.23). 
 As this summary should hopefully make clear, however, Spinoza seems to give 
contradictory answers to the question of just who had the right to communicate God’s 
answers to the population.  Or rather, it may have been that this power was contested, and 
thus distributed differently at different times.  The boundaries of the spheres into which 
the religious and the secular powers were separated in this regime seem to be unclear, and 
this would appear to be a big problem, not only because religion had such a hold over the 
spirits of the common people, but also because, as Spinoza now goes on to show, it had a 
predominantly martial character.  Spinoza claims that “God among the Hebrews was 
called the God of armies,” and that in battles in which “the victory or defeat of the whole 
populace” was at stake, it was the physical presence of the ark of the covenant—and thus 
also of God Himself—that impelled the Jews to “fight with the utmost strength” 
(17.5.21).  Their spiritedness, and their zealous dedication to the common good, was 
wholly a product of their militant religiosity.  But because the final arbiter of that 
authority among the population was left ambiguous, that religion seems to have been a 
latent source of violence, civil discord, and inhumanity.  Thus, Spinoza soon notes that 
after Joshua’s death the tribes of Judah and Simeon waged a separate foreign war, during 
which they were reprimanded for the “sin” of failing to “exterminate everyone” 
(17.5.30).  Whereas Joshua could command and control the divine answers, it appears 
that when such executive authority was lacking, there was nothing to keep a lid on this 
half-savage brand of religiosity.  According to Spinoza, when there was not a commander 
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in chief the only bond holding the Jews together was that of religion, and if one of the 
tribal princes was perceived by the others to have transgressed the divine law, he “could 
be considered as an enemy by the rest” (17.9.1).  Thus there would eventually arise civil 
wars which were rooted in theological hatred—“the greatest hatred” (17.8.5)—during one 
of which all the tribes invaded the Benjaminites and “butchered everyone, perpetrators 
and innocents equally” (17.5.31). 
 Spinoza claims that the members of the Hebrew tribes were fellow citizens with 
one another, but only with “respect to God and Religion.”  With “respect to the right that 
one tribe had over another, they were nothing but allies—in much the same mode (if you 
take away the common temple) as the Sovereign Confederate Orders of the Netherlands” 
(17.5.26).  At this point, Spinoza bestows his highest compliment on the Hebrew 
regime—but it is one which even at first glance would appear to be thoroughly 
backhanded.  In the preface Spinoza had identified the intended results of his own 
political project with an idealized Dutch Republic, and he now asks the reader to 
determine the character of that republic by imagining for himself what the Hebrew 
confederacy would look like, if only it were shorn of the very thing which bound it 
together.  Since it was their shared loyalty to religious law that gave the Jews their 
common identity and their deep devotion to their country; since that law was also the key 
factor which both kept them from becoming rebellious and motivated them to prevent 
their rulers from becoming tyrants; in short, since it was the common temple which was 
the locus of all the allegedly favorable features of this regime which Spinoza is 
highlighting in this chapter, the reader is compelled to ask what could serve all these vital 
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functions in its absence.  At the opening of chapter 18, Spinoza suggests that the Hebrew 
regime is not worthy of being imitated, not only because the New Testament has declared 
it to be obsolete, but also because it is incompatible with commerce.  It is suitable only 
for those who would “enclose themselves within their own limits and segregate 
themselves from the rest of the globe, and hardly for those for whom it is necessary to 
have commerce with others” (18.1.4).  In the Dutch Republic, as Spinoza will later note, 
it is commerce, rather than religion, which cements common bonds among citizens 
(20.6.4).  It is therefore tempting to suspect that what will replace the common temple of 
the Hebrews in a Spinozistic liberal-democracy will be the spirit of commerce Spinoza 
alluded to in chapter 5—a spirit marked by a commitment to individual freedom, by a 
zealous attachment to the pursuit of self-affirmation, and by a fierce dedication to 
political and intellectual independence. 
 The contrast which Spinoza sets up between the Hebrew and the Dutch republics 
becomes especially acute as he catalogues the allegedly salutary features of the former 
regime.  For as he does so, he appears to indicate that many of them rest on a parochial 
and even xenophobic outlook which is entirely incompatible with the commercial spirit.  
The Hebrew regime, as he now makes abundantly clear, was rooted largely in hate.  The 
citizens successfully deterred their rulers from becoming tyrannical, but only because the 
latter did not want to risk provoking their “Theological hatred” (17.8.5).  The republic 
remained free because it was guarded by a citizen militia rather than by a professional 
army (17.8.6-8), but the members of that militia fought primarily for God’s glory 
(17.8.11), and the piety which impelled them to undertake such great sacrifices was 
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rooted in turn in “the most antagonistic hatred” toward other nations (17.12.7).  Religion 
among the Hebrews, as Spinoza now makes clear, was not just militant; it was also a 
blood and soil, devoutly xenophobic brand of faith.  The Jews considered that God could 
only be worshipped within the borders of the fatherland (17.12.7), and that worship itself 
consisted largely of “daily faultfinding”—a litany of invectives about other nations 
whose effect was to inculcate a hatred against them which “arose on the basis of great 
piety or devotion and one which was believed to be pious: surely none greater than it or 
more tenacious can be given” (17.12.11).  And it was this hatred—when combined with 
their love of their own fatherland, to be sure (17.12.10)—which was ultimately 
responsible for firming up “the Hebrews’ spirits for tolerating all things with a special 
steadfastness and virtue on behalf of the Fatherland” (17.12.13).  In short, as Spinoza 
dares to write (albeit through the mouth of Tacitus), it was the “superstition” of the Jews 
that ultimately led them to fight with such heroism on behalf of their country (17.12.14). 
 Spinoza invites the reader to compare this theologically-based militancy to 
another foundation for spiritedness which he also claims to have uncovered in the 
Hebrew republic.  As he writes, since the militia was formed entirely of citizens, “matters 
of both war and peace were administered by the same human beings.  One who in camp 
was a soldier, therefore, in the marketplace was a citizen; and one who in camp was a 
general, in court was a judge; and, finally, one who in camp was a commander, in the city 
was a prince”129 (17.12.3).  In an urban, liberal, and commercial society—a society which 
is presided over by courts of law rather than by the authority of priests—the spirit of 
                                                
129 Here the term “prince” (princeps) might simply carry the connotation of “leader” or “first citizen.” 
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commerce, or of individual, prideful independence, can provide the basis for real 
personal striving and a spirited defense of the common good.  “Therefore, no one could 
desire war for the sake of war, but for the sake of peace and to protect freedom; and 
perhaps a Prince abstained from new undertakings as much as he could, so as not to be 
bound to approach the high Pontiff and to stand before him with loss of dignity” 
(17.12.4).  In this presentation, it is religion that serves freedom rather than the reverse.  
Citizens show themselves willing to undertake great sacrifices because they desire peace 
and freedom, and they desire peace and freedom for the sake “of utility, which is the grit 
and life of all human actions” (17.12.15).  According to Spinoza, it was because it was 
seen to protect this utility that (perhaps paradoxically), the Jews were willing to die to 
protect their fatherland.  “For nowhere did citizens possess what was theirs with a greater 
right than did the subjects of this imperium, who had a part of the lands and fields equal 
to the prince’s; and each was owner of his part forever” (17.12.15, emphasis added).  
This idealized Hebrew republic could claim the unconditional and self-sacrificial loyalty 
of citizens because it recognized and gave an outlet to their pride and sense of self-worth.  
The Jews according to this presentation were attached to their property not for the sake of 
greed or the desire for material well-being but because they saw it as the locus or 
representation of their dignity—a dignity that could never be taken away from them, for 
anyone who was compelled to sell his land on account of poverty was required to have it 
restored to him every seven years (17.12.15).  Spinoza thus hints that in a liberal republic 
the preservation of the spirit of commerce might require placing some limits on 
commerce itself.  These limits are made necessary because the aims of commerce are 
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spiritual rather than strictly commercial: they are intended to foster a sense of individual 
pride and self-affirmation, which, it must be said, is also linked to a sense of eternity. 
 But if Spinoza’s description of the Hebrew republic shows how this concern for 
dignity could be properly channeled, it also contains a warning about what could happen 
if this solution is not put into practice.  He claims that one of the chief things which 
deterred the Hebrews’ princes from becoming tyrants was “the fear of some new 
Prophet,” for “such men could easily pull an oppressed populace to themselves.”  The 
prophets, in other words, acted as lightning rods for those who were discontented or 
suffering under misrule, and they only needed to provide “superficial signs” in order to 
persuade such people “of whatever they wanted.”  But whereas misrule tended to create 
bubbling religious pressure among the lowest segments of society, when “things were 
correctly administered” the princes could assert their authority and control these prophets.  
Because the prophets had no popular following, the government could either put them to 
death under the law, or it could accept them, but solely on the basis of its own legal 
authority (17.10.1).  But unfortunately, according to Spinoza, for most of the Hebrews’ 
history this situation was the exception rather than the rule.  Indeed, he notes that the 
Hebrew state largely sought to keep the populace under control not by making it better 
off, and not by satisfying its demands for dignity, but instead by inculcating obedience 
through an almost unbelievably intrusive religious cult.  Repeating his teaching from 
chapter 5, Spinoza again catalogues how the whole point of the Jewish law was to instill 
“the utmost training in obedience,” and in fact, to transform life into “a continual cult” of 
it (17.12.19).  And in this, their law was most successful.  For, as Spinoza writes, “I do 
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not deem that anything more effective can be devised to influence the psyches of human 
beings.  For psyches are taken by no thing more than the joy that arises on the basis of 
devotion, that is, on the basis of love and admiration together” (17.12.21).  Although 
Spinoza seems to come very close here to encountering on its own terms the human 
experience of devotion, or of the sense of joy that can arise from carrying out duties to 
something greater than oneself and perhaps even from sacrificing oneself, he also leaves 
no doubt that he does not regard this sentiment as admirable in the least.  The joy that 
arises from it, in his presentation, is akin to the joy experienced by a slave who delights 
in his slavishness and who could not even conceive of being free.  It is the joy of a slave 
who would fight to keep his chains, not realizing that his psyche has been “taken” by 
another, and thus that this very sentiment is what makes him most of all a slave and 
“useless to himself” (16.6.12).  As Spinoza claimed in chapter 16, “he alone is free who 
lives with a full spirit solely on the basis of the guidance of reason” (16.6.10).  The 
Hebrews, by contrast, were required to accept the edicts of the divine law “without any 
consultation with reason” at all (17.12.25).   
 But even though Spinoza just said that there is nothing more effective than the use 
of devotion to control human beings, Spinoza now indicates that, for whatever reason, 
that was almost certainly not the case among the Jews.  Indeed, he goes so far as to blame 
them for the torrent of discords and civil wars that eventually enveloped the Hebrew 
nation (7.12.31ff.).  The problem, it seems, was that people simply could not stand living 
under a regime in which they were constantly told what to think.  They bristled at the 
theological authority held by the Levites, who “were in the habit of reproving them 
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continually.  For there is no doubt that, among so many thousands, many annoying 
Theologizers were found” (17.12.36).  That the Levites had no official political power 
was entirely irrelevant.  They had an intellectual power, and an honored place in society, 
and (as Spinoza made clear in chapter 5), there is nothing that human beings can stand 
less.  Thus, there was often popular resentment against the religious establishment, and 
the Hebrews murmured about having to feed those who were unrelated to them, 
“especially if grain was costly” (17.12.37).  That this resentment had a spiritual, rather 
than simply an economic cause, however, seems to be indicated by the fact that it was in 
no way limited to times of poverty.  Indeed, Spinoza notes that it was especially “in times 
of leisure, when manifest miracles ceased,” and when no prophets appeared, that the Jews 
“at last abandoned the worship” of God, which was “ignominious and even suspect to 
them” (17.12.38).  Indeed, Spinoza indicates that it was the elite, “and not men of the 
plebs” who especially began to murmur against the rule of Moses when “the populace 
began to abound in leisure in the desert” (17.12.43).  It was wealth and not poverty, the 
free time provided by leisure and not the crush of economic necessity, which led human 
beings to discover a concern for their individual dignity—an egalitarian concern which, 
in turn, led them to a series of religious doubts.  When they finally rebelled, these elites 
publicly accused Moses of being an imposter, and they claimed that this was proved by 
the fact that he “chose his own tribe above all and gave the right of the pontificate to his 
brother forever.  On that account, they went to him in an excited tumult, shouting that 
everyone was equally holy and that he had raised himself above everyone contrary to 
right” (17.12.43). 
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 Perhaps paradoxically, then, Spinoza here seems to indicate that the concern for a 
democratic and egalitarian notion of human dignity can be expected to arise first and 
foremost among an educated, leisured elite.  That concern may well be a product of the 
discovery of the possibility of spiritual freedom—a freedom which is egalitarian insofar 
as it exists only within each, and which is of course open only to the most educated 
segments of the population.  Spinoza juxtaposes this sentiment to that which was 
cultivated by Moses, for Moses, as he now indicates, was able to calm this popular 
disturbance only through a miracle.  But this miracle only caused “a new and universal 
sedition of the whole populace” (17.12.44, emphasis added).  What started as a rebellion 
of the educated had now spread to the whole nation, which universally considered this 
‘miracle’ to have been a fake.  Finally, a “worn out” Moses “calmed them at last after a 
great disaster or pestilence, yet so that everyone preferred dying to living” (17.12.44, 
emphasis added).  Whereas this rationalistic, anti-theological, and democratic-leaning 
elite seemed to promise an awakening of the human spirit, Moses’ religion could 
maintain civil order only by trying to crush it.  Here Spinoza’s estimation of the ultimate 
results of Bible’s politics could not be clearer, for he notes that the Hebrews’ polity was 
so disordered and so miserable that the Jews eventually simply gave up on freedom and 
begged God for a monarch (17.12.49).  “Yet here was immense material for new 
seditions, on the basis of which the ruin of the whole imperium followed at long last” 
(17.12.50). 
 The most lasting achievement of the establishment of a monarchy, according to 
Spinoza, was the unleashing of a hitherto unprecedented amount of political ambition—
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something which was manifest most of all in a conflict between kings and priests 
(17.12.52ff.).  But as Spinoza presents it, this conflict seems to be but the ultimate 
realization of the tension between the spiritual and the secular authority that was latent in 
this regime all along.  The same prophets who previously served as a healthy check on 
governmental power now became a constant source of resistance to legitimate kings—
indeed, even David acquired the throne through an act of usurpation (17.12.54).  
Moreover, the prophets themselves seem largely to have been a product of the lack of 
opportunity for spiritual self-expression that is part and parcel with monarchy, for while 
the populace held the imperium “there were very few prophets,” whereas “after the 
choosing of Kings there were very many of them at the same time” (18.3.7).  Monarchy 
seems to have created an atmosphere of restless discontent which was given an overt 
religious expression, as literally hundreds of prophets swarmed around Israel.   
 The political lesson which Spinoza draws from this is two-fold.  On the one hand, 
he writes, the government needs to possess a total monopoly on religious authority—this 
is the main teaching of chapter 19.  Not only must “the ministers of the sacred matters” 
be denied all access to all political offices, but they must limit themselves to “teaching 
and practicing only what is acceptable and most usual” (18.4.1).  Moral authority must 
come from the state, and the churches should limit themselves to reinforcing the code of 
ethics underlying the regime.  And in a liberal-democracy, that will entail placing “piety 
and Religious worship solely in works”—that is, in obeying the law, helping one’s 
neighbor, and being a good citizen by cultivating “charity and justice” (18.4.5).  
Secondly, Spinoza claims that it is necessary to grant freedom of thought and expression.  
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So while the government needs to have exclusive jurisdiction over religion, as Spinoza 
will argue at the opening of chapter 20, it will best utilize that right when it limits religion 
to a teaching about works and allows citizens to think as they like.  For where opinions 
are criminalized “one is ruled very violently.”  Spinoza claims that this kind of political 
atmosphere is what led to the crucifixion of Christ (18.4.2), but, when this statement is 
put together with what Spinoza said about Jesus in chapter 7 (7.5.8-14), it would also 
appear to be what led to the appearance of Christ.  The corruption of the Hebrew 
republic, and the yoke of Roman tyranny, one is tempted to suspect, created an 
atmosphere of bubbling religious pressure not unlike that which was faced by the Hebrew 
kings.  Indeed, as Spinoza now goes on to indicate, that Christ preached not political 
rebellion, but a kingdom in another world, seems not have made the religion which he 
authored any less seditious than that of the Jewish prophets who preceded him. 
 In chapter 19, Spinoza notes that the dissension between the religious and the 
secular authorities which was the source of all the trouble in the Hebrew regime has 
always been endemic to Christianity.  It can be traced back not just to the conflict 
between Ambrose and Theodosius Caesar (19.1.1) but even, as he remarkably insists, to 
“the very origins of the Christian religion” (19.3.3).  Of course, to any truly pious 
Christian “the very origins of the Christian religion” are divine, and Spinoza, as he did 
when discussing the faults of the Hebrew laws (17.12.31-33), almost explicitly places the 
blame for this on God Himself.  He says that “the first to teach the Christian religion were 
not kings but private men” (19.3.3), and from this seed grew a quarrel between the 
authority of church and state which would plague Europe from the late Roman Empire 
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until Spinoza’s own time.  Now of course, Christ himself was a private man.  Indeed, 
Spinoza’s claim that the Apostles could be excused from preaching without government 
authorization because they had authority from Christ (19.2.13) only begs the question of 
how he came to have that authority.130  And if Christ had this right from God, then that 
only compels one to ask why God would want to divide Europe into competing centers of 
moral and political authority—something which has had disastrous results.  Spinoza 
claims that God punished the Hebrews with bad laws because His intention was not to 
care for them but to punish them: His cares “were not for security, but for vengeance” 
(17.12.33).  Since the Jews, according to Spinoza’s presentation, were a narrow-minded 
and hate-filled people, it should not be surprising that they believed in a God who had a 
similar mindset.  As chapter 19 indicates, a version of that same God remains the 
dominant force in the Europe of Spinoza’s time, and He has brought nearly identical 
political effects. 
 Spinoza’s description of the dysfunctional Hebrew confederacy therefore seems 
to be an allegory for Christian Europe—a group of principalities ostensibly united by a 
common religion, but in practice inextricably divided by that very source of piety which 
was supposed to provide a firm foundation for peace and concord.  The alternative 
theological outlook which Spinoza proposes in its stead is perhaps best summarized by 
his famous statement that, since God rules over human beings only through the mediation 
of earthly government, “no traces of divine justice are found except where just men rule” 
                                                
130 Thus Rosenthal does not quite go far enough when he blames the Disciples for threatening the civil 
authority (1999, 123ff.).  Of course, if Christian morality is defective from Spinoza’s point of view, that 
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(19.1.20).  The outlook encapsulated in this statement is the culmination of Spinoza’s 
efforts, over the last nineteen chapters, to bring the religious attitudes of the vulgar—
though with many variations, to be sure—towards a version of the philosophical view of 
the world.  He here again mentions Solomon, who observed that where just men do not 
rule “the same fate happens to the just and the unjust, the pure and the impure: this has 
made very many doubt divine providence who deemed that God rules over human beings 
immediately and directs the whole of nature for their use” (19.1.20).  On the basis of this 
skepticism about divine providence, Spinoza presents a teaching which claims not to 
deny God’s justice, but indeed to vindicate it at long last.  He suggests that divine justice 
is real, but that that reality is made manifest only as an effectual truth.  God has 
commanded human beings to make for themselves in this world what the Bible promises 
in the world to come.  And because the human concern for piety is rooted in a concern for 
justice, as Spinoza suggested when he contrasted Christ and Moses in chapter 7,  
wherever justice is guaranteed and secured people will not challenge the government’s 
authority in the name of something otherworldly.  In other words, under a regime which 
does not insult people’s dignity by telling them what to think, there will be no more 
crucifixions of people like Jesus, but there will also be no more people like Jesus to 
crucify. 
 The teachings of chapters 19 and 20 are therefore not as contradictory in practice 
as they would seem to be in theory—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the 
contradiction is a dynamic one, and that it effectively creates a healthy middle position.  
                                                                                                                                            
should be one more reason to question whether Spinoza’s favorable portrayal of Jesus in chapter 1 is meant 
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When people are well off, when their desire for individual dignity is satisfied because 
they are granted freedom of speech and thought, they will consent to state supremacy 
over religion because they will no longer take religion all that seriously.  Or rather, they 
will believe religion to be on the side of peace, humanity, and freedom of expression, 
which will justify any state actions conducted for the sake of those ends.  To express this 
somewhat differently, it can be said that the political control of religion of chapter 19 will 
remain present in the liberal and tolerant society of chapter 20—but it will be located not 
in governmental pronouncements but instead in the less noticeable power which all 
regimes have to shape ideas and sentiments (cf. 17.1.9).   
Thus, although Spinoza opens chapter 20 by claiming that it is simply impossible 
for the government to control thoughts, he then blatantly contradicts himself and says that 
it could be guaranteed by an art (cf. 20.1.2 with 20.1.4).  This contradiction can be 
resolved, as it were, in effect, in a society in which the citizens’ beliefs have been shaped 
without their knowing it such that they universally accept the premise that thought 
control is impossible.  For this reason, Spinoza in this chapter presents a description of 
life under a democratic republic as though it is a description of human nature simply (cf. 
20.1.5).  The principle of toleration that is part and parcel with liberalism must be 
founded upon a new understanding of what religion is, and it must exclude, as both 
impious and as a threat to the civil peace, all those sects which fail to accord with it 
because they fail to preach tolerance.  A regime of freedom of thought is still a regime, 
and, it therefore requires a religious teaching which must be enforced through education 
                                                                                                                                            
to be his last word on the subject. 
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and public opinion (cf. 7.11.44-47).131  As Spinoza had claimed at the opening of chapter 
17, all polities inevitably shape psyches so that people come to believe, love, and hate 
some things rather than others (17.1.9).  But even though a democratic republic will mold 
beliefs in a tremendously powerful way, that will in no way prevent it from achieving its 
highest, intellectual aim and purpose.  For, according to Spinoza, the arts and sciences, 
which are necessary “for the perfection of human nature and its blessedness” (5.2.4), “are 
only cultivated with happy success by those who have judgment that is free and 
minimally predisposed” (20.4.19, emphasis added).  Philosophy will need to grow from 
the seeds planted by a certain minimal dogmatism.  Although the truly gifted can become 
free anywhere (A.33), a great many can be helped towards this end if they are “compelled 
to live well on the basis of the freedom of the spirit” (2.9.23).  And as the context of that 
latter statement would seem to suggest, this possibility will be present only in an 
atmosphere which has been decisively liberated from Biblical politics. 
 The final mention of the Bible in the Treatise concerns Moses’ utter failure as a 
statesman (20.1.5).  Here Spinoza’s criticism of the Old Testament is not followed, as at 
so many other points in the Treatise, by a favorable comment about the New Testament.  
From here until the end of the book, Scripture will no longer serve as an authority for 
Spinoza.  The kind of politics that Moses represents will be left by the wayside, as will be 
the Bible itself.  At this final stage in Spinoza’s educational project, the Treatise, along 
with the regime it is trying to construct and the soul that it will nurture, has become 
entirely secular.   
                                                
131 For the homogenizing potential of Spinoza’s religious reforms, and for the new role for public opinion 
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Now, the overwhelming message of chapters 17 through 20 is that theocracy is 
bound to fail because, as Moses learned, the attempt to control minds rests on a 
misunderstanding of human nature.  But Spinoza also says that “judgment can be 
predisposed in many, almost unbelievable modes” (20.1.4) and that a government can 
therefore “make the greater part of human beings believe” or love or hate “whatever it 
wants” (17.1.9).  The problem with theocracy is thus not that it will always fail, but that, 
on the contrary, it has the frightening potential to succeed.  Spinoza, it should be recalled, 
began the Treatise by noting that the Turks have accomplished this “most happily” 
(P.2.4).  For Spinoza, Islam represents the completion of a trajectory that is latent in all 
religiously-based politics; theocracy is the classical solution to the problem of regime 
stability, and it is founded on a recognition that human beings can be successfully 
controlled only when they have lost the ability to think for themselves.  Civil peace is 
therefore not Spinoza’s foremost goal.  If it was, he would have endorsed Turkish-style 
despotism instead of liberal-democracy, which, on account of the freedom it grants, has 
some “disadvantages” (20.4.16).  Moreover, because democracy rests on the mutual 
deterrence—and hence, the risk of confrontation—between rulers and ruled, to establish 
it is to risk enduring a number of political sacrifices.  But those sacrifices, as previously 
noted, will be more than made up for by the presence of the arts and sciences, which 
cannot exist where minds are not free (20.4.19). 
 The republican outlook which Spinoza describes in chapter 20 applies the 
political lessons of chapter 16 to the realm of ideas and sentiments.  As in chapter 16, it 
                                                                                                                                            
which they are likely to create, see Gildin 1973, 385-7. 
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consists primarily in an awareness of the ubiquity of selfishness, and it views the evident 
lack of moral restraints among human beings in moral terms.  As Spinoza writes, the 
highest powers even in a republic have the right to “consider as an enemy everyone who 
does not absolutely think as they do in everything; but we are not disputing about their 
right, but about what is useful” (20.2.2). 
For I grant that by right they can rule most violently and lead citizens to the 
slaughter for the flimsiest of causes: but everyone will deny that this can come 
about in keeping with the judgment of sound reason.  Indeed, since they are 
unable to do these things without great danger to the whole imperium, we can also 
deny that they have the absolute power to do these and similar things, and 
consequently the absolute right as well.  For we have shown that the right of the 
highest powers is determined by their power (20.2.2). 
 
When both rulers and ruled think in ways that are determined by the insights of “sound 
reason”—that is, when they are concerned with their power and interest in this world, 
rather than with their eternal fate in the next—their selfish calculations will lead them to 
a common recognition of the benefits of peace and moderation.  But this balance of 
power that will be established between them will be moral as well as material. As 
previously indicated, citizens who believe that their government has an actual right to 
oppress them will be constantly on their guard against such a possibility, and their 
consciousness of their own rights—of the fact that they can resist government 
encroachments legitimately with all of their power—will instill in them a desire not to be 
oppressed.  The moral dimension of this balance is therefore not just window-dressing.  It 
is what gives citizens their spiritedness, and in so doing it ensures that their rulers do not 
become tyrants and that they do not become slavish.   
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 Moreover, since human beings are intellectual and emotional beings, when they 
adopt this moral reasoning they will also zealously guard against the possibility that the 
government will intrude into their psyches (20.1.3) or tell them what emotions to exhibit 
(20.2.1).  Even though the outlook of democratic citizens will be characterized by an 
attachment to irrational ideas and to emotions, it will thus share something of the 
commitment to spiritual independence typical of the philosopher.  Indeed, the 
philosopher’s desire to live by his own lights, and to trust no authority but his own, now 
appears to be the most fully developed manifestation of a sentiment which is found to 
some extent in all human beings.  As Spinoza writes, even though thought-control is 
abundantly possible, “it still has never come about that human beings fail to experience 
that each is full of his own sense of things, and that there are as many distinctions among 
heads as there are among palates” (20.1.4).  Because both the philosopher and the citizen 
are deeply attached to their own spiritual independence, Spinoza’s liberal republicanism 
will seek to create an atmosphere friendly to the former by bestowing legitimacy upon the 
sense of individuality which he shares with the latter.  In other words, rather than 
lowering ideas to level of tastes, his solution will seek to raise tastes to the level of ideas.  
It will protect serious thinking by cultivating, and conferring dignity upon, a personal 
attachment to all human sentiments, even those which, from the Olympian vantage point 
of the philosopher, would come to sight as trivial or grounded in unreason and emotion.  
Spinoza seems to envision a world in which human beings are encouraged to develop and 
take pride in their own tastes, to form judgments about the likes of literature, philosophy, 
and the arts, and to become deeply offended when anyone, and especially the 
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government, challenges those judgments or tells them what to think.  In the new ethos, 
such challenges will be considered offensive because they imply a denial of one’s 
capability to form such judgments, or to live as an independent, dignified, thinking being. 
 Spinoza argues for freedom of speech, and not just freedom of thought, on the 
somewhat bizarre grounds that it is as impossible to prevent human beings from voicing 
their ideas as it is to prohibit them from having ideas, for “not even the most experienced, 
to say nothing of the plebs, know how to be silent” (20.3.1).  Of course, the Treatise as a 
whole would seem to testify to the ability of a wise man to write carefully, and to craft 
his message delicately, in full awareness of the reality of social and government 
censorship (cf. P.7.1-2; 20.8.1-2).  “Caute” was the motto on Spinoza’s personal seal, and 
indeed, he here calls this tendency of human beings to entrust their opinions to others 
even if there is a need for silence “a common vice” (20.3.1).  But as in chapter 17, 
Spinoza will attempt to construct a society that can produce virtue by building on the 
realistic foundations of human vice (cf. 17.3.3-4).  Liberal-democracy will not prohibit 
vices such as luxury, envy, greed, and drunkenness for the simple reason that it cannot do 
so.  By granting freedom to the human spirit, one necessarily liberates and therefore 
incurs the need to tolerate such vices, but that same liberation also permits freedom of 
judgment, which is a virtue (20.4.18).  “The aim of a Republic,” according to Spinoza, is 
to allow the minds and bodies of human beings “to function safely in their functions” 
(20.4.2).  The freedom which it permits ensures man’s ability to preserve himself in both 
an ordinary and a rich sense: the liberation of the mind will advance together with the 
liberation of the body. Spinoza’s republicanism therefore seeks to achieve a positive 
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goal—the achievement of man’s true highest good—by building on the foundation of 
negative liberty, which aims not at fulfillment but at self-preservation.  In its intellectual 
manifestation, this liberty may first come to sight as a capitulation to the vicious tendency 
of human beings to wear their opinions on their sleeves, but in so doing it will create a 
new virtue of self-expression or intellectual self-expansiveness—a virtue which should 
easily take hold in the popular mind because it will tap into the natural pride which 
humans have in their capacity to exist and operate as independent, self-absorbed thinkers.  
By protecting the expression of ordinary citizens, Spinoza suggests, liberal-democracy 
will also protect the activity of serious thinkers who unfortunately “do not know how to 
dissemble” (20.5.9).  One of the main tasks of the Treatise, it therefore appears at this 
point, is to create a world in which the very idea of esoteric writing is unknown. 
 But since the Treatise is also devoted to ameliorating the socially pernicious 
consequences of traditional interpretations of Scripture, it would also seem to go without 
saying that either freedom of speech cannot be granted absolutely, or that this freedom 
can exist only when thought is carefully controlled.  Spinoza acknowledges “that 
sovereignty can be harmed by words as well as by deed; and so, if it is impossible to take 
this freedom away from subjects completely, it will on the other hand be very pernicious 
to grant it altogether” (20.3.3).  His main practical task in chapter 20 will therefore be to 
make clear how far the liberty of expression can “be granted in keeping with the peace of 
the republic” (20.3.3).  He will need to articulate the character of the unofficial 
homogeneity that will need to underlie liberal society.  In chapters 14 and 19 Spinoza had 
made the limits imposed by piety virtually synonymous with those required by civil 
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peace, and now, in answer to his own question, he seems to take this secular standard a 
step further.  He writes that the “ultimate aim [finem . . . ultimum]” of a republic is “to 
free each from dread” (20.4.1), and he thus impels the reader to recall his ambiguous 
statement from the preface that “it is equally impossible to take away superstition from 
the vulgar as to take away dread” (P.6.1).  The ultimate aim of liberal-democracy—
which, to be sure, may perhaps only be approached asymptotically—is therefore to 
produce the drastic weakening of superstition.  Since its aim is to ensure the preservation 
of humans as “rational beings” and to allow them to “use free reason” (20.4.2), it will 
attempt to reproduce, as far as this is possible on such a grand scale, the atheism of the 
state of nature.  So while Spinoza is therefore attempting to liberate certain sub-
philosophic emotions; while he is seeking to cultivate certain sentiments of pride and 
devotion which can inculcate a deep, spiritual loyalty to a democratic regime; he also 
intends to ensure that those sentiments revolve around an admiration of reason and that 
they are thus subsumed, so to speak, under a rationalist umbrella.  The open expression of 
those emotions which are conducive to superstition and therewith to a hostility towards 
reason, on the contrary, will be unequivocally banned.  As Spinoza writes, the only 
arguments that will be permitted into the public arena will be those which are taught and 
defended “by reason alone” and not those which are rooted in hatred, anger, ruses, or 
personal authority (20.4.6).   
 This limitation would seem to extend even to arguments which are rooted in 
Spinoza’s civic theology from chapters 13 and 14.  After all, when he proposed that 
theology, he also openly proclaimed it to be totally irrational.  If the Treatise outlines the 
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steps in a project for the progressive education of society towards something 
approximating a rationalist outlook, then it seems that what is appropriate for human 
beings who have followed Spinoza through chapter 14 may not be appropriate for those 
who have stayed with him until chapter 20.  At the conclusion of Spinoza’s political 
project, citizens will think of themselves as rational and as liberated from all intellectual 
authority: they will believe themselves to be free of all ruses (20.4.2).  They will not quite 
recognize that their allegiance to reason is not quite wholly rational, nor that their beliefs 
have been decisively shaped by Spinoza or by later thinkers whom he hopes will 
implement his project of cultural reform.  In contrast to what reason actually teaches, 
according to Spinoza, they will believe that it is rational to obey a law in all cases, even if 
in so doing one “often has to act against what he judges and openly thinks is good” 
(20.4.8).  They will believe that since reason and self-interest sanction the social contract, 
these things also call not just for passive obedience, but also for active dedication, on 
behalf of the liberal state (20.4.10).  As he did in chapter 16, Spinoza obscures the tension 
that a clear-sighted person will recognize whenever the maintenance of the social contract 
requires real personal sacrifice on the part of an individual.  He does not advertise it like 
he did in chapters 13 through 15.   
 Because the liberal regime therefore requires a basis in a not entirely rationalist 
ideology, Spinoza acknowledges that certain ideas which challenge its legitimacy must be 
subject to censorship.  “For example, if someone thought that the highest power was not 
within its right, or that no one had to stand by his promises,” such a person would 
necessarily be seditious precisely on account of the fact “that he thinks such a thing” 
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(20.4.13, emphasis added).  There will continue to be thought-crimes even within the 
most permissive liberal-democracy, although perhaps, if such a republic is correctly 
established, there will not typically be a need to punish them in the usual way.  But this 
has tremendous implications for the behavior of genuine philosophers.  Since reason 
teaches precisely that the social contract—and all law for that matter—can never be fully 
rational, it seems that they will still be prohibited from openly expressing their deepest 
views.  Some need for esoteric writing will remain, and the philosophers of the future 
will have to follow Spinoza’s example and claim to be patriotic (cf. P.3.3; 17.5.26; 
20.6.4).  Moreover, it appears that they will also have to endure a drastic dilution of the 
popular perception of their own way of life.  Because they will have an interest in 
upholding a regime where the freedom of speech and thought is guaranteed, they will not 
only have to present themselves as patriotic, but they will also have to endorse liberal-
democracy—as Spinoza himself does in chapter 20—from the citizen’s point of view.  
From that point of view, philosophy appears simply as freedom of expression, or as an 
activity of writing books only “for the learned” (20.6.4).  Thus, they will also have to 
assert that philosophy itself is not necessarily an activity limited to an elite few—for the 
“learned” in a Spinozistic society will include a relatively large class of intellectuals.  As 
Spinoza writes, “the best republic grants the . . . freedom of philosophizing to each” 
(20.4.15, emphasis added).  Philosophy in the future will be seen as something that is 
available to all those who have the time and the desire to take it up.  It will become a term 
used to denote the activity of scholars and academics, rather than a way of life 
characteristic only of truly great minds. 
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 Since authentic philosophy, to Spinoza, will come to flourish under a liberal 
regime only if it does not put itself at the center of political life, this loss of recognition 
would seem to be a price that it will simply have to endure.  But Spinoza is confident that 
the outlook which he is constructing will not lead to relativism, or to a loss of a 
consciousness among the citizenry of the possibility of human greatness.  As he 
summarizes it at the end of chapter 20, this outlook is identical with that which he claims 
to find in the city of Amsterdam, and it is decidedly commercial.  In the Dutch Republic, 
he writes, citizens no longer orient their lives by religious concerns, but they “live with 
the utmost harmony” because, when deciding whether “to trust their goods to someone, 
they care to know only whether he is rich or poor and whether he usually acts in good 
faith or by a ruse” (20.6.4).  Money and credit, rather than faith and theology, will 
provide the social bond under liberal-democracy.  At the same time, however, Spinoza 
seeks to combine these commercial sentiments with a contempt for “the whining vulgar” 
(20.6.4), “whose highest salvation is contemplating money in the bank and having an 
overfull stomach” (20.5.2).   
 Spinoza’s commercial society will therefore not attempt to use the law to curtail 
vice, but it will also seek to preserve the belief that “luxury, envy, greed, drunkenness, 
and other, similar things” are vices (20.4.18).  Public opinion and the mores which 
govern it will cultivate an admiration for those who look upon the body with contempt—
“those whom good education, integrity of morals, and virtue have made freer” (20.5.2).  
Spinoza even closes chapter 20 with a salute to the beauty and nobility of self-sacrifice.  
He writes that the most honorable and upright citizens of a liberal regime will be ready 
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and willing to become martyrs for freedom of speech and thought, and to transform the 
scaffold—“the intimidator of evil men”—into “a most beautiful theater for showing the 
highest example of tolerance and virtue.  For those who recognize themselves to be 
honorable do not fear death or beg for mercy,” but rather “deem it honorable . . . to die 
for a good cause and glorious to die for freedom” (20.5.9).  A morality of tolerance, 
according to Spinoza, should not be expected to reduce human aspirations to the lowest 
common denominator.  On the contrary, it will serve not merely as a means that can 
prevent the adherents of different sects from killing one another, but also as the 
centerpiece of new moral outlook which can inspire the most awesome examples of 
patriotic devotion. 
 But of course, Spinoza’s liberal republic will seek to cultivate a willingness 
among citizens to make such sacrifices in theory so that they will never actually have to 
do so in practice.  In a regime in which freedom of speech and thought is constitutionally 
protected, there will be no cause for martyrdom and hence also no martyrs.  In actual fact, 
then, Spinoza’s liberalism would seem to ensure the disappearance of self-sacrifice—a 
disappearance which he seems to have sought to bring about through his attempt to bring 
human beings as close as they can come to the self-interested outlook which is part and 
parcel with the life of reason.  His political project would therefore seem to prepare the 
way for a view that will look upon self-sacrifice as frankly foolish, or at best, as a relic of 
the irrational moralities of the past which have since been eclipsed by the more 
reasonable Enlightenment teaching about self-preservation.  But if this suspicion is 
correct, then this would seem to pose large problems for the potential success of liberal-
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democracy as Spinoza understands it.  After all, that regime must rest on a successfully 
established balance of power (or right) between rulers and ruled, something which 
presupposes the willingness of citizens to endure the costs to life and property that 
revolution entails.  If this latter sentiment fades away, human political and intellectual 
freedom would seem to find itself under threat—especially in a society where there are 
no more intermediate powers standing between the government and the people. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This last consideration invites a reconsideration of Spinoza’s political philosophy, 
and that of the Enlightenment more generally, in light of the critical reflections on 
democracy which were recorded by Alexis de Tocqueville.  When Spinoza and Locke 
wrote, liberalism was a project that was still confined to the realm of theory.  Tocqueville 
was one of the first great philosophers to observe it in practice.  The United States which 
he visited in the 1830s was a country whose moral and religious outlook had a great deal 
in common with that proposed by Locke, and, according to Tocqueville, it also contained 
the latent seeds of the more far-reaching, radically individualistic, and thoroughly self-
absorbed and self-interested moral orientation which Spinoza sought to propagate.  Those 
Spinozistic tendencies, in his analysis, are not peculiarly American but rather distinctly 
democratic, and they have the potential to produce a lethargic and apathetic citizenry 
which, in turn, may one day voluntarily submit to a new kind of despotism—a despotism 
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that does not oppress men materially but rather degrades them intellectually and 
spiritually. 
 Indeed, perhaps the most alarming part of Tocqueville’s analysis, especially to 
contemporary ears, is the scant ability to prevent such evils which he attributed to 
America’s Constitutional protections for the freedom of thought and speech.  Liberalism 
in the United States, he wrote, not only produces few great works of the intellect, but it 
also seems to be uniquely threatening to the idea of human greatness itself.  Conceived 
solely on Spinoza’s own terms, this seems to be something of a problem.  For while 
Spinoza grants to his citizens a nearly absolute liberty of thought and expression, he also 
seeks to preserve that liberty by bestowing a tremendous amount of power on public 
opinion.  Moreover, although he implies that the greatest philosophers, whom he expects 
liberalism to produce, will still need to disguise their teachings somewhat in order to 
avoid destabilizing society, he also seems to encourage the development of an intellectual 
atmosphere in which the possibility of esoteric writing will not be taken seriously.132  
Especially when the history of liberalism since Spinoza is taken into account, it would 
seem reasonable to ask whether the belief in intellectual equality which he sought to 
cultivate—as found, say, in his deliberate watering-down of the meaning of philosophy— 
will not in fact serve to undermine the popular belief in the very existence of intellectual 
excellence.  One thing which Tocqueville takes quite seriously, but which Spinoza seems 
not to give much weight to, is the possibility that the advent of human equality might 
pose an extreme danger to man’s spiritual life, and thus also to his political freedom. 
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 Perhaps the most important reason to turn to Tocqueville, however, has to do with 
his contrasting, and highly un-Spinozistic view of human psychology and the origins of 
religious belief.  If it is true, as this chapter has tried to suggest, that Spinoza’s Treatise 
contains a theoretical as well as a political project, and if it is also true that that project 
consists in an attempt to weaken orthodox religiosity by helping society move from an 
outlook of devotion and admiration to one which approximates the philosopher’s outlook 
of reason and self interest, then the proof of that project can be ascertained solely through 
an analysis of its political results.  Democracy in America is a book which is largely 
devoted to an analysis of those results, and, if Tocqueville is to be believed, they are far 
from conclusive.  Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, Tocqueville found the 
impulse toward devotion and self-sacrifice to be very much present in the United States, 
in spite of the apparent best efforts of democracy and modernity to stamp it out.  Indeed, 
from his observations of America, he came to the conclusion that the impulse to self-
sacrifice is an ineradicable part of the human soul, and that, as a consequence, many of 
the contradictions and pathologies which plague modern democratic life can be attributed 
to liberalism’s failure to carve out a place for this desire.  Since that desire, to 
Tocqueville, is inextricably linked with the longing for another world, his liberalism, 
unlike Enlightenment liberalism, will seek to lay a firm foundation for religious toleration 
without sacrificing the tremendous benefits which, in his analysis, can be gained from 
what remains of orthodox religious belief.   
                                                                                                                                            
132 Bagley, for instance, writes that “It could be suggested that one casualty of the Enlightenment was a 
serious regard for the ‘art of reading.’” (Bagley 1998, 126 n.7). 
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Chapter 5:  Tocqueville’s Post-Enlightenment Liberalism 
“Only by a kind of aberration of the intellect and with the aid of a sort of moral violence 
exercised on their own nature do men stray from religious beliefs; an invincible 
inclination leads them back to them.  Disbelief is an accident; faith alone is the permanent 
state of humanity.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 284 
 
“Today religion is passing away.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 89 
 
 Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is devoted to a theoretical critique 
of modernity which is derived from an observation of modern political practice.  It was 
“during my stay in the United States,” the author informs us, and presumably not before 
that, that his eyes were drawn to certain “new objects” (3)133 which were present in 
America and which he then began to notice emerging in his native Europe.  The spectacle 
of America convinced Tocqueville that political life in the West had changed 
fundamentally and in an unprecedented way, and it was not by accident that he also 
observed that that country was also the one in which the Enlightenment’s political project 
had been most obviously put into practice.134  America, he claims, exhibits the “extreme 
limits” not simply of democracy, but of “the same democracy” which is “advancing 
rapidly toward power in Europe.”  “A great democratic revolution is taking place among 
us” (3), he famously declares, and for Tocqueville’s French contemporaries (who “all 
                                                
133 Unless otherwise noted all parenthetical references in this chapter come from the Mansfield and 
Winthrop translation of Democracy in America (Tocqueville 2000).  On a few occasions, such as when 
dealing with Tocqueville’s loose French translations of American colonial documents in I.1.2 (for which 
Mansfield and Winthrop supply only the English originals), I have had recourse to the Schleifer translation 
in the recently issued bilingual Liberty Fund historical-critical edition (Tocqueville 2010).  All references 
to the French text come from that edition as well, and all usages of its translation have been noted in the 
text.   
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see” this revolution but “do not judge it in the same manner” [3]) these words could only 
be taken to refer to one thing: the continuing legacy of 1789, as manifest above all in the 
overthrow of feudal aristocracy, a regime which was founded on the intimate political 
alliance between the monarchy and the Church.   
 Resting as it did on a claim about the divine right of kings, the Ancien Régime 
constituted the peak of theocratic politics according to Spinoza.  The destruction of this 
regime was therefore the chief political aim of his radical version of the Enlightenment 
project,135 and, albeit with varying degrees of salutary modification, it was precisely the 
results of that project which Tocqueville discovered on display in the United States.  
America, to Tocqueville, thus reveals what political life will look like after the overthrow 
of the alliance between monarchy and Christianity has reached its logical completion, or 
rather, since Tocqueville denies that America ever had a revolution (12), it reveals what it 
would have looked like if that alliance had never existed in the first place.  Tocqueville’s 
description of the United States therefore presents “an image of democracy itself” (13) 
because it articulates the nature of a political order which is decisively shaped by the 
insights of modern rationalism.  As Tocqueville describes it in Democracy in America, 
that order is marked by the successful attempt to weaken orthodox or Biblical 
Christianity, to undermine religiously-based law, and to place moral and political 
authority instead in the independent reason of individuals and in a state which, as the 
                                                                                                                                            
134 Tocqueville makes this latter observation especially in II.1.1-2. 
135 Israel draws a straight line of influence from the thought of Spinoza to that of Rousseau, Diderot, and 
the Jacobins (Israel 2001, 704-720), and he credits the anti-Christian and anti-monarchical ideas of the 
Theologico-Political Treatise—as diffused through more popular media—with creating “a revolution of the 
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artificial creation of such individuals, is understood to be the embodiment of their 
collective reason.136 
 To Tocqueville, however, the triumph of this new understanding of politics also 
signals the possibility of a set of hitherto unknown political dangers.  Whereas Spinoza 
had argued for democracy in order to ensure the protection of individual freedom, 
Tocqueville observes that “the generative fact” of modern political life is not liberty but 
“equality of conditions” (3).  Liberalism and democracy, he suggests, do not necessarily 
accompany one another, and when they do it is the latter (understood not as a form of 
government but as an egalitarian “social state”) which is stronger and more fundamental 
than the former.137  By in effect throwing each individual back on the authority of his 
own reason, modern democracy, according to Tocqueville, not only removes all obstacles 
which can thwart the will of the modern state, but, as the quotations provided at the 
opening of this chapter would seem to indicate, it also does “a sort of moral violence” to 
the human soul.  As this chapter will attempt to show, Tocqueville’s main criticism of the 
modern Enlightenment project is that it rested on a flawed view of human psychology—a 
view which failed to acknowledge what Tocqueville considers to be man’s natural 
                                                                                                                                            
mind” that made the events of 1789 possible (p. 714).  For the particularly strong influence which 
Spinozism enjoyed in France, see esp. pp. 565-98. 
136 One of Tocqueville’s most famous claims is that the majority in the United States is omnipotent: “The 
people reign over the American political world as does God over the universe” (55).  The reason why the 
democratic legislature enjoys unlimited power, however, comes from the fact that the authority of the 
majority which it represents is both “material and moral” (243), and its moral authority is absolute because 
the majority “claims to be the unique organ of reason” (84). 
137 The essence of this Tocquevillian observation is well summarized by Manent, who writes that “In the 
formulation ‘liberty is equal for all,’ which essentially distills the definition of democratic liberty, the 
predicate is stronger than the noun.  The extension of liberty to all members of the social body changes its 
meaning.  The center of gravity of the social mechanism tips to the side of equality.  To affirm the equal 
liberty of all citizens amounts to affirming equality first” (Manent 1996, 23, emphasis original). 
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longing for immortality.  That longing, according to Tocqueville, always takes the form 
of a paradoxical desire to affirm oneself by simultaneously sacrificing oneself, and it is 
not only the key element in the origins of religious belief—which means that religion is 
much more deeply ingrained among human beings than Spinoza acknowledges—but it 
also appears to be the foundation of all politics which can be said to be deserving of the 
name. 
 By denying the existence of this longing, and by constructing a new order based 
on the supposition that human beings are fundamentally this-worldly, self-regarding, and 
apolitical, the modern project in Tocqueville’s estimation threatens to bring about the 
destruction of politics and the advent of a new condition of social isolation which he 
terms “individualism.”  The ‘effectual truth’ of the Enlightenment can be seen in the 
creation of a society in which human beings are cut off from one another and have no 
sense of membership in or duty to a larger whole.138  Such a condition, Tocqueville 
suggests, does violence to human nature because it suffocates our natural desire to carry 
out duties to such a whole.  It makes man into a purely self-interested being, a rational 
calculator who lacks distinctly human tensions or contradictions, a being who possesses 
neither a sense of greatness nor of self-contempt, but who has become merely a seeker 
after material well-being or “comfortable self-preservation.”  But as Tocqueville warns, 
such an end does not require freedom.  Indeed, material comfort may in fact be more 
                                                
138 Manent suggests that, according to Tocqueville, democracy tends to reproduce the state of nature within 
society (Manent 1996, 12, 26-8).  Winthrop writes that Tocqueville’s Americans must be told how they 
would benefit from social cooperation upon each instance when it is required of them.  Radicalizing the 
teaching of the social contract theorists, who had made the break with the state of nature definitive, the 
Americans in effect depart from and return to it “on each and every occasion of social activity” (Winthrop 
1991, 401).  See also Winthrop 1993, 210 and Mansfield and Winthrop 2006, 99. 
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easily be provided by a new kind of despotism—a despotism which will rob men of their 
humanity precisely by caring for them and which will thus degrade them “without 
tormenting them” (662). 
 Although this critical description of modernity, centering as it does on the place 
given to material comforts, would at first glance seem more Lockean than Spinozistic, 
Tocqueville associates the ultimate tendencies of democracy with Spinoza’s more radical 
philosophic project.  He insists that men living under democracy will ultimately be drawn 
to philosophic doctrines which deny freedom of the will and the importance of the 
individual, and they will especially be led to embrace pantheism, which, as he presents it, 
seems to be but a stop on the road to outright materialism.  Unlike Spinoza, who claimed 
that the popular acceptance of at least the first two of these would lead to a flourishing of 
the summum bonum, Tocqueville suggests that, precisely because of the attractiveness of 
such doctrines, there are few societies more threatening to both civic and intellectual 
virtue than liberal-democracy.  To Tocqueville, Spinozism is most representative of those 
pernicious intellectual trends that promise eventually to favor despotism by dimming 
passions and shrinking souls.  By contrast, he discovers what he calls “human greatness 
[grandeur]” in precisely those medieval aristocracies which Spinoza wrote the 
Theologico-Political Treatise in an effort to destroy.  For while these societies rested on a 
conventional inequality which Tocqueville acknowledges to be unjust, they also gave 
birth to those beautiful but tension-ridden desires which, in his analysis, made possible 
not only civic virtue but also genuine freedom of the mind.  While acknowledging the 
need to accept democracy as a “fait accompli” (13), then, and even as one which has a 
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great deal of moral force on its side, Tocqueville suggests that the key political problem 
of our time consists in the need to find a way to re-instill within its fold those 
simultaneously self-affirming and self-despising longings which were in fact most 
characteristic of aristocracy.  It is precisely for this task, this chapter will argue, that a 
“new political science is needed for a world altogether new” (7).139 
THE “GREAT DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION” 
 Of course, the suggestion that Tocqueville viewed democracy as a product of the 
Enlightenment appears to run counter to the picture of its origins which he presents in his 
                                                
139 By emphasizing the critical side of Tocqueville’s attitude toward democracy, this chapter will attempt 
to challenge the interpretations of those scholars who have tended to regard him as working within the 
modern tradition.  These authors have tended in particular to emphasize his professed intellectual debts to 
either Montesquieu or to Rousseau, two of the three authors with whom he claimed to “live a little every 
day” (Tocqueville to Kergorlay, November 12 1836; quoted in Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, xxx).  
Zetterbaum, for example, finds support in Tocqueville for Montesquieu’s teaching about the ‘spirit of 
commerce,’ (1967, 132-7) and he accordingly claims that Tocqueville exhibits a “fundamental agreement 
with the presuppositions of modern political thought; despite apparent departures, he follows in the 
tradition originating with Machiavelli” and he continues “the natural-rights teaching of Hobbes” (pp. 104-
5).  In a somewhat similar fashion, Koritansky (1986) regards Tocqueville as a Rousseauian through and 
through, and he interprets Democracy in America simply as an application of the teachings of the Emile and 
the Social Contract.  While Tocqueville therefore does appear as a critic of bourgeois modernity in 
Koritansky’s account, the criticism which he is said to present is by no means original with him—
Koritansky’s Tocqueville follows Rousseau in radicalizing modernity even while attacking it.  One of the 
best succinct statements of Tocqueville’s debt to Rousseau, and of the political reasons that caused him not 
to stress that debt, can be found in Bloom (1990, 312-13), who concludes that although Tocqueville is not 
“simply the same as Rousseau, . . . the difficulty is more on the side of differentiating them than of 
assimilating them” (p. 313).  While a full analysis of the influence of Montesquieu and Rousseau on 
Tocqueville would require a thematic examination of their writings—something which is obviously 
impossible in the current context—by making clear the central place which the longing for immortality 
holds in Tocqueville’s psychology, I hope to indicate his fundamental disagreement with both the thought 
of the Enlightenment and with Rousseau’s critique of it.  Lawler (1993) has argued that while Tocqueville 
agreed with Rousseau’s psychological insights in important respects, he could not accept his apparent 
solution to the problem posed by our mortality—the reverie, which Lawler interprets as a form of escapism 
(pp. 6-7, 47-8).  Instead, even while considering him to be an unbeliever, Lawler claims that Tocqueville 
was nonetheless indebted for his understanding of human psychology to the third author with whom he 
claimed to live every day, namely Pascal.  In what follows, my interpretation of Tocqueville will be closer 
to that of Lawler than those of Zetterbaum and Koritansky, but at the end of this chapter I will attempt to 
point out what I consider to be a set of fundamental and irreconcilable differences between his thought and 
that of Pascal. 
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introduction.  There he describes it not as a sudden revolution but as a gradual and 
centuries-old process of societal transformation—a process which was not only not 
caused by human efforts, but which in fact served to illustrate the seeming irrelevance of 
all human agency.  As he writes, both democracy’s advocates and its opponents worked 
for its establishment despite themselves and “without knowing it, as blind instruments in 
the hands of God” (6).  Seventeen years after he completed the first volume of 
Democracy in America, however, Tocqueville apparently came to accept a very different 
picture.  In an address which he delivered to the Academy of Moral and Political 
Sciences in 1852, he argued that the French Revolution was caused not by social and 
economic forces but by a small group of renowned authors.  It was “political science,” he 
claimed, which produced the “greatest event in history,” and thus it will always be, for in 
every society it is the political sciences which produce “a sort of intellectual atmosphere 
where the spirit of the governed and the governments breathe” (Tocqueville 1951- , 
16:233, my translation).  On the opening pages of Democracy in America, by contrast, 
Tocqueville makes no explicit mention of the thought of the Enlightenment and none 
whatsoever of 1789.  Indeed, throughout the work he presents himself not as a political 
scientist but as a kind of sociologist, giving scant importance to great men or great 
events, and describing important political outcomes as rooted in allegedly more 
fundamental and longer-lasting sub-political causes.140 
                                                
140 This has understandably earned Tocqueville praise from sociologists (e.g. Aron 1965, 181-231) and 
occasional criticism from political scientists.  West (1991), for example, harshly criticizes Tocqueville for 
allegedly neglecting the controlling power of law and for regarding the political as a mere reflection of the 
sub-political.  A similar criticism is found in Anastaplo (1991, 459).  For a more nuanced account of what 
Tocqueville means by the “social state,” and of the theoretical and political considerations that caused him 
to introduce this important category, see M. Zuckert 1993 together with Lively 1962, 42-4 and 238.  Both 
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 Did Tocqueville, then, simply undergo a change of mind about this fundamental 
question at some point between 1835 and 1852?  Before hastily leaping to such a 
conclusion, it will be helpful to consider whether the account of the origins of democracy 
which he provides in the introduction may be more easily understood if it is read while 
keeping in mind the political situation of Tocqueville’s European audience.  As he notes 
on the work’s very first page, French politics in the early to mid 19th century is marked by 
a fundamental division over the character of democracy (understood in Tocqueville’s 
sense of equality of conditions).  “Some consider it a new thing, and taking it for an 
accident, they still hope to be able to stop it; whereas others judge it irresistible because 
to them it seems the most continuous, the oldest, and the most permanent fact known in 
history” (3).  These two parties, whom we might call reactionaries and progressives, 
appear to be manifestations of the two “great parties” whose opinions, according to 
Tocqueville, are “as old as the world” and present, at least to some extent, “in all free 
societies.”  One of these parties seeks to restrict popular power, while the other seeks to 
extend it (167, 170).  And yet, while this would seem to suggest that aristocracy and 
democracy are at least in some sense permanent features of all political life, in the 
introduction Tocqueville gives the powerful impression that they are instead two 
                                                                                                                                            
authors emphasize the complexity that lies behind Tocqueville’s apparent status as a sociologist and the 
connections between that self-presentation and the expectations of his democratic audience.  In a similar 
fashion, Ceaser (1990, 69) argues that Tocqueville’s refusal to entertain the possibility of establishing 
regimes other than democracy in modern times arises from his astute observation of the limits provided by 
the historical circumstances in which he wrote.  Zetterbaum claims that Tocqueville followed Montesquieu 
in returning to a “classical” mode of analysis, and he equates what Tocqueville calls the “social state” with 
what the ancients called the “regime” (1967, 52).  This latter position has also been forcefully argued by 
Ceaser (ibid.) and by Manent (2006, 115, 118-9), who claims that Tocqueville’s study of democratic 
political life permitted him “to rediscover the most fundamental intuition of Plato and Aristotle, . . . 
namely, that there exists a close correspondence between the order of the city and the order of the soul.”  
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successive phases in history.  But his argument that these two social states are rooted not 
in nature but in history is far from convincing.141  Faced with the need to address one 
party which thinks democracy entirely novel and another which thinks it eternal, 
Tocqueville’s somewhat humorous response is in effect to split the difference.  He claims 
that democracy is neither new nor eternal but instead that it is approximately seven 
hundred years old (3-4).  
 His account of the gradual and allegedly inevitable (and providential) march of 
equality therefore begins around the year 1135, when France is “divided among a few 
families who possess the land and govern the inhabitants.”  Of course, looking back 
seven hundred years from that point, one would quite likely consider oneself to be living 
at the apex of a historical process marked by the gradual and progressive development of 
inequality (cf. 383-4, 420-1).  Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries presents the 
spectacle of pure aristocracy unmixed with any democratic element: a savage, brutal, 
warrior society in which rule is founded only in compulsion.  At that time, the “right of 
command passes from generation to generation by inheritance; men have only one means 
of acting upon one another—by force; only one origin of power is to be discovered—
landed wealth” (4).  If the extreme of democracy is a soft-despotism (as Tocqueville will 
                                                                                                                                            
Because of this, Manent concludes, Tocqueville “is a full-fledged if unintentional member of the school of 
political philosophy founded in Athenian democracy” (115).  
141 Tocqueville’s speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences is also noteworthy for its 
emphatic rejection of historicism in favor of a political science “founded on the nature . . . of man” and on 
his “instincts which change their object according to the times, without changing their nature, and which 
are as immortal as his race” (Tocqueville 1951- , 16:230, my translation).  For Tocqueville’s hostility to 
Hegel and to German philosophies of history, see Kessler 1994, 61; Koritansky 1986, 13-14; Lively 1962, 
34-5; and Zetterbaum 1967, 18.  Tocqueville’s professed opposition “to the Hegelian identification of what 
is with what is right” (Zetterbaum 1967, 18) could of course also apply to Spinoza’s identification of right 
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argue in Volume II), it would therefore appear that the extreme of aristocracy is a 
despotism of the more traditional sort—a state of unmitigated barbarism which is on that 
account devoid of art, leisure, philosophy, or any kind of cultural and intellectual life. 
 “But then the power of the clergy comes to be founded and soon spreads” (4).  As 
Tocqueville presents it, it was the political power of Christianity—the advent of a rival to 
civil authority, which Spinoza denounces in chapter 19 of the Treatise—that 
simultaneously founded both democracy and civilization in Europe.  Thanks to the 
church, “he who would have vegetated as a serf in eternal slavery” could now take a 
“place as a priest in the midst of nobles” and would “often take a seat above kings” (4, 
emphasis added).  Now, this characterization of the medieval church as a force for 
equality is a drastic overstatement, but it allows Tocqueville to accomplish several 
important ends.  Rhetorically, the claim that democracy is distinctly Christian—and that 
it is taking place among “Christian peoples” or in the “Christian universe” (6-7)—helps 
to further the idea that it is providential.  If it can be established that democracy is rooted 
in the Church, then Tocqueville may be able to persuade orthodox reactionaries to stop 
resisting it and instead to join him in helping to direct it.142  At the same time, however, 
                                                                                                                                            
with power in chapter 16 of the Treatise.  See Tocqueville’s letter to Corcelle of July 22, 1854 (Tocqueville 
1861, 2:270-1).  
142 Not surprisingly, how scholars view the seriousness or lack thereof of Tocqueville’s ‘providential 
thesis’ tends to reflect what they think about his religious beliefs.  Lively (1962, 40-1), Kessler (1994, 52-
4), and Zetterbaum (1967, 1-16, 19-21), who regard Tocqueville simply as a “religious functionalist,” 
consider his claims about equality’s divine character as crafted to meet the rhetorical requirements posed by 
his political situation.  In support of this view, Zetterbaum convincingly cites the following passage from a 
letter which Tocqueville wrote to Eugène Stoffels a month after the publication of Volume I: “I tried to 
diminish the ardor of [the Republican party], and without discouraging them, to show them the only road to 
take.  I attempted to diminish the terrors of [the aristocrats], and to bend their will to the idea of an 
inevitable future in such a way that the one being less impetuous, and the others offering less resistance, 
society could advance more perfectly toward the necessary realization of its destiny.  Here is the master 
idea of the work” (Quoted in Zetterbaum 1967, 21, Zetterbaum’s emphasis).  Of course, that the realization 
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Tocqueville’s presentation at this point also seems to indicate that equality is neither 
divine nor eternal.  It had a founding, and that founding consisted not in the divine 
revelation of Christianity but in the establishment of the Church as a human authority.  
Here as elsewhere, Tocqueville analyses religion “from a purely human point of view” 
(284, 419), and that point of view indicates that the power of the clergy was a force for 
civilization because it introduced a standard higher than brute force which began to 
erode, but in so doing refined and softened, the rule of Europe’s warrior-aristocracy. 
 While the Church was therefore in one sense a force for democracy, its 
establishment also signaled the peak of aristocracy—a peak which was not synonymous 
with its extreme, but which was achieved only after the establishment of a healthy tension 
within society between competing democratic and aristocratic elements.  The Church 
exercised a power over kings because kings became believers.  As social relations 
became “complicated and numerous” the idea of civil law was born and monarchs, 
clothed in “ermine” as well as “mail” (4), ceased to base their rule on brute force but 
instead claimed the authority of right.  Those who were designated as ‘nobles’ according 
to their social rank also claimed the right to hold that rank because they believed 
themselves to be noble in truth.  And the conception of nobility to which they appealed, 
as Tocqueville describes it, always involved an element of selflessness.  In the eulogy of 
aristocracy which he provides in the introduction, Tocqueville makes clear that that 
                                                                                                                                            
of “destiny” requires the bending of wills would seem to call into question whether—or to what degree—
that destiny is really “necessary” in the first place.  See also Ceaser 1991, 300-1.  For a more pious and 
therefore egalitarian view of Tocqueville’s thought, see Mitchell 1995, who tries to place Democracy in 
America within the tradition of Augustinian, Catholic Christianity.  As the next few paragraphs and this 
chapter as a whole should make clear, my analysis disagrees as much with this view as with Zetterbaum’s 
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regime, at its best, represented a certain ideal of human behavior—a code of mutual 
generosity and reciprocal devotion that “could have been established” between the 
various unequal classes (8).  Although this society surely contained numerous “miseries,” 
in the midst of those miseries human beings “enjoyed several kinds of happiness one can 
conceive and appreciate only with difficulty in our day” (8).  Our day, as Tocqueville will 
later make clear, is excessively self-interested and materialistic.  “The taste for well-being 
forms the salient and indelible feature of democratic ages” (422), and so those things 
which it is now difficult to appreciate would appear to be precisely those immaterial 
goods which are found only where there exists a conception of virtue that demands the 
overcoming of what is conducive to one’s happiness in the most ordinary sense of the 
term.  Because kings were so far above the people, they felt themselves “vested in the 
eyes of the crowd with an almost divine character,” but this led them to draw “from the 
very respect they generated the will not to abuse their power” (8).  Similarly, on the other 
side, the people too considered the rule of the nobility to be divine, and their obedience 
elevated rather than debased them precisely because they considered the sacrifices 
demanded of them to be legitimate (8). 
 As Tocqueville will later note, “the official doctrine” of aristocratic times in 
matters of morality held “that it is glorious to forget oneself and that it is fitting to do 
good without self-interest like God himself” (500).  Now of course, one can ask whether 
this moral outlook may not contain a certain tension, for if such an action is carried out 
for the sake of glory then it is arguably not so simply disinterested.  But Tocqueville’s 
                                                                                                                                            
contention that Tocqueville continued the legacy of Hobbes.  For the differences between Tocqueville’s 
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suggestion, both in the introduction and throughout the work, is that this potentially 
paradoxical sentiment produced something truly grand.  Among the aristocracy, it 
permitted the achievement of immaterial goods—“pursuits of luxury, refinements of 
taste, pleasures of the mind, and cultivation of the arts”—and even among the people the 
instinct for self-forgetting produced “generous sentiments, profound beliefs, and savage 
virtues” (8).  Constituted around such an ethic, “the social body could have stability, 
power, and above all, glory” (8).  This glory may well have been founded on a confused 
sentiment, but that does not make it mere vainglory according to Tocqueville.  On the 
contrary, the tension within it appears to be at the root of something truly lofty of which 
Christianity, by promising salvation in return for self-forgetting, provided perhaps the 
clearest manifestation (504-5).  By inculcating this ethic, it seems, the rise of the Church 
produced these refined sentiments and decisively undermined the warrior-barons’ 
monopoly on power.  Because the latter’s claim to rule by divine right was a claim of 
nobility, it also entailed the willingness to make a very real sacrifice—and this sacrifice 
would eventually be exacted when the aristocracy chose to display its virtue by not acting 
in its own interest, which in turn led it to loosen its grip on the social body.  
 Unlike Spinoza, who tends to regard politicized religion under aristocracy at best 
as a means of population control and at worst as a form of insanity, Tocqueville’s 
assessment of it appears to be somewhat more complicated.  As he presents it, the 
flowering of medieval Christianity simultaneously constituted both the peak of 
aristocracy and the beginning of its eventual decline.  This is because the immaterial 
                                                                                                                                            
theology and that of St. Augustine, see Kessler 1994, 53-4. 
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goods whose achievement it made possible broadened human horizons and instilled a 
concept of the universal.  “Poetry, eloquence, memory, the graces of the mind, the fires of 
the imagination, depth of thought, all the gifts that Heaven distributed haphazardly, 
profited democracy, and even if they were found in the possession of its adversaries, they 
still served its cause by putting into relief the natural greatness of man” (5).  Since the 
official moral doctrine of aristocratic times was a universalistic ideal, it also revealed 
aristocratic conventions for what they were.  It permitted one to measure conventional 
greatness according to a newly discovered standard of natural greatness.  In so doing, it 
made clear that those who were noble in rank were not necessarily noble in soul, that 
human greatness is neither due to birth nor inherited like land, and that, because it is rare 
and haphazard, its distribution is in a sense democratic.  Aristocratic morality thus 
consequently and naturally led to calls (like that issued by Spinoza) for the destruction of 
the conventional aristocracy in the name of the natural aristocracy, and it was hoped that 
political democracy would allow the latter to come to the fore.143  Democracy’s conquests 
“therefore spread with those of civilization and enlightenment, and literature was an 
arsenal open to all, from which the weak and the poor came each day to seek arms” (5). 
 This mention of enlightenment therefore appears to be a quiet allusion to the 
Enlightenment.  Tocqueville’s claim that science became “a seed of power put within the 
                                                
143 One example of such a call is found in Thomas Jefferson’s letter to John Adams of October 28, 1813.  
Jefferson claims that “there is a natural aristocracy among men” whose grounds are “virtue and talents.”  
Like Tocqueville, he credits the progress of technology—and especially the invention of gunpowder—with 
toppling the rule of those who are endowed only with “bodily strength,” and he confidently predicts that the 
best way to bring about the rule of the natural aristocracy “is exactly that provided by all our constitutions, 
to leave the citizens the free election and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from 
the chaff.  In general they will elect the real good and wise.  In some instances, wealth may corrupt, and 
birth blind them; but not in sufficient degree to endanger the society” (Jefferson 1984, 1305-6). 
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reach of the people” recalls the goal of that project to use knowledge to aid the weak and 
the poor and to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate.144  The development of 
technology (such as firearms and the printing press), together with the advent of 
commerce and “transferable wealth” (5) served to equalize conditions both materially and 
intellectually.  The rise of the middle class was therefore coeval with the development of 
Protestantism, which democratized human greatness by teaching that all “are equally in a 
state to find the path to Heaven” (6).  But although Protestantism gave all the right to read 
the Bible for themselves, in so doing, as Tocqueville will later make clear, it also paved 
the way for a more general extension of moral and intellectual authority to the individual, 
which led in turn to a more thoroughgoing skepticism among the likes of Descartes and 
Voltaire (404-5).  And it is precisely here, according to Tocqueville, that can be glimpsed 
a new set of dangers unforeseen by the more hopeful originators of the Enlightenment 
project.  Tocqueville’s sole mention of the “natural aristocracy” in Democracy in 
America concerns the danger which equality poses to it.  On the American frontier, where 
“one can observe democracy reaching its furthest limit,” human beings are so isolated 
that they “hardly know one another,” and they escape “not only the influence of great 
names and great wealth, but of that natural aristocracy that flows from enlightenment and 
virtue” (50).  When democracy is left to itself, it produces what Pierre Manent has aptly 
termed a “dis-society” (1996, 12, 142)—a state in which individuals are isolated from 
one another not only physically, but also intellectually and spiritually.  Rather than 
permitting the cultivation of the most outstanding human beings, such a condition will in 
                                                
144 This suggestion is made by Hancock (1991, 375-6).  The phrase “the relief of man’s estate,” of course, 
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fact smother them, so to speak, in the cradle, because it will extinguish the sense of 
nobility and of duty to others which is at the root of all human greatness. 
 Under aristocracy, Tocqueville writes, there was much misery, “but souls were 
not degraded” (8).  Democracy, by contrast, if it is not somehow mitigated, seems 
destined to bring about this result.  The grave threat which it poses to “the natural 
greatness of man” is what produces “a sort of religious terror” in Tocqueville’s own soul 
(6).  As a partisan of human greatness, he fears for the future of the soul itself.  His “new 
political science” (7) will therefore seek to preserve the soul, to the extent that that is 
possible in the era of democracy,145 and to do this it will need to combat the most extreme 
tendencies of the Enlightenment while also recognizing that the latter has shaped the 
world in a way that cannot be simply reversed.  In order to persuade the “most powerful, 
most intelligent, and most moral classes” to take hold of democracy “so as to direct it” 
(7), he will need to convince reactionaries that it cannot be overthrown and progressives 
that it is not something to be blindly embraced.  He thus famously claims that the 
inevitable development of equality is “a providential fact” (6), but to prove this claim he 
articulates a mixture of Biblical and Enlightenment theology.  For those orthodox 
Christians who remain loyal to the Old Regime, Tocqueville links democracy with the 
Church and refers to it as a phenomenon that is occurring “among Christians” (6).  
Invoking his own experience of “religious terror,” he momentarily speaks the language of 
Old Testament piety, and he claims that the coming of equality has “the sacred character 
                                                                                                                                            
comes from Francis Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning. 
145 For the distinctiveness of Tocqueville’s concern with the soul, see Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, xviii, 
and 2006, 84 and context. 
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of the sovereign master’s will” (7)—a will which will eventually vindicate “his justice” 
even if we cannot understand how or why this could be the case (12).146  But 
Tocqueville’s argument for democracy’s providential character makes no claim to 
prophetic insight.  Here again he measures the divine from a human perspective, and he 
extends the natural theology which the Enlightenment made popular to a teaching about 
history.  “It is not necessary that God himself speak in order for us to discover sure signs 
of his will; it suffices to examine the usual course of nature and the continuous tendency 
of events; I know without the Creator’s raising his voice that the stars follow the arcs in 
space that his finger has traced” (7). 
 To speak to one audience which is sympathetic to the Enlightenment and another 
which is hostile to it, Tocqueville claims that democracy is inevitable, but also that it can 
be restrained, at least to a certain extent.  He suggests that it is sanctioned by Nature’s 
God, but also that that God, like the Biblical God, permits and even demands human 
action for the sake of righteousness (understood as the need to preserve man’s aristocratic 
dignity).  The Creator has surely not “made man so as to leave him to debate endlessly in 
the midst of the intellectual miseries that surround us.”  “God prepares a firmer and 
calmer future for European societies” (12), but that future (and thus also “his justice”) 
depends on the inhabitants of those societies: “their fate is in their hands, but soon it will 
escape them” (7).  Democracy is like a raging river; it cannot be stopped or reversed, but 
it could perhaps be directed—to the extent that nature will allow—through human artifice 
                                                
146 Zetterbaum notes that Tocqueville never refers to the wisdom or goodness of providence in the 
introduction.  Yet, preserving Tocqueville’s own ambiguity, Zetterbaum also attributes to him a more or 
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(7).  Tocqueville will later assert that men living under democracies tend to think in terms 
of grand, impersonal causes and to deny the importance of human agency.  Democratic 
historians emphasize the role of large-scale societal developments—they subject human 
beings “either to an inflexible providence or to a sort of blind fatality” (471)—and the 
French in particular are obsessed with general ideas which deny the importance of the 
individual.147  Tocqueville’s providential thesis therefore seems to be crafted largely with 
such readers in mind: it attempts to convince them that democracy can be altered by first 
conceding to them that it cannot be stopped.  But Tocqueville will also later point out that 
the democratic understanding of history contains a great deal of truth—at least when one 
is speaking about democratic times.  Modern historians tend to emphasize social causes 
over individual influences because such influences really are weaker today than they 
were in the past (470).  Thus, Tocqueville’s understanding of the “great democratic 
revolution” would seem to be that it is not truly a product of history.  It had a human 
“founding” (which Tocqueville credited to the Church, but which might just as plausibly 
be attributed to the Enlightenment and to the way that was prepared for it by the 
Reformation), and while it could possibly have been undone at that moment, it is now too 
firmly established for we who are born into it today to roll it back.  But it is not so fully 
                                                                                                                                            
less unqualified acceptance of democracy’s justice, as distinct from its goodness (see Zetterbaum 1967, 7,  
in the context of his first chapter as a whole).   
147 “Each morning on awakening I learn that someone has just discovered some general and eternal law 
that I had never heard spoken of until then.  There is no writer so mediocre that it is enough for him to 
discover truths applicable to a great realm in his first attempt, and who does not remain discontented with 
himself if he has been unable to enclose the human race in the subject of his discourse” (412).  Cf. also 
Tocqueville’s comments at the close of the work, denouncing the tendency of his contemporaries to subject 
human beings to “previous events, the race, the soil, or the climate” (676). 
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mature that it cannot be directed by human means.148  The democratic historian’s 
understanding of the world is not entirely true, but it may yet become so, and when that 
happens human greatness will be eradicated—if not forever, then at least for the next 
epoch.149 
 
THE “NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE”  
 Whereas democracy threatens human greatness, the chief advantage of 
aristocracy, at least according to Tocqueville’s initial description of it, was that it tended 
to foster a kind of human being who personified an ideal of virtue.  By commanding self-
overcoming and a contempt for material pleasures, aristocracy’s public endorsement of 
this ideal ennobled souls because it sanctioned voluntary obedience.  “It is not the use of 
power or the habit of obedience that depraves men,” Tocqueville writes, “but the use of 
power that they consider illegitimate, and obedience to a power they regard as usurped 
and oppressive” (8).  But by eradicating all legitimate hierarchies—and here one is 
reminded of Spinoza’s teaching that a truly free person will never obey—democracy 
destroys any notion that actions which are not in one’s immediate self-interest can be 
voluntary and thus also just.  According to the modern notion of liberty, “obedience has 
lost its moral character and there is no longer anything that separates the manly and proud 
                                                
148 Lively (1962, 33-41) faults Tocqueville for not undertaking a metaphysical examination of the 
philosophical question of free will.  But Tocqueville’s intention appears to be to analyze the world as it is 
given to us, and the conclusions about personal agency with which he opens and closes his work—that 
human choice exists, but only in limited ways—appear to reflect this.   
149 On the potential for democratic intellectual trends to produce their own ‘effectual truth,’ see Lawler 
1991, 101 and context. 
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virtues of the citizen from the lowly self-indulgence of the slave” (quoted in Manent 
1996, 19).150  Consequently, since the advent of democracy the “prestige of royal power 
has vanished without being replaced by the majesty of the laws; in our day the people 
scorn authority, but they fear it, and fear extracts more from them than was formerly 
given out of respect and love” (9).  With no conception of willful self-overcoming, the 
only possible authority becomes that of fear and force.  Thus, albeit with several notable 
modifications, democracy threatens to bring about a return to the kind of government that 
existed under the feudal barons.  Indeed, just as the latter came to an end with the 
strengthening of Christianity as a political force, Tocqueville will suggest throughout the 
book that the maintenance of freedom under democracy requires the preservation of 
religion—which he famously calls the first of America’s political institutions (280). 
 As he will indicate more clearly later on, Tocqueville at times presents the idea of 
freedom and of rights as aristocratic rather than democratic.  Freedom, he suggests, is the 
capacity for moral excellence or virtue that is exhibited in one’s capacity for self-
overcoming.  “The idea of rights is nothing other than the idea of virtue introduced into 
                                                
150 This quotation comes from an article Tocqueville wrote in the London and Westminster Review in 1836.  
Because it occurs as a part of his definition of the modern, negative idea of liberty—which he also calls the 
only “correct” or “just” (“juste”) idea of liberty—most Tocqueville scholars attribute to him a simple 
approval of the idea that such obedience is immoral.  As Tocqueville makes clear in the introduction, 
however, and as Manent points out, it is not simply enough to leave things at this, because “the democratic 
idea, as correct as it is, tends to produce a precarious and menacing situation . . . A correct idea of liberty 
tends to bring about bad consequences; a false [positive and aristocratic] idea of liberty tends to bring about 
good consequences.  Such is the paradox that Tocqueville presents us” (Manent 1996, 19; see also Lively 
1962, 221-2 with Kessler 1994, 34 and Zetterbaum 1967, 28).  As will be made clear at greater length 
below, Tocqueville always presents the idea of liberty under democracy as a problem—the paradox which 
Manent draws our attention to poses the key dilemma to which his theoretical enterprise attempts to 
respond.  But as a political scientist who inhabits a position above the partisan fray (15), it is not altogether 
clear whether Tocqueville ever does—or even if he can—provide a fully satisfactory solution to it.  By 
calling attention to Tocqueville’s extended meditation on this problem, this interpretation will attempt to 
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the political world.”  It is what allows man to “show himself independent without 
arrogance and submissive without baseness” (227).  Thus, although the theorists of the 
Enlightenment sought to inculcate a democratic and egalitarian notion of rights, 
Tocqueville jarringly declares that that teaching did not and indeed could not take hold: 
today, he writes, “the idea of rights does not exist” (10).151  To recover it, it appears, it 
will be necessary to re-introduce some aristocratic elements within the heart of 
democratic society—which can be done either by reproducing them artificially or by 
strengthening such residues of aristocracy as may continue to exist. 
I conceive a society, then, which all, regarding the law as their work, would love 
and submit to without trouble; in which the authority of government is respected 
as necessary, not divine, and the love one would bear for a head of state would not 
be a passion, but a reasoned and tranquil sentiment.  Each having rights and being 
assured of preserving his rights, a manly confidence and a sort of reciprocal 
condescension between the classes would be established, as far from haughtiness 
as from baseness (9). 
 
Tocqueville’s political science begins from a recognition that considerations of reason 
and necessity—which is to say, of self-interest—have irreversibly supplanted the 
aristocratic desire “to do good without self-interest like God himself” (500).  But by 
working within these horizons which have been shaped by modern rationalism, 
Tocqueville’s political science will seek to preserve something like the old notion of 
aristocratic freedom—but that will also require maintaining a certain amount of 
inequality.  If “a sort of reciprocal condescension” is established between the rich and the 
                                                                                                                                            
refute Zetterbaum’s claim that he “refused to acknowledge” the “permanence and intransigence” of “the 
dichotomy between democracy and human excellence” (1967, 84). 
151 That Tocqueville’s notion of rights is aristocratic rather than democratic is most persuasively argued by 
Winthrop (1991, 423-4; 1993, 208, 214-5).  For the alternative, more libertarian Tocqueville, see Kessler 
1994, 34, 47-9, 203 n.1.  Koritansky claims that Tocqueville, like Rousseau, found the model for freedom 
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poor in democracy, Tocqueville suggests, the new societies will contain neither the great 
pride nor the utter servility of former ages, but they will permit both classes to retain a 
moderate amount of dignity. 
 In a society constituted in this way, there will be “less brilliance than within an 
aristocracy” but also “less misery; enjoyments will be less extreme and well-being more 
general; sciences less great and ignorance rarer; sentiments less energetic and habits 
milder; one will note more vices and fewer crimes” (9).  Tocqueville does not try to 
deceive his fellow aristocrats about what they will need to leave behind.  He states quite 
clearly that they must come to recognize the need to abandon “forever the social 
advantages that aristocracy can furnish” (9, emphasis added).  Democracy does offer very 
real goods (9), but it is necessary to face up to the fact that accepting them entails 
drastically lowering one’s sights and one’s expectations from political life.152  However, 
this aristocratic sense of loss—which Tocqueville himself seems to display here—is to 
some extent eclipsed by the pressing political need which this book seeks to address.  
Since equality is too strong to overturn, all true partisans of human greatness must 
recognize that the only avenue open to them is to moderate and guide democracy from 
within.    
To instruct democracy, if possible to reanimate its beliefs, to purify its 
mores, to regulate its movements, to substitute little by little the science of affairs 
for its inexperience, and knowledge of its true interests for its blind instincts; to 
adapt its government to time and place; to modify it according to circumstances 
and men: such is the first duty imposed on those who direct society in our day. 
                                                                                                                                            
“in the pre-civilized condition of man” (1986, 26), but he also stresses the need to give it an active, political 
direction through the General Will. 
152 Consider especially in this regard Tocqueville’s comments at the end of I.2.6 (234-5) in the light of that 
chapter’s more positive title. 
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A new political science is needed for a world altogether new (7). 
 
By accepting democracy not only as “an accomplished fact” (13) but also as something 
fundamentally just, Tocqueville and his new political scientists will be able to influence 
democracy (if only to a certain extent) because they will speak, and hopefully be 
accepted, as its friends.  As Tocqueville writes at the opening of Volume II, “Men do not 
receive the truth from their enemies, and their friends scarcely offer it to them; that is 
why I have spoken it” (400).  In democracy, as he makes abundantly clear throughout the 
work, the sole governing power is the majority, and its power is omnipotent.  But 
Tocqueville nowhere says that the majority cannot be instructed and directed—if that was 
the case, then his task would be futile (cf. 672).  Indeed, it would appear to be the case 
that by accepting democracy, and, perhaps more importantly, by taking its moral claims 
seriously, Tocqueville’s political science will be able to exercise a moderate and 
moderating influence on public opinion from behind the scenes.153  
 Speaking to the new society on its own terms, the new political science will need 
to discover democratic solutions to democratic problems (cf. Zetterbaum 1967, 101).  
Most famously, Tocqueville recommends the formation of associations which can 
“replace the individual power of nobles” and serve as an intermediate body between the 
government and the people (9).  More fundamentally, however, his task requires finding a 
way to persuade citizens to continue to make “great sacrifices” even when the standard to 
which they look has become “enlightenment and experience” rather than “enthusiasm and 
ardent [religious] beliefs” (9).  As previously indicated, Tocqueville appears to suggest 
                                                
153 For Tocqueville’s “indirect strategy,” see Ceaser 1990 26-40, 156-8; 1991, 306ff. 
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that the moral devotion to liberalism which Enlightenment thinkers like Spinoza tried to 
instill simply did not take hold.  Rather, according to Tocqueville, it seems that the 
serious, amoral core of Spinozism and of similar philosophies filtered down to the 
general population, which began to think in terms of power and interest rather than rights.  
To rehabilitate a sense of duty and moral obligation, and thus also to resuscitate the spirit 
of political virtue, Tocqueville’s political science will attempt to instill the paradoxical 
belief that self-sacrifice can be grounded on self-interest.  It will propagate the doctrine of 
‘self-interest well understood,’ which holds “that to profit from society’s benefits, one 
must submit to its burdens” (9) even should those burdens entail acts of self-forgetting 
whose payoff is not immediately clear. 
 As one might be tempted to suspect, such a feat will require re-animating society 
with religion, all the while paying careful attention to the kinds of beliefs that a deeply 
skeptical democratic public will and will not accept.  Tocqueville’s political science 
therefore has some common ground with the Enlightenment’s political science insofar as 
it has a practical, philanthropic aim.  But the solutions which Tocqueville proposes—
starting with a recommendation to strengthen religious belief—not only cut against the 
grain of the early modern project, they are also rooted in a series of theoretical 
observations which are not shaped by either loyalty or hostility to that project.  
Tocqueville claims simply to accept democracy or modernity as an “accomplished fact” 
and not to judge whether it has been “advantageous or fatal to humanity” (13).  He thus 
appears to study the political results of the Enlightenment in a way that is alien to the 
spirit of the Enlightenment.  He begins from political life as it is, that is, as it presents 
 311 
itself in actual society rather than as it can be conceived theoretically in an abstract state 
of nature.  Thus, he derives his insights from the observations of a real place, America, 
and what he seeks to discover there is not the nature of man per se but the nature of 
democracy—that is, what its “natural consequences” are and what effects it has 
“naturally given to the laws,” to government, and to society as a whole (13).154  And yet, 
Tocqueville is also very far from the view that human beings are entirely the products of 
social convention.  On the contrary, he indicates that by observing life within the 
‘natural’ confines of convention, and by taking the opinions that animate political life 
seriously, the potential Tocquevillian political scientist will be able to follow him in 
seeing “not differently, but further than the parties” (15).155 
 As he describes it, this dialectical ascent allows Tocqueville to fulfill a theoretical 
and a practical goal.  Theoretically, it allows him to satisfy a legitimate curiosity;156 
practically, it allows him to find lessons in America “from which we”—that is, we 
Europeans—“could profit” (12).  For reasons that are perhaps not entirely made clear in 
the introduction, Tocqueville’s task as a political philosopher entails a certain social 
                                                
154 This lesson about Tocqueville’s method seems to be conveyed by the title of Manent’s study (Manent 
1996). 
155 In this respect, Tocqueville appears to be close to the classical position regarding the political nature of 
man and the capacity of the scientist to undergo a dialectical ascent through the study of the latter.  See 
Eden 1992. 
156 Tocqueville’s statement that “it is not only to satisfy a curiosity, otherwise legitimate, that I have 
examined America” could suggest that this intellectual satisfaction was actually his primary purpose.  If it 
is not sufficient to refute Koritansky’s claim that “From the perspective of classical philosophy, what is 
absent from Tocqueville is the idea of contemplation as the activity for the sake of which all other human 
activities can be directed” (1986, 11), it at least raises the preliminary possibility that Tocqueville regarded 
theoretical activity as something that could be pursued as an end in itself.  Agreeing in this respect with 
Koritansky, Lawler marshals evidence from Tocqueville’s letters and from his Recollections which seems 
to indicate that he could not find philosophy humanly satisfying, and that he turned to political life for this 
reason (1993, 107ff.).  At the end of this chapter I will attempt to argue that, even if Tocqueville did display 
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responsibility.  He seeks in the United States “an image of democracy itself”—that is, an 
idea of its very nature and of the effects it produces when it is “abandoned almost without 
restraint to its instincts”—but he also will elucidate the precautions which the Americans 
have and have not “made use of to direct it” (13).  America will therefore enjoy a dual-
role in Tocqueville’s book.  It will sometimes appear as democracy incarnate, the 
exaggerated image of an egalitarian society.  At other times, however, it will serve as an 
example of a polity which has more or less successfully restrained democracy by relying 
on various aristocratic counterweights.  As we will soon see, foremost among these is the 
apparently successful American use of religion, which Tocqueville calls the “most 
precious inheritance from aristocratic centuries” (519).157  
 As “an image of democracy itself,” America allows Tocqueville to observe the 
effects of the triumph of the Enlightenment on the human soul.  As the rest of this chapter 
will attempt to make clear, the phenomenon which he terms “individualism” appears to 
be the unintended result of the Enlightenment’s successful attempt to create a political 
order marked by religious doubt and self-interested calculation.  The social contract 
theorists taught that, in their natural and most clear-sighted state, human beings are 
guided neither by a concern for divine law nor for duties to others, and Spinoza in 
particular sought to reproduce such a state within society.  When viewed as a 
representative of democracy’s unrestrained instincts, Tocqueville’s America reveals such 
                                                                                                                                            
a marked political ambition, there is some evidence in Democracy in America to attribute to him a more 
classical conception of intellectual virtue. 
157 For a list of the “considerable” residual aristocratic elements which Tocqueville finds in American 
society, beginning with religion but extending to ideas of rights and various English constitutional 
inheritances, see Mansfield and Winthrop 2006, 100-1.  See also Boesche 1987 and Ceaser 1990, 36. 
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a project’s dangerous potential for success.  As previously mentioned, it presents the 
spectacle of a rational citizenry that calculates on each occasion the costs and benefits of 
cooperating with society, and it thus paradoxically produces something like the state of 
nature within society (Manent 1996, 26-8).  From his observations of America, however, 
Tocqueville comes to the conclusion that such a society tends to distort rather than most 
fully express human nature.  He finds the Americans to be far from content, and he 
attributes the restiveness and the anxieties which they display in the midst of their 
abundance to a deep if unrecognized dissatisfaction with this skeptical and calculating 
ethos.  As he hints in the introduction, the decline of religion has accompanied a decline 
of communal attachments, and both of these in turn have led to a weakening of those 
deep passions for self-overcoming which once gave aristocratic society so much vitality.  
Contemporary European society, he writes, is tranquil only because it believes itself to be 
weak, infirm, and near death: “like the passions of old men that end only in impotence, 
desires, regrets, sorrows, and joys produce nothing visible or lasting” (10). 
 Indeed, Tocqueville reserves his harshest words in the introduction for what 
would appear to be the radical vanguard of the Enlightenment: those “who, in the name 
of progress, striving to make man into matter, want to find the useful without occupying 
themselves with the just, to find science far from beliefs, and well-being separated from 
virtue” (11).158  These appear to be the apostles of atheistic modernity, the intellectual 
foot-soldiers of the Enlightenment which Spinoza sought to create.  They consider justice 
to be subservient to utility, philosophy to be entirely separate from theology, and man to 
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be simply a particle of nature.  But while Spinoza predicted that the spread of this kind of 
religious skepticism would benefit intellectual life, Tocqueville, writing a century and a 
half later, records that this only had the effect of rendering “virtue . . . without genius and 
genius without honor” (12).  Considering civic virtue to be irrational, philosophy turned 
its back on society, and society, it would appear, returned the favor by ceasing to hold 
intellectual life in high esteem.  Spinoza’s high-aiming liberalism backfired; it created a 
crassly materialistic and therefore anti-intellectual society.  When the atheistic-
materialism of the radical Enlightenment took hold among the highest levels of the 
vulgar, it became very degraded.  The idea of the summum bonum did not survive its 
severance from the divine.  Rather, the idea of historical progress which Spinoza first 
elaborated transformed itself from a means into an end, and the faith which was once 
placed in God took history for its object instead.  As Tocqueville writes in his chapter on 
poetry, as equality not only eradicates aristocratic institutions but even begins to 
assimilate nations, “faith in positive religions” falters and men are instead “disposed to 
conceive a much vaster idea of divinity. . . . Perceiving the human race as a single whole, 
they easily conceive that one same design presides over its destiny, and they are brought 
to recognize in the actions of each individual the tracing of a general and constant plan 
according to which God guides the species” (461-2).  The materialists whom Tocqueville 
singles out in the introduction claim to be the vanguard of this divine historical plan; they 
call themselves “the champions of modern civilization, and they insolently put 
themselves at its head” (11), but in so doing they threaten to prepare a future in which 
                                                                                                                                            
158 As Mansfield and Winthrop note (2006, 82-3, 103 n.6), Tocqueville subdivides his two major audiences 
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man has become matter and in which the requirements of human dignity can thus no 
longer dictate what is “forbidden or permitted, or honest or shameful, or true or false” 
(12).  The most alarming danger which threatens Europe, then, is a kind of moral nihilism 
which would appear to be directly attributable to the most radical strain of Enlightenment 
thought.  In a world in which that strain has finally become triumphant, Tocqueville 
fears, there may come into being a new and unprecedented kind of tyranny whose 
boundaries cannot be foreseen—a tyranny which will justify itself by the “impious 
maxim” that “everything is permitted in the interest of society” (280).159 
 Tocqueville, however, insists that America is noteworthy because the strength of 
religion which reigns there has been able to prevent anyone from espousing such a 
maxim.  When the United States is viewed not as the extreme of unmitigated democracy 
but as the home of a series of successfully implemented aristocratic counterweights, its 
peaceful and religious democracy can stand as an instructive example for the emulation 
of a disordered and potentially tyrannical Europe.  In Europe Christians who oppose 
democracy face off against democrats who are hostile all religious beliefs (10-12), but 
Tocqueville insists that this situation is so unnatural as to violate “all the laws of moral 
analogy.”  If it was more aware of itself, he suggests, Christianity would recognize its 
                                                                                                                                            
into six smaller groups (10-11).  Of those six, this is the only group about which he has nothing kind to say.  
159 This appears to be one of the few places where Tocqueville seems to predict that the despotisms of the 
democratic age might not be of the “soft” variety.  One prominent criticism of his work, to which we will 
return below, blames him for failing to foresee the kind of tyrannies that in fact did come into existence in 
the century after the one in which he wrote (see, for example, Anastaplo 1991, 457 and Banfield 1991, 51-
2).  Interestingly, while Banfield faults Tocqueville for his invocations of patriotism and civic devotion, 
Anastaplo blames him—and the modern project of which he takes him to be “too much” (p. 456) a part—
for neglecting such considerations entirely.  Whereas the one claims that his admiration for patriotism over 
moneymaking paved the way for “the Nazi regime” (Banfield 1991, 51-2), the other faults him for being 
too narrowly commercial and thus for inadvertently bringing about a barbaric reawakening of the call to 
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compatibility with democracy—as found above all in its teaching of human equality and 
of freedom as “the source of all moral greatness.”  Similarly, if democracy were more 
enlightened about its interests, it would recognize that “the reign of freedom cannot be 
established without that of mores, nor mores founded without beliefs” (11).  But 
Tocqueville also implicitly suggests that he is the only European who believes democracy 
and religion to be compatible.  Thus, were it not for the example of America, we might be 
tempted to suspect that Christianity cannot coexist with democracy or with liberalism—at 
least not in its orthodox form.  But Tocqueville, as we will shortly see, insists not only 
that America has retained a genuinely Christian civil religion, but indeed, that it remains 
fundamentally Puritan, even in the 1830s (27-8, 267, 275).  And Puritanism, as he will 
argue in the second chapter of Volume I, “was not only a religious doctrine; it also 
blended at several points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories” 
(32).  Tocqueville therefore looks to the example of America because it allegedly 
demonstrates that even the most zealous and austere religiosity is in fact friendly to 
freedom and equality, or that Christianity and modern politics can coexist while 
remaining uncorrupted—though perhaps not uninfluenced—by one another. 
 
AMERICA’S PURITAN FOUNDING 
 At the end of the first chapter of Volume I, as Tocqueville completes his 
description of the geography of North America and of the character of its native 
                                                                                                                                            
“make great sacrifices for the fatherland” (Anastaplo 1991, 457).  For a more nuanced view which shows 
Tocqueville to be sensitive to the danger of both soft and hard despotism, see Ceaser 1990. 
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inhabitants, he concludes that although the Indians “occupied” the soil of the continent, 
“they did not possess it.  It is by agriculture that man appropriates the soil,” he writes, and 
since the Indians lived by hunting, they inhabited North America “only in the 
meantime”—they were destined to be swept aside on the day that “civilized men” came 
to settle there (26-7, emphasis original).  According to Tocqueville’s initial presentation, 
then, America “still formed only a wilderness” (26) on the day when Europeans 
discovered it.  It appears to be an actual, historical example of what Locke called the state 
of nature, a “still-empty cradle of a great nation” containing the raw materials “for 
commerce and industry,” just waiting for its latent wealth to be extracted by the efforts of 
human beings (27, cf. Locke Second Treatise, ch. 5).  The United States, it would appear, 
is the Lockean nation, formed out of a pre-political state, governed (as Tocqueville writes 
in the headings for the next chapter) by a “Social contract” (27), and thus rooting itself 
on the maxims of a new, rationalistic political science, destined to conquer the vast 
American wilderness in an effort to usher in a new era of prosperity and material well-
being.  It was on that empty continent, Tocqueville writes, “that civilized men were to try 
to build a society on new foundations, and applying for the first time theories until then 
unknown or reputed inapplicable, they were going to give the world a spectacle for which 
the history of the past had not prepared it” (27). 
 The initial presentation which Tocqueville gives, then, is that American politics 
constitutes a great experiment; its foundations make clear the first ever attempt to put the 
insights of modern political thought into practice.  He appears to allude to the new 
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political science spoken of in The Federalist160 and to the revolutionary, distinctly 
modern principles of natural right and natural law which are expressed most powerfully 
in the Declaration of Independence.  But this makes it all the more striking that, although 
Tocqueville was quite familiar with the Declaration and with the importance Americans 
gave to it, in this seminal—and extremely lengthy—work on the foundational ideas of 
politics in the United States, he fails to mention it a single time.161  Instead, as he opens 
the second chapter of Volume I, Tocqueville appears to contradict himself completely 
and to provide a wholly contrary description of the character of American civilization.  
He now says that America did not have a founding but a “point of departure,” thus 
insinuating that the origins of its politics were not wholly original but were instead rooted 
in inherited European conventions (Mansfield and Winthrop 2006, 98).  Most 
importantly, however, he argues in this chapter that the true originators of democracy in 
the United States were not modern rationalists but Puritans, religious fanatics and ardent 
theocrats who came to America not to establish a society based on “new foundations” 
but, quite the contrary, to re-institute the ancient Hebrew republic which Spinoza goes 
out of his way to attack in chapters 17 and 18 of the Treatise.  Tocqueville therefore 
actually suggests that America’s true theoretical founder is not Locke but Moses,162 that 
its political order is rooted not in reason but in revelation, and that the character of its 
inhabitants is shaped not by radical innovation but by an adherence to an ancestral divine 
                                                
160 See, for example, #9 (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961, 67).   
161 Tocqueville’s neglect of the Declaration is the central target of West’s criticism of him (see West 1991).  
For a critique of this view, see Kessler (1994, 39-40, 167-8), who helpfully points to Tocqueville’s 
unpublished comments about the Declaration (ibid. 207 n.1) which can be found in Pierson 1938, 181-2. 
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law.  Or rather, Tocqueville suggests that America somehow combines each of these 
contrary elements, and that it therefore presents the spectacle of a “great social enigma” 
(37).  This enigma is the genuine reconciliation of the “spirit of religion and the spirit of 
freedom” (43, emphasis original), a reconciliation which does not compel either to 
sacrifice its fundamental character and which therefore somehow successfully combines 
ancient and modern understandings of political life. 
 According to Tocqueville, the point of departure which he is about to describe is 
of such overriding importance for explaining the character of America in the 1830s that 
“Those who read this book will . . . find in the present chapter the seed of what is to 
follow and the key to almost the whole work” (29).  He thus appears to hint that the 
establishment of this uneasy combination between orthodox religiosity and modern, 
liberal freedom will constitute a key part of the practical task of his “new political 
science.”  Moreover, by revealing how this can be achieved, Tocqueville’s account in this 
chapter also promises to begin to make clear the theoretical relationship between religion 
and modern liberal-democracy.  Tocqueville suggested in the introduction that the “great 
democratic revolution” is both divine and distinctly Christian, and in a later chapter he 
will state that “it was necessary that Jesus Christ come to earth to make it understood that 
all members of the human species are naturally alike and equal” (413).163  At the opening 
                                                                                                                                            
162 Kessler suggests that this honor should be extended to Jesus as well, but it is noteworthy that while 
references to the Old Testament abound in this chapter, the New Testament is never mentioned (see Kessler 
1994, 166). 
163 While Tocqueville thus attributes a belief in human equality to Jesus, he does not explicitly attribute to 
him the belief that that there is an “equal right to freedom that each bears from birth,” (413, emphasis 
added) as Kessler claims (1994, 83, 102, 108, 137).  He states only that the ancient philosophers failed to 
teach this latter doctrine, not that Jesus actually did so.  As will be made clear later on, Tocqueville 
associates Christianity with support for democracy (in the sense of equality of conditions), but one of his 
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of the present chapter, however, he considers the relationship between religion and 
democracy to be an unsettled matter, and indeed, he looks to the Puritan settlement of 
America because it provides the unprecedented example of a (religious) founding which 
is not enveloped in ignorance and “surrounded . . . with fables behind which the truth lies 
hidden” (28).  Since Europe and America share “the same democracy” (3), and since 
peoples “always feel [the effects of] their origins,” an examination of its point of 
departure will explain “the destiny of certain peoples that an unknown force seems to 
carry along toward a goal of which they themselves are ignorant” (28).   
 There can be no doubt, of course, that those peoples are the “Christian peoples” 
(7) of Europe who are being carried along toward an ever-increasing equality of 
conditions.  If Providence or Jesus Christ really was the initiator of that movement, then 
the opportunity which we moderns have to study America’s origins will reveal “in broad 
daylight what the ignorance or barbarism of the first ages hid from our regard” (28).  Just 
as Providence in the introduction was presented both as an impersonal force and as a 
demand for human intervention, so too it here also sanctions a similar kind of freedom in 
the realm of intellectual activity: it permits us to examine the point of departure, and thus 
“to discern in the destiny of nations first causes that the obscurity of the past” concealed 
from our fathers (28-9, emphasis added).  It will teach us whether democracy and 
Christianity are fundamentally interlinked (as Tocqueville often stresses throughout this 
                                                                                                                                            
most prominent themes is that such a democracy can exist in slavery as well as in freedom.  Tocqueville 
does say that Christianity abolished slavery (326), but since it also made its peace with the virtual slavery 
that was medieval serfdom, one can question the degree to which Tocqueville intends for this to be read as 
his serious view of history.  His introduction, after all, makes clear that the full consequences of 
Christianity’s alleged destruction of servitude were not felt until after the Enlightenment. 
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work), or conversely, whether religion’s continued presence in America is simply a 
residue of the past, one of those “incoherent opinions that are encountered here and there 
in society like those fragments of broken chains that one sometimes still sees dangling 
from the vaults of an old building, no longer supporting anything” (28).164 
 According to Tocqueville, the emigrants who came to settle on the shores of what 
would become the United States shared a set of common traits which eventually 
benefitted the mature political life of that nation.  “Born in a country that the struggle of 
parties had agitated for centuries, and where factions had been obliged in their turn to 
place themselves under the protection of the laws, their political education had taken 
place in that rough school, and one saw more notions of rights, more principles of true 
freedom spread among them than in most of the peoples of Europe” (29).  Their political 
experiences, and the lessons which they drew from them, seem to have corresponded 
with the teachings of the original social contract theorists.  Living in an atmosphere of 
political agitation and insecurity, they recognized that the only way to escape such a 
condition was to adhere to a new principle of liberty according to which each is bound to 
respect the rights of others in those areas of their exclusive concern.  This was the origin 
                                                
164 Mitchell places great weight upon this last statement, which he reads as indicating Tocqueville’s view 
that behind our more secular democracy today there can be found a deeper and more fundamental religious 
core (1995, 213).  But from its context, it is not so clear that this statement should be taken in this sense.  
Tocqueville’s simile would seem more accurately to refer to those anachronistic religious practices—such 
as Sunday closing laws—which often continue to exist in formerly religious societies and which frequently 
remain only because, like these chains dangling from old buildings, no one has yet gotten around to taking 
them down.  Indeed, Tocqueville calls the reader’s attention to a whole host of such antiquated and now 
unenforced laws and practices in endnote E (680-3).  In this note, Tocqueville draws the reader’s attention 
to the unenforced sumptuary laws that remained on the books in the 1830s, but he also notes the way in 
which the Sabbath is rigorously observed in America.  By considering these things together, he seems to 
suggest that the latter is on its way to becoming as obsolete as the former.  As will be argued more at length 
below, Tocqueville would not have been surprised by the secularization of American public life which 
occurred in the twentieth century. 
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of “the dogma of the sovereignty of the people,” which Tocqueville often equates with 
the notion that there is a right to individual freedom that exists within what would today 
be referred to as a private sphere (29, cf. 381).  But Tocqueville also indicates that these 
settlers were not simply content with the assurance of their personal freedom and 
security.  For in addition to their political education, they also acquired a different but 
complementary education “in the midst of the religious quarrels that [then] agitated the 
Christian world” (29).  The development of liberal notions of rights did not bring the 
wars of religion to an end because rights thus understood could not benefit the mind or 
the soul.  In fact, it appears that for the latter aim these sectarian conflicts were actually 
beneficial. 
 In one of the more remarkable passages in Democracy in America, and one that 
makes clear the great difference that exists between himself and his Enlightenment 
predecessors, Tocqueville actually speaks rather glowingly about the religious conflict 
which Locke and Spinoza sought to eradicate.  In the “fury” of sectarian violence, he 
writes, the character of the English, “which had always been grave and reflective, had 
become austere and argumentative.”  As a result, “Education had been much increased in 
these intellectual struggles; the mind had received a more profound cultivation” and 
“mores had become purer (29).  With points of doctrine in dispute, it would appear, 
America’s future immigrants did not draw the Lockean lesson about the theological 
irrelevance of “indifferent things.”  On the contrary, when faced with these disputes, they 
found it necessary, in their sobriety, to undertake a serious examination of the state of 
their souls—to the great benefit of both their minds and their moral character.  The wars 
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of religion, one might say, harmed the body but could not harm the soul—they led to 
massive damage to life and to property, but they did not produce the injuries that come 
from popularized skepticism (cf. 418). 
 Now of course, this nostalgic salute to the wars of religion is clearly an 
overstatement, and it is hard to believe that Tocqueville could think that someone who 
would kill or maim another on account of his beliefs could possibly have a healthy soul.  
But he can look back nostalgically on the English Civil War and the Thirty Years War 
because, after the final victory of the Enlightenment, such events are no longer realistic 
possibilities.  On the contrary, having experienced the Revolution, the Terror, and 
Napoleon, Tocqueville’s French audience is likely to recognize that future conflicts will 
almost certainly have a fundamentally different, and perhaps far more bloody character.  
His rhetorical strategy here, as in the introduction, seems to be to allay the concerns of 
reactionaries by speaking well of Puritan religiosity, all the while attempting to warn 
rationalists and progressives of the dangers that are posed by what he later terms negative 
doctrines (286).  Indeed, it is precisely to discover an alternative to the allegedly false 
dichotomy between liberal skepticism and orthodox intolerance that Tocqueville looks to 
these refugees from the wars of religion who first settled America.  For among them, he 
suggests, one can discover a singular example of a new kind of freedom, “not the 
aristocratic freedom of the mother country, but the bourgeois and democratic freedom of 
which the history of the world still had not offered a complete model” (30).  This liberty, 
as we will soon see, consisted not in mere individualism, or in the desire to remain free 
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from the thumb of authority, but rather in an aristocratic sense of virtue that continued to 
exist within the horizon of bourgeois equality. 
 According to Tocqueville, this latter possibility became manifest only in the 
settlements of the North, where there could be found a dual concern for both political 
liberty and religious truth.  In the South, by contrast, “No noble thought” and “no 
immaterial scheme presided at the foundation of the new settlements” (31).  Jamestown 
and the other Southern colonies, though also English, seemed to stray from the promise 
created by the conditions of their homeland.  The Southern settlers forgot about religious 
soul-searching and became preoccupied instead with greed, and the colonies which they 
formed were accordingly dedicated to no end higher than the pursuit of material wealth.  
As a result, Jamestown naturally attracted only individuals of the lowest sort, mostly gold 
seekers and other “people without resources or without [good] conduct, whose restive 
and turbulent spirits troubled the infancy of the colony and rendered its progress 
uncertain” (30-1).  These men possessed a liberty which was entirely unconstrained not 
only with respect to its ends but also with respect to the means by which these ends could 
be pursued.  It is therefore not surprising that hardly “had the colony been created when 
they introduced slavery,” which in turn came “to exert an immense influence on the 
character, the laws, and the whole future of the South” (31).  At Jamestown, the 
unadulterated right of each to pursue material goods naturally led to an attempt to do so 
in an exploitative and tyrannical fashion; the desire of the settlers to be left alone and 
simply to live in isolation without fear of interference from others gave way in turn to the 
destruction of liberty and to the birth of a despotic society with all the typical vices 
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thereof.  Far from leading to the flowering of the life of the mind, such a negatively 
construed freedom gave rise to an institution in slavery that, as Tocqueville affirms, 
“enervates the forces of the intellect and puts human activity to sleep” (31).   
 The fate of the secular and excessively materialistic South therefore appears to 
foreshadow Tocqueville’s fears about the worst possibilities for the future of democratic 
man.  It encapsulates the potential for equality, if not properly controlled and directed by 
a teaching about spiritual greatness, to direct man exclusively to the pursuit of well-being 
and therewith to isolation and to a kind of despotism that will eradicate human longing 
and human vitality.165  In the North, by contrast, where “altogether contrary nuances were 
woven into this same English background” (31), this problem did not present itself.  The 
immigrants who settled there came to America not to seek out material well-being but, on 
the contrary, “to obey a purely intellectual need” and, indeed, to undertake great 
sacrifices of comfort and security in order “to make an idea triumph” (32, emphasis 
original).  They came to the New World to form a society which was egalitarian in its 
social makeup and politically free, but which also consciously sought to fulfill the higher 
potentialities of which human beings are uniquely capable.  And those higher 
potentialities, as exhibited through their example, involved certain devotions, and certain 
duties to others, which, as we have seen, are fundamentally aristocratic in character.  
Thus, “the emigrants of new England,” whom Tocqueville takes as a model for the entire 
North, voluntarily restricted their freedom by bringing with them “admirable elements of 
order and morality.”  They “went to the wilderness accompanied by their wives and 
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children” (32).  Whereas the family receives no thematic treatment in Spinoza and is 
hardly mentioned in his description of the best republic, these settlers seem to find both 
political freedom and intellectual fulfillment only by remaining steadfastly attached to its 
binding ties and to a morality with which it is inextricably linked. 
 According to Tocqueville, it was the civilization of New England which was 
destined to become the model for the “whole American world” (32).  There, the 
democratic idea of freedom coexisted in a healthy tension with the aristocratic idea of 
duty.  Together, as Tocqueville now makes clear, these coalesced into the notion that 
liberty is meant to serve a higher, spiritual purpose which must in turn place restrictions 
upon its own exercise.  New England’s first immigrants, “or, as they so well called 
themselves, the pilgrims,” belonged to a sect in England that was so austere that its 
members had been pejoratively given the name “Puritans” (32, emphasis original).  Now 
in the 1830s, as Tocqueville will soon show, the spirit of sect and the importance of 
doctrine had given way in American religion to an emphasis on morality and tolerance.  
Among the Puritans, however, a commitment to “doctrine,” which is to say, to truly 
orthodox religiosity, “blended at several points with the most absolute democratic and 
republican theories” (32).  Because they came to America both to live “in their manner 
and pray to God in freedom” (32), they exhibited a commitment to religious freedom 
which at the same time took seriously and refused to undermine religion’s most 
fundamental claims.  Tocqueville names them “pious adventurers” (33), and he thus 
suggests that they somehow combined the steadfast independence of the American 
                                                                                                                                            
165 For the connections between Tocqueville’s discussion of slavery and his nightmare scenario for the 
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pioneer with an old-fashioned religious devotion that rendered their spirits radically 
communitarian.   
 Now, considering the decline in sectarianism and of the importance of doctrine 
which later occurred under America’s mature liberal-democracy, it is reasonable to ask at 
this point whether Tocqueville’s account of the Puritans is meant to be taken as an 
accurate historical description, or whether, on the contrary, it is intended as a salutary 
teaching for those who are living at a time when the kind of nobility described in this 
chapter is disappearing.  Tocqueville quotes at great length Nathaniel Morton’s 
description of the sacrifices undertaken by New England’s first settlers, who set out into 
the wilderness fully convinced that they were literally re-enacting the story of the Book 
of Exodus, and who were confident that what they had endured would earn them the 
“rays of glory” appropriate for the founders of a New Israel (33).  According to 
Tocqueville, this sentiment ennobles their enterprise and transforms it into something that 
an attachment to freedom alone, as in the South, could never produce.  Morton’s old-
fashioned belief in divine providence “elevates his language.”  “In your eyes as in his, it 
is no longer a small troop of adventurers going to seek fortune beyond the seas; it is the 
seed of a great people that God comes to deposit from his hands onto a predestined land” 
(33).  But since the Old Testament polity which the Puritans sought to reproduce can 
hardly be described as a liberal republic, how can Tocqueville plausibly claim that they 
were the originators of the “bourgeois and democratic freedom”—the belief that each is 
simply to be left to himself in those areas of his exclusive concern—which is at the core 
                                                                                                                                            
character of the democratic soul, see Lerner 1987, ch. 5. 
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of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people?  Were not the Puritans simply pre-liberal 
or Biblical in their understanding of politics, as Tocqueville himself seems to indicate 
when he says that their religion was “almost as much a political theory as a religious 
doctrine” (35, emphasis added)?  Since their piety was rooted above all in a sense of duty 
to God, family, and community, it would appear at least somewhat puzzling to suggest, as 
Tocqueville does, that their piety could be successfully combined with the spiritual 
independence of the American pioneer. 
 It therefore seems likely that Tocqueville’s description of the Puritans is meant to 
be taken not as a literal recounting but rather as an attempt to show how these two 
fundamentally opposed understandings of political life could perhaps be fused together.  
This becomes most clearly evident as he quotes the text of the Mayflower Compact—or 
rather, a very loosely translated version of it—and tries to present it as America’s original 
social contract.  Taking this document as a model, future American settlers “constituted 
themselves” into political society.  Arriving in an uninhabited wilderness, which the 
reader is here again tempted to equate with the state of nature, “they name their 
magistrates” and give themselves laws “as if they came under God alone” (37).  But that 
latter qualification is not a mere figure of speech, for the original Plymouth settlers 
combined themselves into a political society not only to ensure their security, but also to 
work “for the glory of God, the development of the Christian faith and the honor of our 
country” (Tocqueville 2010, 59).  Tocqueville thus tries to present the Mayflower 
Compact as a kind of amalgam of the Enlightenment’s social contract teaching and Old 
Testament Judaism, in which pre-political human beings come together and voluntarily 
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form a society which places restrictions upon their natural liberties not just for the sake of 
their own preservation, but also for the pursuit of certain higher responsibilities that can 
be found in a devotion to God and country.  But Tocqueville’s version of the Compact 
removes the settlers’ acknowledgement of their fidelity to King James I, and it adds the 
word “contract” where the original speaks only of a “covenant”—which is of course a 
Biblical term (Tocqueville 2010, 59, cf. with ibid. n. r).  As Tocqueville reminds us, 
“This took place in 1620” (35), twenty-two years before the publication of Hobbes’ De 
Cive and thirty-one before Leviathan, a work for which, it may safely be presumed, the 
Puritans would have had little sympathy.     
 By reading this alternative, half-liberal understanding of politics into America’s 
founding, Tocqueville is able to portray an idealized but for that matter tension-ridden 
picture of what democracy in the United States stands for—a picture which can serve as a 
corrective to the Enlightenment rationalism which is dominant in the 1830s.  To reveal 
“the password to the great social enigma” that is America—that is, to show how authentic 
religious belief could be successfully combined with liberal freedom—Tocqueville turns 
to a brief analysis of the legislation of this period, of which the “most characteristic” 
example is Connecticut’s Code of 1650 (37).  Unlike the Framers of the American 
Constitution, who in their commitment to liberty devoted their primary attention to 
political laws, the legislators of Connecticut gave greater importance to religious and 
moral obligations, and they therefore “occupied themselves first with penal laws” (37).  
To this end, they enacted a series of “bizarre” and “tyrannical” measures, literally copied 
from the books Deuteronomy, Exodus, and Leviticus, which enjoined the death penalty 
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for blasphemy, religious dissent, sorcery, and adultery.  Excessively “preoccupied with . . 
. maintaining moral order and good mores,” their laws “constantly penetrate into the 
domain of conscience” and hand down draconian penalties for the likes of drunkenness, 
lying, and even kissing (38-9).  But Tocqueville also claims that Puritan society was 
“enlightened” and its “mores mild,” which ensured that these measures were seldom 
actually applied.  His Puritans are not the ones who would go on to conduct witch trials at 
Salem.  Instead, they present the bizarre spectacle of an enlightened society in which that 
sort of religious zealotry has largely fallen by the wayside, but which nonetheless chooses 
to model its laws on the illiberal theocratic code of the Old Testament, with the result that 
such legislation is rarely if ever enforced.    
 In the detailed notes which he provides at the end of the work, Tocqueville 
acknowledges that within two generations the “rigor” of the Puritans was eventually 
“much weakened” (682), not to say corrupted.166  Blessed with the benefit of hindsight, 
he uses his largely positive—if occasionally chastising—account of American politics in 
the 1620s as a model which can show how some salutary restrictions might be placed on 
the excessively materialistic democracy of the 1830s.  Notable in this regard is 
Tocqueville’s statement that Connecticut’s “bizarre” and “tyrannical” penal laws “were 
not imposed” but in fact “were voted by the free concurrence of all the interested persons 
themselves” (39).  This thus appears to be the very first American instance of the tyranny 
of the majority which has such a prominent place in his analysis of the United States.  
                                                
166 This is especially evident in a quotation which Tocqueville provides from a 1663 sermon denouncing 
New Englanders for forgetting the original, religious origins of their colony and devoting themselves 
instead to “increasing cent per cent” (688). 
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Moreover, in many instances it took the same kind of extra-legal form that Tocqueville 
would find in the 1830s, as mores, “more austere and more puritanical than the laws,” 
attempted to regulate aspects of human behavior which even these intrusive regulations 
did not touch.  But while Tocqueville calls these measures shameful “lapses,” he leaves 
no doubt that he admires something of the spirit behind them.  Indeed, the vehicle by 
which this censoriousness was put into practice turns out to be that most famous of all 
Tocquevillian remedies for the ills of democracy, the “association” (39).  In choosing 
ancient Israel as their model for political virtue they sought to copy “the legislation of a 
rude and half-civilized people” (38) and thus crossed the line into the absurd, but even in 
so doing they accomplished something useful because they sought to endow freedom 
with an active, political direction which could combat individualism and lead citizens to 
communal attachments. 
 In an 1843 letter to Arthur de Gobineau, Tocqueville credits Christianity with 
inciting a social revolution which toppled certain “rude and half-savage virtues” that were 
typical of the ancient republic.  Even so, he laments that the “duties of men among 
themselves as well as in their capacity of citizens, the duties of citizens to their 
fatherland, in brief, the public virtues seem to me to have been inadequately defined and 
considerably neglected within the moral system of Christianity” (Tocqueville 1959, 192, 
emphasis original).  By modeling their politics on the Old Testament (rather than the 
New), Tocqueville suggests, the Puritans reintroduced into the modern world not only a 
spirit of moral restriction, but also that which is characteristic of a truly “political life” 
(42).  Thus, he points out that Connecticut’s draconian penal laws were accompanied by, 
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and “in a way connected to” another “body of political laws which . . . seems to anticipate 
from very far the spirit of freedom in our age” (39, emphasis added).  These latter 
provisions contained all the libertarian “principles on which modern constitutions rest” 
(39), but they also contained several communitarian aspects such as a citizen militia (40) 
and the organization of political life around a township.  In these localities, Tocqueville 
insists, one can discover “a real, active, altogether democratic and republican political 
life” in which interests, “passions, duties, and rights” are all “grouped around the 
township’s individuality and attached to it” (40).  Here, in this little polis, an awareness 
of one’s personal rights is accompanied by, and indeed founded on, a sense of civic duty.  
In the township, the reality of modern democracy is infused with the spirit of the classical 
republic, and affairs “that touch the interest of all are treated in the public square and 
within the general assembly of citizens, as in Athens” (40). 
 Just as Nathaniel Morton called for some rays of glory to reach the earthy saints 
(33), the political spirit which Tocqueville salutes in these passages brings to the fore a 
rather un-Christian sense of pride.  Paradoxically, however, that pride appears to be part 
and parcel with a sense that one’s own excellence, in order to be justly celebrated, must 
be founded upon a capacity to engage in acts of authentic self-forgetting.  Thus, 
Tocqueville’s account of America’s Puritan founding reaches its climax with a lengthy 
quotation of John Winthrop’s “beautiful definition of freedom”.  According to that 
definition, there are in fact two kinds of liberty, the first of which is “a kind of corrupt 
liberty, the use of which is common to animals as it is to man” (Tocqueville 2010, 68).  
This understanding of liberty is virtually identical to that put forward by Hobbes and 
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Spinoza, the last of whom derives it by collapsing the distinction between man and non-
human nature.  It is the freedom “of doing whatever you please.”167  Because it possesses 
only a negative orientation, it leads to no good greater than mere life.  It can produce 
nothing which is distinctly human, which is to say, nothing for which it is worthwhile to 
die.  Entirely apolitical, it “is the enemy of all authority” and “it suffers all rules with 
impatience.”  As Tocqueville made clear in the introduction, such an understanding of 
freedom saps law of all legitimacy because it cannot lend its principled acceptance to 
those sacrifices and those limitations on freedom which are in fact demanded by all 
political and communal association.  By promising liberation, it deceives us into 
becoming “inferior to ourselves” because it erodes that sense of prideful self-
overcoming—of elevation above oneself—which is most distinctive of humanity.  But 
according to Winthrop there also exists another kind of liberty, a “civil,” “moral,” and 
“holy liberty” which “we must defend at all costs, and if necessary, at the risk of our 
life:” this is “the liberty to do without fear all that is just and good” (Tocqueville 2010, 
68-9).  What would today be called positive liberty, a liberty which exists only so that 
man may have the opportunity to perfect himself through moral duty, appears to be 
essential for instilling in him those noble and immaterial sentiments that both call upon 
him to renounce his existence but in the absence of which that existence is felt to be 
entirely worthless.  And as this chapter of Democracy in America has made clear, the 
                                                
167 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan xiv.2; Spinoza, Treatise 16.2.1-5. 
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achievement of that lofty end requires not unrestricted freedom to make the right choice 
but moral restrictions, rooted in communal piety, and serving an educative function.168 
 Now, it would seem plausible to criticize the idea of positive liberty, as Kraynak 
does, as a tension-ridden halfway house between liberal and illiberal understandings of 
politics.  But Tocqueville’s sober teaching seems to be that such a halfway house, 
tension-ridden though it may be, is the only option available to us against the dangerous 
tendencies of an unmitigated liberalism.  Since the intellectual and political worlds 
created by the Enlightenment cannot be overthrown, the best that we can do is to 
establish a dynamic contradiction, an intellectual muddying of the waters that will lead 
religion to think of itself as compatible with (though not identical to) liberalism, and 
liberalism to regard religion (and the sacrifice for which it calls) as vital to its survival.  
Thus, the massive surface impression which Tocqueville gives at the end of this chapter 
and throughout Volume I is that freedom and religion, which are “apparently so 
opposed,” are actually “diverse but not contrary,” and that it is “the character of Anglo-
American civilization” which proves this (43).  Thus, in the United States religion and 
freedom lend each other “mutual support”—the former sees that faith is likely to remain 
strong when the liberal separation of church and state has been accepted, and the latter 
considers that its own survival requires good mores, which cannot endure without beliefs 
                                                
168 Given the prominent place which Tocqueville gives to John Winthrop’s speech, it is hard to see how 
Kessler, among others, can conclude that Tocqueville’s understanding of liberty “is largely negative and 
wholly devoid of religious content” (1994, 34; but cf. 120-1).  Kessler states at one point that Tocqueville 
designed a “civil religion . . . primarily to protect the private rights of individuals” (p. 59), and he often 
seems to suggest that Tocqueville viewed religion as something supportive—rather than restrictive—of 
democracy’s natural tendencies.  Although he provides somewhat contrary indications at the end of his 
work, he often presents Tocqueville as “the first great political philosopher to reform Christianity in the 
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(43-4).  But as Tocqueville will go on to make clear, this rosy picture of American 
religiosity actually hides a deeper but growing threat to the preservation of faith and 
freedom alike. 
  
AMERICA’S REASONABLE CHRISTIANITY 
 Now, to preserve a spirited and self-sacrificial brand of piety in support of liberal 
republicanism and a regime of toleration was of course the central endeavor of Locke’s 
project of religious reform.  Tocqueville’s observations about the character of American 
religion in Volume I therefore appear to provide powerful if not overwhelming evidence 
of the massive success which Locke’s more moderate version of the Enlightenment 
enjoyed.  He records that the separation of church and state among the Americans has 
actually brought about the strengthening of religion and has allowed it to serve, in his 
famous phrase, “as the first of their political institutions” (280).  Through the example of 
how it is practiced, American Christianity seems to have demonstrated that toleration can 
eradicate sectarianism without eroding a serious attachment to religion itself and to the 
morality which it supports.  Tocqueville records that in the United States there are so 
many sects that the vast differences between them have become almost meaningless.  
Americans give no importance to theological dogmas and religious ceremonies,169 but 
they are united by a fierce attachment to “the morality of Christianity,” which “is 
everywhere the same” (278).  Convinced (with Locke) of the necessity of religious 
                                                                                                                                            
light of modern democratic conditions” (p. 59), and he thus seems to credit to him innovations which he 
describes but whose origins should more properly be attributed to his Enlightenment predecessors.  
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beliefs for the maintenance of social bonds, American judges refuse to accept the oaths of 
those who profess not to believe in God (280).  In a similar fashion, American men 
consider stable families and good mores to be essential for the protection of freedom and 
commercial well-being, and they thus continually voice support for religion as an 
indispensible element for the maintenance of public morality (44, 279, 509, 565, 576, and 
esp. 594-5).  
 In the United States, it therefore appears, religious toleration goes together with 
the establishment of a universally accepted civil religion which, as one of Tocqueville’s 
section titles declares, “SERVES POWERFULLY THE MAINTENANCE OF A 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC” (275).  In true Lockean fashion, a transformed, civically-
oriented version of Christianity preserves political freedom by placing a salutary limit on 
the great liberation of the individual which liberal-democracy permits.  Although the 
American political world seems to be abandoned without restraint to human innovation, 
according to Tocqueville that innovation is limited in practice by the “empire over 
intelligence” which Christianity and Christian morality hold (279).  By tightening the 
intellectual bond at the same time that the moral bond is relaxed (282), religion places a 
salutary restraint on the mind that prohibits even the thought of anti-republican 
sentiments: revolutionaries do not exist, and if they did, they would be unable to attract 
followers.  “So, therefore, at the same time that the law permits the American people to 
do everything, religion prevents them from conceiving everything and forbids them to 
dare everything” (280).  In the United States, Tocqueville writes, “there is no single 
                                                                                                                                            
169 Tocqueville will elaborate upon this at the opening of Volume II.  Cf. 404 and 421-2. 
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religious doctrine that shows itself hostile to democratic and republic institutions” (277).  
Christianity has therefore been transformed into a support for the liberal regime precisely 
because that regime has bought into being an unprecedented uniformity of opinion.  
American Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, “all perceive their religion in the same 
light” (423)—they not only agree on specific theological tenets (or lack thereof), they 
also share a common perception of what religion is.  Thus, “there reigns so to speak only 
a single current in the human mind” (277), and American priests have adjusted their 
message so as to conform to it.   
 As a true civil religion, American Christianity is rooted in the power of “the 
sovereign” (278)—that is, the majority.  It reigns “on the admission of all” (279), which 
is to say, “much less as revealed doctrine than as common opinion” (409).  But 
Tocqueville also seems to suggest that this neither jeopardizes the benefits that come 
from authentic religious belief nor threatens to prevent the genuine spiritual liberation 
which both freedom and religion promise.  His description of religion’s hold on the 
American mind recalls his earlier discussion of the power which the majority exercises 
over thought (243-5).  But while he there claimed that “there is no freedom of mind in 
America”—a fact which is sufficient to explain why there are no truly outstanding works 
of the intellect in the United States—he also gave an example of the “good use” to which 
the majority’s intellectual power can be put.  That example—the prime example which 
Tocqueville gives in his discussion of the tyranny of the majority—concerns religion: the 
majority, he says, has been able to take away even the thought of publishing books which 
are hostile to religion or which undermine good mores.  He writes that the beneficial use 
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of this power “is only an accident” (245), but in his thematic discussion of religion in 
Volume I he seems to point the way to understanding how the majority could come to use 
its own omnipotence in order to restrict itself.  He indicates that religion’s hold as 
common opinion in America rests to a great extent on the fact that, while “some profess 
Christian dogmas because they believe them,” others do so “because they are afraid of 
not looking like they believe them” (279).  These others may include philosophers like 
Spinoza, but they may also include potential revolutionaries like Napoleon.  This 
therefore seems to be a beneficent version of the tyranny of the majority—or rather, since 
Tocqueville declares that the notions of tyranny and benefit will never be united in his 
thought (216), it would perhaps be better to call it a harsh but necessary restriction.170   
 Since the majority in democracy constitutes the sole social power, and since that 
power is political, moral, and intellectual all at the same time (243), the only restriction 
which can be placed upon it must come, paradoxically, from its own self-limitation.  But 
Tocqueville suggests that such a feat is both possible and ennobling: carrying on the 
legacy of the Puritans, he indicates, the Americans have continued to espouse a 
“democratic and republican Christianity” (275) which preserves their freedom because it 
                                                
170 This apparent contradiction between Tocqueville’s discussion of the tyranny of the majority in I.2.7 and 
his discussion of religion in I.2.9 has been noted by Kessler (1994, 115) as well as by Catherine Zuckert 
(1993, 232).  Faced with this tension, both of these authors conclude that Tocqueville ultimately abandoned 
hope in religion’s ability to provide an effective restraint on democracy (see also Zetterbaum 1967, 123).  
Kessler emphasizes the institutional elements of Tocqueville’s “secular strategy,” while Zuckert goes so far 
as to suggest that he changed his mind about religion in the five years between the publication of Volume I 
and Volume II.  This objection is not weak, since it would seem unreasonable to expect a religion grounded 
in public opinion to exercise an effective restraint on public opinion.  Nonetheless, I am going to suggest 
that Tocqueville is quite serious about this, and that it constitutes one of the chief examples of his attempt 
to provide a democratic solution to democratic problems.  That this solution is not so obviously prone to 
coming unraveled will become evident once we consider that Tocqueville regards religion not simply as a 
“civil religion” aimed at population control but as the locus for man’s natural longing for immortality—and 
his teaching about the latter remains consistent throughout both volumes. 
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restricts it and which furthermore permits them to conceive and carry out great political 
projects.  Tocqueville indicates that American religion has become almost entirely 
divorced from its original Biblical foundations, but those foundations have been replaced 
with a deep and abiding patriotism and by a spirited devotion to the cause of liberal-
democracy.  He records having witnessed a political gathering of two or three thousand 
people whose purpose was to provide arms and money in support of Polish independence.  
At the end of this meeting a priest delivered a prayer on behalf of the Poles asking God to 
protect their freedom and to end the evils of occupation.  Were it not for a passing 
mention of Christ’s passion at the end (277), it would be hard to characterize the civic 
piety contained in this address as specifically Christian.  Indeed, Tocqueville indicates 
that among the Americans Christianity seems to have melded into a more general but 
nonetheless deeply spiritual devotion to the maintenance of their republican institutions: 
they “so completely confuse Christianity and freedom in their minds that it is almost 
impossible to have them conceive of the one without the other” (280-1).  Their concern 
with their eternal fate has thus become blended together—in a kind of strange mental 
fog—with their more worldly interests, but it appears to be precisely this union of heaven 
and earth that gives them their distinctive, zealous, and deeply devotional brand of civic 
piety.  Believing that religion and freedom must go together, they send priests on 
missions into the wilderness both out of a genuine attempt to merit heaven by saving 
souls and because they are convinced that if the new states are not religious they will not 
be free, and if they are not free they will threaten the republicanism and the prosperity of 
those states that already exist (281). 
 340 
 It is often tempting to read Tocqueville so as to suggest that the piety of his 
Americans is focused exclusively on the concerns of the present life.  But while 
Tocqueville will go on to acknowledge the danger that religion in democracy will 
become simply a rubber-stamp for the desire for material well-being, it is noteworthy 
that, especially in the present chapter, he never goes this far.  Instead, he describes how 
the spirit of religion and that of freedom have become somehow incorporated “into one 
another” (43).  The American missionaries whom he describes have a motivation that is 
simultaneously political and religious: their concern for self-interest has merged with one 
for civic duty, their hope for “Heaven in the other world” has fused together with a desire 
for “well-being and freedom in this one” (43, 281).  Similarly, although Tocqueville 
notes that utilitarian calculations are often—if not always—at the root of American 
religiosity (280), he nonetheless declares that “America is . . . still the place in the world 
where the Christian religion has most preserved genuine powers over souls.”  Hypocrisy 
“ought to be common” in a place like the United States (278), but the surprising thing, 
apparently, is that it is not.  Americans therefore seem to have successfully achieved the 
spirited combination of devotion and self-interest, of reason and faith, and of civil 
religion and authentic piety whose possibility Locke sought to outline.  They plunge into 
the wilds at great personal risk for what they tell themselves are self-interested reasons; 
they believe simultaneously in Christianity’s truth and in its political necessity; and, 
perhaps most importantly, they equate the Gospel’s message with a support for liberal-
democratic morality, but this does not inhibit those acts of devotion and self-sacrifice 
which can only arise from genuine faith.   
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 If America’s utilitarian but also apparently sincere faith can be associated with 
Locke’s reasonable Christianity, the more radically secular outlook which was prevalent 
among the European elites of Tocqueville’s time can claim an affiliation with the author 
of the Theologico-Political Treatise.  Tocqueville touts his observations of American 
piety as proof that those Europeans who “believe with Spinoza in the eternity of the 
world,” and who link the cause of liberty to the destruction of faith, have in fact “no more 
seen religious peoples than free peoples” (281).  But while Tocqueville thus suggests that 
French revolutionary thinkers like Voltaire and Diderot—to say nothing of Spinoza 
himself—misunderstood the meaning of both faith and freedom, he also provides some 
quiet indications that America’s religiosity, apparently so robust, may in fact contain the 
seeds of a more ‘European’ outlook.  At the conclusion of his thematic discussion of 
religion in Volume I, Tocqueville provides a brief account of the process by which 
America’s liberal religiosity may have come into being.  When religion is attacked by 
“negative” doctrines, which affirm the falseness of one religion without establishing the 
truth of any other (286), he writes, deep doubt and apparently zealous belief tend to 
advance together.  When the intellectual climate of an era attacks religion in general, such 
as happened in the eighteenth century (282), men “let the object of their dearest hopes 
escape them almost by forgetting.”   
In ceasing to believe religion true, the unbeliever continues to judge it useful.  
Considering religious beliefs under a human aspect, he recognizes their empire 
over mores, their influence on laws.  He understands how they can make men live 
in peace and prepare them gently for death.  He therefore regrets his faith after he 
has lost it, and deprived of a good of which he knows the entire value, he fears to 
take it away from those who still possess it (286). 
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 Now, in the course of his analysis in Volume I, Tocqueville has attributed similar 
beliefs to the Americans.171  Although he has given the overwhelming impression that 
American piety is “genuine” (278), he has also claimed that it is impossible to verify this 
by looking to the bottom of hearts (280).  He thus seems to invite the reader to do what 
many students of Tocqueville have done and to question whether the faith of the 
Americans, which constantly has concerns of this world in view, can really be as sincere 
as he seems to insist that it is.172  For according to Tocqueville, when large parts of the 
public—or at least society’s elites—adopt a more far-sighted outlook than is present, say, 
in Voltaire; when they continue to see the civic benefits which religion provides even as 
they cease to believe in miracles and in the theological authority of the Bible; when they, 
along with Locke, come to recognize the “reasonableness, or rather necessity” of 
Christianity,173 they work, almost despite themselves, to produce a religiosity that is as 
zealous as it is hallow.  “With those who do not believe hiding their disbelief and those 
who believe showing their faith, a public opinion in favor of religion is produced; people 
love it, sustain it, and honor it, and one must penetrate to the bottom of their souls to 
discover the wounds it has received” (287).  
 In contrast to his initial impression, then, Tocqueville provides a reason to suspect 
that the Americans’ punctilious attention to “all the external duties of religion” (282) may 
                                                
171 Of course, Tocqueville himself also analyzes religion “from a purely human point of view” and presents 
a teaching about its political utility and about its helpfulness as “the consolation of all miseries” (284).  It is 
therefore tempting to take this statement as at least to some extent autobiographical.  In a famous letter to 
Sophie Swetchine at the end of his life, Tocqueville describes an unwilling loss of faith which he 
experienced at sixteen after reading some books in his father’s library. The relevant passage is quoted in 
full by Jardin, who insists that the works in question were those of Rousseau and Voltaire (Jardin 1988, 61-
2).  A translation of the entire letter can be found in Tocqueville 2002, 334-7.   
172 For one of the best examples, see Manent 1996, 83-107. 
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reveal a similar superficiality.  In a statement that is much more frank than anything he 
wrote in Democracy in America, Tocqueville observed to his friend and cousin Louis de 
Kergorlay that, in spite of the Americans’ outward piety, “there is a great store of doubt 
and indifference hidden underneath these external forms.”  Although the Americans were 
full of religious zeal “in days gone by,” at the present time it is “expiring day by day.  
Faith is evidently inert; enter the churches (I mean the Protestant ones) and you hear them 
speak of morality; of dogma not a word, nothing that could in any way shock a neighbor” 
(Tocqueville 1985, 48).  And this, according to Tocqueville, seems to bode ill for the 
future not just of American religion, but for all intellectual life, for the “human spirit 
loves to plunge itself into abstractions of dogma” (ibid.).  As Tocqueville later indicates, 
“There is almost no human action, however particular one supposes it, that does not arise 
from a very general idea that men have conceived of God, of his relations with the human 
race, of the nature of their souls, and of their duties toward those like them” (417).  The 
attempt of the early modern thinkers to separate religious dogma from religious morality 
was therefore strictly speaking untenable.  Since every human action is ultimately 
dependent on notions that are, from a Lockean perspective, “indifferent,” each of those 
notions places a “a salutary yoke on the intellect” which is necessary for man’s 
“happiness” as well as his “greatness” in the present life (418, emphasis added).  By 
focusing on “the duties of men toward one another” (278) while simultaneously 
discouraging human beings from engaging in the kind detailed reflection about the 
dogmatic sanctions for those duties which the Puritans underwent, modern rational 
                                                                                                                                            
173 The Reasonableness of Christianity (172[105]). 
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religion appears to pose a real threat to human intellectual life.  When this “salutary 
yoke” is relaxed and “doubt takes hold of the highest portions of the intellect,” 
Tocqueville declares, it “half paralyzes all the others.”  Then, each “becomes accustomed 
to having only confused and changing notions about matters that most interest those like 
him and himself; one defends one’s opinions badly or abandons them, and as one 
despairs of being able to resolve by oneself the greatest problems that human destiny 
presents, one is reduced, like a coward, to not thinking about them at all” (418).   
 Tocqueville thus tells Kergorlay that the “so-called tolerance” which one finds in 
America, “in my opinion, is nothing but a huge indifference” (Tocqueville 1985, 48).  
This indifference, this milieu which accommodates literally hundreds of sects, “is hardly 
satisfying” to the human spirit—Protestants “live and die in compromise, without ever 
concerning themselves with reaching the depths of things” (ibid., 50).  But if American 
Protestantism poses a substantial threat to the human intellect,174 American Catholicism 
seems to embody the opposite danger.  Indeed, although Tocqueville claims in 
Democracy in America that America’s Catholics “form the most republican and 
democratic class there is in the United States” (275), he tells Kergorlay that in actuality 
they make use of the tolerance offered to them but privately remain “as intolerant as they 
have always been, as intolerant in a word as people who believe. . . . I am not sure that 
they would not be persecuting if they found themselves to be the strongest” (Tocqueville 
1985, 50, emphasis original).  So while the Protestantism of America’s rich tends toward 
Unitarianism—a kind of deism which is “without strength and almost without life,” the 
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Catholicism which is growing among the poor poses a real civic danger (but also a 
spiritual benefit).  It “gives rise to real and profound beliefs; but it divides the human race 
into the fortunate and the damned, creates divisions on earth that should exist only in the 
other life” and is thus “the child of intolerance and fanaticism” (ibid. 53).175 
 Speaking as a convinced liberal—if a liberal of a new kind176—Tocqueville 
identifies as the central political problem of modern times the need to reconcile tolerance 
with the moral and intellectual seriousness that, for most people at least, can only be 
found in genuine, which is to say intolerant, religious belief.  But of course, these two 
alternatives are not equally likely in 1835, a time when one still encounters ardent 
believers, but when one is scarcely likely to discover Puritans in favor of re-instituting 
the Mosaic Code.  In the vast bulk of Democracy in America Tocqueville is therefore 
preoccupied with the more immediately pressing danger—democracy’s potential to 
encourage assimilation and therewith to bring about indifference and the weakening of 
beliefs.  Perhaps anticipating the liberal reforms which the Vatican would undertake in 
the twentieth century, Tocqueville records that Catholic priests in America provide 
theological arguments for toleration and the separation of church and state which would 
have shocked their European co-religionists (276).  The intolerant attitude of American 
Catholics which he describes to Kergorlay may therefore be only a temporary 
phenomenon, destined eventually to give way under liberalism’s tremendous power to 
                                                                                                                                            
174 In this letter Tocqueville actually attributes this danger to all Protestantism (Tocqueville 1985, 49-50).  
Cf. his comments in Democracy in America on Luther as preparing the way for the Enlightenment (404-5). 
175 Helpful discussions of this letter can be found in Galston 1992 and Kessler 1993.  I discovered it in 
Owen (forthcoming), to which this account of the latent religious apathy of Tocqueville’s Americans is also 
highly indebted. 
 346 
influence the moral opinions of those who live under it.  But the danger inherent in this 
development would seem to make it all the more necessary to fight against it to the extent 
that it is possible to do so, even or especially if it should mean making society less 
liberal.  As Tocqueville wrote to Gobineau: 
There are, of course, certain doctrines that are necessarily part and parcel of 
certain religions, and which are not the exclusive attributes of any one of them.  
Such are the virtue attributed to faith, the utility of faith, the necessity of faith, the 
inadequacy of deeds without faith—and their consequence is that certain amount 
of intolerance with the contemporary absence of which you seem so satisfied.  
These doctrines are inherent in all religions . . . and they are necessarily 
inseparable from all the good they bring us.  Yet I am convinced that the eventual 
damage to human morality thereby caused is far less than what would result from 
moral systems that have emancipated themselves from religion altogether.  The 
longer I live the less I think that the peoples of the world can ever separate 
themselves from a positive religion; and this growing conviction makes me less 
concerned with these inconveniences that are eventually inherent in every 
religion, including the best.177 
 
 Tocqueville’s concern for religion is therefore no less utilitarian, and even no less 
this-worldly than the Enlightenment’s, but he locates that utility in an intellectual and 
spiritual realm.  Or rather, since Locke and Spinoza both expected liberalism to produce 
outstanding works of the intellect along with great civic devotions, it would perhaps be 
more accurate to say that, according to Tocqueville, their expectations rested on a 
misunderstanding of the natural psychology that lies behind religious belief.  
Tocqueville’s section entitled “ON THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES THAT MAKE 
RELIGION POWERFUL IN AMERICA” (282) occurs after his discussion of its civil 
                                                                                                                                            
176 Tocqueville’s famous characterization of himself as “a liberal of a new kind” occurs in a letter to 
Eugene Stoffels dated July 24, 1836 (Tocqueville 1861, 1:402). 
177 Tocqueville to Gobineau, October 2, 1843 (Tocqueville 1959, 205-6, emphasis original).  Kessler points 
out that this letter also contains Tocqueville’s declaration, curiously omitted by the editor Lukacs, that “Je 
ne suis pas croyant [‘I am not a believer’]” (See Kessler 1994, 193 n.1 and 3, with Tocqueville 1951- 9:57).  
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religion, and he thus appears to suggest that religion’s genuine power over souls cannot 
be rooted in a concern for utility or for the maintenance of republican institutions.  
Indeed, Tocqueville begins this section by observing the visible failure of the predictions 
of the “philosophers of the eighteenth century,” who, following Spinoza, predicted that 
religious zeal would “be extinguished as freedom and enlightenment increase[d]” (282).  
Intimating that he may at first have agreed with such thinkers, Tocqueville records that 
upon arriving in the United States he was “first struck” by the survival of religion among 
conditions of freedom (282).  Feeling a “desire to know the cause of this phenomenon,” 
he reports, “I interrogated the faithful of all communions.”  “To each of them I expressed 
my astonishment and exposed my doubts” (282-3).  What he discovered was that each of 
his interlocutors “attributed the peaceful dominion that religion exercises in their country 
principally to the complete separation of church and state” (283).   
 The official answer of this section to the question posed in its title therefore seems 
to be that it is the separation of church and state which is the principal cause that makes 
religion powerful in America.  As Tocqueville indicates, however, that is the agreed upon 
opinion of the parties, and as he noted in the introduction, his task in America was to 
undertake “to see, not differently, but further than the parties” (15).  Thus, Tocqueville 
records that after confirming the virtues of the separation of church and state through his 
own observation, he then took an additional step.  “I wanted to bring the facts back to the 
causes: I wondered how it could happen that in diminishing the apparent force of a 
religion one came to increase its real power, and I believed that it was not impossible to 
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discover this” (283).  The answer that Tocqueville came to provides what is undoubtedly 
his fullest articulation of his understanding of human religious psychology. 
The short space of sixty years will never confine the whole imagination of man; 
the incomplete joys of this world will never suffice for his heart.  Alone among all 
the beings, man shows a natural disgust for existence and an immense desire to 
exist; he scorns life and fears nothingness.  These different instincts constantly 
drive his soul toward contemplation of another world, and it is religion that guides 
it there.  Religion is therefore only a particular form of hope, and it is as natural to 
the human heart as hope itself.  Only by a kind of aberration of the intellect and 
with the aid of a sort of moral violence exercised on their own nature do men 
stray from religious beliefs; an invincible inclination leads them back to them.  
Disbelief is an accident; faith alone is the permanent state of humanity (283-4). 
 
Tocqueville’s analysis of the separation of church and state therefore seems to serve 
chiefly as a means for the discovery, through a dialectical ascent from common opinion, 
of what he here calls “one of the constituent principles of human nature” (284). 
 Since, as we have just seen, religion in the usual sense of the term actually 
appears to be quite weak in America, it seems more likely that Tocqueville is actually 
explaining here why religious longings remain present despite this.  In Volume II he will 
go on discuss the phenomenon of American restiveness, the tendency of the prosperous to 
remain agitated and miserable in the midst of their well-being precisely because the “soul 
has needs that must be satisfied” (510).  He devotes a section of the long final chapter of 
Volume I to the ironically named “COMMERCIAL GREATNESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES,” and what he there seems to indicate above all is the inability of the way life 
characteristic of a commercial republic to satisfy what is deepest in us and most 
distinctive of our humanity.  He records how the Americans paradoxically “put a sort of 
heroism into their manner of doing commerce.”  In the two year voyage between Boston 
and China, for example, the American sailor will endure the most grueling hardships and 
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tremendous personal sacrifices in order to sell a “pound of tea for one penny less than the 
English merchant” (387).   Tocqueville compares his devotion to commerce to that which 
the French displayed in the wars of the Revolution, and he notes, somewhat dryly, that 
what “the French did for victory,” the Americans “do for low cost” (386).  They use 
means befitting a noble goal in an attempt to achieve one which is entirely prosaic and 
thus unworthy of them, and this disproportion reveals a certain dissatisfaction, a 
continuing desire for something which commercial life taken on its own cannot provide.  
Democracy therefore has not eradicated the attractions of self-sacrifice, but it has made 
them more anomalous, and in so doing it has brought into relief a certain key defect 
which characterizes life under democracy—a “particular form of hope” that has no 
healthy outlet in the modern world, and which has therefore engendered a number of 
pathologies which the thinkers of the Enlightenment did not anticipate. 
 Tocqueville’s comments on the longing for immortality therefore make clear how 
he understands what he frequently calls “human greatness:” that which is most distinctive 
of humanity and which separates man from all the other beings is precisely his 
simultaneous “natural disgust for existence” and “immense desire to exist.”  The hope for 
eternity, according to Tocqueville, always consists in a prideful desire to assert one’s own 
excellence—one’s elevated status which renders one deserving of immortality—but that 
sense of excellence is always intermixed with, and indeed founded upon, the deeply felt 
and by no means mercenary need to sacrifice oneself.  After all, only someone who has 
shown himself willing to forget himself entirely can plausibly be said to merit this kind of 
resplendent self-affirmation.  There would therefore appear to be a concern for justice in 
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a certain sense at the root of all such pride: the glory of a robber-baron or a tyrant would 
seem to be as empty and unfulfilling, as ultimately incomplete or inadequate, as the 
misery of someone whose self-abnegation goes unrewarded or unrecognized in the long-
term.  In a brief comment on this passage, Mansfield and Winthrop suggest that the 
disgust for life which Tocqueville describes here “resembles what Plato calls thumos” 
(Mansfield and Winthrop 2006, 86).  This seems correct, but insofar as Tocqueville 
explicitly associates this complex and paradoxical longing with the desire for 
immortality, it would seem justified to associate it with eros as well.178  To Tocqueville, 
because religion springs from this deep and ineradicable human hope, it is simply much 
more deeply rooted in human beings than Spinoza acknowledges.  Indeed, even though 
the desire to affirm oneself by forgetting oneself may ultimately be self-contradictory, it 
is not self-contradictory to have a nature that demands two contradictory things.  In 
Tocqueville’s view, human beings are just so constituted, and any attempt to eliminate 
their erotic desires and their devotional longings, even by pointing out their inherently 
confused character, would seem to commit “a sort of moral violence” against human 
nature.  Faith or hope may change its object, he indicates, but it will not die, and so to 
undermine orthodox Christianity, as Spinoza does, by shaking confidence in the authority 
of the Bible, can only lead to a redirection of religious desire.  And as Tocqueville will 
                                                
178 Just how much Tocqueville was familiar with the works of Plato and Aristotle is somewhat unclear.  
Manent claims that he “barely read them” at all (Manent 2006, 115).  But one does not necessarily have to 
have studied these thinkers to arrive at a similar conclusion to the one contained in their thought.  Indeed, 
as previously mentioned, Tocqueville indicates in the current context that he derived this lesson about 
human nature much as Socrates himself did: by observing political life and by reflecting upon the character 
of ordinary moral opinions. 
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make clear in Volume II, many of the forms which eros can take under democracy have 
the potential to be profoundly damaging to the human soul. 
 
REASON, PANTHEISM, AND THE DEMOCRATIC SOUL 
 In accordance with the indications which he provided in the introduction, 
Tocqueville’s depiction of American religion in Volume I can be said to serve two 
complementary purposes.  As “an image of democracy itself,” his description of the 
United States shows the potential of a democratic society to trend in a more ‘European’ 
or Spinozistic direction—to diffuse skepticism or religious indifference across the body 
politic and thus to do violence to man’s nature as an unfulfilled erotic being, with the 
result that now, in Tocqueville’s words, “nothing any longer sustains man above himself” 
(300).  But at the same time, Tocqueville’s more positive, surface presentation of 
America provides an instructive example of the place which religion could hold within a 
certain a type of democratic society.  It appears to make clear that it is at least possible 
for a religious consensus rooted in the social power of the majority to restrain the 
freedom of that majority and in so doing to preserve a sense of civic duty, religious 
devotion, and erotic longing.  A society constituted on this basis would not be home to 
the seemingly superhuman devotions and accomplishments of the feudal aristocrat, but it 
could succeed in raising “the crowd up to themselves.”  By preserving those longings and 
psychological tensions which are distinctly human, in other words, it would at least 
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combat the imminent danger of “letting all citizens fall below the level of humanity” 
(301).   
 At the end of Volume II, Tocqueville informs his reader that five years of 
additional reflection have made this possibility, rather than the more straightforward 
tyranny of the majority, the new object of his fears (661; Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, 
liii).  He now indicates that, if left unchecked and unmodified, democracy threatens to 
produce not tyranny, but an entirely new kind of despotism—a kind of all-encompassing 
bureaucratic state which will “degrade men without tormenting them” (662).  This new 
kind of state will neither oppress nor dominate men, but it will brutalize them, and all the 
more so because it may very well do so with their consent.  Tocqueville describes this 
new nightmarish vision in the following way: 
[A]fter taking each individual by turns in its powerful hands and kneading him as 
it likes, the sovereign extends its arms over society as a whole; it covers its 
surface with a network of small, complicated, painstaking, uniform rules through 
which the most original minds and the most vigorous souls cannot clear a way to 
surpass the crowd; it does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and 
directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one’s 
acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not 
tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally 
reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious 
animals of which the government is the shepherd (663). 
 
This kind of administrative despotism must be distinguished from tyranny because 
tyranny is political, and hence also, at its core, erotic.  But in a world where “passions are 
. . . contained, imagination bounded, [and] pleasures simple,” “tyranny in a way lacks an 
occasion and a stage” (662).  Whereas tyranny, even in its most wicked forms, is born of 
a version of those passions which belong to mankind alone, this so-called soft despotism 
will brutalize man precisely by extinguishing those pregnant desires and that distinctly 
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human sense of dissatisfaction which alone can give birth to grand political, spiritual, and 
intellectual achievements.   
 But of course, if these same desires are natural to man (as Tocqueville indicated 
in Volume I), it would appear puzzling to say that their ultimate eradication is possible 
and even likely.  One of Tocqueville’s chief tasks in Volume II will therefore be to reveal 
how it is that eros can become dimmed if not extinguished in democracy—or rather, he 
will indicate how it can turn in on itself and, in effect, destroy itself, and how future 
political scientists who are armed with knowledge of this danger can work to prevent it.  
As the remainder of this chapter will seek to show, the central task of Tocqueville’s 
religious project in Volume II will be to support the maintenance of certain kinds of 
religious beliefs, compatible with but also restrictive of democratic intellectual trends, 
which can preserve certain distinctly human confusions in the democratic soul.  This task 
not only fulfills the promise Tocqueville seemed to make in Volume I to show how a 
civil religion rooted in public opinion can also restrain that opinion, but, as he makes 
clear at the very opening of his second work, it will require constructing a bulwark 
against the popular influence of the Enlightenment’s philosophic rationalism. 
 The opening chapter of Volume II, “ON THE PHILOSOPHIC METHOD OF 
THE AMERICANS,” contains Tocqueville’s most direct confrontation with the influence 
of the Enlightenment’s political project.  Its opening sentence, however, sets the theme 
for the rest of the work by making his estimation of the political results of that project 
abundantly clear.  As he writes, “I think there is no country in the civilized world where 
they are less occupied with philosophy than the United States” (403).  In America, unlike 
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in every pre-modern society, the members of the citizenry can be accurately said to 
exhibit a common “philosophic method”: each gathers the insights by which he will 
guide his life not from revelation or theology or from a sense of the ancestral, but solely 
from “the individual effort of his reason” (403).  Distrusting all intellectual authority and 
taking “tradition only as information” (403), refusing to trust in the answers provided by 
others and looking instead only to their own lights “as the most visible and closest source 
of truth” (404), the Americans as Tocqueville describes them seem to exhibit the outlook 
which Spinoza hoped would characterize a healthy liberal-democratic citizenry.  But 
whereas Spinoza sought to create such a mindset because he was confident that the 
triumph of a popularized version of his own rationalism would favor the cause of its 
future cultivation by genuine philosophers, Tocqueville, examining the phenomenon of a 
rationalistic society in practice, apparently came to the opposite conclusion.  
Paradoxically, the triumph of the rationalism which Tocqueville here attributes to 
Descartes—but which could just as well be said to characterize his great student 
Spinoza—apparently created an intellectual atmosphere which was unequivocally hostile 
to philosophy in the true, undiluted sense of the term.  “Americans do not read 
Descartes’s works because their social state turns them away from speculative studies, 
and they follow his maxims because this social state naturally disposes their minds to 
adopt them” (403).  Descartes, in other words, prepared a world in which men like 
himself would no longer exist. 
 The reason for this, Tocqueville suggests, can be found, somewhat surprisingly, in 
the commitment to intellectual independence which all Americans exhibit.  While one 
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might suppose at first that the prevalence of such a mindset would lead to great 
intellectual diversity, Tocqueville indicates that, on the contrary, it actually produces an 
intellectual uniformity which leaves no place for the great intellectual disputes which 
have divided philosophers throughout history.  Because Americans rely only on their own 
reason, “they easily conclude that everything in the word is explicable and that nothing 
exceeds the bounds of intelligence.”  They have “little faith in the extraordinary and an 
almost invincible distaste for the supernatural,” but that lack of faith is not grounded on 
any genuine refutation of traditional theology.  Rather, as Tocqueville strikingly suggests, 
“they willingly deny what they cannot comprehend” (404).  Their rationalism, in other 
words, is a dogmatic rationalism, which is to say that it is no rationalism at all.  There is 
no sense in America of an authentic and humanly meaningful tension between reason and 
revelation; on the contrary, there is a sense that this quarrel—if it was not meaningless in 
the first place—has been settled definitively.  But that confidence, because it is rooted 
only in a powerful cultural prejudice, is entirely unfounded—and yet, unfounded though 
it may be, it is sufficient to prevent some future Descartes or Spinoza from turning the 
serious efforts of his intelligence to an investigation of the fundamental problem it 
obscures.   
 In America, according to Tocqueville, the belief in the authority of each’s 
individual reason has resulted not just in the rehabilitation of the capacity of the human 
mind to arrive at truth, it has also produced the notion that all truth is graspable by each.  
Americans only believe what they can see for themselves, and this leads them to scorn 
forms as “useless and inconvenient veils” (404).  But since they deny what they cannot 
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comprehend, it also leads them to believe that truth itself is something which is only as 
nuanced as their mental capacities will permit.  By its very nature it can be unwrapped 
and examined “in broad daylight” (404).  It is therefore telling that Tocqueville claims 
that the Americans deny the extraordinary as well as the supernatural, which suggests that 
their philosophic method is as hostile to the idea of human greatness as it is to divine 
greatness.  Because “they ordinarily seek in the works of the mind only easy pleasures 
and instruction without work” (414-5), they appear to have no notion that philosophical 
investigations may require great effort and even a substantial amount of courage, let 
alone careful reading. 
 Now, Tocqueville traces the origins of this philosophic method not to Descartes 
but instead to Martin Luther (404).  Because Luther, as Tocqueville claimed in the 
introduction, effectively democratized man’s access to salvation (6), his submission “to 
individual reason [of] some of the dogmas of the ancient faith” (404) eventually prepared 
the way for Spinoza’s more radical claim that the individual mind is sufficient to attain 
the summum bonum on its own.  But Tocqueville, announcing an agreement with the ends 
of Spinoza’s rationalism if not with its means, suggests that the Americans’ philosophic 
method should be approached with caution “by those who see in the freedom of the 
intellect something holy” (410).  Spinoza’s project backfired, it appears, because even if 
he did recognize the need for popular dogmatism, he failed to appreciate the full 
consequences of the form which this dogmatism would take in an egalitarian society.  
Moreover, those consequences, according to Tocqueville, follow from the fact that man’s 
devotional instinct is no less intellectual than it is political.  Just as he had earlier 
 357 
suggested that the root of human liberty is found not in independence but in devotion to 
something greater than oneself, he now indicates that the intellectual freedom even of the 
greatest philosopher requires “a salutary servitude that permits him to make good use of 
his freedom.”  “Thus, the question is not that of knowing whether an intellectual authority 
exists in democratic centuries, but only where it is deposited and what its extent will be” 
(408).   
 Tocqueville’s answer, of course, is that this intellectual authority will be found in 
public opinion, which is set by the sovereign majority.  But whereas in Volume I 
Tocqueville had stressed the capacity of this public opinion to muzzle political dissent, 
here in Volume II he begins to highlight the potential of the process which empowers it to 
do profound damage to the human soul.  When each “withdraws into himself and claims 
to judge the world from there” (404), men living under democracy seem to put on display 
the prideful self-absorption and intellectual independence which Spinoza sought to 
inculcate.  “When the man who lives in democratic countries compares himself 
individually to all those who surround him, he feels with pride that he is the equal of each 
of them; but when he comes to view the sum of those like him and places himself at the 
side of this great body, he is immediately overwhelmed by his own insignificance and his 
weakness” (409).  The pride which the individual citizen feels in his own freedom, 
negatively understood, turns into despondency when he comes to understand that the 
achievement of his independence has gone together with the creation of a moral and 
intellectual authority “the very idea of which aristocratic peoples could not conceive” 
(409).  In other words, just as his thoughts cannot remain truly unbounded, so too his idea 
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of his own freedom cannot remain purely negative.  He will continue to feel the pull of 
devotion to political authority; the religious instinct which is present in him will re-
awaken, but it will take for itself the very object which destroys his sense of his own 
greatness.  In future ages, Tocqueville predicts, “faith in common opinion will become a 
sort of religion whose prophet will be the majority” (410).  Precisely because men in 
democracy will place intellectual authority “within the limits of humanity, not beyond it” 
(408), their devotional longings will become attracted to objects which, paradoxically, 
diminish rather than support the importance of the individual.   
 This phenomenon, according to Tocqueville, appears to be manifest above all in 
two developments which are peculiar to the democratic age: the excessive “passion” or 
“love” for equality which is widespread throughout society in both America and Europe, 
and the attraction to pantheism which is distinctive of European high culture.  To begin 
with the first of these, Tocqueville rather remarkably insists that he has “no need to say” 
that the “first and most lively of the passions to which equality of conditions gives birth . 
. . is the love of this same equality” (479).  This fact is so evident that everyone has 
noticed it: it “has been said a hundred times that our contemporaries have a much more 
ardent and tenacious love for equality than for freedom,” but no one has yet provided a 
satisfactory explanation as to why this is so (479).  To fill this void, Tocqueville provides 
an account of it that is rooted in the following observation:   
If one wishes to pay attention to it, one will see that in each century one 
encounters a singular and dominating fact to which all the others are connected; 
this fact almost always gives rise to a mother idea, or a principal passion, that in 
the end attracts and carries along in its course all sentiments and all ideas.  It is 




In this revealing yet still obscure passage, Tocqueville seems to indicate that politics in 
every age is marked by a certain primary fact.  But he also suggests, as he did in the 
introduction, that that “primary fact” is also a “generative fact” (3).  It seeks, as it were, 
to preserve itself, and to do this it shapes and molds human passions so that they take its 
preservation or advancement for an end.  Thus, in democratic ages man’s love or 
passionate desire has been directed towards equality.   
Do not ask what unique charm men in democratic ages find in living as equals, or 
the particular reasons that they can have for being so obstinately attached to 
equality rather than to the other goods that society presents to them: equality 
forms the distinctive characteristic of the period they live in; that alone is enough 
to explain why they prefer it to all the rest (480). 
 
In the age in which we live, Tocqueville therefore suggests, the longing for eternity 
which was formerly shaped and directed by religion has taken equality for its object 
instead.  Men in democracy, he says, “do not hold to equality only because it is dear to 
them; they are also attached to it because they believe that it will last forever” (480).  
They love equality “with an eternal love” (52), “an ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible 
passion” (482), and they consider it the “only . . . good in the whole universe worth 
longing for” (481). 
 The French word égal can carry a connotation of sameness as well as equality, 
and throughout the work Tocqueville understands democracy as a social state in which 
human beings are alike as well as equal: it introduces to the human mind the notion of 
“those like oneself (semblables)” (535-9; Orwin 2000, 142; Mansfield and Winthrop 
2000, xlvii).  Moreover, as we will soon see, it tends to make variety disappear from the 
human species (588).  Democracy’s tendency to instill a passionate desire for equality in 
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human beings therefore also leads them to feel an eternal and devotional love for what 
eradicates human distinctiveness and individuality.  It channels the natural human desire 
to forget oneself not, as in the feudal aristocrat, towards a paradoxical kind of self-
affirmation—in which the sacrifice is considered as something which renders one 
deserving of greatness—but rather towards a more complete and therefore perhaps less 
confused form of self-abnegation.  Men in democracy, according to Tocqueville, love 
equality so much and in such a way that “nothing can satisfy them without [it],” and 
“they would sooner consent to perish than lose it” (52).  They will “compromise their 
dearest interests” (481) and perhaps even their lives, to preserve it, and if they cannot get 
equality in freedom, “they still want it in slavery” (482).  Just as they are attracted to 
equality precisely because of its ability to eradicate human distinctiveness, they are 
willing to accept slavery because they feel no desire to preserve that authentic self-
distinction which Tocqueville regards as part and parcel with freedom.  Indeed, they may 
even be attracted to equality for the promise it holds to destroy liberty thus understood. 
 This, at any rate, is the suggestion which Tocqueville appears to make in his 
discussion of pantheism, which he identifies as an intellectual trend which will hold 
“secret charms” for men living in democracy “although it destroys human individuality, 
or rather because it destroys it” (426).179  Tocqueville’s brief chapter on pantheism, 
which may contain his most hostile comments in the entirety of Democracy in America 
towards any particular school of thought, appears to single out Spinozism in particular as 
                                                
179 That pantheism constitutes the logical culmination of democracy’s natural intellectual drift—and that 
the deepest sentiments of democratic man therefore tend toward an eradication of human individuality—is 
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representative of the natural tendency of the democratic mind.  Just as he had earlier 
claimed that the Americans are governed by a “philosophic method,” so too he here 
makes a point of identifying pantheism as a philosophic system (426).  But Tocqueville 
also indicates that, at least in his time, the popularity of pantheism appears to be a 
distinctly European development, and his discussion of it contains no reference at all to 
America.  In Europe, however, its influence is so strong that the majority of “the works of 
the imagination published in France . . . either contain some opinions or depictions 
borrowed from pantheistic doctrines or allow one to perceive a sort of tendency toward 
these doctrines in their authors” (425).  Despite its quasi-religious character, then, 
pantheism, to Tocqueville, seems to be the clearest visible manifestation of that dominant 
rationalist ‘European’ mindset, hostile to religiosity in the ordinary sense, which he 
associated with the name of Spinoza in Volume I.  
 On the surface, pantheism would appear to have such a small hold in America for 
the simple reason that it is a philosophic doctrine, and as Tocqueville has already 
informed us, the Americans are uniformly indifferent to philosophy.  But, just as the 
Americans practice a reasonable Christianity which eschews the supernatural in favor of 
what is “within the limits of humanity, not beyond it” (408), it would appear that the 
fusion of rationalism and religion which pantheism achieves is not so alien to the outlook 
which Tocqueville discovered to be uniform throughout the United States.  In fact, it 
would even seem accurate to say that pantheism represents the most complete tendency, 
or the ultimate trajectory, of rationalist religion.  After all, Spinoza’s teaching that there is 
                                                                                                                                            
most successfully shown in Lawler’s study (1993, ch. 2).  Lawler, however, does not stress the role of 
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only one substance in the universe, and that that substance is God, would seem to be the 
logical culmination of the Enlightenment’s tendency to promote theologies which equate 
God with nature.  The pantheist goes as far as one can in making God rational and non-
mysterious, or in preserving a sense of the divine within a universe governed by 
impersonal natural necessities—one could say that he stops just short of an embrace of 
outright materialism.  Thus, Tocqueville claims that this philosophic religion will be 
attractive to men living under democracy precisely because they are obsessed with the 
“idea of unity” (426).  They constantly “aspire to be able to link a multitude of 
consequences to a single cause” because their social state has taught them to view 
themselves (and all other things as well) merely as constituent parts of a giant mass.  But, 
as Tocqueville made clear in his chapter on the Americans’ philosophic method, that 
latter tendency is the product of a mindset shaped by Enlightenment rationalism, and so it 
would seem that pantheism is attractive both because it is itself rationalistic and also 
because it accords with those non-rational or erotic tendencies to which the 
Enlightenment gave birth.   
 As regards the former, Tocqueville claims that the democratic mind is inclined to 
embrace pantheism because it is bothered by the (irrational and mysterious) separation 
that is present in traditional theology between the Creator and his creation, “and it 
willingly seeks to enlarge and simplify its thought by enclosing God and the universe 
within a single whole” (426).  But this reasoned and intellectual preference for 
consistency and uniformity also has an effect on the human passions, and as Tocqueville 
                                                                                                                                            
erotic desire in the attraction to pantheism but emphasizes instead its roots in Rousseauean ‘sentiments.’  
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closes this brief chapter he declares that even though pantheism is ostensibly simply a 
philosophic system which “seeks to explain the universe,” in practice it can be expected 
“to seduce the human mind” (426, emphasis added).  The destruction of human 
individuality which it promises, and which makes it attractive to the democratic mind, 
therefore appears to be a distinctly pernicious version of eros.  To speak in Spinoza’s 
terms, the idea that human beings are merely “a particle” of nature may at first become 
impressed on the mind simply as an idea, and it may do no more than convince men 
intellectually that they have no exalted status in the cosmos.  But this recognition soon 
transforms itself into a human desire to be nothing, or to lose oneself and one’s own 
individuality in a universe which has been renamed “God.”  Tocqueville’s indirect 
criticism of Spinoza here, then, would seem to be that he tapped into a naturally 
occurring desire for self-forgetting which he failed to understand or whose existence he 
denied—with the result that it took on a form which turned out to be dangerous, 
especially because, being unrecognized, it was necessarily uncontrolled and undirected. 
 Tocqueville’s estimation of the Enlightenment would therefore seem to be 
encapsulated in the following thought: that, whether it intended to or not, the modern 
project created a world in which eros or human pride began to turn against itself, and, in 
effect, to consume itself.  But if Tocqueville indicates that the likes of Locke’s reasonable 
Christianity and Spinoza’s religion of nature are symptoms of this more general ailment, 
it is also not so clear from his analysis whether traditional Christian theology can provide 
much of a remedy.  We have already seen that Tocqueville regards Protestantism as 
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containing the seeds of a more thoroughgoing rationalism,180 and, once one looks past his 
somewhat flattering surface presentation, his estimation of Roman Catholicism does not 
seem to be much better.  His chapter on Catholicism in Volume II immediately precedes 
his chapter on pantheism, and he presents the growth of these two seemingly opposed 
religious outlooks as part of a single development.  While a large number of people in 
democracy are becoming unbelievers or turning to more naturalistic religions, others are 
joining the Catholic Church for the same reason that their counterparts are leaving it in 
favor of outlooks like pantheism: they have “a hidden instinct” which leads them to 
admire the Church’s universal government, and “its great unity attracts them” (424).  In 
Volume I, Tocqueville advertises Catholicism’s natural favorability towards democracy, 
understood, as always, not as a form of government but as “equality of conditions” (276).  
But the fact that it is naturally amenable to this kind of social state would seem to call 
into question whether it can really stand up as a bulwark against the natural disadvantages 
to which that same social state gives birth.  Indeed, in this same section Tocqueville 
writes that the Catholic Church’s support for equality goes together with a support for 
“obedience.”  “Catholicism is like an absolute monarchy.  Remove the prince and 
conditions are more equal in it than in republics” (276).181 
                                                
180 Tocqueville also makes this point in the letter to Kergorlay cited above.  Because Protestantism 
liberated the human spirit, but only half-way, “It seems clear to me that the reformed religion is a kind of 
compromise, a sort of representative monarchy in matters of religion which can well fill an era, serve as the 
passage from one state to another, but which cannot constitute a definitive state itself and which is 
approaching its end” (Tocqueville 1985, 49-50, emphasis original).  According to Tocqueville, what is 
often called a mixed government “has always seemed to me to be a chimera” (240). 
181 Given this, it is hard to see how Mitchell can conclude that Tocqueville considered “Roman Catholics . 
. . to be the best citizens of a democracy” (Mitchell 1995, 122, emphasis added).  
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 To be sure, Tocqueville also claims that Catholics in America “are not naturally 
opposed” to republicanism (276), but to be unopposed to something is not necessarily to 
be zealously in favor of it.  As Tocqueville initially frames this problem, then, it appears 
to be far from clear whether Catholicism, along with Protestantism, can serve as the basis 
for a spirited and devotional outlook which can support freedom.  The admiration for the 
Catholic Church’s universal government which the lower classes under democracy feel 
parallels the seductiveness of pantheism, and of its destruction of the importance of the 
human individual, which attracts the elite.182  In an important passage to which we will 
soon return, Tocqueville describes the social conditions that accompanied the birth of 
Christianity in terms which seem to evoke his predictions for the kind of despotism which 
democratic peoples have to fear. 
At the moment when the Christian religion appeared on earth, Providence, which 
was undoubtedly preparing the world for its coming, had united a great part of the 
human species, like an immense flock, under the scepter of the Caesars.  The men 
who composed that multitude differed much from one another, but they 
nevertheless had this common point: they all obeyed the same laws; and each of 
them was so weak and small in relation to the greatness of the prince that they all 
appeared equal when one came to compare them to him (420). 
 
While Tocqueville here politely attributes this political development to Providence, he 
also makes quite clear that Christianity, in his view, arose out of conditions that can only 
be described as despotic and therefore as destructive of the individual’s sense of his own 
greatness.  At least certain of its virtues, it would not seem far-fetched to suggest, are 
those which are always encouraged by absolute governments: especially humility, 
                                                
182 Just as Tocqueville writes in Democracy in America that he expects democrats in the future to become 
divided between unbelief and the Roman Church, he also observes to Kergorlay that the rich and the poor 
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forgetfulness of injuries, and a lack of political ambition (cf. 485, Tocqueville 1959, 
191).183   
 At occasional points in Democracy in America, and more explicitly in his letters 
to Gobineau, Tocqueville seems to endorse the so-called “secularization thesis,” the idea 
that modern, liberal-democratic morality arose when the aims of Christian ethics were 
somehow brought down to this world.184  Space will obviously not permit a full 
discussion of this aspect of Tocqueville’s thought, but it may be sufficient to note that 
both Christian and democratic morality, in his estimation, share one crucial overriding 
feature: they are both unequivocally hostile to human pride.185  It is true, of course, that 
Tocqueville frequently mentions that the Americans feel great pride—pride in 
themselves, in their freedom, and in their independence.  They are, as he writes, 
“impatient at censure and insatiable for praise.  The slimmest eulogy is agreeable to them 
and the greatest is rarely enough to satisfy them; they pester you at every moment to get 
you to praise them; and if you resist their entreaties, they praise themselves” (585).  But 
from this constant (and somewhat humorous) badgering for praise Tocqueville draws the 
                                                                                                                                            
in America are increasingly drifting towards Unitarianism and Catholicism respectively (Tocqueville 1985, 
51-2; cf. also Kessler 1993). 
183 Tocqueville thus quietly seems to voice a similar criticism of Christianity as Rousseau and Machiavelli.  
The kinship between Christianity and ordinary despotism, however, would appear somewhat limited in 
light of the latter’s tendency to discourage human beings from loving one another (485).  Whether 
Christianity would be more compatible with a soft despotism, whose reduction of men to a herd or a flock 
has some connection with the rise of pity and compassion in modern society, would seem to be less clear. 
184 As Orwin points out, however, the transformation of Christian charity into the Baconian, “purely 
worldly” end of relieving man’s estate “represents a radical transformation of the original” (2000, 145-6).  
Tocqueville’s exchange with Gobineau is discussed and analyzed in Galston 1992, 220-4 and Tessitore 
2005. 
185 This indication, at any rate, is provided by the title of Hobbes’s Leviathan, the “King of the Proud” 
(xxviii.27; Job 41:33-4; cf. also xv.21).  My reflections on pride in this chapter are heavily indebted to the 
work of Mansfield and Winthrop, who also note this common feature of both Christianity and modern 
democracy (2000, xxxii-xxxiii, cf. also lviii-lxvi). 
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reasonable conclusion that there is something “restive and envious” in the American’s 
pride: unlike the (aristocratic) Englishman, whose pride “has no need of nutriment” but 
“lives on itself,” the American’s behavior is indicative of a deep and nagging doubt 
which he feels about his own merit (585).  Thus, as Tocqueville concludes several 
chapters later, the democratic man who seems so excessively proud at first glance 
actually “despises himself,” for “he believes himself made only to taste vulgar pleasures.”   
Therefore, far from believing that one must recommend humility to our 
contemporaries, I should want one to strive to give them a vaster idea of 
themselves and of their species; humility is not healthy for them; what they lack 
most, in my opinion, is pride.  I would willingly trade several of our small virtues 
for this vice (604). 
 
The unhealthy version of the desire for self-forgetting which democracy encourages, and 
which has at least something in common with both pantheism and Christianity, may in 
fact reflect a self-hatred arising from a recognition among democrats of their insignificant 
and vulgar status—a recognition which is all too common in modern democracy because 
it is also all too reflective of reality.  In democracy, where suicide is common (514), men 
remain in a certain respect above themselves, for the capacity to feel self-disgust 
indicates that one has not yet become wholly brutalized.  But, as Tocqueville will also go 
on to indicate, even that barrier currently finds itself under threat of being breached: the 
self-loathing which democrats feel is born of a very real and disturbing sense that they 




HOW THE TRIUMPH OF HUMANITY ENDANGERS HUMANITY 
These considerations on pride occur at the start and the end of a brief sequence of 
chapters which are devoted to a discussion of honor and ambition in the United States 
(II.3.16-19).  After recording the great sense of spiritual satisfaction which the Americans 
exhibit outwardly, Tocqueville shows the reader why that outward pride ultimately 
reveals an inner despondency, and the movement between these two poles is indicative of 
a problem which effects not only the aspirations of individual democrats, but also of 
democracy itself.  After describing the “stubborn,” “jealous,” and boastful (586) character 
of the Americans’ national pride in chapter sixteen of part three, Tocqueville next turns to 
a short discussion of “HOW THE ASPECT OF SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES IS 
AT ONCE AGITATED AND MONOTONOUS” (II.3.17, 587).  This innocuously titled 
chapter begins by conveying the impressions which Tocqueville himself, as a visitor from 
the old aristocratic societies of Europe, must have felt upon arriving in the thoroughly 
modern, industrial democracy that is the United States.  Saluting those pioneers who 
bravely struck out into the wilderness to develop and cultivate the American continent, as 
well as the entrepreneurial spirit of those capitalists who followed in their wake, 
Tocqueville declares that “nothing is more apt to excite and nourish curiosity than the 
aspect of the United States.”  Here everything seems to “vary constantly,” and one could 
“say that unmoving nature itself is moving, so much is it transformed daily by the hand of 
man” (587).  The traveler who witnesses such a novel movement cannot but be excited by 
this tumult, and his excitement would also seem to echo the great hopes, and the 
expectation of a better future, which animated the original architects of this society.  For 
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those authors and statesmen who brought it into being, the Enlightenment project to 
conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate had the character of a grand and noble 
experiment—it understood itself as devoted to a goal whose ambitions were 
unprecedented in human history, and, like Nathaniel Morton and his followers, those who 
were instrumental in its success could claim a few truly deserved rays of glory for 
themselves.   
According to Tocqueville, however, while this experiment may have been 
exciting and glorious to those who were fighting for it on the front lines, now that the 
dust has settled and it has finally been completed, the results are far from remarkable.  “In 
the long term . . . the sight of such an agitated society appears monotonous, and after 
having contemplated this picture of such movement for some time, the spectator gets 
bored” (587).  The Enlightenment and the Revolution were driven, of course, by a desire 
to overturn the inequality which was the defining feature of the old aristocratic societies.  
To raise the overall condition of mankind by eradicating those feudal institutions that 
prevented him from attaining his most basic needs was not only a noble goal, it was one 
which Tocqueville will identify in the next chapter as the very essence of justice.  But the 
same aristocratic hierarchy which forced each man to remain “nearly fixed in his sphere,” 
according to Tocqueville, also produced a rich diversity of “passions, ideas, habits, and 
tastes”—for the great distance that existed between classes under the Old Regime made 
men “prodigiously unalike” (587).  Now that democracy has broken down these ancient 
barriers, this diversity has given way to an unprecedented uniformity:  “all men are alike 
and do things that are nearly alike.”  Individually, of course, they “are subject . . . to great 
 370 
and continual vicissitudes,” but when this is considered from a distance, “the name of the 
actors alone is different, the play is the same” (587).   
In aristocratic centuries society was stagnant—which is to say that, the luxury of a 
few notwithstanding, by modern standards it was wretchedly poor.  In today’s capitalist 
democracies, by contrast, society is prosperous because it is agitated and permeated with 
competition, but the uniform character of that competition makes the excitement which it 
produces seem very boring once it is glimpsed from a bird’s eye view.  In aristocracies, 
the members of one class had no experience of material well-being and were therefore 
“not familiar enough with it to desire it” (507), while those of the other, accustomed to 
such comfort from birth, turned their attention exclusively to “some more difficult and 
greater undertaking” (506).  Because this latter class was “placed in a permanent and 
hereditary manner above the crowd,” it naturally conceived “a high-minded idea of itself 
and of man.”  Without the need to think about providing for its well-being, its members 
could imagine a diverse set of “glorious enjoyments” and fix their efforts on more 
“magnificent goals” (436).  In democracy, however, when ranks are confused and wealth 
is open to all, “birth, condition, and profession no longer distinguish men,” and “there 
remains scarcely anything but money that creates very visible differences between them 
and that can set off some from their peers” (587).  The Americans therefore pour all their 
efforts into the pursuit of wealth and to ostentatious displays of it (586) because that is 
the only means remaining to them of asserting their status and their dignity over and 
against their fellow citizens.  There is only one kind of ambition among citizens in a 
democracy, and that is the desire to grow rich: “Men who live in democratic times have 
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many passions; but most of their passions end in love of wealth or issue from it” (587).  
This gives them all “a family resemblance, and it is not slow to create a tiresome picture” 
(588). 
Remarkably, Tocqueville thus suggests that the reason why the Americans devote 
themselves entirely to the pursuit of material well-being is not itself materialistic.  He 
makes a point of informing the reader that their preoccupation with money arises not 
because “their souls are smaller” but simply because money is much more important in 
the United States than it has ever been anywhere else (587).  Their sense of pride, honor, 
and ambition is just as vibrant as among other peoples, but in an egalitarian society it is 
simply a troubling fact that the desire for distinction and recognition must necessarily be 
channeled in a commercial direction.  But since the result of this is a society 
unprecedentedly uniform in its passions and sentiments, it would also appear fair to say 
that the longing for distinction under democracy produces nothing of the sort.  
Tocqueville thus indicates that there is a fundamental tension in every society between 
diversity and equality, and he claims that America’s resolution of this tension in the 
latter’s favor is also indicative of a trend which is quickly leaving its mark on “almost all 
men of our day” (588). 
Variety is disappearing from within the human species; the same manner of 
acting, thinking, and feeling is found in all the corners of the world.  That comes 
not only from the fact that all peoples deal with each other more and copy each 
other more faithfully, but from the fact that in each country, men diverge further 
and further from the particular ideas and sentiments of a caste, a profession, or a 
family and simultaneously arrive at what depends more nearly on the constitution 
of man, which is everywhere the same (588). 
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To take Tocqueville’s words in their most literal sense, the ascendancy of democracy and 
the collapse of aristocratic inequality have brought to the fore that which all men most 
obviously have in common according to nature: the body.  The immaterial virtues of the 
feudal aristocrat had called for holding the body in contempt, but because this contempt 
was rooted in a sense of dignity that was held to be appropriate only to the members of a 
certain class, those virtues can have only a very precarious place under liberal-
democracy, which embodies the triumph of a newly discovered and fundamentally 
egalitarian conception of human nature.  Here as elsewhere, Tocqueville gives his 
endorsement to the liberal notion of human equality, and he claims that the coming 
‘Americanization’ of the world is inevitable because human nature demands it.  Like 
travelers lost in a forest “in which all the paths end at the same point, . . . [all] peoples 
who take for the object of their studies and imitation, not such and such a man, but man 
himself, will in the end encounter each other in the same mores” (588).  But if the spread 
of America’s way of life represents the triumph of justice, it also represents that of 
monotony and the decline of all those immaterial sentiments which Tocqueville calls 
human greatness, and so it is hard to believe that his understanding of human nature can 
be simply egalitarian. 
 Now, this tension between equality and greatness, between the justice which the 
Enlightenment achieved and the threat to human excellence which it engendered, is of 
course the guiding problem of the entirety of Democracy in America.  But Tocqueville’s 
treatment of it in the following chapter, “ON HONOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES” (589), seems to hold special significance, for he there 
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articulates the cause of this tension between justice and greatness through an account of 
the roots of human moral psychology as a whole.  Tocqueville begins this chapter by 
noting that  
It seems that men make use of two very distinct methods in the public judgment 
that they bring to the actions of those like them: sometimes they judge them 
according to the simple notions of the just and the unjust that are widespread over 
all the earth; sometimes they appraise them with the aid of very particular notions 
that belong only to one country and one period (589).   
 
The first of these methods of judgment (which Tocqueville terms ‘justice’) is born in 
response to the “permanent and general needs” which the human race feels “in all places 
and at all times,” while the second (which he names ‘honor’) reflects the specific needs of 
“more restricted associations”—of particular nations, of castes that reside within nations, 
and even of those numerous small associations and sub-castes which made up the 
intricate patchwork of social relations that existed in aristocratic society (589).  While 
justice may therefore represent the demands of nature and honor those of convention, 
Tocqueville also suggests that it is not quite sufficient to reduce moral psychology to this 
simple dichotomy, for in every human being these conflicting moral sentiments are 
always in some way intertwined with one another, but at the same time, they are always 
somehow distinct.  “Often it happens that these two rules differ; sometimes they combat 
each other; but they are never entirely confused with one another, nor do they ever 
destroy each other” (589).  Since there is always a tension in the soul between nature and 
convention, and since neither can ever be simply victorious over the other, Tocqueville’s 
thought would seem to be that humans by nature are conventional beings, at least in part.  
Every human being must live within a particular society, which must in turn have a 
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particular moral code which is instrumental for its survival but which is also almost 
certain to conflict with the general interests of humanity.  In this sense conventions can 
be said to be ‘natural,’ but since human beings always feel the pull of justice as well, 
their nature will always be more or less deeply divided against itself.  When “men submit 
without hesitation and without murmur” to the requirements of honor, for example, “they 
still feel, by a sort of obscure but powerful instinct, that there exists a more general, older, 
and more holy law which they sometimes disobey without ceasing to recognize” (589). 
 According to Tocqueville, this holy law reflecting the general needs of the human 
race has “naturally” given birth among “all men” to certain ideas of “blame and shame:” 
to evade these needs has been called “to do evil,” while to submit to them has been called 
“to do good” (589, emphasis original).  But Tocqueville also says that what he calls 
justice or “simple virtue” “lives on itself and is satisfied with its own witness” (598), and 
so it would appear that these ideas of blame and shame do not exist in order to provide 
extrinsic support for actions which a clear-sighted person might not find to be good for 
their own sake.  Rather, Tocqueville also associates justice with the demands of reason 
(594, 598), and the sole example of this “holy law” which he gives in this chapter is the 
prohibition against homicide (590).  That the praise and blame associated with justice is 
“natural” and necessary means that it is not conventional; men apparently feel no need to 
endow justice with extra rewards or with notions of glory that make it more attractive.  
Because it simply reflects the natural needs of humanity—the material and bodily 
necessities that must be met in order for human beings simply to live—it does not 
demand great devotions but limits itself instead to outlining a set of simple instructions 
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which it is in the interest of all to follow: it clearly benefits both oneself and one’s 
neighbor if neither has to fear being killed by the other.  Moreover, because justice is 
universal, in theory at least it does not require sacrifice—if men could ever come to take 
their moral bearings solely from the collective self-interest of the human race, there 
would be no cause for conflict and therefore no need for self-overcoming as well. 
 But if the demands of justice are largely free of ambiguity, it is not so with honor.  
Honor, as Tocqueville notes at the outset of this chapter, usually carries two meanings: it 
signifies both the glory or the esteem that one can win as a result of carrying out a certain 
act, as well as “the sum of the rules with the aid of which one obtains this glory” or 
esteem.  Tocqueville claims that in writing this chapter he has always taken the word 
‘honor’ in the latter sense (589 n.1), but it is curious that in his account these two 
meanings never actually seem to be entirely divorced—for the rules of honor by which 
one gains esteem always demand great sacrifices, and those sacrifices are always 
accompanied by the prospect that one can ‘win honor’ by undertaking them.186  Since 
codes of honor exist to serve the interests of particular groups which are set off from, or 
elevated above, the rest of humanity, it should not be surprising that they frequently stress 
certain martial virtues.  The Romans, for example, whose polity “was formed for the 
conquest of the world,” made the words in their language for “virtue” and for “valor” 
literally synonymous (593).  Similarly, the code of honor of the medieval European 
aristocracy—“the most extraordinary species of honor that has ever appeared in the 
world”—was constructed to facilitate the needs of a warrior nobility which “formed a 
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separate body amidst the people” (590).  To maintain its superior social position, “it had 
to have virtues and vices for its use” (590), and it therefore needed particularly to honor 
what Tocqueville calls “the virtues that have greatness and luster and that can be readily 
combined with pride and love of power” (591).  Born “of war and for war” (591), it 
needed to preserve its rule by esteeming above all else great military courage and loyalty 
to one’s superior.  Thus, “it imperiously commanded men to overcome themselves, it 
ordered the forgetting of oneself” (591) in battle and the sacrifice of one’s life out of 
loyalty to one’s lord (592).   
 Because every association has “special interests” (593) which conflict with those 
of other associations—to say nothing of humanity as a whole—to maintain their position 
they must always ask their members to take risks and overcome themselves for the sake 
of this narrowly-construed common good.  Even the Americans, who honor commerce 
rather than war, esteem those who “brave the furies of the ocean to arrive sooner at port” 
or “tolerate without complaint the miseries of the wilderness” (595).  In other words, all 
codes of honor praise—and thus call good—actions which are in reality bad for an 
individual but good for the group.  This may be what Tocqueville has in mind when he 
says that they all contain maxims that are “incoherent and . . . bizarre” (591), for if an 
individual were clear-sighted and knew that his actions only aimed at the good of his 
group, he might question why he should sacrifice his own good—and his own life—for 
its sake.  Unaware of this problem, he thinks simultaneously that he renounces his own 
good for that of his group and that, in so doing, he acquires some good of his own in the 
                                                                                                                                            
186 Koritansky (1986, 136) similarly notes that honor must always carry both of these meanings, but he 
 377 
form of honor.  As Tocqueville writes, members of aristocracies perceive their code of 
conduct as “the distinctive feature of their physiognomy; they apply its different rules”—
including those mandating self-sacrifice—“with all the ardor of personal interest and, if I 
can express myself so, they put passion into obeying it” (597).  According to Tocqueville, 
it was precisely this tension-ridden sentiment that provided the moral foundation of those 
magnificent and difficult undertakings that were characteristic of life under aristocracy.  
It allowed those who were born into an elevated position to put on display what he calls 
“the virtues that have greatness and luster” (591), those grandiose and admirable acts of 
self-overcoming “that often dazzle, but still more often bring trouble in society” (594). 
 The somewhat uncomfortable truth that Tocqueville points to here, then, is that 
what he calls human greatness necessarily accompanies the presence of violence and 
inequality.  Moreover, the reverse of this is also true: as the class distinctions that gave 
birth to these rules of honor begin to break down, society can be expected to become 
more orderly, more rational, more pacific, and more in touch with those natural needs of 
humanity whose procurement does not require outstanding acts of willful self-assertion 
and self-sacrifice.  The “complete and detailed code” (597) of honor that was found in the 
Middle Ages resulted from the fact that the lines between ranks were clearly delineated, 
but as these distinctions begin to blur, the rules of honor will become “less numerous” 
and more vague.  They will be “limited to a few precepts,” and these “will be less and 
less distant from the moral laws adopted by common humanity” (596).  The Americans in 
the 19th century—who have no hostile neighbors—still have a sense of honor, but since it 
                                                                                                                                            
does not stress its sacrificial element. 
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casts blame on the warlike virtues of the Middle Ages (594), one could say that it is 
closer to justice than the moral outlook of the feudal aristocracy.  Their code of honor 
praises the courage that is necessary to conquer nature and settle the wilderness, but “the 
wildernesses are filling up” (298), and so it would seem that its days too are numbered.  
As the frontier closes and modernity settles in, honor can be expected to approach more 
and more those “simple and general notions of good and evil” (599) that reflect the most 
basic, natural needs of mankind.  And as Tocqueville previously suggested, this 
development will likely be accompanied by a gradual breaking-down of national barriers.  
As “all the peoples of the world . . . come to the point of having the same interests and 
the same needs” (599), a version of what is now called the Democratic Peace will be 
established.  Borders will reflect political and administrative divisions rather than 
national and cultural ones, and a cosmopolitan society which understands itself as 
devoted to the procurement of the most simple and basic—which is to say, bodily—
human needs will look upon martial virtue as the Americans already do: as a “blind and 
barbaric fury” (594) that is now safely consigned to the realm of history.  In 
Tocqueville’s predicted future, in other words, society will be more peaceful but souls 
really will be smaller, for as morality becomes less complex, less confused, more 
rationalized, and more reflective of the need simply to preserve human life, those great 
but ultimately confused longings for distinction and self-affirmation that were present 
under aristocracy will fade into oblivion. 
 Now of course, in Volume I Tocqueville had suggested that the presence of these 
longings is what distinguishes humans from the other beings, and at the opening of this 
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chapter on honor he claimed that mankind could never live by justice alone.  The 
conclusion of this chapter then, would seem necessarily to point to the possibility that 
humanity itself may be coming under threat.  Indeed, as Tocqueville now turns to a 
discussion of the precarious place of ambition within liberal-democracy, he seems to 
make clear the danger of just such a nightmare scenario.  He opens this chapter by 
reflecting on a seemingly strange spectacle that is present in America: in spite of the fact 
that there are no obstacles in the United States “that would limit desires and prevent them 
from soaring in all directions” (599), one can scarcely encounter there anything 
resembling those truly grand ambitions that were found under aristocracy.  Americans are 
universally “devoured by the desire to rise, but one sees almost none of them who appear 
to nourish vast hopes or to aim very high.  All want constantly to acquire goods, 
reputation, power; few envision all these things on a grand scale” (599).  This strange 
discordance between the large number of ambitions and their ultimately petty aims is of 
course especially striking because it seems to undercut the hopes which are most 
commonly associated with liberal-democracy—a kind of polity which, in Spinoza’s 
thought, was supposed to be populated by citizens self-consciously pursuing what they 
thought of as the summum bonum. 
  But Spinoza and the other architects of liberalism lived under aristocracy, and so 
Tocqueville suggests that it is not surprising that their thought, and that of the 
revolutionary generation that followed them, should have been animated by truly grand 
hopes for what liberal-democracy could accomplish.  When equality was established in 
France, he writes, ambitions bloomed there “almost without limit,” but this was because 
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at that moment the door to “a long-envied greatness” had finally opened (600).  Indeed, 
in every “revolution that overturns an aristocracy,” “nothing seems impossible to 
anyone,” and desires become boundless precisely because the spirit of the aristocracy 
then “drifts over the mass.”  The people who have lived under its laws, who have “seen 
its splendors,” and have allowed themselves, “without knowing it, to be pervaded with 
the sentiments and ideas that it had conceived,” now undertake great efforts to satisfy 
these passions that have always lay dormant within them (600).  But if this is the greatest 
instance of aristocratic passion, it is also the last one, and indeed, it is the only instance in 
which all of these great longings are made truly accessible to all.  As the revolutionary 
generation dies and the last “remains of aristocracy finally disappear,” one “forgets the 
great events that accompanied its fall.”  As “repose succeeds war, the empire of rules 
reigns within the new world” (600). 
 The revolution that overturns an aristocracy might therefore be compared to a war 
to end all wars—something which, for a lover of battles and a seeker after glory, would 
almost certainly entail the greatest opportunity and the greatest disappointment.  For once 
this greatest and most fulfilling struggle has been waged successfully, such grand 
passions no longer have a place.  Instead, when a democracy reaches its “permanent and 
normal state” (601), equality both unleashes and limits ambition.  It “gives some 
resources to all” but “very extensive resources” to none, and this causes citizens to 
recognize that since they “cannot habitually aim very high,” they must focus all their 
energies on “coveting [the] petty objects” that are within their reach (601).  Thus, what 
“above all turns men of democracies away from great ambition is not the smallness of 
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their fortune, but the violent effort they make every day to pursue it.  They compel the 
soul to employ all its strength in doing mediocre things—which cannot fail soon to limit 
its view and circumscribe its power” (601).  What Tocqueville thus suggests is that 
among democratic peoples ambitions can be expected to turn in on themselves and thus 
in effect to destroy themselves.  Like the American sailor whom Tocqueville described in 
Volume I, men in democratic times can be expected to put the violent and restive efforts 
of the soul in the service of the pursuit of the goods of the body—which will lead in the 
short run to the disappearance of immaterial longings, and which may also in time 
threaten the existence of even those few, low-aiming, passions that remain. 
 Now, to be sure, at several points in Democracy in America Tocqueville insists 
that the comfort and preservation of the body requires, and will therefore lead to, the 
cultivation of the soul.  He suggests, for example, that no prosperous people has existed 
that is not also a free people (514-5), that the practical part of the sciences depends upon 
the purely theoretical part (434), and, in short, that in men “the angel teaches the brute the 
art of satisfying itself” (521).  But Tocqueville also provides contrary suggestions—
which leads one to suspect that these former claims are intended to convince democrats, 
by speaking to them on their own terms, of the need to pay attention to the improvement 
of their souls.  He claims that in China, “where equality of conditions is very great and 
very old” (602), the progress of the sciences, and indeed, of civilization itself, eventually 
reached a point where it simply came to a stop.  In this orderly and administrative state, 
human knowledge dried up, but “material well-being” remained present; society was 
peaceful, revolutions “were very rare, and war was so to speak unknown” (438-9).  
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Tocqueville’s description of China therefore seems to foreshadow his later prediction of 
the soft despotism which democratic nations have to fear.  It shows that a civilization 
which is not overrun by barbarians can still die a peaceful death (439), because it may be 
possible after all for a centrally-organized administrative state to provide human beings 
with the material well-being which they covet.187   
Unfortunately, according to Tocqueville, the dimming of ambitions that occurs 
once democracy establishes itself prepares the way for just such a possibility.  As the 
great aristocratic passions die out, they can be expected to be replaced by a rational 
standard that imposes a set of uniform rules on the great mass of individuals.   
In a democratic society, as elsewhere, there are only a certain number of great 
fortunes to be made; and as the careers that lead to them are open indiscriminately 
to each citizen, the progress of all must be slowed.  As the candidates appear 
nearly similar, and as it is difficult to make a choice among them without 
violating the principle of equality, which is the supreme law of democratic 
societies, the first idea that presents itself is to make all advance at the same pace 
and to subject all to the same tests (602).     
 
In such an atmosphere, “youth is lost and . . . imagination [is] extinguished;” the longings 
for greatness that from time to time naturally appear in the young and ambitious are 
boxed in until they suffocate (602).  The result is a collection of individuals who are as 
uninspired and un-erotic as the hero of a Chinese novel who “touches the heart of his 
mistress by passing an examination well.  Great ambitions breathe uneasily in such an 
atmosphere” (602).   
                                                
187 Cf. Tocqueville’s description of a ‘soft despotism’ at the end of the work.  Such a state provides for 
citizens’ security, “foresees and secures their needs, facilitates their pleasures, conducts their principal 
affairs, directs their industry, regulates their estates, divides their inheritances; can it not take away from 
them entirely the trouble of thinking and the pain of living” (663)? 
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 If the paucity of ambition under democracy seems to forebode the eventual 
dimming, and even the virtual eradication of human eros, then, it would also appear to be 
the case that even those extremely “great ambitions” which do arise from time to time 
“despite these natural obstacles” suffer from a similar problem.  Tocqueville claims that 
when grander ambitions are found under democracy, the destruction of the institutional 
restraints which were present under aristocracy renders them more dangerous and gives 
them a more “violent and revolutionary character” than existed in these former ages 
(603).  But although “they believe they can dare all,” even to the point of overturning the 
state, the longings of those who possess such ambitions nevertheless remain decisively 
shaped by the democratic society in which they came of age.  Their passions are tinged 
with “very vulgar tastes” and mores, and so they tend to desire not glory but only the 
power that is necessary to make others obey.  Or rather, they seek power “only to procure 
small and coarse pleasures [for themselves] more easily” (603).  But although 
Tocqueville does predict that this kind of ambition will pose a danger for a healthy 
democracy, he closes this chapter by conceding that the paucity of democratic ambition 
remains his main concern: “for democratic societies I dread the audacity much less than 
the mediocrity of desires” (604).   
Since both of these dangers, after all, are rooted in the threat which equality poses 
to human passions, one of the most important tasks of “the heads of these new 
societies”—of the democratic legislator who has been instructed by Tocqueville’s 
political science—must be to preserve some sense of those grand, immaterial desires that 
characterized aristocracy.  To re-instill democratic citizens with a genuine sense of pride, 
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it will be “good to give them difficult and perilous affairs . . . in order to elevate ambition 
and to open a theater for it” (604).  Although such projects could likely to take peaceful 
forms as well, it would seem very likely that Tocqueville is here referring to war (and 
perhaps also to imperialism).  War, after all, was the necessary condition for what 
Tocqueville in the previous chapter called the “virtues that . . . dazzle” (594).  And as he 
states a few chapters later, “war almost always enlarges the thought of a people and 
elevates its heart.  There are cases where only it can arrest the excessive development of 
certain penchants that equality naturally gives rise to, and where, for certain deep-seated 
maladies to which democratic societies are subject, it must be considered almost 
necessary” (620-1).188  As Tocqueville made clear in his chapter on honor, those maladies 
include a forgetting of the notion of self-sacrifice and the ascendency of a purely 
‘rationalistic’ outlook which inclines citizens to concern themselves solely with the goods 
of the body and with the pursuit of material well-being.  The belief of democratic citizens 
that they are suited to nothing immaterial, and that they are “made only to taste vulgar 
pleasures” (604), is at the root of their self-hatred—as we will see more clearly below, it 
is beginning to convince them that they are descending to the level of the animals.  Thus, 
war and other grand projects can re-instill a healthy sense of pride in democrats because 
                                                
188 It is passages such as these which provoke Banfield’s opposition to “the illiberal Tocqueville” (Banfield 
1991, ch. 3).  In light of contemporary sentiments, this criticism is understandable, and certainly there is no 
aspect of Tocqueville’s thought that is more jarring to modern ears than his gentlemanly praise of war.  But 
Banfield’s confident statement that “we [now] know” that individualism and materialism “need not destroy 
. . . public virtue” (p. 52) is arguably not so self-evidently true.  Tocqueville’s call for a re-awakening of 
patriotism and public-spiritedness is intended to show democracy that it faces a problem that perhaps 
cannot be so easily solved—but he is confident that this advice will not be taken too harshly because he 
speaks as a friend of liberty.  Because Tocqueville does speak as a partisan of individual freedom, 
Banfield’s characterization of his thought as “reminiscent of Robespierre” (p. 49) almost certainly goes too 
far.  For a more measured view, see Koritansky 1986, 141. 
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they will also help to preserve those distinctly human notions of self-contempt and self-
overcoming which gave the deeds of the feudal aristocrat so much “greatness and luster” 
(591).  But as Tocqueville also made clear in his discussion of honor, the idea of sacrifice 
will always be accompanied by that of recompense, and, as he states in another place, 
“there are a great number of sacrifices that can find their recompense only in the other 
world” (504).  Thus, in order to retain some remnant of those tension-ridden but 
ultimately resplendent longings which were widespread under aristocracy but which 
democracy endangers, it will be necessary first and foremost to preserve what 
Tocqueville calls “the most precious inheritance from aristocratic centuries,” namely 
religion (519). 
 
TOCQUEVILLE’S RELIGIOUS PROJECT 
 In Volume I Tocqueville had emphasized the importance of religion for the health 
of republicanism in America, and although he had stressed there that belief remains 
strong in the United States because man has a natural longing for immortality, he also 
quietly indicated that that longing is not quite as robust in America as he appears to 
suggest.  Indeed, as Tocqueville goes on in Volume II to describe the pathologies 
afflicting the democratic soul, he confirms this latter suggestion, and he indicates how it 
has come about that the human desire for the eternal is now under threat, and thus why it 
is that what “ought to be, in our day, the natural state of men in the matter of religion” 
(286, emphasis original) has not in fact come to be established.  The restiveness which 
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the Americans feel in the midst of their well-being, and more importantly, their ever-
increasing self-hatred in a society which directs them exclusively to the pursuit of the 
goods of the body, are signs of the “moral violence” (284) that modernity has committed 
against human nature.  In a possible allusion to the Enlightenment’s project, Tocqueville 
associates the notion “of vanquishing and outwitting nature” with aristocracy (509).  The 
original idea of modernity was conceived in a society in which great passions led the 
most outstanding human beings to conceive of the kind of grand projects whose existence 
is now imperiled (523).  Even when these took a material form, they were still grandiose, 
and one can say that they therefore were still products more of the soul than of the body.  
Such was the case with the Enlightenment, but now that the latter’s conquest of nature 
has succeeded, it is no longer a question “of depleting the universe in order better to 
satiate the passions of man; it is about adding a few toises to one’s fields, planting an 
orchard, enlarging a residence, making life easier and more comfortable at each instant, 
preventing inconvenience, and satisfying the least needs without effort and almost 
without cost” (509).  Because “the soul clings” to these small efforts, it allows them to be 
placed “between it and God.”  It risks forgetting the idea of devotion and sacrifice, and of 
the immortality that can be attained through them, and it concentrates its efforts instead 
on the more straightforward and clear-sighted pursuit of the material.  “Thus there could 
well be established in the world a sort of honest materialism that does not corrupt souls, 
but softens them and in the end quietly loosens all their tensions” (509).189 
                                                
189 The word ressorts here is more literally (and commonly) translated as “springs of action” (cf. 
Tocqueville 2010, 938) but Mansfield and Winthrop’s choice of “tensions” seems to capture how 
 387 
 In Volume I Tocqueville had claimed that what distinguishes man from the other 
animals is a tension-ridden (but single) desire which combines self-disgust and self-
affirmation.  Similarly, in Volume II he identifies two things that separate us from the 
beasts: the belief in the possibility of self-perfection (427), and the capacity for self-
sacrifice (521-2).190  The easing of tensions which democratic materialism brings about 
therefore also threatens the existence of what is distinctly human: materialism in the 
ordinary sense places the soul in jeopardy because it encourages the acceptance of 
materialism in the philosophic sense.  Tocqueville writes that if he had lived in an 
aristocracy he would have attempted to direct “the human mind toward physical studies,” 
but he cautions that in the times in which we live, excessive pre-occupation with the 
physical may lead man finally to “degrade himself” (518-9).  He cautions that the 
excessive taste for material enjoyments that characterizes democratic life can be expected 
to dispose human beings to think that “all is nothing but matter.”  Those who believe that 
there is nothing spiritual will understandably turn their exclusive attention to material 
enjoyments, which they will pursue “with an insane ardor. Such is the fatal circle into 
which democratic nations are propelled” (519).  
 To combat this danger, Tocqueville calls upon the democratic “legislator” to 
utilize his “art,” which “consists in discerning well and in advance the natural inclinations 
of human societies” in order to know when to assist and when to restrain them (518).  
                                                                                                                                            
Tocqueville understands the complicated and paradoxical psychological basis of what he calls the “precious 
goods that make for the glory and the greatness of the human species” (509).  
190 In the first passage referred to, Tocqueville states that the endeavor to perfect oneself is the only thing 
that distinguishes man from the animals, which, when taken with his subsequent statement about the 
distinctly human character of self-sacrifice, would seem to suggest that these are in fact two aspects of the 
same, single longing. 
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Examining the characteristics of human societies as they fluctuate according “to time and 
place” (7), the new political science, armed with Tocqueville’s insights into the needs of 
the soul, will attempt to address those permanent requirements of human nature as they 
present themselves in specific, historically contingent ways.  If he had lived centuries 
earlier, Tocqueville may have encouraged the weakening of religious beliefs—at least to 
a certain extent—but in the materialistic age in which we live his advice is unequivocal: 
“Legislators of democracies and all honest and enlightened men” must “apply themselves 
relentlessly to raising up souls and keeping them turned toward Heaven” (519).  
Qualifying to a considerable extent his statements in Volume I about the omnipotence of 
the majority and the weakness of democratic governments, he now seems to indicate that 
“philosophers and those who govern” (523) can influence the sovereign power of public 
opinion, at least to a limited extent.  But those limitations would seem to be expansive 
enough to permit certain unnamed individuals “who are interested in the future of 
democratic societies” to spread within them “a taste for the infinite, a sentiment of 
greatness, and a love of immaterial pleasures” (519).  To this end, the most important task 
of those who answer Tocqueville’s call will be to combat, as “the natural enemies” of a 
democratic people, all those who profess “those harmful theories that tend to make it 
believed that everything perishes with the body” (519).   
 Now, Tocqueville’s advice to this newly empowered group of democratic 
legislators is famously—or perhaps infamously—low-aiming.  He tells them that they 
must work to promote a belief—any belief—in something immaterial, and that they can 
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do this only by acting as if they believe, even if they do not (521).191  “Surely,” he writes, 
“metempsychosis is not more reasonable than materialism,” but “if a democracy 
absolutely had to make a choice between the two . . . I would judge that its citizens risk 
brutalizing themselves less by thinking that their soul is going to pass into the body of a 
pig than in believing it is nothing” (519-20).  Tocqueville here seems most obviously to 
suggest that even though metempsychosis and materialism are equally false and absurd 
(cf. 418), because the former endows men with at least a semblance of pride and a longer 
view of things, it contains something salutary.  But Tocqueville’s claim that it is “not 
more reasonable” than materialism may also imply of these two beliefs materialism is the 
more rational.  Unassisted reason, he may be suggesting, can not teach us that there is a 
soul or that it is immortal; left to its own lights, the human mind can conclude only that 
the universe, mankind included, is composed solely of matter.  Materialism would 
therefore seem to be the logical endpoint of that craving for unity and rationality which 
attracts the democratic mind to pantheism.  In opposing it, Tocqueville seems to speak, if 
not as a defender of unreason, then at least as a proponent of the Pascalian position that 
reason unassisted is capable only of discovering its own limitations.  As we will see more 
clearly below, however, Tocqueville critiques this very position elsewhere in Democracy 
in America, and he here associates his own view not with Pascal—whose absence here is 
                                                
191 Interestingly, Tocqueville predicts that this latter piece of advice will harm him “in the eyes of 
politicians,” not of the pious.  Given the thrust of this chapter, his suggestion may be that this is a 
somewhat desperate remedy born of the fact that, for all politically relevant purposes, there are no more 
pious.  The only way to re-instill a semblance of genuine religiosity in citizens is therefore to have 
governments “teach” them to know, love, and respect religion by their actions (521).   
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notable, given the many references to him throughout the work—but with the 
“philosophy” of Socrates and Plato (520). 
 According to Tocqueville, that materialism is in fact not so ‘reasonable’ after all 
is evident from a plain contradiction that can be found in the works of those thinkers who 
espouse it.  Although “their system could be of some utility to man” if it could give “him 
a modest idea of himself, . . . they do not make anyone else see that this should be so; and 
when they believe they have sufficiently established that they are only brutes, they show 
themselves as proud as if they had demonstrated they were gods” (519).  The self-
contradiction of the materialists seems to characterize the philosopher as Spinoza 
conceives of him, someone who takes great pride in achieving a finis ultimus that consists 
in recognizing that man can never be more than a mere particle of nature.  To the extent 
that the thinkers of the Enlightenment tended to promote an ultimately materialistic view 
of man, Tocqueville seems to suggest, they found themselves unable to give an account 
of their own way of life.  Not unreasonably, Spinoza claimed an exalted dignity for the 
manner of existence characteristic of the philosopher, but that dignity was founded on a 
paradoxical—Tocqueville might say incoherent—recognition that neither the universe 
nor the human soul supports such a thing in any way.  In contrast to the materialists, “It is 
not certain that Socrates and his school had decided opinions about what would happen to 
man in the other life; but the sole belief on which they were settled, that the soul has 
nothing in common with the body and that it survives it, was enough to give Platonic 
philosophy the sort of sublime spark that distinguishes it” (520). 
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 Notably, here as elsewhere in Democracy in America, Tocqueville does not claim 
in his own name to believe that the soul survives the body.  Instead, what he most highly 
praises about the Socratic school concerns not so much what its members apparently 
believed about the other life, but instead the rhetorical effect which their profession of 
this belief produced.   
When one reads Plato, one perceives that in the times prior to him, and in his 
time, many writers existed who extolled materialism.  These writers have not 
come down to us or have come only very incompletely.  Thus it has been in 
almost all centuries: most of the great literary reputations have been joined to 
spiritualism.  The instinct and the taste of the human race sustain this doctrine; 
they often preserve it despite men themselves, and they make the names of those 
attached to it persist (520). 
 
In this brief passage, Tocqueville identifies himself not only as having read Plato, but as 
having learned from him a certain manner of writing appropriate to a historical situation 
which they both share in common.192  Like Plato, Tocqueville too is writing at a time 
when materialism is prevalent, and it may not be too much of an overstatement to suggest 
that it is the widespread success of a politicized form of Epicureanism which accounts in 
large part for the otherwise vast differences between the worlds in which these two 
authors lived.193  Spinoza, it should be recalled, professed admiration for Epicurus and 
the ancient atomists, and he derided Plato for his spiritualist opinions and for so defaming 
Democritus that his works were all burned (Spinoza 1995, 279).  By drawing attention to 
a rhetorical task which he shares with Plato—the same rhetorical task which succeeded in 
ensuring that the works of the Greek materialists failed to survive—Tocqueville also 
                                                
192 For Tocqueville’s Platonic manner of writing, see Lawler 1993, 96.  Lawler, however, does not find a 
substantive similarity between Tocqueville and the Socratics. 
193 Cf. Strauss 1965, 37-52. 
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indicates his intention to combat, albeit to the limited extent that remains possible, the 
influence of those “champions of modern civilization” whose stunted understanding of 
the human soul risks making “man into matter” (11).   
 But Tocqueville’s professed rhetorical alliance with Plato would also seem to 
reflect a more substantive agreement with him, for as Tocqueville indicates, the 
tremendous success which Plato achieved in making his name persist was rooted in his 
awareness of the “instinct and the taste of the human race” (520).  In contrast to the 
modern materialists, whose lack of this awareness is indicated by their failure to 
recognize and account for their own pride, the work of both Plato and Tocqueville is 
distinguished by a recognition that the “soul has needs that must be satisfied” and that 
those needs incline men permanently to a “love of what is immortal.”  Tocqueville insists 
that this love, which Plato called eros, can be hindered or deformed, but never destroyed 
(510), and he therefore appears to indicate that the chief defect of modern materialist 
thought was its failure to recognize this.  Although materialism may therefore be 
completely ‘reasonable,’ at least in a certain sense, the self-contradiction of the thinkers 
who espouse it provides powerful evidence that it in their attempt to judge what is 
irrational and vulgar from the standpoint of what reason teaches, they failed to take 
seriously and to do justice to the irrational longings that distinguish a truly human soul.  
In this respect at least, Tocqueville appears to be a proponent of a richer and more 
complete, Socratic rationalism. 
 Because the soul has needs that must be satisfied, and because no political 
arrangement can make those needs disappear, it follows, according to Tocqueville, that 
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liberal-democracy can ignore them only at its own peril.  In a short but important 
discussion of the “exalted and almost fierce spiritualism” of the Americans, Tocqueville 
appears to warn that, since contemporary liberalism is rooted in a philosophical tradition 
that is unaware of the depth of the desire for immortality in human beings, it risks 
bringing about a ferocious and perhaps uncontrollable eruption of it.  Observing what 
historians have referred to as the Second Great Awakening, Tocqueville describes the 
“bizarre sects” which have arisen in the American wilderness.  “Religious follies,” he 
writes, are common in America, and from time to time they attract whole families who 
leave their comfortable lives in the East and who, trekking out into the wild, “forget for 
several days and nights the care of their affairs and even the most pressing needs of the 
body” (510).  Unlike Spinoza, who almost certainly would not expect a liberal-
democracy to produce new prophets or claims of divine experiences, Tocqueville here 
seems to indicate that he would not be surprised by the emergence of a man like Joseph 
Smith: “I would be surprised if mysticism did not soon make progress in a people 
uniquely preoccupied with its own well-being” (511).  But his assessment of these raw 
and uncontrolled outbursts of religiosity is almost entirely negative—indeed, he presents 
these “follies” not so much as a legitimate manifestation of religious desire but as an 
unpredicted backlash which has been produced by a political order that has given no 
outlet for more moderate and restrained religious longings.  As he writes, if “the minds of 
the great majority of the human race were ever concentrated on the search for material 
goods alone, one can expect that an enormous reaction would be produced,” as “some 
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men” who were chained too tightly to the goods of the body would “throw themselves 
head over heels” into a concern for those of the soul (510, emphasis added).194 
 If this is true, then it follows that the classic Enlightenment solution to the 
problem of fanaticism—that of toleration and the spread of commerce—is likely to 
increase, rather than diminish, religious zeal.  As he writes, “It is said that the 
persecutions of the emperors and the tortures of the circus peopled the deserts of the 
Thebaid; but I think that it was rather the delights of Rome and the Epicurean philosophy 
of Greece.”  Unlike Locke, for example, who suggests in The Reasonableness of 
Christianity that the rise of religious zealotry is connected to poverty and persecution, 
Tocqueville insists that the outbreak of religious feeling which occurred around the time 
of Jesus was in effect created by a Roman regime which, like its American counterpart 
centuries later, “imprisoned” the human spirit within the limits of materialism (511).  
Christianity therefore “may have pushed the glorification of the spirit to excessive 
lengths,” as Tocqueville candidly wrote to Gobineau, but it was apparently “swept to 
[such] spiritual excesses” by the widespread loss of religious faith, and by the tremendous 
influence of Epicureanism, which occurred as the old pagan religions became discredited 
without being replaced by anything spiritual (Tocqueville 1959, 206-7).  Tocqueville’s 
                                                
194 As previously mentioned, Tocqueville has often been criticized, not wholly unreasonably, for failing to 
ascertain that the greatest political danger which would present itself in the century after his own would not 
be a soft-despotism, but a set of regimes which would surpass all precedents for human cruelty.  While it is 
no doubt true that Tocqueville’s prediction of the decline of human passions would seem to sit uneasily 
with the rise of ideology in the twentieth century, his discussion here of the “enormous reaction” which 
modern bourgeois materialism was likely to produce would seem to permit one to form a Tocquevillian 
explanation of the reaction that did occur—even if it did not take an explicitly religious form.  Moreover, 
here as in his chapter on ambition, Tocqueville predicts a twin danger facing democracy: excessive and 
limitless passion, on the one hand, and the mediocrity of desires, on the other.  If these manifest themselves 
politically as soft despotism and hard despotism respectively, then one could say that these are two 
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analysis in his chapter on America’s exalted spiritualism, in other words, would seem to 
begin to convey his understanding of how Christianity originated, and why it became so 
popular so quickly.  Like those “bizarre sects” whom Tocqueville observed in the 
American wilderness, the religion of Jesus was a ferocious, self-abnegating counter-
reaction to a political order which had taken selfishness to humanly unacceptable lengths. 
 As previously indicated, Tocqueville writes at one point that Jesus Christ was the 
first person ever to teach that men are “naturally alike and equal” (413), and shortly after 
this he notes that the Roman Empire under which he lived shared many of the potentially 
unfavorable characteristics of contemporary democracy: the equality of all men before a 
vast, impersonal state; a sense of isolation and individual weakness (420); and, as we 
have now seen, the spread of a materialist philosophy that in turn instilled an excessive 
preoccupation with the enjoyments of the body (511).  When these statements are put 
together, it is easy to see why Tocqueville considers Christianity to be the religion which 
is most suitable for democratic times.  And yet, the fact that so many of Christianity’s 
egalitarian qualities seem to reflect democracy’s most dangerous tendencies should give 
us pause before coming to the conclusion that Tocqueville seeks simply to preserve its 
influence.  Because they crave unity and coherence, Tocqueville writes, men “who are 
alike and equal” are prone to conceive of “the notion of a single God imposing the same 
rules on each of them and granting them future happiness at the same price” (420).  Since 
the human mind will always seek to harmonize heaven and earth (275), the same 
tendency that inclines democratic peoples to centralize political authority and to create an 
                                                                                                                                            
manifestations of the same threat: for the inhabitants of a soft despotism are not likely to put up much 
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administrative “empire of rules” (600) also leads them to worship “a single omnipotent 
being, dispensing the same laws to each man equally in the same manner” (421)—a Deity 
who presides over a theological order which appears quite similar to the Chinese-style 
bureaucracy that threatens to suffocate grand ambitions by stifling human pride.   
 Analyzing religion once again “from a purely human point of view” (419), 
Tocqueville thus provides a naturalistic explanation not only for why a religion hostile to 
human pride first arose and then spread with ferocious rapidity under the Roman Empire, 
but also for why that same hostility has again become present under the conditions of 
modern democracy.  Now, to be sure, Tocqueville first posits this explanation of “the 
influence exerted over religious beliefs by the social and political state” merely as a 
hypothesis, but he then claims that its “proof came after the destruction of the Empire” 
(420). 
As the Roman world was then shattering, so to speak, into a thousand shards, each 
nation returned to its former individuality.  Inside those nations, ranks were soon 
graduated to infinity; races were marked out, castes partitioned each nation into 
several peoples.  In the midst of this common effort that seemed to bring human 
societies to subdivide themselves into as many fragments as it was possible to 
conceive, Christianity did not lose sight of the principal general ideas it had 
brought to light.  But it nonetheless appeared to lend itself, as much as it could, to 
the new tendencies arising from the fragmentation of the human species.  Men 
continued to adore one God alone as creator and preserver of all things; but each 
people, each city, and so to speak each man, believed himself able to obtain some 
separate privilege and to create for himself particular protectors before the 
sovereign master.  Unable to divide the Divinity, they at least multiplied it and 
magnified its agents beyond measure; the homage due to angels and saints 
became an almost idolatrous worship for most Christians, and one could fear a 
moment might come when the Christian religion would regress to the religions it 
had defeated (420-1).   
 
                                                                                                                                            
resistance when a hard despotism finally invades. 
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Tocqueville here suggests that the historical record provides us with the results of a grand 
experiment that reveals how religious beliefs naturally adapt themselves to different 
social and political circumstances.  At the height of the Middle Ages, when humanity was 
divided and individuals could form a sense of their own greatness, the Christian 
commandment against pride became almost a dead letter, and Christianity itself 
accordingly turned into a kind of crypto-paganism.  At the same time, however, 
Christianity “did not lose sight of the principal general ideas it had brought to light”: it 
reigned as a democratic inheritance from the age which had preceded it, and, as 
Tocqueville indicated in the introduction, it was able to hold in check—if only to a 
limited extent—some of the more pernicious inegalitarian tendencies of aristocracy.  
Conversely, it would appear that when Tocqueville calls for “religion” to be preserved 
“as the most precious inheritance from aristocratic centuries” (519), he is referring not to 
the original Christianity of the time of Jesus, but to the individualistic and prideful brand 
of piety that was dominant in the almost un-Christian Middle Ages.    
 Now of course, as Tocqueville also makes clear, the capacity to instill such beliefs 
in democratic times will be extremely limited.  One could say that, if Tocqueville has his 
way, religion in the future will be ninety nine percent democratic and only one percent 
aristocratic, but it is precisely by conceding that ninety nine percent that it will be able to 
establish the one percent that is critical for retaining some conception of human 
individuality in times of equality.  Thus, when Tocqueville gives some practical 
suggestions to those who are in charge of regulating religions in democratic centuries, he 
instructs them to make sure not to alienate the faithful by breaking from the tendencies of 
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their age, but he presents these concessions as steps which can help to ensure that 
democrats accept at least a minimally aristocratic brand of piety.  He cautions them to be 
mindful of the ultra-monotheistic tendencies of democrats and not to allow the worship of 
secondary agents to be confused with that due to the Creator; he warns them “not to 
struggle unnecessarily” against the hostility to religious forms and ceremonies which 
arises from the democratic “philosophic method” (421); and most importantly, he advises 
them not to seek to destroy the “mother passion” of democratic times—the love of 
material well-being (422).  In each of these cases, Tocqueville informs the legislators of 
the new societies of what they must do to ensure that they do not simply alienate their 
audience, for if one attempts to steer democratic citizens away from the beliefs that they 
already accept, it is to be feared that in jumping from one faith to another they will fall 
into an abyss of materialism (518).  The caretakers of democratic religion must therefore 
be sure to please the majority “in all that is not contrary to faith” (423), but this last 
qualification is important.  Speaking for the moment as a partisan of aristocratic 
religiosity, Tocqueville claims to “believe firmly in the necessity of forms” (421).  
Because ceremonies “fix the mind in the contemplation of abstract truths,” they help to 
preserve “the dogma” which is the core of all religions, but if they are multiplied beyond 
measure they will only serve to create an unbelieving democratic multitude (421-2).  
Similarly, although religion in the future should not seek to destroy the passion for 
material well-being, it can still “purify, regulate, and restrain the too ardent and too 
exclusive taste” for it which men feel in times of equality (422, emphasis added). 
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 Tocqueville, of course, never informs the reader what his personal religious 
beliefs are.  He does acknowledge, however, that if he had lived in an aristocratic century 
he would have written a very different book (518), and he also claims that there is no 
such thing as a general idea, strictly speaking: “because there are no beings in nature 
exactly alike,” there are also “no identical facts” and “no rules indiscriminately 
applicable in the same manner to several objects at once” (411, emphasis added).  This 
latter statement, which goes together with his declaration in the introduction that “there is 
almost never any absolute good in the laws” (13), suggests that Tocqueville’s guiding 
intentions are pragmatic—as someone who seeks to see not differently, but further than 
the parties, he seeks to promote not what is democratic or aristocratic per se, but instead 
to pursue the good that can be found when a balance is established between them.  Since 
he is writing in a time when democracy threatens to eradicate human greatness, he seeks 
to encourage religious belief because of its capacity to restrain the commercialism which 
constitutes the chief element of that threat.  Thus, although American religion applauds 
the progress of industry and speaks frequently of the cares of this world, Tocqueville 
cautions that it has not (yet) become a mere theological rubber stamp for democracy’s 
natural materialistic tendencies.  Rather, he observes that the American clergy abandons 
“a part” of the human heart “to present cares;” it presents the concerns of this life “as 
important although secondary objects,” and it endeavors to find the spot where well-
being and salvation “touch and are bound to each other” (423, emphasis added).  By 
conceding so much to materialism, religion in democracy has the potential to preserve at 
least a tiny kernel of spiritualism: “The human heart is vaster than one supposes; it can at 
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once contain a taste for the goods of the earth and a love of those of Heaven; sometimes it 
seems to give itself over frantically to one of the two; but it is never long before it thinks 
of the other” (520).    
Because in democracy “it is always the majority that makes one believe” (423), 
the religious restraints on public opinion which Tocqueville seeks to establish will need 
to be rooted in public opinion.  They will result from the complicated and perhaps 
uncertain efforts of his political science to control the sovereign power of democracy by 
making concessions to it and, in effect, becoming a part of it.  Here, as in Volume I, 
Tocqueville pins his hopes on finding a means to convince the majority to exercise its 
omnipotent power in a beneficent and self-restricting way.  Throughout Democracy in 
America, he seeks to persuade democrats of the need for such limitations by speaking to 
them of the need for an enlightened selfishness—a kind of selfishness which, 
paradoxically, calls not for the straightforward and rational pursuit of one’s own well-
being, but instead for a set of small but allegedly necessary sacrifices whose ultimate 
payoff is to be found only in an uncertain future.  Indeed, many if not all of the practical 
recommendations for democracy’s improvement which he makes throughout the work 
rest on the inculcation of this kind of thinking,195 and although his analysis of its 
applications to specific problems are scattered among both volumes, his most explicit 
theoretical treatment of the idea that underlies each of them is found in his discussion of 
the “doctrine of self-interest well understood” (501). 
 
                                                
195 For an account of these practical and institutional recommendations, see Zetterbaum 1967, 93-97.   
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SELF-INTEREST WELL UNDERSTOOD  
 In the introduction to Democracy in America Tocqueville had spoken of a 
“science” of self-interest, and he had juxtaposed that science—which he bemoaned as 
lacking among the Europeans of his time—to the lack of enlightenment which 
characterized the religious beliefs typical of aristocratic ages (10).  In Volume II, by 
contrast, he strikes a different tone.  In his thematic discussion of interest well 
understood, he always refers to this idea as a “doctrine,” never as a science, and he 
praises the aid which religion can give to it.  He underscores that when he speaks of 
religion he is referring to a set of purely “dogmatic beliefs,” and he emphasizes not only 
that all human beings require such dogmas, but that, precisely because of the answers 
which they provide to the most important human questions—answers which make clear 
the “duties” which men have to God and to one another—religious beliefs should be 
considered “the most desirable” dogmas in all centuries (417).  But Tocqueville also 
stresses in his discussion of the Americans’ philosophic method how resistant they are to 
accepting dogmatic beliefs—or to admitting to themselves that they accept them—and he 
accordingly praises American preachers, as we have just seen, for advertising the spot 
where the demands of religion and those of rational or this-worldly selfishness happen to 
coincide (423).  His recommendations therefore seem to be marked by a certain 
ambiguity: sometimes he appears to speak as a defender of reason and enlightened self-
interest, at other times he comes across as a proponent of dogma and sacrifice.  Indeed, if 
this ambiguity permeates Tocqueville’s work as a whole, it is especially present in his 
explicit treatment of the doctrine of interest well-understood—and this appears to be 
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especially important because this discussion is not limited to an analysis of moral 
thinking in democracies, but it instead considers the latter in light of the tensions that 
pervade our moral psychology as a whole.  Tocqueville draws attention to these tensions 
first and foremost by dividing his analysis of self interest well-understood into two 
chapters, the first of which contains no mention of religion at all and the second of which 
is exclusively devoted to a discussion of it (500, 504).  The structure of his analysis thus 
reflects what he suggests is the natural relationship between morality and religion, a 
relationship that both reflects the depth of the hopes which human beings place in 
morality and also signals the ultimate tendency of those hopes to be disappointed.  For, as 
Tocqueville will make clear in this section, while human beings tend to regard morality 
first and foremost as something that can subsist on its own, their conception of it as 
something resplendent and lofty also entails the idea that it is beneficial, and they 
therefore look to religion to provide a secondary but nonetheless absolutely essential 
sanction for it.   
 Tocqueville begins the first of these chapters with the following declaration: 
“When the world was led by a few powerful and wealthy individuals, these liked to form 
for themselves a sublime idea of the duties of man; they were pleased to profess that it is 
glorious to forget oneself and that it is fitting to do good without self-interest like God 
himself.  This was the official doctrine of the time in the matter of morality” (500).  In 
aristocratic ages, according to Tocqueville, those who were most serious about morality 
believed that their actions were undertaken without any consideration for their own 
benefit.  They believed that this disinterestedness made their souls beautiful and sublime 
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and deserving of glory, and they found that conception of nobility reflected in a selfless 
God whose omnipotence was equal to His justice.  But, as we mentioned previously in 
our discussion of Tocqueville’s introduction, this grand and noble conception of morality 
is also highly problematic.  Insofar as this notion of divine selflessness is at the root of a 
conception of human excellence—of a glorious and sublime existence which renders one 
better in soul and which it “pleases” one to possess—it is not clear how virtue thus 
understood can plausibly claim to be disinterested and thus also worthy of this excellence 
or glory or sublimity of soul.  Indeed, that this idea was the “official doctrine” of the 
times leads one to suspect that hypocrisy under aristocracy ought to have been fairly 
common, and Tocqueville claims to doubt “that men were more virtuous in aristocratic 
centuries than in others” (500-1).  What distinguished those centuries was that “the 
beauties of virtue were constantly spoken of,” but while this was going on men also 
studied the utility of virtue “in secret” (501).  Men were not more virtuous in aristocratic 
times than they are now, in other words, because they can never be completely 
disinterested.  Human beings will always look for sacrifice to yield some recompense, the 
only question is where that recompense will be found. 
  Whereas aristocratic peoples found their reward for virtue in an idea of sublime 
and divine glory which was considered part and parcel with virtue itself—and which 
therefore greatly obscured the innate hope for this reward—in democratic ages “the 
imagination takes a less lofty flight.”   
[As] each man concentrates on himself, moralists become frightened at this idea 
of sacrifice and they no longer dare to offer it to the human mind; therefore they 
are reduced to inquiring whether the individual advantage of citizens would not be 
to work for the happiness of all, and when they have discovered one of the points 
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where particular interest happens to meet the general interest and to be 
confounded with it, they hasten to bring it to light; little by little such observations 
are multiplied.  What was only an isolated remark becomes a general doctrine, 
and one finally believes one perceives that man, in serving those like him, serves 
himself, and that his particular interest is to do good (501). 
 
Now, that Tocqueville, who has already claimed that there are no permanently valid 
general ideas, continually refers to self-interest well understood as a “doctrine” suggests, 
as this passage seems to imply, that as a principle it is not true.  At the end of this chapter, 
he admits with classic understatement that he does not “believe that the doctrine of self-
interest such as it is preached in America is evident in all its parts,” but he nevertheless 
calls upon “the moralists of our day” to do their utmost to promote it, even “should they 
judge it imperfect” (503).  Thus, in accordance with his own advice, he refers to this 
doctrine as a teaching of “enlightened” selfishness (or egoism [égoïsme]) even though, 
strictly speaking, it is not.  For, to repeat, although there are a “great number” of times 
when their reasoning makes sense (503), the Americans who claim to sacrifice to the 
common good because they are confident of receiving a long-term payoff also frequently 
judge wrongly.  If they were truly clear-sighted about their individual interests, they 
would pursue these exclusively, and if they did not disregard the common good entirely, 
they would at least rationalize that the latter is somehow served through the unbridled 
exercise of private selfishness. 
 But this is not what self-interest well understood calls upon men to do.  Unlike 
truly enlightened egoism, which “withers the seed of all the virtues” (483), self-interest 
well understood uses the vague promise of long-term benefit to persuade man “that one 
must sacrifice oneself” for the common good in the short run (501).  In fact, as the title of 
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this chapter suggests, Tocqueville finds this doctrine useful for its capacity to serve as a 
counterweight to individualism, which, in his analysis, threatens eventually to turn into 
pure egoism and therewith to a forgetting of the very idea virtue, private as well as public 
(483).  Self-interest well understood should therefore not be confused with “Mandeville’s 
maxim that private vices lead to public benefits;”196 it teaches men not “that the useful is 
never dishonest” but instead that “honesty can be useful” (503).  Although the doctrine of 
interest shares common ground with economists who claim that the sacrifice of 
immediate short term pleasures is rational because it is likely to lead to long-term 
benefits, it opposes those proponents of the free market who claim that each’s pursuit of 
his own well-being ensures that of the collective—it is unequivocally hostile to the idea 
that greed is good.  Tocqueville writes that this latter idea is the “only” teaching that he 
finds “every day” in the mouths of his European contemporaries, and he says that there is 
no telling “what stupid excess their selfishness” will eventually be brought to and what 
“shameful miseries” will eventually result from this (503).  Tocqueville therefore 
recommends the doctrine of self-interest well understood as a remedy for this condition, 
and he observes how its widespread presence in America has, quite paradoxically, 
permitted those who espouse it to act on “the disinterested and unreflective sparks that 
are natural to man” (502).197 
                                                
196 Zetterbaum 1967, 103.  For Spinoza’s influence on Mandeville, see Israel 2000, 111. 
197 A number of Tocqueville scholars tend to take the doctrine of self-interest well understood as a teaching 
about interest in the narrow sense.  Winthrop, for example, equates it with the idea that “whatever is useful 
must be good” (rather than the reverse), and argues that it has the potential to exacerbate (rather than 
restrain) individualism and thus lead to despotism (1993, 214).  Her analysis presents Tocqueville’s 
discussion of this doctrine more as a description of democratic moral thinking than as a lesson about how to 
change it.  In a similar fashion, Koritansky is wholly silent on Tocqueville’s strong recommendation that 
this doctrine be taught to democratic publics (see 1986, 117).  Anastaplo (1991) and Zetterbaum (1967, 
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 Tocqueville says that the doctrine of interest well understood has been created and 
propagated by an anonymous set of American “moralists” who “have perceived that in 
their country and their time” man has “been led back toward himself by an irresistible 
force.”  Because they have lost “hope of stopping him,” they no longer dream “of doing 
more than guiding him,” and so they now concede the legitimacy of the pursuit of 
interest, “but they do their best to prove that the interest of each is to be honest” (501).  
These moralists, in other words, remain moralists in the strict sense of the term.  Far from 
mere apologists for democracy’s natural instincts, as Tocqueville presents them they 
appear to be quasi-independent observers who, like Tocqueville himself, are concerned 
with instilling the idea of virtue in men—at least as far as circumstances will permit.  
They have become “frightened” at the idea of sacrifice largely because their “less lofty” 
audience no longer accepts the “sublime” idea of self-overcoming that was present under 
aristocracy (500-1).  Having recognized that democrats can be counted on to take their 
bearings by reason and self-interest rather than by admiration for a God who does good 
for its own sake, they have recognized the need to alter their message accordingly.  In so 
doing, according to Tocqueville, they have been tremendously successful, for “they have 
convinced their fellow citizens” (501) that it is always beneficial to oneself in the long-
term to make temporary sacrifices for the common good. 
 By emphasizing the utilitarian and advantageous side of virtue rather than its 
resplendent, sublime, and sacrificial dimension, Tocqueville’s anonymous American 
                                                                                                                                            
102ff.), on the other hand, both acknowledge this, but they interpret his advice as a wholehearted 
endorsement of the rationalistic and self-interested thinking which the Enlightenment sought to instill.  For 
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moralists have found a way of turning “personal interest against itself” (502).  In other 
words, by creating a “doctrine” that appeals to the rationalistic and materialistic instincts 
of democrats, they have effectually duped their audience into acting on the unreflective 
instinct for self-sacrifice that is “natural to man” and that formed a part—but only a 
part—of aristocratic morality.  As Tocqueville presents it, self-interest well understood 
therefore functions as a kind of noble lie which presides over the moral thinking of the 
American polity, and this can be seen in the way that the Americans create the most 
elaborate and far-fetched accounts of how their acts of self-forgetting are really 
ultimately self-interested.  They “complacently” explain how their enlightened love of 
themselves leads them “to sacrifice a part of their time and their wealth” to the common 
good, but in this “they do not do themselves justice”: “they would rather do honor to their 
philosophy than to themselves” (502).   
 But while interest well understood therefore appears to be a myth whose power 
arises from the concessions which it makes to American rationalism, in order to be 
believable its mythical character must necessarily be obscured, which means that the 
connection between sacrifice and reward which it advertises must also be plainly 
discernable, at least in the vast majority of cases.  This is why Tocqueville claims that the 
tenets of self-interest well understood are often true (503), for where citizens are called 
upon only to sacrifice “a part” of their time and their wealth for the sake of the whole, 
selflessness will be less demanding and the resulting payoff will be clearer.  This doctrine 
therefore cannot recover the truly grand acts of self-overcoming that aristocracies 
                                                                                                                                            
a more Christian interpretation of this doctrine (which also differs somewhat from the one offered here), 
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occasionally put on display, but it can inculcate a set of un-extraordinary but solid and 
dignified middle-class virtues.  It “does not produce great devotions; but it suggests little 
sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude of 
citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted,” and “masters of themselves” 
(502).  And yet, Tocqueville never denies that these small sacrifices are sacrifices.  The 
constituent elements in democratic moral psychology are therefore the same as in 
aristocratic thinking, but their priority has been reversed.  In aristocracy the sacrificial 
element of virtue was advertised by all while the hope that it would bring a benefit was 
unrecognized by most and studied only by a few.  In America, by contrast, the idea that 
virtue entails a payoff is touted by all, and while its sacrificial element remains present, it 
appears to be entirely unrecognized (except perhaps for readers of Tocqueville).  Among 
the Americans, the distinctly human confusion which is part and parcel with the notion of 
virtue is preserved, and this is why Tocqueville claims that, while self-interest well 
understood “perhaps prevents some men from mounting far above the ordinary level of 
humanity,” it does an admirable job of keeping many others there who would otherwise 
fall below it (502).  Because it prevents men from becoming simple rational calculators 
of their own benefit, it maintains in their souls a certain version of those tension-ridden 
sentiments that only human beings possess, and it accordingly prevents them from 
brutalizing themselves. 
 One of the most common criticisms of Tocqueville by contemporary scholars 
concerns his apparent support for “religious functionalism.”  By encouraging future 
                                                                                                                                            
see Mitchell 1995, 189-90. 
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democratic citizens to look favorably upon religion for its social benefits, this view 
alleges, Tocqueville inadvertently undermines the only truly solid basis that religious 
beliefs can have: the conviction in the minds of the people as to their truth.198  But while 
Tocqueville acknowledges that the Americans consider religion from the perspective of 
utility, and while he therefore invites the reader to surmise that they also share his “purely 
human point of view,” he does not say the same about the doctrine of self-interest well 
understood.  Of this doctrine, he indicates, the Americans are all true believers (501).  By 
catering to the Americans’ belief in their own rationality, in their intellectual 
independence and clear-sighted pursuit of their own advantage, this pseudo-rational myth 
has re-instilled in them a necessary mental fog that has permitted them to engage in small 
but nonetheless substantial acts of self-sacrifice.  And yet, because this is a fog, and 
because the idea of virtue to which it leads requires a belief in both sacrifice and reward, 
its presence will necessarily entail the continued existence of the kind of religious hope 
which Tocqueville says is “natural to the human heart” (284).  After all, “there are a great 
number of sacrifices that can find their recompense only in the other world,” and so it is 
both necessary and desirable for religious beliefs to complement the doctrine of interest 
well understood (504).  In the case of the Americans, as Tocqueville makes clear, these 
religious convictions may be a pale shadow of what they were under aristocracy, and the 
otherworldly hopes which they entail may be only dimly recognized by those who hold 
them, but Tocqueville indicates that self-interest well understood can help them to 
survive, if only in a weakened or inchoate form. 
                                                
198 See, for example, Lively 1962, 196-9; Manent 1996, 90ff.; Zetterbaum 1967, 119-22. 
 410 
 According to Tocqueville, the “founders of almost all religions” have taught 
something which is really not qualifiedly different from the lessons of those 
“philosophers” who have espoused the doctrine of self-interest well understood.  While 
the latter have sought to convince men that “one must constantly triumph over oneself to 
serve oneself better,” the former have done the same—they “have only moved the goal 
back” by placing it in the next life (504).  Insofar as self-interest well understood teaches 
men that virtue will ultimately be beneficial for the virtuous person, it reflects the natural 
human hope for recompense, and the inability to rest satisfied with a complete self-
abnegation, that is present in all moral thinking, be it religious or secular, democratic or 
aristocratic.  But although the founders of almost all religions have made their doctrines 
popular by making virtue the “best bargain,” in Locke’s phrase, Tocqueville also suggests 
that they tapped into something which transcends this kind of self-interested thinking: “I 
refuse to believe that all those who practice virtue out of a spirit of religion act only in 
view of recompense” (504, emphasis added).  Although recompense might be a part of 
what drives human beings towards religious beliefs, these beliefs can never be that 
mercenary.  As Tocqueville states, those “zealous Christians” who proclaim that they 
only do good to be rewarded in heaven in fact “deceive themselves.  I respect them too 
much to believe them.”   
It is true that Christianity tells us that one must prefer others to oneself to gain 
Heaven; but Christianity tells us as well that one ought to do good to those like 
oneself out of love of God.  That is a magnificent expression; man penetrates 
Divine thought by his intelligence; he sees that the goal of God is order; he freely 
associates himself with that great design; and all the while sacrificing his 
particular interests to the admirable order of all things, he expects no other 
recompense than the pleasure of contemplating it (504-5). 
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As Tocqueville describes it, interest is not “the sole motive of religious men” (505).  He 
never, however, denies that it is an important motive.  In his psychology, humans are 
drawn to religion both by a sublime and poetic feeling of forgetting oneself and being one 
with God, and by a desire to affirm themselves and to live forever.  Neither of these by 
itself would be humanly acceptable.  The thought of someone who goes to heaven only 
because he desires a reward is as unpalatable as the thought of someone who does good 
all his life but is punished nonetheless.  Interest is therefore not the sole motive for 
religious belief, but it is “the principal means religions themselves make use of to guide 
men, and I do not doubt that it is only from this side that they take hold of the crowd and 
become popular” (505).   
 It is in the light of this statement—which applies to aristocratic as well as 
democratic religion—that one should consider Tocqueville’s declaration that this method 
is particularly prominent in the United States.  Just as religion made use of the promise of 
reward to gain the crowd in former centuries, moralists today must make use of a similar 
logic to establish their influence at a time when the people rule.  Thus, Tocqueville 
presents the Americans as cold calculators who turn to religious beliefs because they 
have internalized a very watered down version of ‘Pascal’s wager,’ and he says that “it 
seems to be reason much more than the heart that leads them to the foot of the altar” 
(505).  Moreover, “Not only do Americans follow their religion out of interest, but they 
often place in this world the interest that one can have in following it” (505).  The stress 
on reason and self-interest that characterizes American religion naturally inclines the 
faithful to look only for those certain and tangible rewards which their “philosophic 
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method” instructs them to take seriously.  Thus, “only with great trouble” can American 
preachers make the faithful look to heaven rather than earth, and to “touch their listeners 
better” they constantly stress the temporal and utilitarian benefits which belief provides 
(505).  But that these preachers can direct attention to the other world “only with great 
trouble” suggests that they still can do this, albeit on extremely rare occasions. By saying 
that they speak almost exclusively of this world to “touch their listeners better,” 
Tocqueville thus suggests that these preachers have followed his own advice: by 
conceding a great deal to democratic materialism, they have preserved at least the bare 
possibility of spiritualism.  When listening to them, it is “difficult to know . . . if the 
principle object of religion is to procure felicity in the other world or well-being in this 
one” (506, emphasis added).  It is not completely certain that religion in America serves 
only the latter, and this ambiguity is crucial for the preservation of some residual spiritual 
longings.  A vague and perhaps unrecognized hope for another world may yet remain in 
the background.  Religion has not become simply a sanction for democracy’s natural 
instincts. 
 According to Tocqueville, then, both aristocratic and democratic religions ground 
their appeals on arguments from self-interest, but the main difference between them is the 
tendency of the latter to conceive of this interest in a more prosaic light.  Unlike the 
feudal aristocrat, who had undertaken monumental sacrifices out of a tremendously 
grandiose vision of self-affirmation—or even the medieval peasant, who had endured a 
miserable life in the expectation that there would be a better one to come—the American 
democrat as Tocqueville describes him combines a multitude of small sacrifices with a 
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hope for petty, largely material gains.  His acts of self-overcoming are less costly and less 
impressive than those of his aristocratic forbearers, and his vision of the reward that can 
be attained thereby is consequently also less grand.  The morality which he puts on 
display is thereby less impressive and less admirable, but it still arises from the same 
confused sentiment that renders such action uniquely human and which therefore makes 
ambitions which strive for immaterial things possible.  Indeed, because it remains the 
case that not every sacrifice yields an obvious recompense, the religion of the Americans 
can only remain mostly, but never entirely, this-worldly.  Their hope that piety will bring 
a temporal reward may yet reflect a dim hope for something beyond this life, and even if 
it is seldom glimpsed, that hope should also preserve a modicum of the idea that virtue or 
devotion has an inherent dignity of its own.  To be clear, Tocqueville does not suggest 
that anything close to aristocratic greatness will be possible in the democratic future.  In 
fact, it appears that his most important aspiration is to preserve the bare minimum of what 
is truly distinctive of humanity.  But his extremely sober suggestion would seem to be 
that a certain lowering of horizons and dimming of passion is simply inevitable—the only 
question is to what extent this can be mitigated.  His foremost task is not to recover what 
is permanently lost but instead to preserve those aspects of human greatness which 
democracy is not forced to destroy.   
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PHILOSOPHY AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 
 Tocqueville’s comments about the contemplative pleasure that accompanies the 
disinterested side of human religious longings (505) recalls his characterization of the 
Puritans’ devotion as an attempt to fulfill a “purely intellectual need” (32).  Although the 
Puritans themselves might have resisted this interpretation of their divine mission, 
Tocqueville associates the desire for self-forgetting which they exhibited with the 
penetration of “Divine thought” by human intelligence (504), and he thus suggests that 
there is a certain kinship between the cultivation of man’s religious longings and the 
fulfillment of his intellectual potential.  Indeed, the sole example he provides of what he 
apparently regards as the peak of the theoretical life—and the figure who arguably 
receives the greatest praise from Tocqueville in the entire book—is not a self-absorbed 
rationalist like Spinoza but Pascal.  Pascal, according to Tocqueville, lived under an 
aristocracy that could “facilitate the natural spark of the mind toward the highest regions 
of thought.”  He therefore exhibited “a sublime and almost divine love of truth” (436) 
which is reminiscent of the “sublime idea of the duties of man” that characterized the 
official moral thinking of aristocratic times (500).  His love of truth appears to be the 
most intense instantiation of the erotic devotion that characterized the political and 
martial virtues of the feudal aristocrats, and as Tocqueville presents him, he appears to 
pursue an immaterial good that is purer, loftier, and less susceptible to the charge of 
hypocrisy than the glory which they typically sought to attain.    
According to Tocqueville, Pascal’s life was characterized by a “pure desire to 
know” that was unmixed with any concern for glory, for material well-being or the goods 
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of the body, or even for the preservation of life itself.  His was “an ardent and 
inexhaustible love of truth that nourishes itself and enjoys itself incessantly without being 
able to satisfy itself” (435).  This “ardent, haughty [or proud], and disinterested passion” 
for “abstract sources of truth” and “mother ideas” (435) is all-consuming, and 
Tocqueville claims that it is ultimately “sterile” (438)—perhaps because, like all erotic 
longings, it grows while it is being satisfied and therefore can never lead to the attainment 
of the ultimate felicity which it promises.  Pascal’s overwhelming passion “to discover 
the most hidden secrets of the Creator” (435) therefore led him literally to destroy 
himself.  It caused him “to tear his soul in a way from the midst of the cares of life” and 
to break “the bonds that hold it to the body, so as to die of old age before forty” (436).199  
Interjecting himself into his description of this extraordinary man, Tocqueville writes that 
upon considering such a phenomenon “I halt in bewilderment and understand that it is no 
ordinary cause that can produce such extraordinary efforts” (436). 
With this succinct statement, Tocqueville briefly and enigmatically conveys a 
sense of the experience of understanding which he underwent upon contemplating 
Pascal’s extraordinary example.  He draws attention to the bewilderment or the wonder 
that he experienced upon witnessing, so to speak, the clearest and most representative 
manifestation of the human possibility that is the pious life.  In so doing, however, 
Tocqueville also subtly reminds the reader that he is not Pascal, for to contemplate the 
                                                
199 Lawler helpfully notes that Tocqueville’s account of Pascal’s self-destruction implies a quiet critique of 
the latter’s zealous—not to say fanatical—quest for truth.  While Lawler is correct to point out that 
Tocqueville never suggests that “Pascal’s ‘quest’ was successful,” as we will shortly make clear he almost 
certainly goes too far when he intimates that Pascal self-destructed because the quest for truth, in 
Tocqueville’s estimation, is ultimately “futile” (1993, 79). 
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phenomenon of piety in its purest form and to reflect that it can be the product of “no 
ordinary cause” is not necessarily to be pious oneself.200  Indeed, Pascal as Tocqueville 
describes him never reflects on the roots of his own “extraordinary efforts,” and while 
Tocqueville claims that “no ordinary cause” can produce them, he never says that such a 
cause cannot be identified.  Indeed, the account of erotic longing which he provides 
throughout Democracy in America would seem to provide the explanation of just such a 
cause, and Tocqueville may very well be suggesting in this passage that he came to an 
understanding of the nature of eros by studying the religiosity of people like Pascal. 
In a brief but pregnant passage in Volume I, Tocqueville appears to announce his 
fundamental disagreement with this “great man.” 
A great man has said that ignorance is at both ends of science.  Perhaps it 
would have been truer to say that profound convictions are found only at both 
ends and that in the middle is doubt.  One can in fact consider human intelligence 
in three distinct and often successive states. 
Man believes firmly because he adopts without going deeply.  He doubts 
when objections are presented.  Often he comes to resolve all his doubts, and then 
he begins to believe again.  This time he no longer seizes the truth haphazardly 
and in the shadows, but he sees it face to face and advances directly into its light 
(179, emphasis original).  
 
As the context of this reference to the Pensées makes clear, when Pascal claims that 
ignorance is at both ends of science, he means that human reason at its peak can only 
come to recognize its own incapacity.  After overcoming “the pure natural ignorance in 
                                                
200 As Manent writes, “To recognize the genius (in the full sense of the term) of Pascal surely does not 
require us to agree that he is right.  It is to feel the necessity of seriously entertaining the possibility of 
one’s own conversion, and thus, eventually, seriously to spell out reasons why, once thoroughly thought 
through, one does not convert” (1996, 77).  Lawler, on the other hand, does not consider Tocqueville to be 
a believer, but he does not consider his lack of faith to be based on this kind of dialectical ascent.  Rather, 
he writes that Tocqueville was simply “not fortunate enough” to have had religious faith.  As a result, he 
exhibited the miserable “mixture of pride and anxiety which is the human . . . condition” (1993, 92) as it 
presents itself according to nature or in the absence of revelation. 
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which all men find themselves at birth,” most ordinary men arrive at “vain knowledge” 
and pretended wisdom.  The “great intellects,” on the other hand, “find they know 
nothing.”  Having “run through all that men can know,” they come at last to “a learned 
ignorance which is conscious of itself” (Pascal 1941, 110-11).201  Although this 
characterization of the weakness of human wisdom might appear similar to a description 
of a Socratic “knowledge of ignorance,” the two could not be more distant—in fact, they 
are as distinct as ignorance and knowledge themselves.  An “ignorance which is 
conscious of itself” entails a recognition of the ultimate incapacity of the human mind, it 
is first and foremost a claim about what we cannot know.  “Knowledge of ignorance,” by 
contrast, can be attained only if the mind is capable of engaging in real introspection, and 
the doubts which it encounters as a result of these efforts pave the way, as Tocqueville 
indicates, for the achievement of a limited but nonetheless substantial certainty.   
 Whereas Pascal insists that the human mind at its peak can do no more than 
recognize that it will always be trapped in darkness, Tocqueville, perhaps borrowing that 
most famous of all Platonic metaphors, insists that a few human beings will be able to 
escape from the shadows of truth and advance “directly into its light” (179).  While the 
vast majority require dogmatic beliefs to give them a sense of their moral duties, and to 
provide a kind of anchor for their intellects, the limitations on human knowledge which 
this thought implies are practical rather than theoretical.  Because of the limitations of 
leisure and ability that will always be encountered in most men, it is “difficult for each 
person, left to himself, to come to fix his ideas solely by the effort of his reason,” but that 
                                                
201 This reference is to fragment #327 in the Brunschvig ordering, which this edition follows. 
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is not to say that such a thing is impossible for a few.  Indeed, “minds very free of the 
ordinary preoccupations of life, very penetrating, very agile, very practiced, can, with the 
aid of much time and care, break through to these so necessary truths” (417).202   
 Now, to be sure, Tocqueville also insists that even the wisest of human beings 
must necessarily take the vast majority of their opinions on the basis of trust. 
This is not only necessary; but desirable.  A man who would undertake to 
examine everything by himself could accord but little time and attention to each 
thing; this work would keep his mind in a perpetual agitation that would prevent 
him from penetrating any truth deeply and from settling solidly on any certitude.  
His intellect would be at the same time independent and feeble.  It is therefore 
necessary that he make a choice among the various objects of human opinions and 
that he adopt many beliefs without discussing them in order better to fathom a 
few he has reserved for examination (408, emphasis added). 
 
As Tocqueville thus suggests, the acceptance of opinions on the basis of trust—and 
perhaps also the consciousness that these opinions are mere opinions—is the necessary 
first step in a process that can ultimately lead to genuine knowledge.  This knowledge, as 
Tocqueville asserts both here and in his implicit critique of Pascal’s position, will be 
gained not through an observation of non-human nature but instead through an 
introspective examination of a few human opinions—an examination that will likely 
judge the latter in the light of other, unexamined beliefs, and which will therefore reveal 
whether the two can be coherently held at the same time.  He appears to suggest that this 
process reveals the natural limitations of the human mind, but also that it indicates the 
solid character of what we can know after all.  Referring to those few who can “break 
                                                
202 Lawler thus appears to err when he claims that Tocqueville “shared Nietzsche’s view that ‘Socrates and 
his school’ were in part cleverly deceptive and in part self-deceptive” (1993, 96).  Tocqueville clearly does 
not regard Pascal “as the most perfect of men,” as Bloom suggests (1987, 251), but his critique of him is 
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through” to those “so necessary truths” about God, the soul, and human duties, 
Tocqueville writes: 
Still we see that these philosophers themselves are almost always surrounded by 
uncertainties; that at each step the natural light that enlightens them is obscured 
and threatens to be extinguished, and that despite all their efforts, they still have 
been able to discover only a few contradictory notions, in the midst of which the 
human mind has constantly floated for thousands of years without being able to 
seize the truth firmly or even to find new errors (417).  
 
 It is precisely their awareness of these contradictions, Tocqueville suggests, which 
distinguishes philosophers from non-philosophers.  Their knowledge of the world is 
limited to the realm of the human, but the wisdom which they can gain after resigning 
themselves to that limitation is nonetheless substantial.  By recognizing the character of 
the “few contradictory notions” which have always and will always characterize the 
human mind, the philosopher as Tocqueville understands him can undergo a dialectical 
ascent from common opinion to something superior—he can come, in Tocqueville’s 
famous phrase, to see “not differently, but further than the parties” (15).  This is an ascent 
which Tocqueville seems to have undergone upon contemplating the kind of life that 
Pascal represents, and it is one which he points the reader to when he provides such a 
vivid description of the tension-ridden but also beautiful character of the longing for 
immortality (283-4), as well as when he articulates the “sublime” but deeply confused 
passion for glory which characterized aristocratic morality and aristocratic piety (500, 
504-5).  This may be why Tocqueville confidently claims that religion is rooted in 
“human nature,” and why he insists that his “purely human point of view” (284) is 
                                                                                                                                            
surely not that he led “too theoretical a life” (Lawler 1993, 93).  On the contrary, Tocqueville indicates that 
Pascal was not introspective or theoretical enough.   
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sufficient to establish that religion is “natural to man” (278)—which may be meant to 
imply that it is not divine.  At the very least, he asserts that this process of ascent from 
common opinion can lead to an authentic spiritual liberation.  The limitation of inquiry to 
the examination of a few human opinions, he writes, “is a salutary servitude” that permits 
man “to make good use of his freedom” (408).203 
 Once this is recognized, it becomes apparent that the kinship between the 
theoretical life and the religious life can be envisioned from a political standpoint as well.  
Because Tocqueville could only come to attain the kind of understanding he possessed by 
thinking through the contradictions which are inherent in Pascal’s outlook, it follows that 
his very existence as a philosopher is, in a way, dependent on that of men like Pascal.  
His attempts to keep religion alive in modern times, and to resist the easing of tensions 
that democracy threatens to bring about, can therefore be read in the light of his professed 
concern for “the destiny of those like me” (672).  Where souls are flat and unconfused 
variety will cease to exist, and the great alternatives that have always characterized 
human life will disappear.  Human beings will no longer be able to choose between a life 
of piety, of honor, or of wisdom, to name a few, and where that choice is absent the great 
task of judging among these alternatives which has characterized political philosophy 
                                                
203 While these brief comments may not be enough on their own to establish Tocqueville’s status as a 
thinker of the first rank, they should at least give us pause before jumping to the conclusion that he is not.  
Catherine Zuckert, for example, seems to speak too hastily when she says that Tocqueville’s political 
science “does not provide an adequate account of its own philosophic foundation” (1991, 131).  Her 
contention that Tocqueville never provides “an example of the ability of the mind to rise above its historical 
circumstances” (ibid., 151) is contradicted not only by his discussion of Pascal (whose achievement was 
made possible by “no ordinary cause,” including social state), but also by the account that he gives of his 
own activity, which allows him to rise above the quarrel between the democratic and aristocratic “parties.”  
Moreover, the bulk of Volume II is devoted to a juxtaposition of these two great historical possibilities.  Cf. 
Manent 2006, 120. 
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since the time of Socrates will also cease to exist.  By keeping these alternatives alive in 
democratic society by encouraging religious belief, and by safeguarding the memory of 
the political alternative that is aristocracy through his writing, Tocqueville’s political 
science seeks to preserve and continue this great tradition.
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Conclusion:  Tocqueville’s Political Science Today 
“It is natural to believe that what most satisfies the regard of this creator and preserver of 
men is not the singular prosperity of some, but the greatest well-being of all: what seems 
to me decadence is therefore progress in his eyes; what wounds me is agreeable to him.  
Equality is perhaps less elevated; but it is more just, and its justice makes for its greatness 
and its beauty.” 
-Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 674-75 
 
 It would perhaps be easy to come away from Tocqueville’s analysis with the 
impression that democracy, even at its best, is something that simply comes at too high a 
price for friends of human greatness such as himself to accept.  After all, the “mother 
thought” (14) that unites the disparate parts and diverse topics of his book would seem to 
consist not in a certain political lesson but rather in a problem: the insuperable tension 
that exists between justice—understood in the contemporary, egalitarian sense of the 
term—and human greatness.  But even though Tocqueville continually trumpets the 
justice of democracy throughout this work, because he also calls attention quite explicitly 
to its tendency to instill mediocrity and to stifle the potential of the most outstanding 
human beings, there is also a very real sense in which his analysis reveals it to be a force 
for injustice.  Thus, one prominent study of Democracy in America ends by declaring that 
despite his best efforts “Tocqueville cannot help but bring us to question the desirability 
of democracy itself” (Koritansky 1986, 148). 
 Now, to be sure, almost every page of Tocqueville’s writing is permeated by a 
deep sense of loss.  His portrayal of aristocracy conveys an elegiac description of a way 
of life that was marked by poetry, by beauty, and by grandeur.  This description is bound 
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to be moving to those who, unlike contemporary historians, would prefer to study only 
the higher classes of the old societies, and thereby to see in them only the wealth, the 
grace, and the learning of the aristocracy, rather than the poverty, the coarseness, and the 
ignorance of the people.  But even though Tocqueville in the work’s last chapter says that 
this too would be his choice (674), he has provided enough revelations of the depravity 
and the inhumanity of aristocracy to indicate that this is not and cannot be his final 
verdict on the matter (cf. e.g. 535-9).  Because Tocqueville writes as someone who 
endeavors to see “not differently, but further than the parties” (15), he is neither a 
democrat nor an aristocrat.  He sees through and beyond each of the two “great parties” 
(170) which divide all free societies—that is, all societies in which the final victory of 
either the people or the great has not eradicated all human vitality and all politics 
properly so-called.  Indeed, in Volume II Tocqueville presents an extended comparison of 
these two great historical alternatives.  By setting up what is in essence a dialogue 
between the ways of life and conceptions of justice characteristic of democracy and 
aristocracy, he preserves the memory of the latter in a time when it is both most 
necessary and most at risk of being forgotten.  In so doing, he allows his most careful 
readers to see the faults and the merits of each, and he allows future political scientists 
following his own example to arbitrate between them. 
 Knowingly or unknowingly, then, Tocqueville in this respect writes in a way that 
is reminiscent of the political science of Aristotle.  His analysis is permeated by a sober 
awareness of the limitations of politics and of the inevitable failures that will accompany 
all attempts to create a society that is free of injustice.  Tocqueville’s realism teaches that 
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an aristocracy which produces greatness at the price of inequality and injustice exposes 
that greatness to a real moral challenge, but it also teaches that a democracy which 
achieves justice at the expense of greatness thereby commits a very real and very unjust 
kind of tyranny.  Since no polity can be without faults, Tocqueville’s strategy is one of 
moderation and of balance.  He indicates that if he had lived in a former age, he would 
have called attention to the material and physical sentiments that democratic citizens 
today are much too enamored of, for by instilling a concern in the aristocratic class for 
physical security and material well-being, he would have tried to encourage it to treat the 
people with more humanity.  But in modernity the task is different.  Now it is not 
prosperity and security but human excellence that is threatened, and that is why much of 
Democracy in America is dedicated to persuading the “sovereigns in our time” to turn 
their attention not to making “great things” but instead to making “great men” (672).  By 
preserving residues of aristocracy within democracy, Tocqueville’s political science 
seeks to provide the tools to do this.  But of course, these tools will be useless if these 
sovereigns themselves—and with them, the elite, former aristocratic classes of society—
will not accept them.  It is therefore to convince those elites to come over to democracy’s 
side that Tocqueville presents his most emphatic arguments for its greatness.  
 Democracy in America is addressed in large part to an audience which is 
disillusioned with democracy, and this, perhaps more so than anything else, serves to 
make this work particularly appropriate for readers in our own time.  For the disillusioned 
readers whom Tocqueville addresses include not only partisans of aristocratic revival—of 
which our time has of course seen its share—but also ordinary democrats who are 
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plagued by self-despair and self-hatred.  Tocqueville’s work begins from the recognition, 
which permeates across the political spectrum today, that the high hopes of the 
Enlightenment have not been realized.   His analysis indicates that those hopes were 
bound to be disappointed because they rested on a flawed understanding of human 
psychology—an understanding that failed to do justice to humanity’s deepest longings.  
Believing that human beings are or can be made largely at home in this world, or that 
religion need root itself only in the more or less mercenary concern for benefit or 
personal utility, the theological reforms of Locke and Spinoza backfired in ways which 
these thinkers did not anticipate.  Because they failed to understand that pride is rooted in 
a desire for some kind of self-overcoming and service to others, and therefore also in a 
desire to be worthy or deserving of some excellence, they laid the basis for a society 
made up largely of isolated and calculating individuals—individuals who recognized 
their own ignobility in this respect, and who therefore despised themselves accordingly.  
Moreover, according to Tocqueville, the Enlightenment’s failure to appreciate this most 
fundamental desire of the human soul also necessarily left this desire uncontrolled and 
undirected, and it therefore risked allowing pride or the longing for immortality to 
resurface in wild, unmoderated, and pernicious forms.  The Tocquevillian dichotomy 
between “a natural disgust for existence and an immense desire to exist” (284) has 
manifested itself in his time and our own as the spread of lethargic despair, on the one 
hand, and the awakening of new and dangerous spiritual longings, on the other. 
 The failings of contemporary liberal theory which we detailed in chapters one and 
two provide a disturbing illustration that we continue to be faced with these same twin 
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problems.  The incapacity of contemporary theorists to find an adequate grounding for 
democracy’s deepest moral claims reflects a widespread lack of self-confidence in 
democracy’s ultimate meaning and spiritual purpose.  To be sure, Americans today 
continue to muddle through, and liberalism acts as a more than adequate modus vivendi.  
But as Tocqueville warns, the preservation of a healthy republican polity, and indeed, of 
liberalism in the authentic sense of the term, requires more than this.  A peaceful society 
cannot remain a free society if it is populated by “pusillanimous and soft citizens” (672).  
The preservation of freedom requires an energetic citizenry animated by a “watchful and 
combative fear” (673), a citizenry which is thereby willing to fight and to make great 
sacrifices to defend its way of life.  For this, liberal-democracy requires the attachment of 
citizens at a deep spiritual level, and Rawls’ anti-foundationalist liberalism, which 
apologizes for the grudgingly conceded need to defend that way of life, obviously cannot 
provide this.  In a similar way, as Tocqueville showed in Volume I, a Christian liberalism 
which makes religion into a mirror-image of democracy is most likely to facilitate, rather 
than to restrain, its most spiritually damaging tendencies.  But Kraynak’s aristocratic 
revival, on the other hand, would seem to present the opposite danger.  Tocqueville’s 
warning to the aristocrats and the reactionaries of his day was that liberal-democracy, 
despite its great spiritual drawbacks, is the only viable option for modern times other than 
despotism.  That attempts in the twentieth century to produce an aristocratic re-
awakening produced only unprecedented nightmares would seem to confirm the 
soundness of this advice, and it is a lesson which today’s less than friendly critics of 
liberalism would do well to heed.   
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 The two dangers which Tocqueville foresees for the democratic age can be said to 
be roughly equivalent to the prospects of soft despotism and hard despotism.  But 
because the materialistic and lethargic citizens of a soft despotism are only too likely to 
enable the rise of a neighboring hard despotism, these should probably be regarded as 
two aspects of the same overriding problem.  To combat it, Tocqueville’s political 
science seeks to cultivate a deep-seated loyalty to liberalism by paying attention to the 
nature of human pride and to the character of man’s spiritual longings.  For members of 
the self-despising democratic citizenry, this entails the careful cultivation of eros through 
the encouragement of religious belief, and the initiation of grand patriotic projects that 
can provide a healthy outlet for the desire for self-sacrifice.  Now, to be sure, such 
enterprises will certainly not produce a spiritual life or a devotion to the common good as 
rich or as resplendent as that which existed under aristocracy, but neither will they 
produce one which is as fanatical and as zealous as the one which characterized the times 
in which Locke and Spinoza lived.  If Tocqueville’s task is successful, his new political 
science will preserve the goods that democracy can offer, and it will do this by 
maintaining those healthy tensions in the human soul which his psychology places at the 
root of all human greatness. 
 Because it sees the need to take a constant, active hand in political life, 
Tocqueville’s political science rejects the Madisonian view that a healthy liberal polity 
can subsist on its own by counting on the natural action of ambition counteracting 
ambition.  Rather, Tocqueville insists that if democracy is left to its own devices it will 
cause ambition to disappear, and so to combat this danger it will need to enlist the help of 
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an elite which can aid and direct liberalism from behind the scenes.  To remain healthy 
and vibrant, liberalism will require the support of future Tocquevillians, of “philosophers 
and those who govern” (523)—which in Tocqueville’s broad usage would seem to refer 
to writers, intellectuals, religious leaders, politicians, and other elite shapers of public 
opinion.  To garner the loyalty of such (potentially aristocratic) elites, to cater to their 
sense of honor and their desire for nobility, and to provide a picture of the kind of 
spiritual defense of democracy which they might one day profess, Tocqueville in the final 
chapter of the work describes the beginnings of a civil religion.  
 Directing his attention to those who would overturn democracy out of a naïve and 
self-destructive attempt to make the world again into what it once was, Tocqueville offers 
some of the most forceful words in all of Democracy in America.  “I am convinced . . . 
that all those in the centuries we are now entering who try to base freedom on privilege 
and aristocracy will fail.  All those who want to attract authority to a single class and 
retain it there will fail.”  Rather, as he declares (in a statement which is almost certainly 
autobiographical), “All those of our contemporaries who want to create or secure the 
independence and dignity of those like themselves must . . . show themselves as friends 
of equality; and the only means worthy of them for showing themselves as such is to be 
such: the success of their holy enterprise depends on it” (666).  Tocqueville’s concern to 
improve democracy, as we have already seen, is founded on a care for the future of those 
like himself (672)—but by this he seems to refer not just to philosophers, but also to all 
those who are aristocrats by nature, who have noble souls and generous sentiments.  By 
converting such individuals to the cause of democracy, Tocqueville can also ennoble it by 
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placing their lofty and self-sacrificial desires in its service.  The rhetorical thrust of 
Democracy in America therefore aims to convince this audience that a new kind of 
greatness can be found by working for the cause of human equality and democratic 
freedom.  Thus, for example, he calls the establishment of a settlement in Africa for freed 
slaves “a beautiful and great idea [une belle et grand idée]” (345), and he salutes the 
nobility, and the lofty and immaterial purpose that animated the Puritan settlement of 
New England.  It is therefore fitting that he closes his work by doing what he earlier said 
he could not and would not do.  He strives to enter into the “point of view of God,” and, 
considering things from that exalted vantage point, to show how a regime that appears 
mediocre to him and to his aristocratic audience is actually just, and that its justice 
therefore “makes for its greatness and its beauty” (675; cf. 419). 
 By purporting to discover a potential source of human greatness in the cause of 
equality, Tocqueville seeks to attract to that cause the longings and the ambitions of those 
who might otherwise oppose it on account of its alleged spiritual emptiness.  In so doing, 
he does a great deal to combat that emptiness, for by giving the great a place within 
democracy, Tocqueville makes its characteristic equality less extreme, and he thereby 
preserves those immaterial longings which are part and parcel with hierarchy.  Now, as 
previously noted, those longings will never be as rich or as robust as they were under 
aristocracy, but they will be spiritual, and that means also that they will be human.  
Moreover, if this project is successful, the kind of liberal theology which he outlines here 
will filter down to ordinary citizens, and it will turn their love of equality in a more noble 
and self-transcending direction.  As specified in the final pages of Democracy in 
 430 
America, this theology is not specifically Christian: persecution is not a problem which it 
sees a need to combat, and it seeks to craft a spiritual faith which can help to preserve 
those goods which Tocqueville insists that democracy can offer.  Tocqueville thus 
appears to hope that his most attentive readers, the future political scientists whom he 
hopes to groom, will recognize that although the advantages of aristocracy can never be 
recovered, a democracy which has not yet reached its logical extreme can furnish some 
very real advantages, and thus also that it is both possible and necessary to direct society 
towards their procurement.  By articulating this kind of limited yet prudent political 
science, Tocqueville allows us to join him in seeing not differently, but further than the 
parties, and he thereby instills a moderation which is altogether necessary for the 
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